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This thesis is based on an econometric investigation of the relationship between industry 
linkages and Foreign Direct Investment in Nigeria. Unique data obtained from a survey of 
Nigerian firms conducted by the World Bank Enterprise Survey Department was employed 
for the estimations based on manufacturing and service firms. This study also constructed an 
input-output table to measure both horizontal and vertical linkages. This study is divided into 
four parts. 
Firstly, the study investigated spill-over effects from FDI to domestic firms through 
horizontal and vertical linkages using the augmented Cobb-Douglas models as well as the 
Ordinary Least Square and Fixed Effect techniques. The results of the estimation show 
evidence of the positive effects of foreign presence on domestic firms and the presence of 
large technology gaps. Also, the results indicate that there is a productivity spill-over in both 
horizontal and vertical linkages. Firms with technology level below its foreign competitors 
tend to benefit from the technology brought by FDI.  
Secondly, the study investigates Nigerian innovative outcomes of domestic firms’ 
performance by using the Crepon Duget Mairesse model coupled with augmented Cobb-
Douglas function. The result showed that firm-level innovation activity in Nigeria appears to 
be high and even larger than in similar countries around the region, but the extent of 
innovativeness is low and incremental. This suggests that in contrast with OECD countries, 
some of the innovations implemented are so minor, or are based on imitation, to the extent 
that they do not have a significant impact on productivity (survival innovation). 
Thirdly, the study theoretically and empirically investigates the impact of Export-platform 
FDI on backward linkages; by doing this, a three-country model is developed and tested. The 
results from the various hypotheses tested indicate that there is a significant relationship 
between FDI and backward linkages in Nigeria; and the role of the trade agreement, local 
content requirement and market size is very critical for spill-overs and productivity. 
Lastly, the study also looks at how FDI loosens the financial constraints of domestic firms 
through the use of the Euler framework, and the consideration of the industry linkages. The 
results show that private domestic firms do have financing constraints and the flow of inward 
FDI alleviates the financing constraints by signalling. This study provides new evidence on 














1.1 Background of the Study"..........................................................................................................."1"
1.2 Literature of Related Studies"...................................................................................................."2"
1.3 Research Questions"...................................................................................................................."5"
1.4 Objectives of the Thesis"............................................................................................................."6"
1.5 Contribution of thesis"................................................................................................................."7"
1.6 Structure of thesis"......................................................................................................................."9"
CHAPTER 2: Input-Output Table Construction, Industry Linkages and FDI in Nigeria".........."11"
2.1 Introduction".............................................................................................................................."11"
2.2 Overview Structure of the Nigerian Economy"......................................................................."14"
2.3 Inter-Industry Linkages and Economic Growth Nexus"........................................................"23"
2.3.1 Compilation of the Input-Output Table".........................................................................."25"
2.3.2 Presentation of Results"......................................................................................................"26"
2.3.3 Summary"............................................................................................................................"31"





2.4.5 Investment promotion Era"................................................................................................"38"
CHAPTER 3: Literature Review"......................................................................................................"57"
3.1 Theories of FDI"........................................................................................................................."57"
3.1.1 Neoclassical Trade theory"................................................................................................."57"
3.1.2 Industrial Organisation theory: Internalisation"............................................................."60"
3.1.3 Transaction costs theory"..................................................................................................."60"
3.1.4 The OLI paradigm"............................................................................................................"61"
3.1.5 Product cycle approach"....................................................................................................."63"
3.1.6 Entry mode theory"............................................................................................................."63"
3.2 Types of FDI"............................................................................................................................."63"





3.2.4 Strategic asset seeking FDI"..............................................................................................."65"
3.3 Determinants of FDI to Nigeria"..............................................................................................."65"
3.3.1 Market size"........................................................................................................................."66"
3.3.2 Openness to trade".............................................................................................................."69"
3.3.3 Environmental risk (external uncertainty)"....................................................................."72"
3.3.4 Natural resource endowments".........................................................................................."74"




3.4 FDI and Job Creation in Nigeria"............................................................................................"80"
3.5 Domestic Investment and SME in Nigeria"............................................................................."83"
3.5.1 Overview of Domestic Investment in Nigeria".................................................................."83"
3.5.2 Overview of SMEs in Nigeria"..........................................................................................."84"
3.6 FDI, SME and Industrial Policy in Nigeria"............................................................................"85"
3.6.1 FDI and Incentive Policies"................................................................................................"86"
3.6.2 SMEs Related Policies"......................................................................................................."90"
3.7 Conclusion"................................................................................................................................."91"
CHAPTER 4: Productivity Spill-overs, FDI and Industry Linkages"............................................"93"
4.1 Introduction".............................................................................................................................."93"
4.2 Intra- Sectoral (horizontal) spill-overs"..................................................................................."95"
4.3 Inter-Sectoral (vertical) spill-overs"........................................................................................."98"
4.4 Methodology and Data"..........................................................................................................."106"
4.4.1 Model specification".........................................................................................................."106"
4.4.2 Data Description and main variables"............................................................................."109"
4.5 Estimation Results".................................................................................................................."113"
4.6 Using Total Factor Productivity to Estimate Productivity Spill-overs from FDI"............."116"
4.6.1 Specification of Total Factor Productivity Model"........................................................"116"
4.6.2 Detailed Estimation Methods and Calculation of TFP"................................................."118"





CHAPTER 5: Innovation Outcomes on Productivity"..................................................................."148"
5.1 Introduction"............................................................................................................................"148"
5.2 FDI and Innovation Policy in Nigeria"..................................................................................."151"
5.3 Data Description and Measurement of Innovation"............................................................."153"
5.3.1 Measuring Innovation"....................................................................................................."154"
5.4 Methodology"..........................................................................................................................."157"
5.4.1 The knowledge function".................................................................................................."158"
5.4.2 The innovation function".................................................................................................."159"
5.4.3 The productivity Equation".............................................................................................."161"
5.5 Estimation Result"..................................................................................................................."162"
5.5.1 The determinants of investing in Knowledge input in Nigeria"...................................."163"
5.5.2 Innovation Function"........................................................................................................"167"
5.5.3 Innovation and Productivity"..........................................................................................."171"
5.5.4 Innovation and employment"..........................................................................................."174"
5.6 Conclusion"..............................................................................................................................."178"
CHAPTER 6: Export-platform FDI on Backward Linkages"......................................................."199"
6.1 Introduction"............................................................................................................................"199"
6.2. The three-country model"......................................................................................................"202"
6.2.1. Third market equilibria"................................................................................................."204"
6.2.2 Impacts of Export-platform FDI on backward linkages".............................................."208"
6.3 Evidence from Nigeria supporting industries"......................................................................"214"
6.4 Data Description"....................................................................................................................."215"




6.6.1 Foreign investments in export-oriented industries and production of supporting 
industries"..................................................................................................................................."223"
6.6.2 Impacts of trade agreements, LCR and third country size".........................................."226"
6.7 Conclusion"..............................................................................................................................."234"
CHAPTER: 7 FDI on Financial Constraints of Domestic Firms"................................................."247"
7.1 Introduction"............................................................................................................................"247"
7.2. The Functions of a Financial System"..................................................................................."251"




7.5 Data Description and Methodology"......................................................................................"256"
7.6 Estimation Results".................................................................................................................."259"
7.6.1 All firms included"............................................................................................................"261"
7.6.2. Foreign-invested firms excluded"..................................................................................."265"
7.7. Robustness check and some extensions"..............................................................................."267"




8.2 Revisiting the Research Questions"........................................................................................"281"
8.3 Final Conclusion"....................................................................................................................."282"





List of Figures 
Figure 2-1 GDP Shares of Sectors in Percentages……………….………………………..14 
Figure 2-2 Growth of Current GDP by Sectors of the Economy in Percentages.…………15 
Figure 2-3 Production of Agricultural Sector Output (Billions Naira)……………………16 
Figure 2-4 Export of Crude Petroleum & Gas (Quantity bbls)……………………………18 
Figure 2-5 Number of Telephone Used From 2001 to 2015………………………………22 
Figure 2-6 Relationship between Active Lines and Teledensity…………………………..22 
Figure 2-7 Internet Users (per 100 people)……………………………………….………..23 
Figure 2-8 Coefficients of Backward and Forward Linkages Using C.W Method……..…27 
Figure 2-9 Clusters of Industry Linkages in Nigeria………………………………………28 
Figure 2-10 Coefficients of Backward and Forward Linkages Using Rasmussen Method..30 
Figure 2-11 Inward Flow of FDI in USD (Billions)……………………………………….38 
Figure 2-12 Percentage Share of Capital Investment by Sectors 2003-2015……………...39 
Figure 2-13 Number of FDI Project by Sectors 2003-2015………………………………40 
Figure 2-14 FDI by Country of Origin in Percentage……………………………………41 
Figure 3-1 Jobs Created From 203-2015………..…………………………………………66 
Figure 3-2 Relationship between Private Domestic and Foreign Investment…..…………68 
Figure 4-1 Analytical Framework of industry Linkages and FDI………………………103 
Figure 5-1 Innovation Function…………………………………………………………152 
Figure 5-2 Reasons to introduce product innovations……………………………………165 
Figure 5-3 Impact of Innovation on Skilled/Unskilled Employment…………………….171 
Figure 6-1 Impacts of Export-platform FDI on backward linkages…………………….  201 




CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background of the Study 
The impact of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) on host countries has been a contentious area 
of research in the fields of economics, international business and politics. In economics and 
international business research, the investigation of FDI effects on an economy is undertaken 
using either of two primary approaches. One is the macro approach which involves the 
empirical investigation of FDI effects on economic growth, trade, real wages or employment. 
Thesecondis the micro approach which relates measures of FDI or foreign presence on 
smaller economic units such as firms or plants. However, in both macro and micro 
investigations, there is a considerable level of debate and contrasting views. Starting from 
macro investigations, some studies argue that FDI can augment domestic capital 
accumulation and thus enhance economic growth (Slywester, 2005). Similarly, some show 
that FDI can fuel domestic investment by raising the investment ratio above the domestic 
savings ratio (Thirlwall, 2006). On the other hand, some studies contend that FDI can crowd 
out domestic investment and create distortions within the economy which deter GDP growth 
(Chase-Dunn, 1975). In the same line of thought, Cebula (1992) argues that FDI can raise the 
price of capital and thereby depress investment. 
FDI has become an essentialmechanismfor the advancement of many developing countries 
based on the belief it will promote growth through job creation and technology transfer. The 
experience of some developing countries that enjoy the fruits of FDI, such as emerging 
developing economies, have induced many host countries to continue offering an attractive 
policy for FDI. 
Technology is an essential element for the long-term growth of many countries because 
technology can push countries out of the diminishing return trap (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 
1995). Moreover, the literature on FDI frequently emphasises the multinational firms own 
some specific technology as their competitive advantages and that these assets enable them to 
compete when they invest in the host countries (Markusen & Venables, 1999; Rodriguez-
Clare, 1996). Therefore, the arrival of the foreign firms could lead to the possibilities that 
some of the technology brought by multinational firms could be transferred or spill-over to 
the host countries. 
The arrival of multinational firms enables cross-border technology. However, this does not 
guarantee that the host countries can ultimately benefit from such cross-border technology. 
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The reasons are, firstly, that the multinational firms could try to prevent the leakage of their 
technology to their competitors and, secondly, that the host countries, especially the domestic 
firms, may lack some skills and abilities to fully benefit from the technology brought by 
those multinational firms. 
Consequently, the most critical role of the host government is to direct the technology 
brought by FDI in such a way that it is beneficial to the domestic firms. If domestic firms can 
learn and absorb that technology, there are possibilities that industrialisation could start in the 
host country and that long-term growth could be expected. One of the critical policies, carried 
out by many host countries, is to build linkages between FDI and domestic firms because as 
long as the FDI generates some demand for intermediate goods produced by domestic 
suppliers, there is hope that technology transfer or spill-over to domestic suppliers occurs. An 
alternative policy is to promote the domestic firms’ abilities so that they can benefit from the 
new technology or learn to absorb the new technology. 
As mentioned above, if foreign firms generate demand for intermediate goods, they will 
create linkages with domestic suppliers. These linkages could bring two benefits to host 
countries. First, the linkages between foreign firms and the domestic suppliers can generate 
technology spill-over to domestic suppliers. Second, the linkages will encourage many entries 
and employment in the supplying industries. However, not all the domestic suppliers can 
benefit from the technology spill-over. Domestic suppliers will benefit from the technology 
spill-over differently, depending on their characteristics and absorptive capacity (Gorg & 
Greenaway, 2004; Smeets, 2008). 
 
1.2 Literature of Related Studies 
Linkages between FDI and the host country have been the focus of many studies based on the 
belief that such linkages could benefit host countries. Rodriguez-Clare (1996) and Markusen 
& Venable (1999) explained that this linkage generated demand for intermediate goods 
produced by the domestic suppliers, which resulted in their entrance into the chain of the 
supplying industries and could lead to the growth of supplying industries. Furthermore, the 
linkages also generated employment in those supplying industries. Also, Javorcik (2004) 
pointed out that there wasevidence of technology spill-over from the foreign firm in the 
downstream industries to the domestic suppliers in the upstream industries. He explained that 
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foreign firms could encourage domestic suppliers to improve their productivity or the foreign 
firms might transfer technology to improve the productivity of domestic suppliers.  
Studies on productivity spill-over from FDI to domestic firms in the host country are 
abundant. Most of the empirical studies focused on horizontal spill-overs, which occurred 
when foreign and domestic firms were in the same industries because of competition, 
imitation and movement of labour from foreign to domestic firms (Blomstrom & Kokko, 
1998). However, the results from empirical studies have been mixed with both positive and 
negative spill-overs being reported (Gorg & Greenaway, 2004; Smeets, 2008). Likewise, 
empirical evidence of the vertical spill-over is also mixed with positive and no spill-over 
effects (Smeets, 2008).  
There are possible explanations for these mixed findings. However, two prominent factors 
are the technology gap and the absorptive capacity. Theoretical explanation on the role of the 
technology gap argues that the technology gap affects the productivity spill-over from foreign 
to domestic firms because the larger gap permits the potential that domestic firms can catch 
up quickly to foreign firms. That is, the larger the gap, the more opportunities for domestic 
firms to learn from the foreign firms (Findlay, 1978). On the other hand, there is also a 
theoretical explanation that the large gap encourages foreign firms to bring only old 
technology because, with the larger technology gap, foreign firms will be able to earn the 
profit by using only modest technology in competition with domestic firms. However, if the 
technology gap is smaller, the foreign firms need to bring in the high technology to compete 
with domestic firms (Glass & Saggi, 1998; Wang & Blomstrom, 1992). 
Regarding the role of absorptive capacity, the theory has suggested that to learn to make use 
of new knowledge brought by foreign firms, domestic firms need a certain level of absorptive 
capacity. Cohen and Levinthal (1989, 1990) explained that organisation needed prior related 
knowledge to learn or to imitate the new knowledge. They inferred that basic knowledge was 
needed before the advanced knowledge could be easily learned or copied. For example, 
workers might need to know how to type before they could use Microsoft Word efficiently. 
Cohen and Levinthal (1989, 1990) also argued that there were costs associated with imitation 
and those costs would be lower if an organisation had a certain level of absorptive capacity. 
Despite the theoretical explanation of the roles of technology gap and absorptive capacity on 
productivity spill-over, the empirical evidence is mixed (Smeets, 2008).  
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Conversely, firms which are already technologically advanced are thought to have little room 
for further advancement. This is supported by the works of Chuang and Hsu (2004), Jordaan 
(2008, 2013), Lai, Wang, and Zhu (2009), Sjöholm (2007), Smeets (2008), Tian, Jiang, and 
Jiang (2010), Xu and Zhao (2012) and Yin and Zhou (2014). The other strand of the literature 
emphasises the importance of a small technology gap in aiding technology transfer from 
foreign firms, given that these firms have the basic skill level to follow and adopt the 
technology being used by foreign-owned firms (Cantwell, 2009). This is endorsed by the 
works of Dimelis (2005), Farole and Winkler (2015), Hamida and Gugler (2009), Jabbour 
and Mucchielli (2007), Marcin (2008), Takii (2005), Ubeda and Pérez-Hernández (2016) and 
Wang, Ning, Li and Prevezer (2016). Thus, the current literature either accepts or rejects the 
sweeping statement that absorptive capacity matters for FDI spill-overs, but is devoid of 
differentiating between intra- or inter-industrial linkages between local and foreign affiliates 
and whether they may respond differently to changes in absorptive capacity (Imbriani, 
Pittiglio, Reganati & Sica, 2014; Khalifah, Salleh & Adam, 2015). 
In relation to the impact of innovation on productivity, Hall (2011) provides a comprehensive 
survey of the empirical work. The survey mainly focuses on 16 existing empirical studies 
using the workhorse empirical model, the Crepon-Douget-Mairesse (CDM) model (Crepon, 
Duguet & Mairessec, 1998), implemented using firm-level data in OECD countries and a few 
emerging markets. Hall’s (2011) main finding is that, in general, most studies find a positive 
correlation between product innovation and productivity, but the impact of process 
innovation is ambiguous. According to Hall (2011), the problem with process innovation is 
that it cannot be measured in the surveys beyond the dichotomous variable of whether the 
firm implements process innovations or not. In general, these studies suggest that innovation 
has a positive impact on productivity. 
The evidence for developing countries, however, is scarce. One relevant study is Goedhuys, 
Janz and Mohnen (2006), which examined the primary drivers of productivity in Tanzania. 
The authors did not find any link between Research and Development (R&D), product and 
process innovations, licensing of technology, or training of employees, and productivity. The 
results suggest that Tanzanian firms were struggling to convert knowledge inputs into 
productivity improvements due to the weak enabling environment for business, which was 
the primary constraint on productivity according to their empirical results. 
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Because of the benefits of FDI as mentioned above, host countries have used many incentives 
to attract FDI, but there is little discussion about the impact of Export-platform FDI on 
backward linkages. Therefore, this thesis incorporates and expands the model of Lin and 
Saggi (2007) into developing a three-country model, to look at impact relationship between 
Export-platform FDI and backward linkages as its one primary channel by which foreign 
firms affect the host country. 
Financing constraint severely affects developing countries, particularly African countries and 
this problem can inhibit firm growth and exacerbate poverty. Using enterprise-level dataset 
from the World Bank’s Enterprise Survey, Fowowe (2017) investigates the effects of 
financing constraints on the growth of firms in Africa using both objective and subjective 
measures of access to finance. Preliminary analysis shows that African financial systems are 
characterised by small banking systems. Banks in Africa are poor in channelling deposits to 
where they most efficiently used, signalling low intermediation efficiency. This constraint 
leads to situations where banks prefer to invest in government securities rather than lend to 
the private sector. Also, African banks have low outreach, with banks enjoying high-interest 
rate spreads and targeting short-term finance, to the detriment of long-term finance for 
investments. 
These considerations have prompted the research questions for this study which are presented 
in the following section. 
 
1.3 Research Questions 
The research questions underlying this study are fourfold: 
Question 1: Are there spill-over effects from FDI to domestic firms in Nigerian industrial 
sectors? 
Given the extensive literature on FDI spill-overs in manufacturing & servicing firms and the 
lack of consensus on the actual direction and extent of spill-overs, unique data employed in 
this study will contribute to the debate by providing a comprehensive analysis on Nigerian 
manufacturing and service firms. This will contribute towards the attempts to arrive at a 
standpoint on FDI spill-over investigation. The approach towards our investigation is to 
provide estimates of foreign presence measures using augmented Cobb-Douglas production 
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functions. Also, emphases are placed on vertical productivity spill-overs and technology gaps 
as well as the introduction of new proxies for absorptive capacity. 
Question 2: Do innovation outcomes in Nigerian industrial sectors affect domestic firms’ 
performance? 
How do innovation investment outcomes affect domestic firms’ performance? To examine 
the innovative behaviour of firms in Nigeria, the World Bank 2014 Enterprise Survey 
Innovation module was used as it had comprehensive survey findings on innovation 
information carried out in Nigeria. The approach involved using a logical framework, based 
on the CDM model, which holds that firms invest in knowledge inputs that can be 
transformed into innovation outcomes according to the efficiency of their innovation 
function. The aim is, therefore, to provide a rich description of firm-level innovation and 
investment in knowledge capital and also linking innovation activities with productivity. 
Question 3: Does Export-platform FDI have an impact on backward linkages? 
This is a methodological question, which involves two procedures. The first of these is to 
develop a three-country model and incorporate the model and assumption from the works of 
Lin and Saggi (2007). The second procedure is the application of the model to supporting 
industries in Nigeria in order to investigate the impacts of this kind of FDI on backward 
linkages. The reason is that it is one of the main channels through which foreign firms affect 
the host country. 
Question 4: Does FDI loosen domestic firms’ financing difficulties? 
Empirically, this question answers some questions on the impact of FDI inflow into a host 
country. Therefore, in answering this question the author uses an improved Euler framework, 
and considers both horizontal and vertical linkages with FDI through the utilisation of the 
constructed I-O table. 
 
1.4 Objectives of the Thesis 
One of the objectives of this thesis is to focus on how to enable domestic firms (both 
domestic supplier and domestic firms in final goods industries) to benefit from the 
productivity spill-over from FDI. Along with this objective, the thesis attempts to construct a 
symmetrical input-output table based on recently available data that helps to explain industry 
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linkages in Nigeria and also attempts to identify the role of absorptive capacity of domestic 
firms - their technology gap compared to their foreign competitors in affecting the 
productivity spill-over. 
The second objective of this thesis centres on the role of innovation outcomes of domestic 
firm’s performance. This thesis, accordingly, looks at providing a rich description of the 
nature of firm-level innovation and investment in capital. To boost productivity, there is a 
need for broad-based innovation and investment capital. According to Schumpeter (1942), 
innovation is the engine of the ‘creative destruction’ process that spurs economic dynamism 
and transformation and is at the centre of the development process. 
The third objective of this thesis is to examine the impact of Export-platform FDI on 
backward linkages because it is one of the mainchannels through which foreign firms affect 
the host country. In doing so, this objective expands more on the works of Lin and Saggi 
(2007) and develops a three-country model to explain Export-platform FDI in Nigeria. 
The fourth objective of this thesis is to consider the role of inward FDI on alleviating the 
financial constraints of domestic firms. Firms in developing countries typically cite financing 
constraints as one of their primary obstacles to investment.  To achieve this objective, the 
author looked at the role of information asymmetry in the credit market by proposing a new 
hypothesis. This hypothesis stated that FDI could alleviate the financing constraints of 
domestic firms by reducing the information asymmetry in the credit market. Also, the Euler 
framework is improved to analyse the impact of FDI on domestic firm’s constraints.   
1.5 Contribution of thesis 
There are two limitations of previous studies on productivity spill-over that are subject to 
discussion that this thesis attempts to extend. First, the empirical evidence on the role of the 
technology gap on productivity spill-over tends to focus only on the technology gap between 
domestic and foreign firms within the same industry (horizontal spill-over). There is little 
attention given to the technology gap between foreign and domestic firms in vertical 
linkages. This thesis attempts to verify whether the technology gap affects the vertical 
productivity spill-over. In particular, the study attempts to verify whether the domestic 
suppliers in the upstream industry can benefit from vertical productivity spill-over if they 
have the technology below their foreign competitors and similarly, whether domestic firms in 
the downstream industry can benefit from vertical productivity spill-over when they have the 
technology below that of their foreign competitors. The main reason for such empirical 
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analysis is that it can point out the role of FDI in both upstream and downstream industries 
while taking account of the competition between domestic and foreign firms as well. 
The second limitation in previous research is related to the use of proxies to measure 
absorptive capacity. Previous studies tended to use R&D as proxies for absorptive capacity, 
but such R&D is not appropriate, especially in developing countries such as Nigeria. Some 
reasons that R&D is not a good proxy for absorptive capacity are as follows. Firstly, in the 
developing countries such as Nigeria, most FDI is invested in labour-intensive industries and 
usually comes with less complicated technology. Therefore, R&D is less needed in an 
industry where labour is used intensively and simple technology is easily imitated. Secondly, 
in developing countries, the majority of domestic firms are small/medium firms, and they 
cannot afford R&D expenditure. Finally, R&D is not a good proxy for absorptive capacity 
because even though domestic firms may have R&D, they may still need trained workers to 
use R&D. In this study, two proxies for absorptive capacity are used: worker’s education 
level and training offered by firms. 
Besides the two limitations on technology gap and absorptive capacity in the previous 
studies, there is also limited evidence on the impact of innovation on productivity from 
developing countries. Therefore, this study sheds more light on the nature of firm-level 
innovation and investments in knowledge capital as well as on the link between innovation 
activities and productivity from the Nigerian perspective. Also, the study assesses the impact 
of Export-Platform FDI on backward linkages, as its impact on host countries has received 
scant attention in research especially in the case of developing countries. 
In summary, this study contributes to the literature by filling some gaps found in the previous 
studies on the relationship between industry linkages and FDI. In the first direction, it 
investigates the role of the technology gap on productivity spill-over by extending the role of 
the technology gap to the case of vertical spill-over. Also, it investigates the role of 
absorptive capacity on productivity spill-over by introducing new proxies of absorptive 
capacities: the workers’ education and training offered to workers. Also, it adds to the body 
of literature on the impact of innovation outcome on firm’s productivity from a developing 
country standpoint. In the second direction, it contributes to the literature by constructing a 
theoretical model and providing empirical analysis to explain the impact of Export-platform 
FDI on backward linkages in the host country.  
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This study adds to the body of literature and empirical findings by investigating the impact of 
inward FDI on financial constraints of domestic firms. Few studies have looked at the 
rationale from the perspective of information asymmetry. Therefore, one of the major 
contributions is the connection of industry linkages with financial constraints, as well as 
developing an improved Euler framework to capture financial constraints of domestic firms 
with a developing country. 
 
1.6 Structure of thesis 
The general approach in each Chapter of the thesis is to provide a detailed study or analysis 
of industrial sectors including manufacturing and service firms in Nigeria. Most chapters 
have a distinctive methodology but use similar data sources and they end up highlighting 
distinctive findings that correspond to various studies and the context of the thesis. In 
summary: 
Chapter 1 provides the basic research questions, objectives and an overview of the thesis, 
with a description of related literature across the subject area. 
Chapter 2 explores the Nigerian economy and constructs an input-output table that shows 
various inter-relationships between different domestic industrial sectors. Also, the chapter 
explores FDI trends in Nigeria as well as various determinant factors that contribute to FDI 
inflow. Various FDI theories are discussed in this chapter, and Nigerian industry policies are 
mentioned. 
Chapter 3 reviews theliterature related to foreign direct investment, industry linkages, 
theories as well as determinants of FDI from the country’s perspective. 
Chapter 4 provides an empirical approach to productivity spill-overs, FDI and industry 
linkages. The chapter analyses intra-sectoral spill-overs and inter-sectoral spill-overs which 
include forward and backward linkages. The chapter also introduces new proxies for 
absorptive capacity and defines technology gap through mathematical formulation. Cobb-
Douglas and the Total Factor Productivity Model are used in this chapter for empirical 
investigation. 
Chapter 5 explores the role of innovation inproductivity and defines firm-level innovation 
empirically. Also, the chapter analyses the link between innovation activities and 
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productivity, including employment. FDI and innovation policies of Nigeria are discussed 
extensively within this chapter and the CDM model is well incorporated. 
Chapter 6 provides both a theoretical and empirical approach towards spill-overs and industry 
linkages by examining the impact of Export-platform FDI on backward linkages in the host 
country. The chapter develops a three-country model and places emphasis on the works of 
Lin and Saggi (2007). The chapter also develops some testable hypothesis, which was tested 
using empirical data both from the Enterprise survey and the Nigerian Bureau of Statistics. 
Chapter 7 provides an empirical approach toward FDI and financial constraints of domestic 
firms using a modified Euler framework. The chapter defines financial constraints and 
analyses firms based on upstream and downstream production settings. Also, the chapter 
looks at horizontal and vertical linkages with FDI. 
Chapter 8 provides the overall conclusion of the thesis which points out how the research 





CHAPTER 2: Input-Output Table Construction, Industry Linkages and 
FDI in Nigeria 
2.1 Introduction 
The fundamental issues of economic growth revolve around critical determinants, as well as 
supporting and retarding factors, which lie in the complex interactions among various forces 
within the economic environment. Kuznets (1971, p.60) defined the economic growth of a 
country as "a long-term rise in capacity to supply increasingly diverse economic goods to its 
population; this growing capacity is based on advancing technology and the institutional and 
ideological adjustments that it demands". The increase in the outputs of major sectors of an 
economy, such as manufacturing and natural resource due to increases in the use of inputs or 
improvement in technology, leads to economic growth. Key macroeconomic indicators such 
as the gross national product (GNP), gross domestic product (GDP) and net national product 
(NNP) are used, among other economic parameters, as measures of economic growth 
performance of an economy. Thus aprogressive increase in the outputs of major sectors of an 
economy is a manifestation of the attainment of economic growth. 
Economic growth is driven by a process that is generated and sustained by the efficient 
utilisation of economic resources to meet effective demand and social needs. The challenge 
facing countries in attaining economic growth is that of creating an enabling atmosphere for 
harnessing of economic resources. This challenge has become even more intensified by an 
increasingly interdependent global economic dispensation that tends to undermine and 
marginalise sluggish economies which has given rise to disparities among countries of the 
world regarding their levels of attainment of economic growth. Some economies have 
witnessed sudden and remarkably very high growth rates above the world average. This 
achievement is being referred to as ‘growth miracles’. On the other hand, those economies 
that have performed abysmally below world average are referred to as ‘growth disasters’. 
The neoclassical and endogenous growth models of economic growth, regarded as the two 
broad classifications of economic growth theory (McCallum, 1996), have dwelt extensively 
on the theoretical and empirical requisites of economic growth. Congruent with the classical 
argument of Malthus (1798), natural resource utilisation, pollution and other environmental 
considerations have become critical to the possibilities of long-run economic growth (Romer, 
2001). The effect of natural resources on society is as old as human activities. The 
environment inserts itself at the intersection between nature and society in that, outputs of 
human economic activities (production, exchange and consumption) generate environmental 
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problems while the depletion of scarce renewable and non-renewable natural resources raises 
concerns about the sustainability of economic rents from the exploitation of natural resources. 
Considering that economic growth entails the capacity to supply increasingly diverse 
economic goods, natural resources such as oil and gas have the potential for being catalysts 
for generating economic growth if properly harnessed. Even though natural resources have 
been part of economic growth analysis from a much earlier period, the publication of The 
Limits of Growth (Meadows, Meadows, Randers & Behrens, 1972) propelled an upsurge in 
research on the economics of natural resources. Besides the perception of being a basis for 
national prosperity, power and wealth, issues such as essentiality, intergenerational equity, 
sustainability and optimal utilisation of natural resources have crystallised the crucial role of 
natural resources in the attainment of economic growth. Natural resources, conceived as 
factor inputs, fit into the classical production function and have, thus, become a significant 
component of economic growth analysis, which stresses the constraints imposed by finite 
resources and the principle of diminishing returns. 
Real productive activities engender economic growth by ensuring a continuous improvement 
in the methods of production, the discovery of new resources and thus creating the necessary 
conditions for efficient utilisation of resources. A multiple sector positive performanceis 
essential for the growth of the overall economy, but a sector of the economy that attracts a 
large spectrum of economic activities can stimulate the productive fibre of other sectors 
towards real production and provide the requisite impetus for the sustainable growth of the 
economy. A natural resource sector, such as oil and gas, tends to generate tremendous 
economic activities arising from their intrinsic versatile utility value. The temptation for rent-
seeking behaviour could undermine the efficient use of the natural resource and other 
resources of the economy thereby crippling the chances of the growth of the economy. If 
rents, derived from natural resource extraction, are used to facilitate complacent consumption 
to the detriment of real production, there will be an expansion of non-tradable sector 
activities leading to the shrinking in tradable sector activities such as manufacturing. This 
phenomenon is referred as the ‘Dutch Disease’, and it is a chronic source of slow growth due 
to the absence of "backward and forward" linkages among sectors of the economy (Sachs and 
Warner, 1997). The manufacturing sector, with a thriving service sector for support, is a vital 
source for economic growth through learning-by-doing, as such should have a pivotal link 
with the oil and gas sector regarding resource use for real productive activities that propel the 
economy towards a sustainable growth path. 
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Inter-industry linkage analysis describes a multi-industry process of complex combinations of 
numerous and diverse resources that are transformed into usable goods and services. This 
process hinges on the method of input-output that illustrates the use of resources obtained 
from different sectors by other sectors of the economy. The absorptive capacity (the ability of 
capital investment or resource to yield healthy levels of return) of industries and that of the 
overall economy provides the impetus for inter-industry linkages. The productivity level of 
the economy reflects on the value-adding capabilities of factors of production which hinge on 
the level of inter-industry linkages that exists within the economy. There is a positive 
relationship between the extent of inter-industry linkages and the level of the output of the 
economy, which is an important measure of economic growth. Given that economic growth is 
engendered by the efficient use of resources and considering that inter-industry linkages are 
about multi-industry absorption of resources obtained from different sectors of the economy, 
a formidable inter-industry linkage process is crucial for attaining economic growth. 
To understand the structure of an economy requires understanding how each sector of the 
economy is related one another. The role of industry linkages has long been an interest for 
economists since Hirschman (1958), who argued that interdependent structure was essential 
for economic development in a country. He postulated that industry linkages depended on 
demand and supply of inputs of intermediate goods to other economic activities. A rise or a 
fall in production of an economic sector would have an impact on the other sector of the 
economy. The magnitude of the impact depended on whether that sector had strong or weak 
linkages with the others.  
The study of industry linkages among economic sectors requires the use of an input-output 
table, which is compiled from a comprehensive survey of demand and supply of intermediate 
goods among all sectors of an economy. The input-output table could show the degree of 
interdependence between one economic sector and another. Usually, the construction of an 
input-output table is costly and only the government can compile such a table. 
Having a good input-output table enables the author to predict the impact of growth in one 
economic sector on the other. Recently, the input-output table has provided a good tool for 
simulation of macroeconomic policies for many countries. For example, the impact of the 
growth of import or export of final demand on all sectors in the economy and the impact of 
an increase in wage rate, consumption tax or import duties need to be taken into account. In 
Nigeria, there isn’t an updated symmetric input-output table, as the last one constructed was 
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in 1999 by Patrick Osakwe from the Trade and Regional Integration Division, of the United 
Nations Economic for Africa (UNECA). For this reason, a more updated version based on the 
data from the Nigerian Bureau of Statistics (NBS) Database was used to construct the table. 
2.2 Overview Structure of the Nigerian Economy 
Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa with a population of over 140 million people. 
The country is endowed with vast expanses of land, forest resources and abundant natural 
resources, including rivers and lakes, oil and gas, and solid minerals. It is, therefore, a 
potentially large centre of production and consumption activities and has the potential for 
becoming a large economy.  Nigeria’s economic structure is largely oil-based.The economy 
has stumbled for years due to political unrest, corruption and poor fiscal policies. However, 
since the restoration of democracy and the introduction of economic reforms, the country is 
growing at a fast pace. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) projections, 
Nigeria is the second fastest growing economy in the world and will outperform other 
African economies shortly. 
The GDP growth right from the 1980s up until recent time is shown in figure 2-1 and 
indicates that the agricultural sector contributes more to the economy than any other sector in 
total. However, the service sector has remarkably improved over the years. The agricultural 
sector contributed an average of 40% to the total GDP from the beginning of the 1980s up 
until 2013. The Industrial sector has contributed about 30% to the total GDP for the years in 
question.  The trade sector which in some cases can be classifiedas part of the Service sector 
has also improved over time. Especially between the years 2007 to 2013, its growth has 
improved enormously. 
Figure 2-1. GDP Shares of Sectors in Percentages 
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In the twenty-first century, the industrial sector has fallen in terms of its contribution to GDP 
as shown in figure 2-2; however, the service industry including trade has done remarkably 
well. The agricultural sector seems to be slowly declining. 
Figure 2-2. Growth of GDP by Sectors of Economy in Percentages 
"
 (Source: National Bureau of Statistics 2015) 
 
Production output of agricultural products is shown in figure 2-3 below. The leading 
agricultural sector is crop production which exceeded any other sector by a huge margin from 
2010-2014. The crop production sector produces about 70% of the agricultural sector and it 
consists of crops such asbeans, rice, cassava, yam, maize, groundnut and Guinea corn. The 
livestock sector has had a gradual growth rate. Forestry and fishing sectors have had similar 







































































Figure 2-3. Production of Agricultural Sector Output (Billions of Naira)"
"
(Source: National Bureau of Statistics 2015) 
 
Table 2-1 below displays the structure of the industrial sector as a percentage share of GDP at 
a constant price. Industry has contributed about 22% to the GDP from 2010 to 2014. Within 
the industrial sector, crude oil accounted for about 61% of the sector’s GDP; which is, 
therefore, the largest share of GDP when compared to other sectors within the industrial 
sector. This validates the point that the crude oil sector is vital to the economic growth of the 
country. It also shows that the country depends greatly on the oil industry. The manufacturing 
sector also contributed about 39% to the sector’s GDP from 2010-2014. However, the food 



















Table 2-1 GDP Shares of Industrial Sectors in Percentages (Source: National Bureau of Statistics 2015) 
 
Industrial Sector 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
  (a) Crude Petroleum & Natural Gas 69.83 66.79 62.74 54.60 50.84 
  (b) Solid Minerals 0.43 0.46 0.55 0.64 0.69 
           Coal Mining 6.20 6.52 6.43 6.63 6.92 
           Metal Ores 4.54 4.56 4.06 4.01 4.07 
           Quarrying & Other Mining 89.26 88.92 89.50 89.35 89.01 
  (c) Manufacturing 29.74 32.75 36.72 44.77 48.47 
            Oil Refining 7.13 6.43 4.67 5.92 4.66 
            Cement 6.18 5.65 5.65 6.46 7.30 
            Food, Beverage and Tobacco 64.23 58.50 54.94 50.44 46.44 
            Textile, Apparel and Footwear 9.85 13.56 17.04 18.82 21.52 
            Wood and Wood Products 3.45 3.09 3.29 2.94 2.89 
            Pulp, Paper and Paper Products 0.68 0.68 0.63 0.76 0.75 
            Chemical and Pharmaceutical Products  0.70 0.92 1.29 1.59 1.91 
            Non-Metallic Products 1.66 2.35 2.34 2.54 2.98 
            Plastic and Rubber products 0.95 1.81 2.22 2.38 2.70 
            Electrical and Electronics 0.07 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.08 
            Basic metal, Iron and Steel 1.24 2.44 2.60 2.42 2.44 
            Motor vehicles & assembly 0.61 0.62 0.74 0.76 0.83 
            Other Manufacturing 3.25 3.84 4.47 4.90 5.50 
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The main markets for the petroleum products are US, Canada, South American Countries 
such as Brazil and Argentina, EU countries such as Germany, Netherlands and the rest, 
Central American countries such as Barbados, Oceania/Pacific countries such as New 
Zealand and Australia, Asian/Far East countries such as Japan, China, Taiwan, India and 
African countries such as Ghana, Senegal Ivory-Coast and the rest. Figure 2-4 below also 
displays the volume of export by markets. There are some reasons that lead to high export of 
petroleum products such as tariff incentives given to some countries. Looking at the diagram 
form 1997 through to 2010, the North American region had imported more of the country’s 
crude oil, and by far the largest amount of crude was by the US. By 2011, the import from the 
North American region started to decline due to production capabilities derived from their 
region. However, the EU region, between 2012 and 2014, has imported more Nigerian Crude 
oil than any other region and the growth of import by the region has been significantly 
increasing. The Asia/Far East region has maintained a considerate amount of crude oil 
importation while the African region in the last six years has had a stable importation 
volume. 
 
Figure 2-4. Export of Crude Petroleum & Gas (Quantity bbls) 
#
(Source: Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation Bulletin 2015) 
 
Table 2-2 below displays the structure of the Service Sectors in Nigeria in percentages of the 
constant price of the year 2010. It shows that the trade sector remains the top sector in the 

























































From 2010 to 2014, the sector had an average of 17% of the sectors’ GDP. The construction 
sector has shown a growing impact in the GDP share from 2010 to 2014 which could be as a 
result of infrastructure development within the economy. The information and 
communication sector also plays a vital role in the composition of the sectors’ GDP. 
However, the growth of this sub-sector has been on the decline in the past five years. The 
education sector has shown rapid growth in the last five years, and this could be attributed to 




Table 2-2 GDP Shares of Service Sectors in Percentages (Source: National Bureau of Statistics 2015) 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Construction 2.88 3.16 3.32 3.59 3.82 
Trade 16.47 16.76 16.44 16.62 16.57 
Services 34.73 34.34 34.59 35.87 36.17 
  (a) Transport 3.66 3.73 3.43 3.26 3.17 
  (b) Information and Communication 31.40 30.80 30.24 29.92 29.88 
  (c) Utilities 1.17 1.49 1.61 1.74 1.57 
  (d) Accommodation and Food Services 1.30 1.36 1.50 2.38 2.63 
  (e) Finance & Insurance 10.06 7.06 8.14 8.09 8.16 
  (f)  Real Estate  21.76 20.99 21.13 21.63 21.23 
  (g) Professional, Scientific & Technical Serv.        9.02 10.29 10.57 9.99 9.84 
  (h) Administrative and Support Services Business Services 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 
  (i)  Public Administration 10.54 11.68 8.87 8.07 7.72 
  (j)  Education 4.36 5.51 5.34 5.64 5.73 
  (k) Human Health & Social Services           1.74 1.89 1.88 1.89 1.95 
  (l)  Arts, Entertainment & Recreation 0.16 0.39 0.47 0.50 0.53 
 (m) Other Services 4.75 4.73 6.76 6.84 7.52 
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Table 2-3 below shows the number of commercial banks and other financial and non-
financial institutions between 2006 and 2011. The number of microfinance banks has 
increased enormously; however, due to banking deregulation and policies, the number of 
private domestic commercial banks has reduced. Many mergers and acquisitions have taken 
place within the banking sector. There has also been the improvement in the number of state-
owned banks. The number of security firms has reduced due to the unforeseen event of the 
2007 financial crisis and the sector has also involved more fund managers. 
Table 2-3 Numbers of Banks and Financial Institutions in Nigeria (Source: IMF Country 
Report 2013) 
 
 2006  2010  2011 
 Numbers  Numbers  Numbers 
Commercial Banks 25  24  20 
Private 25  24  17 
Domestic  21  20  13 
Foreign 4  4  4 
State-Owned 0  0  3 
      
Institutional Investors 124  100  91 
Insurance Companies 107  61  61 
Pension Funds 13  30  21 
Unit Trusts 8  8  8 
      
Other Non-Banks Financial Institution 1683  1619  1403 
Finance Companies 112  108   
Specialized development institutions 6  6  6 
Securities Firms 581  580  254 
Fund Managers     136 
Mortgage Institutions 90     
Microfinance Banks 757  800  876 
Discount Houses 5    5 
Bureaux de Change 126  125  125 
Asset management Companies     1 
Others 6     
 
Among the service sectors in Nigeria, the most fascinating and rapidly growing sectors with 
high GDP contribution is the information and communication sector. Figure 2-5 below shows 
the number telephones used in Nigeria regarding lines being connected, active lines and also 
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installed IT capacity. Examining the trend reveals thatit has been on the increase. From 2007 
to 2012, the number of connected lines has been parallel to the number of active lines. 
Figure 2-5. Number of Telephone Used From 2001 to 2015 
#
(Source: Nigerian Communication Commission Report 2015) 
Figure 2-6 below shows the relationship between active telephone lines and telephone 
density. Telephone density is the number of telephone connection for every hundred 
individuals living within an area. Between 2007 and 2015, over 140 million people have had 
an active telephone line at a density percentage of over 100%.  This has been reflected in the 
GDP of the service sector. 
Figure 2-6 Relationship between Active Lines and Teledensity 
#




























































Also, figure 2-7 below displays the number of internet subscribers based on data from the 
world development index. The number has steadily increased between 2001 and 2014. 
Figure 2-7. Internet Users (per 100 people) 
#
(Source: World Development Indicators 2016) 
 
2.3 Inter-Industry Linkages and Economic Growth Nexus 
The economic growth process is crucially intertwined with the transformation of resources to 
different forms of use. Complex interactions of several variables such as demand and supply 
or wages and prices, as well as a series of transactions in which actual goods and services are 
exchanged, are involved in the transformation of resources into various uses. Given the 
diverse nature of contemporary economies, the process of transforming resources involves a 
strong mix of ideas (technology) with other factors of production such as land and labour, in 
addition to other resources from different activity sectors of the economy. Resources, in their 
natural form, have limited direct economic use in satisfying human needs but transforming 
them into goods and services enhances their economic value to the society. Since resources 
are obtained from various natural processes based on industry/sector categorisation of the 
economy, the mix of productive activities by different sectors of the economy is the fountain 
of the transformation of resources into goods and services and the bedrock of the economic 
growth process. 
Inter-industry linkage analysis seeks to establish the multi-industry relationship that is 











































industry linkages is to describe with precision, the complex combination of numerous and 
diverse resources and the processes of their transformation that leads to the production of 
final commodities. This illuminates the different stages of the production chain in that the 
intensity of inter-industry linkages illustrates the level of value-adding activities of factors of 
production, which is also a determinant of the output level of the entire economy, a sine qua 
non-for economic growth. Inter-industry linkages are of two basic types, namely backward 
and forward linkages; backward linkages occur when an industrial activity induces domestic 
production and supply of inputs needed in that activity, and forward linkages occur when an 
industrial activity induces the utilisation of its output by other domestic production activities 
(Hirschman, 1958). 
Technological inter-connections among various sectors of the economy could evolve from 
the structural and spatial interdependence of the production processes of the sectors. The 
rational response to inducements and incentives propels the inherent capabilities of factors of 
production to be transmitted into technological relationships. This leads to an increase in the 
level of activities of sectors of the economy in a self-reinforcing manner. The expansion of 
activity in a given industry leads to increase in demand for inputs from the sector(s) and the 
supplying sector(s) respond to the stimuli of increased demand by expanding production. The 
embodying expansionary effects of inter-industry linkages provide opportunities for 
economies of scale, which could translate into lower per unit cost of production. 
The input-output model, based on the pioneering work of Wassily Leontief (1986), is a basic 
tool for analysing inter-industry linkages (see Appendix). The input-output table, which is 
anchored on the double-entry structure with all industries presented in both horizontal rows 
and vertical columns, reveals the fabric of the economy by showing how the various 
sectors/industries of the economy are woventogether. The vertical column of a basic input-
output table states the inputs of each of the various goods and services that are required for 
production in each of the respective industries. Thisis presented in the form of outlays of all 
sectors within the economy, and the totals of this outlay reflect the total production for the 
economy (within the year under consideration). The horizontal rows represent outlays of the 
inputs of sectors/industries to various sectors of the economy. The total of the outlays for the 
columns is the total output of the economy while the total for the rows represents the extent 
of the supply of inputs by each of the sectors in the row. The final demand element of the 
vertical column usually illustrates the gross national product (GNP), which is a measure of 
the productive activities and by implication economic growth. 
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The changing pattern of inter-industry linkages, which describes inherent dynamic properties, 
is useful for analysing the process of economic growth (see, for instance, Bulmer-Thomas, 
1982; Leontief, 1986). Also, the high linkage hypothesis (Hirschman, 1958) has gained 
tremendous analytical relevance by providing insights into the determination of high linkage 
sectors as the potential source of growth of the overall economy (Cella, 1984; Jones, 1976; 
Laumas, 1975, 1976; Yotopoulos & Nugent, 1973, 1976). Strategic consideration of a large 
activity sector identified as a key sector with high linkage relevance to other sectors can lead 
to gradual diffusion of value-adding activities across sectors of the economy to ensure 
efficient utilisation of resources and generate economic growth. Endogenous growth theory 
and the leading sector strategy of economic growth (Currie, 1974,1997) give additional 
credence to this conception of the economic growth process.  
2.3.1 Compilation of the Input-Output Table 
There are four basic assumptions for the transformation from supply and use tables into 
product-by-product input-output tables or industry-by-industry input-output tables (Eurostat, 
2008). 
Product technology assumption (Model A) 
Industry technology assumption (Mode B) 
Fixed industry sales structure assumption (Model C) 
Fixed product sales structure assumption (Model D) 
The first two assumptions are applied to compile product by product input-output tables. The 
transformation of supply and use (SU) tables to the symmetric industry by industry input-
output tables are based on assumptions on the sales structure. All inputs in the product by 
product input-output (IO) tables are allocated to homogeneous units. Product by product 
IOtables are believed to be more homogenous but further away from statistical sources than 
the industry by industry IO tables. Inputs in the industry by industry IO tables are allocated to 
industries. Industry by industry IO tables is less homogeneous but closer to statistical sources 
and actual observations than product by product IO tables. Model A and Model C have 
negative values after transformation from supply and use input-output tables. To solve 
negative problems, hybrid technology and Almon’s procedure can be used for removing 
negative values. However, Model B and Model D do not have negative values. 
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The implication of the technology assumption is divided into two models; model A is the 
product technology assumptions where each product is produced in own specific way, 
irrespective of the industry where it is produced. In contrast, Model B is based on the 
industry technology assumptions; where each industry has its own specific way of 
production, irrespective of its product mix. To solve the models with negatives, the Almon’s 
procedure is used. The input-output tables for 2010 derived from the supply and use tables 
based on both industry technology assumptions and fixed products sales structures 
assumptions, used the Microsoft Visual Basic languages in Excel format. According to 
Eurostat (2008), the input-output table constructed used domestic production at basic price as 
well as the fixed product sales structures and the industry technology assumption. 
 
The industry technology assumption is used to convert make-use tables (or supply-use tables 
for some international datasets) into a symmetric input-output table. It assumes that an 
industry uses the same technology to produce each of its products. In other words, an 
industry's production function is a weighted average of the inputs required for the production 
of the primary product and each of the by-products, weighted by the output of each of the 
products. 
 
As a requirement of the industry technology assumption, industry by-product coefficients are 
constant. An industry will always produce the same mix of commodities regardless of the 
level of production. In other words, an industry will not increase the output of one product 
without proportionately increasing the output of all its other products.  
 
2.3.2 Presentation of Results 
The analysis seeks to unravel the structural pattern of inter-industry linkages using the results 
obtained for the various linkage measures. Linkage analysis has been calculated for the 
Nigerian economy using the results from the symmetric I-O table constructed which 
transformed from supply and use tables based on fixed product sales structure assumption. 
The 2010 Supply and Use Table was used, and an aggregated 49 sectors and sub-sectors level 
was constructed from the SU table. 
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The empirical analysis is based on the Input-Output Table constructed by the researcher. The 
input-output transactions table is shown in appendix 1. All commodity flows between 
industries and other economic agents in the input-output table are in millions of Naira and 
recorded in basic prices. The basic price of a good or service is the amount receivable by the 
producer from the purchaser minus any tax payable and any subsidy receivable (except 
subsidy on import). The producer price is the amount receivable by the producer from 
purchaser minus any deductible goods and services tax invoiced to the purchaser. The 
purchaser’s price is the amount paid by the purchaser, excluding any deductible goods and 
services tax to take delivery of a unit of a commodity. In the case of goods, the purchaser’s 
price includes any trade margins and transport charges paid by the purchaser. Both basic and 
producer prices exclude transport charges invoiced separately by the producer. 
Table 2-5 (see Appendix) shows the normalised values of forwarding and backward linkages 
of forth-nine sectors and sub-sector in the Nigerian economy. Here the direct input and output 
coefficients, as well as weighted directed input and output coefficients, are used. To find 
backward and forward linkages, first, the input and output coefficients matrices were 
constructed. 
According to the size of the various linkage indicators, all sectors of an economy may be 
grouped into four categories. If the values of both backward linkage and forward linkage of a 
sector are all above the corresponding average (that is the normalised values of both 
backward and forward linkages is greater than 1), the sector is called as “key” sector. If only 
the backward linkages of a sector are greater than the average (only the normalised value of 
backward linkages is greater than one), the sector can be termed as a strong backward 
linkages sector. Similarly, if only the forward linkages of a sector are greater than the average 
(i.e. only the normalised value of forwarding linkages is greater than one), the sector is called 
a strong forward linkages sector. The fourth group refers to the weak linkages category. This 
is the case where a sector’s backward linkages and forward linkages are all less than the 
averages, i.e. the normalised values of backward and forward linkages are smaller than one. 
Table 2-5 (see Appendix) shows these four groups of sectors according to CW method. To 
make the table easier to study, the key sectors are shaded. 
As can be seen in the 2010 data in Nigeria, according to the CW method there were ten key 
sectors. A sector is defined as akey sector if one of the weighted linkages or unweighted 
linkages or both of them show the strong backward and forward linkages. These key sectors 
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are: Manufacture of Food Products, Manufacture of Textiles, Manufacture of coke and 
refined products, manufactures of chemicals and chemical products, manufacture of motor 
vehicles, trailer and semi-trailers, manufacture of furniture, Water collection, waste 
collection, remediation & sewage, wholesale trade, retail trade and land transport & transport 
via pipeline. Crop and animal production, Manufacture of food products and Extraction of 
crude oil are defined as key sectors by weighted linkages since these sectors contribute 
significantly to the economy output, and value added. Its shares to demand, and primary 
inputs account for 20.3%, 11.1% and 18.8%, respectively (see appendix 2).  The unweighted 
linkages define crop and animal production and extraction of crude oil as sectors with strong 
forward linkages. Also, the diagrams below show that a large majority of industries and sub-
sectors in Nigeria have lower forward linkages with the coefficients of forward linkages 
smaller than 1. 
Figure 2-8. Coefficients of Backward and Forward Linkages Using C.W Method 
#
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The sectors with strong backward linkages are other mining and quarrying, manufacture of 
beverages, manufacture of tobacco, manufacture of wearing apparel, manufacture of leather 
footwear, manufacture of rubber and plastics, manufacture of other non-metallic mineral 
products, manufacture of basic metals, manufacture of fabricated metals, manufacture of 
electronics and optical products, manufacture of machinery and equipment, construction, 
repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles, air transport and publish activities. Table 2-5 (see 
Appendix) also shows that about eighteen sectors in the data used had strong forward 
linkages, and the remaining sectors had weak linkages.  






















According to the weighted Chenery-Watanabe method, the repair of motor vehicle industry 
has the highest backward linkages, while the highest under the unweighted linkages is the 
construction industry (see Appendix 3). The manufacture of food products has second 
ranking in the weighted backward linkages, while for unweighted linkages it is the wholesale 
trade industry. The water collection industry and financial services have lowest rankings of 
the weighted and unweighted backward linkages. Concerning forward linkages, the crop and 
animal production industry have the highest weighted forward linkages while the 
telecommunication industry has the highest unweighted forward linkages. It appears that 
repair of motor vehicle industries both has the lowest forward linkage in both the weighted 
and unweighted classification. 
Table 2-6 (see Appendix) shows the normalised values of backward and forward linkages of 
industries of Nigeria for 2010 based on the Rasmussen method. The key sectors have been 
defined in the same way as in the previous section and have been shaded. In comparison with 
the CW method, there are four key industries for Rasmussen method. However, according to 
the Rasmussen method, manufacture of food products is no longer a key sector and is defined 
as a sector with strong forward linkages. This may be the result of insignificance of indirect 
effects in this sector. The new sectors among key sectors are manufacture of textiles, 
manufacture of motor vehicles, trailer and semi-trailers, Manufacture of furniture and water 












CW method, and these sectors contribute significantly to the final demand and value added of 
the economy. 
The water and waste collection industries have the strongest backwards and forward linkages 
concerning the weighted and unweighted classification under the Rasmussen method.  The 
construction and crop production industries have the highest backward and forward linkages 
under the weighted classification. Moreover, the manufacture of motor vehicle industry has 
second strongest backward linkages under the unweighted and weighted classification. The 
least strong backward and forward linkages under the weighted classification are the water 
collection industry and the mining of metal ores. Some weighted ranking is missing and this 
is due to lack of data for a comprehensive share in value added.  
Figure 2-10. Coefficients of Backward and Forward Linkages Using Rasmussen Method 
#
(Source: Author’s calculation based on Constructed I-O Table) 
 
The first ranking in weighted backward and forward linkages have Crop and animal 























weighted CW and Rasmussen method. This shows the significance of this industry to the 
Nigerian economy (see appendix 2). As for backward linkages, there are also some 
differences in ranking positions of some sectors. For example, water collection, waste 
collection and sewage industry are ranked as the strongest with unweighted backward 
linkages whereas weighted backward linkages show that construction industry is the strongest 
regarding backward linkages among the forty-nine sectors. This picture is by the rankings 
given to these industries by weighted and unweighted Rasmussen backward linkages. 
2.3.3 Summary 
This work has investigated the production structure and inter-sectoral linkages of the 
Nigerian economy based on 2010 data. This analysis was undertaken at the relatively 
disaggregated level of industries for which data were available. These are forty-nine 
production sectors and sub-sector. This work is an attempt to empirically identify key sectors 
and industry linkages. Type I and type II output multiplier and indices of backward and 
forward linkages based on Chenery-Watanabe and the Rasmussen Methods were calculated. 
Backward and forward linkages show how much each industry buys and sells to other 
industries, directly and indirectly, caused by the unit increase in final demand and primary 
inputs. So, for the development strategy, it is essential to determine which industries possess 
high backward and forward linkages, Then stimulating final demand or primary inputs 
namely of these industries could positively influence the economic activity of the country. 
To find out key sectors of the Nigerian economy, the results of CW and Rasmussen methods 
are presented together in table 2-7.  Then it is taken into account that a key sector is a sector 
which is placed into this group by at least one method used. In this way, it hasbeen 
discovered that in 2010 in the Nigerian economy there were thirteen sectors that belonged to 
the category of key sectors. These are crop and animal production, manufacture of food 
products, manufacture of textiles, manufacture of refined petroleum products, manufacture of 
chemicals, manufacture of motor vehicles, manufacture of furniture, manufacture of 
machinery and equipment, wholesale trade, retail trade, land transport and 
telecommunication. Investment in these sectors would initiate economic development due to 
their inter-relations with other industries.  
All sectors are classified using the international standard for industry classification (ISIC), 
and their numbers are also provided for verification. The present work may be used by 
policymakersto determine which sectors of the economy to stimulate (for example, using 
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creating extra final demand, decreasing taxes, or with the help of subsiding) to gain better 
results in the sphere of economic development of Nigeria. However, it must be mentioned 
that the analysis is based on the assumption of fixed input and output coefficients, i.e. that 
they remained unchanged since 2010. 
2.4 Overview of FDI in Nigeria 
2.4.1 Pre-colonial era  
Nigeria’s economic relationship with the global economy existed before the creation of the 
country in 1914. The two main regions, the northern savannas and the southern forest 
regions, had trade relationships with countries within Africa and beyond. A notable and well 
established international trade activity was the Trans-Saharan trade of the northern region of 
the country. This involved trade between the northern region and the North African countries, 
Europe, and the Middle East. In the southern regions, trade was concentrated on the coastal 
regions. The geographical proximity to the Atlantic Ocean facilitated trade with different 
countries in the southern region. The ports of the Bights of Benin and Biafra hosted the major 
trade transactions of the southern region. European countries led by Britain, France and 
Germany were the major trading partners with Nigeria.  
 
Within Nigeria, the two major navigable rivers: rivers Niger and Benue were the channels in 
which items of trade were navigated out of the region. The major items of trade in both the 
northern and southern regions were salt, leather goods, weapons, textiles, and slaves. These 
were traded by barter for items such as beads, iron, copper, and cowries. Between the 
sixteenth and nineteenth century, the slave trade was the most important economic activity in 
the region (Falola & Heaton, 2008). Indigenous leaders were deeply involved in the slave 
trade as a major source of revenue for their interests such as reinforcing their empire with 
military weapons against their opponents. Thus, slave trade was promoted by the traditional 
leaders and middlemen in both the centralised communities in the northern region and the 
southwest regions and the decentralised regions of the southeast region. This lucrative trade 
continued till about 1850 despite its abolition by the British in 1807.  
 
With the decline of the slave trade in the 1850s, attention was shifted towards “legitimate 
commerce” which was dominated by the trade in palm products. Initially, the European firms 
which engaged in trade with Nigeria conducted trade from the bights of the southern region. 
These firms did not operate beyond the coastal regions due to fear of contracting malaria and 
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unfamiliarity of the geographic structure of the interior of Nigeria among other reasons. As a 
result, they relied on intermediaries in the Delta and Calabar regions of southern Nigeria for 
trade negotiations. These indigenous middlemen became unreliable to their trading partners 
especially the British firms who gave them credit facilities on which they constantly 
defaulted. As a result of this unfavourable dependence on the middlemen, the British firms 
sought ways of bypassing these middlemen to operate directly in the interior parts of Nigeria. 
Expeditions made by Dr William Balfour Baikie in 1854 on the river Niger led to the 
demystification of the complexities attributed to the region (Falola & Heaton, 2008). Baike 
also made use of the quinine drug as a preventive measure against malaria infection. His 
success in the interior of the region inspired Macgregor Laird to establish the first steamer 
business in the Niger in 1857 (Falola & Heaton, 2008). Although the business folded up after 
some time due to competition from within and outside the region, its existence proved that 
foreign firms could survive in the interiors of the region and therefore bypass the useless 
coastal middlemen. As a result of this revelation, different firms originating from Britain, 
France and Germany began expanding their operations towards the interior of the region, 
especially along the major rivers. The expansion of French and Germans firms towards rivers 
Niger and Benue posed a threat to the British interests in the region. To counter the feared 
competition, the British granted a royal charter to a British firm, the Royal Niger Company in 
1893. The charter gave the company, which was owned by George Goldie, control of the 
trade policies in the Niger. The Royal Niger Company consolidated with both British and 
French firms to become the largest firm in the Niger. This dominance led to the crowding out 
of both foreign and indigenous firms in the region.  
 
This account of foreign operations in the pre-colonial era reveals the plausible reasons for 
investing in Nigeria. This sub-section has shown that amongst other attractions to the region, 
the primary pull factors were the availability of agricultural and human resources. The main 
agricultural resource was palm oil and the basic human resource was in the availability of 
slaves due to the large population of the region. Trade in these items was enhanced by the 
geographical proximity of the region to the Atlantic Ocean. The two navigable rivers within 
the interior of Nigeria, rivers Niger and Benue also became an attraction due to their links to 
other countries in the continent. These attractions lead to the scramble for establishing lasting 
interests in the area by European firms. British firms succeeded in dominating the 
commercial activities in the region, curbing competition from French, German and local 
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firms. Thus, Nigeria has been an important destination for FDI. Its strategic location at the 
coast of the Atlantic and its abundant human resources are the most likely pull factors.  
 
2.4.2 Colonial Era  
Amongst the reasons for the colonisation of Nigeria by the British government, the trading 
interest of the British is of particular interest to this study. To secure their economic interests 
in the region, British firms called upon their government to take control of the Nigerian 
territory as a means of regulating the growing competition experienced in the region. The 
main threats to the British firms were the increased entrance of firms from other European 
countries such as France and Germany and the monopolistic practices of the indigenous 
middlemen in the coastal regions of the Nigeria territory (Falola & Heaton, 2008). Thus the 
perception at that time was that a take over of the territory by the British would ensure that 
the economic interests of the British firms were duly protected (Aremu, 2003). Colonization 
of Nigeria had started since 1861, but the amalgamation of the Nigerian territories only 
occurred in 1914, under the leadership of Frederick Lugard (Falola & Heaton, 2008).  
 
In general, the main activity undertaken by the colonial administration was the 
exploitation/extraction of Nigeria’s agricultural, mineral and human resources. According to 
the Dual Mandate established by the colonial administration, the activities of the colonial 
government would satisfy the interest of both the British and Nigerians. The British 
administration aimed at expanding trade by boosting the exportation of raw materials such as 
cocoa, oil palm, groundnuts, coal, tin and columbite and the importation of finished goods 
(Adeoti, 2002). Also, to enhance the trading activities within the region, the colonial 
government implemented rapid infrastructural development within Nigeria. Of particular 
significance in that period, was the development of transportation infrastructure to aid trade 
within and outside the territory.  
 
The firms that conducted businesses in Nigeria were not all British, as French, Dutch and 
German firms were also operating in the region. The activities of the foreign firms constituted 
a large majority of the external trade on Nigeria, and enormous profits were made by these 
firms. At that time, the economy of Nigeria was largely controlled by international demand 
for the products of Nigerian farmers and traders (Adeoti, 2002). The administration promoted 
the production for exportation of cash crops such as groundnuts from the northern region of 
Nigeria; cocoa from the southwestern region; and palm oil from the southeastern and delta 
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regions. The profits made by these firms were repatriated to their respective countries while 
the Nigerian workforce used to accomplish their aims received marginal wages. Thus an 
assessment of the impact of the activities of the foreign firms on the indigenous citizens could 
be ambiguous, as their operations employed the indigenes in both the upstream and 
downstream sectors, on the one hand, but led to crowding out of local firms and exploitation 
through poor wages, on the other hand. In general, before the Second World War, the 
activities of the foreign firms which, according to the Dual Mandate, would be of benefit to 
the indigenous population, had no significant positive effect on them before.  
 
A major change in the policies of the colonial government occurred after the Second World 
War. As a result of the emergence of an indigenous elite class, the colonial administration 
was pressured towards engaging in nationalistic policies. Thus the British controlled 
government undertook developmental projects that were more beneficial to the indigenous 
citizens. The pressure laid on them also resulted in the shift from extractive activities which 
characterised the operations of the foreign firms to manufacturing activities. As the call for 
nationalisation mounted, the colonial administration enacted laws to ensure that the interest 
of the British owned firms was protected. The pioneer manufacturing British manufacturing 
firms were given preferential treatment through legal amendments. Aremu (2003) and 
Ogbuagu (1983) outlines the policies that were put in place prior to independence as Aid to 
Pioneer Industries Ordinance of 1952; Income Tax Ordinance of 1952; Industrial 
Development (Import Duties Relief) Acts of 1957; Industrial Development (Income Tax 
Relief) Act of 1958; Custom Duties (Dumped and Subsidized) Acts of 1958; Customs 
Drawback Regulations of 1959 and the Income Tax Act of 1959. These amendments and 
laws were all geared towards ensuring that the British firms remained dominant in the region 
after independence.   
 
2.4.3 Post-Independence Era  
The end of the colonial rule occurred on the 1st of October 1960 when Nigeria gained 
independence from the British government. The policies that were put in place to favour the 
foreign pioneer firms were still in effect for two years after independence. However, in 1962, 
the liberal policies towards the activities of foreign firms began to shrink. The Exchange rate 
Control Act of 1962 demanded the permission of the Nigerian Minister of Finance for 
payments outside the country. Another drift from the liberal policies towards foreigners was 
the campaign that Nigerians must occupy key positions in the ownership and control of the 
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factors of production (Aremu, 2003). Three regional indigenous universities were established, 
with significant R&D institutes to enhance the capability of Nigerians in scientific and 
industrial research and technology (Adeoti, 2002). Thus, although foreign investment was 
promoted, indigenous participation was gradually enforced. A further departure from the 
liberal policies came in the form of bureaucratic obstacles imposed on potential foreign firms 
wishing to invest in Nigeria. The Immigration Act of 1963 demands that foreign firms 
wishing to operate in Nigeria must be granted a ‘Business Permit’ and an ‘Approval Status’ 
before being allowed to operate in the territory. The general perception in this period was the 
lack of trust on the activities of the foreign firms by the indigenous ruling class. Thus, a 
gradual departure from the liberal policies was experienced in the mid-1960s  
 
2.4.4 Indigenisation Era  
The Indigenisation Era is a crucial period in studies on FDI in Nigeria. The lack of growth in 
the absolute values of FDI in Nigeria during the 1970s could be attributed to the effects of the 
indigenisation policies. However, it should be noted that era which involved 
“Nigerianisation” of the economy started in the colonial era. After the Second World War, 
the growing pressure from the indigenous elite led to the consideration of placing Nigerians 
at the helm of affairs during the colonial era. The first of such attempt towards 
“Nigerianisation” was the establishment of a Marketing Board System which gave the 
Nigerian government control over the marketing of Nigeria’s export crops (Ogbuagu, 1983). 
This followed the mild restrictive measures adopted post-1962, which has been mentioned in 
the previous section. In 1966, the country witnessed two military coups which led to the 
installation of Gen John Aguyi-Ironsi in January; and later the instalment of General Yakubu 
Gowon in July of the same year, after the assassination of the former. Under General 
Gowon’s rule, preludes to the indigenisation policy included Companies Act of 1968; 
Banking Act of 1969; Petroleum Act of 1969; and Patents and Design Act of 1970. These 
were basically measures to ensure greater indigenous participation in the different aspects of 
the economy.  
 
The actual indigenisation decree was declared in 1971 under Gowon’s administration. The 
basic aims of the decree were threefold: The first was to increase the opportunities of 
Nigerian businessmen; the second was to promote the retention of profits into the economy; 
and the third was to promote foreign investment in specific sectors such as intermediate and 
capital goods production sectors (Ogbuagu, 1983). The indigenisation era came in three 
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statutes: Nigeria Enterprise Promotion Act of 1972; The Nigerian Enterprise Promotion Act 
of 1977; and The Nigerian Enterprise Promotion Act of 1987. Enterprises in Nigeria were 
classified into three schedules: Schedule I, Schedule II and Schedule III.  
 
Schedule I enterprises consisted of companies in which the ownerships were reserved 
exclusively for Nigerians. Foreigners were therefore not allowed to participate in the 
ownership or control of the listed enterprises. These enterprises include selected companies in 
the following categories: small-scale industries, medium scale industries, processing 
industries, services sector, transportation industry, entertainment, media, and retail trade 
(Ogbuagu, 1983).  
 
Schedule II requires foreigners to invest a maximum of 40% of the equity in the listed 
enterprises. These enterprises included some large-scale import substitution industries, 
processing industries, food industries, commercial activities, transportation, construction 
industries, etc. (Ogbuagu, 1983).  
 
The promulgation of the Nigerian Enterprise Promotion Act of 1977 led to a revision of 
Schedule I and Schedule II, and the addition of an entirely new schedule, Schedule III. The 
reviews of the first two schedules were merely the removal of a few enterprises listed 
previous Act. However, Schedule III involved the extension of the limit of foreign 
participation to 60%, especially in sectors with high technological requirements (Aremu, 
2003).  
 
The indigenisation era marked the most restrictive measures towards foreign direct 
investment in Nigeria’s history. It is, therefore, not surprising that volume of FDI inflows in 
Nigeria was somewhat stagnant during this era. However, this poses some interesting 
questions regarding the lack of distrust on the activities of foreign firms in the region. Did 
Nigerians experience strong crowding out effects or negative spillovers before the 
indigenisation era? Alternatively, wasindigenisation motivated by mere political sentiment? 
A notable number of studies and commentaries have attributed the motivation of 
indigenisation policies to the lack cooperation of the foreign firms with the Nigerian 
government in difficult situations such as the civil war which lasted between 1967 and 1970 




2.4.5 Investment promotion Era  
The indigenisation era was followed by another period of restrictive measures. Under the 
leadership of General Olusegun Obasanjo, the National Office of Industrial Property Act of 
1979 was enacted. The major aim of this act was to scrutinise imported technology coming 
into Nigeria. The idea was to narrow the domestic technological gap by channelling imported 
technology to specific priority areas (Aremu, 2003). Thus, the act required that foreign firms 
would be scrutinised at the entry stage to ensure that they conformed to the objectives of the 
act.  
 
In the wake of global calls for more FDI promotion in the 1980s, the Nigerian government 
sought measures to soft-peddle the restrictive measures imposed during the 1970s. This led to 
the promulgation of the Nigerian Enterprise Promotion Act of 1987. The basic addition made 
to the 1977 act was that under the 1987 act, foreign firms were given the opportunity to 
increase their percentage holdings in any enterprise without increasing their voting power 
(Aremu, 2003).  
 
The most recent promotional acts that confirmed the “open” status of the country were the 
creation of the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission (NIPC) and the Foreign 
Exchange Monitoring and Miscellaneous Provision (FEMAMP) in 1995. In particular, the 
establishment of NIPC marked the transition of Nigeria to a country completely open to FDI. 
The agency is, therefore, a member of the World Association of Investment Promotion 
Agencies. The main objectives of NIPC are to coordinate and monitor all investments in the 
country. The various departments of NIPC engage in diverse activities such as the provision 
of a one-stop investment centre, investment promotion, investor relations, policy 
implementation and external relationsamong others.  
 
The government of Nigeria has over time, developed other schemes that indirectly affected 
FDI in the country. One of such schemes was the Export Processing Free Zones Scheme 
(EPFZS). The scheme provided incentives to businesses which engaged in the exportation of 
goods and services. Demarcated zones called Export Processing Zones (EPZs) were set up, 
and the management of these zones was delegated to the Nigerian Export Processing Zones 
Authority (NEPZA). Other notable efforts to promote FDI in Nigeria included granting of 
Pioneer Status which gave a tax holiday to qualified firms and legal provisions that enabled 
repatriation of profits (UNCTAD, 2008).  
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Figure 2-11.Inward Flow of FDI in USD (Billions) 
#
(Source: fDi Intelligence report 2016) 
 
As a result, a large inflow of FDI has come to Nigeria seeking benefits from these incentives. 
Figure 3-1 above shows the change in FDI from the UNCTAD database. The data show a 
sharp increase from 2000 to 2009 as those where the years that the majorprivatisations took 
place. However, the flow of FDI started as far back as 1970 but did not pick up until 1989 
due to political instability. In the last three years, FDI has begun to decline, and this is mainly 
due to fall in commodity prices. 
From 2003 to 2015, the oil industry contributed more foreign investment in capital into the 
country in that, it contributed about 60% of the total investment for the period. The diagram 
below classified sectors based on capital investment received between 2003 and 2015.  The 


































































Figure 2-12. Percentage Share of Capital Investment by Sectors 2003-2015 
#
(Source: fDi Intelligence report 2016) 
 
The communication sector took more projects than any other singular sector from 2003 to 
2015 as this was the era of technology innovation and also the era of internet breakthrough. 
The software and IT service sector attracted quite a different amount of FDI projects for the 





























Figure 2-13. Number of FDI Project by Sectors 2003-2015 
#
(Source: fDi Intelligence report 2016) 
 
The top investor in Nigeria as of 2015 was the United States, followed by France and the 
United Kingdom. The diagram below shows the pie chart of FDI by country of origin. The 
combination of South-Korea, China, UAE, Japan and India is around 34% exceeding that of 




























Figure 2-14.FDI by Country of Origin in Percentage 
#

























Table 2-5 Backward and Forward Linkages Using the Chenery-Watanabe Method 
ISIC   Activities Backward Linkages BL Coefficient Category Forward 
Linkages 
FL Coefficient Category 
01 Crop and Animal production, hunting and related service activities 0.261 0.379 wB 1.732 2.516 sF 
02 Forestry and logging  0.463 0.672 wB 0.546 0.794 wF 
03 Fish and aquaculture 0.608 0.883 wB 0.193 0.281 wF 
05 Mining of Coal and lignite 0.456 0.662 wB 0.018 0.026 wF 
06 Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas 0.348 0.506 wB 1.896 2.754 sF 
07 Mining of metal ores 0.436 0.634 wB 0.028 0.041 wF 
08 Other Mining and Quarrying 0.708 1.028 sB 0.108 0.156 wF 
10 Manufacture of Food Products 0.991 1.440 sB 2.114 3.071 sF 
11 Manufacture of Beverages 0.999 1.451 sB 0.226 0.329 wF 
12 Manufacture of Tobacco  0.982 1.426 sB 0.009 0.013 wF 
13 Manufacture of Textiles 1.000 1.452 sB 0.801 1.163 sF 
14 Manufacture of Wearing apparel 0.988 1.435 sB 0.280 0.406 wF 
15 Manufacture of Leather Footwear 0.997 1.449 sB 0.384 0.558 wF 
16 Manufacture of wood and wood products 0.617 0.896 wB 0.136 0.198 wF 
17 Manufacture of paper and paper products 0.555 0.807 wB 0.396 0.576 wF 
19 Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products 0.893 1.297 sB 0.986 1.432 sF 
20+21 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products and pharmaceutical preparations 0.704 1.023 sB 1.779 2.584 sF 
22 Manufacture of rubber and plastics products 0.766 1.112 sB 0.361 0.525 wF 
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23 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products including Cement  0.865 1.256 sB 0.486 0.706 wF 
24 Manufacture of basic metals 0.763 1.109 sB 0.118 0.171 wF 
25 Manufacture of fabricated metal products 0.998 1.449 sB 0.109 0.158 wF 
26+27 Manufacture of electronic and optical products and electrical equipment 0.826 1.200 sB 0.652 0.948 wF 
29 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 0.975 1.416 sB 1.022 1.484 sF 
28+30 Manufacture of machinery and equipment 0.998 1.450 sB 0.338 0.492 wF 
31 Manufacture of furniture 1.000 1.452 sB 0.847 1.231 sF 
32 Other Manufacturing 0.501 0.728 wB 1.652 2.401 sF 
35 Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 0.477 0.692 wB 0.320 0.465 wF 
36-39 Water collection, waste collection, Remediation, and Sewage  0.991 1.440 sB 1.063 1.545 sF 
41-43 Construction  0.833 1.210 sB 0.596 0.866 wF 
45 Repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 1.000 1.453 sB 0.000 0.000 wF 
46 Wholesale trade  1.000 1.453 sB 1.521 2.210 sF 
47 Retail trade  1.000 1.453 sB 1.521 2.210 sF 
49 Land transport and transport via pipelines 1.000 1.453 sB 0.705 1.024 sF 
50 Water Transport 0.542 0.787 wB 0.206 0.300 wF 
51 Air Transport 0.734 1.066 sB 0.168 0.243 wF 
52 Warehousing and support activities for transportation 0.470 0.683 wB 0.807 1.172 sF 
53 Postal and courier activities 0.258 0.375 wB 0.036 0.052 wF 
55+56 Accommodation and Food and beverage service activities 0.653 0.949 wB 0.181 0.263 wF 
58+59+60 Publishing activities, Motion picture, video and television programme production, sound 
recording and broadcasting activities 
0.999 1.451 sB 0.046 0.067 wF 
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61 Telecommunications  0.561 0.815 wB 2.315 3.362 sF 
64+65 Financial services, insurance and pension funding  0.188 0.273 wB 1.629 2.367 sF 
68 Real estate activities 0.194 0.281 wB 1.507 2.189 sF 
69-75 Professional, scientific and technical activities 0.484 0.703 wB 2.064 2.999 sF 
77 Administrative and support service activities 0.395 0.575 wB 1.013 1.471 sF 
84 Public administration  0.456 0.662 wB 0.354 0.514 wF 
85 Education  0.489 0.710 wB 0.002 0.004 wF 
86-88 Human health and social work activities 0.502 0.730 wB 0.002 0.003 wF 
90-93 Creative, arts and entertainment activities 0.451 0.655 wB 0.035 0.051 wF 
94-99 Other Services activities 0.356 0.518 wB 0.423 0.615 wF 



















Table 2-6 Backward and Forward Linkages Using Rasmussen Method 
ISIC   Activities Backward 
Linkages 
BL Coefficient Category Forward 
Linkages 
FL Coefficient Category 
01 Crop and Animal production, hunting and related service activities 1.52 0.328 wB 14.09 3.041 sF 
02 Forestry and logging  5.01 1.081 sB 2.00 0.433 wF 
03 Fish and aquaculture 2.65 0.572 wB 1.28 0.276 wF 
05 Mining of Coal and lignite 2.18 0.470 wB 1.03 0.221 wF 
06 Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas 1.86 0.402 wB 7.14 1.541 sF 
07 Mining of metal ores 1.95 0.420 wB 1.05 0.226 wF 
08 Other Mining and Quarrying 3.53 0.762 wB 1.35 0.292 wF 
10 Manufacture of Food Products 3.16 0.683 wB 9.08 1.959 sF 
11 Manufacture of Beverages 4.16 0.898 wB 1.70 0.367 wF 
12 Manufacture of Tobacco  3.63 0.782 wB 1.04 0.224 wF 
13 Manufacture of Textiles 7.17 1.548 sB 5.20 1.121 sF 
14 Manufacture of Wearing apparel 4.47 0.964 wB 1.88 0.405 wF 
15 Manufacture of Leather Footwear 4.24 0.915 wB 1.70 0.367 wF 
16 Manufacture of wood and wood products 3.24 0.700 wB 1.29 0.279 wF 
17 Manufacture of paper and paper products 2.89 0.623 wB 1.80 0.388 wF 
19 Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products 2.82 0.607 wB 3.43 0.740 wF 
20+21 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products and pharmaceutical preparations 3.09 0.667 wB 4.43 0.956 wF 
22 Manufacture of rubber and plastics products 2.70 0.583 wB 1.81 0.392 wF 
23 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products including Cement  3.24 0.699 wB 1.96 0.423 wF 
24 Manufacture of basic metals 4.53 0.979 wB 1.39 0.301 wF 
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25 Manufacture of fabricated metal products 2.44 0.527 wB 1.19 0.256 wF 
26+27 Manufacture of electronic and optical products and electrical equipment 4.44 0.958 wB 2.18 0.470 wF 
29 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 10.34 2.230 sB 10.57 2.280 sF 
28+30 Manufacture of machinery and equipment 5.12 1.104 sB 1.56 0.337 wF 
31 Manufacture of furniture 8.95 1.932 sB 5.60 1.209 sF 
32 Other Manufacturing 2.66 0.575 wB 3.53 0.762 wF 
35 Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 2.23 0.481 wB 1.64 0.353 wF 
36-39 Water collection, waste collection, Remediation, and Sewage  68.16 14.708 sB 77.61 16.749 sF 
41-43 Construction  3.95 0.852 wB 2.30 0.497 wF 
45 Repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 3.75 0.809 wB 1.00 0.216 wF 
46 Wholesale trade  3.80 0.820 wB 5.96 1.285 sF 
47 Retail trade  3.80 0.820 wB 5.96 1.285 sF 
49 Land transport and transport via pipelines 4.07 0.878 wB 2.96 0.639 wF 
50 Water Transport 2.66 0.574 wB 1.98 0.427 wF 
51 Air Transport 2.66 0.573 wB 1.51 0.327 wF 
52 Warehousing and support activities for transportation 2.40 0.518 wB 2.89 0.624 wF 
53 Postal and courier activities 1.69 0.365 wB 1.08 0.233 wF 
55+56 Accommodation and Food and beverage service activities 2.60 0.561 wB 1.36 0.293 wF 
58+59+60 Publishing activities, Motion picture, video and television programme production, sound 
recording and broadcasting activities 
3.14 0.678 wB 1.07 0.232 wF 
61 Telecommunications  2.30 0.495 wB 6.88 1.484 sF 
64+65 Financial services, insurance and pension funding  1.44 0.311 wB 4.22 0.910 wF 
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68 Real estate activities 1.35 0.292 wB 3.94 0.851 wF 
69-75 Professional, scientific and technical activities 2.14 0.463 wB 4.85 1.046 wF 
77 Administrative and support service activities 2.17 0.469 wB 3.52 0.759 wF 
84 Public administration  2.32 0.501 wB 1.75 0.377 wF 
85 Education  2.07 0.446 wB 1.00 0.216 wF 
86-88 Human health and social work activities 2.43 0.525 wB 1.00 0.216 wF 
90-93 Creative, arts and entertainment activities 2.26 0.488 wB 1.06 0.229 wF 
94-99 Other Services activities 1.68 0.363 wB 2.24 0.484 wF 























Table 2-7 Key sectors (K), Sectors with Strong Forward Linkages (sF), Sectors with Strong Backward Linkages (sB), Sector with Weak Linkages (W) 
  CW  Rasmussen   
ISIC   Activities BL FL BL FL Results 
01 Crop and Animal production, hunting and related service activities wB sF wB sF K 
02 Forestry and logging  wB wF sB wF sB 
03 Fish and aquaculture wB wF wB wF W 
05 Mining of Coal and lignite wB wF wB wF W 
06 Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas wB sF wB sF sF 
07 Mining of metal ores wB wF wB wF W 
08 Other Mining and Quarrying sB wF wB wF sB 
10 Manufacture of Food Products sB sF wB sF K 
11 Manufacture of Beverages sB wF wB wF sB 
12 Manufacture of Tobacco  sB wF wB wF sB 
13 Manufacture of Textiles sB sF sB sF K 
14 Manufacture of Wearing apparel sB wF wB wF sB 
15 Manufacture of Leather Footwear sB wF wB wF sB 
16 Manufacture of wood and wood products wB wF wB wF W 
17 Manufacture of paper and paper products wB wF wB wF W 
19 Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products sB sF wB wF K 
20+21 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products and pharmaceutical preparations sB sF wB wF K 
22 Manufacture of rubber and plastics products sB wF wB wF sB 
23 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products including Cement  sB wF wB wF sB 
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24 Manufacture of basic metals sB wF wB wF sB 
25 Manufacture of fabricated metal products sB wF wB wF sB 
26+27 Manufacture of electronic and optical products and electrical equipment sB wF wB wF sB 
29 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers sB sF sB sF K 
28+30 Manufacture of machinery and equipment sB wF sB wF K 
31 Manufacture of furniture sB sF sB sF K 
32 Other Manufacturing wB sF wB wF sF 
35 Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply wB wF wB wF W 
36-39 Water collection, waste collection, Remediation, and Sewage  sB sF sB sF K 
41-43 Construction  sB wF wB wF sB 
45 Repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles sB wF wB wF sB 
46 Wholesale trade  sB sF wB sF K 
47 Retail trade  sB sF wB sF K 
49 Land transport and transport via pipelines sB sF wB wF K 
50 Water Transport wB wF wB wF W 
51 Air Transport sB wF wB wF sB 
52 Warehousing and support activities for transportation wB sF wB wF sF 
53 Postal and courier activities wB wF wB wF W 
55+56 Accommodation and Food and beverage service activities wB wF wB wF W 
58+59+60 Publishing activities, Motion picture, video and television programme production, sound recording and 
broadcasting activities 
sB wF wB wF sB 
61 Telecommunications  wB sF wB sF K 
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64+65 Financial services, insurance and pension funding  wB sF wB wF sF 
68 Real estate activities wB sF wB wF sF 
69-75 Professional, scientific and technical activities wB sF wB wF sF 
77 Administrative and support service activities wB sF wB wF sF 
84 Public administration  wB wF wB wF W 
85 Education  wB wF wB wF W 
86-88 Human health and social work activities wB wF wB wF W 
90-93 Creative, arts and entertainment activities wB wF wB wF W 


















Appendix 1 Inter-Industry Transaction Table of Nigeria for the 2010 year in basic prices (in thousands of Naira) 
 ISIC 01 02 94-99  Final Consumption Expenditure  EXPORTS  Capital Formation     
  Crop and Animal   
Total                 
production, Forestry Other         Fixed        Intermediate Household       Changes in  Final Demand IMPORTS TOTAL OUTPUTS  
ISIC Activities hunting and and service NPISH Government TOTAL Goods Service TOTAL Capital TOTAL  
Consumption Expenditures Inventories       
related service logging activities       Formation                      
  activities                  
 Crop and Animal                   
 production, hunting and                   
01 related service activities 3492431 0 0 6,939,539 11744636 0 0 11744636 375605 0 375605 18303935 1845444 20149379 32,269,620 165,693 39,043,466  
02 Forestry and logging 484 82140 0 201,753 0 0 0 0 30811 0 30811 294122 0 294122 324,934 5,642 521,044  
03 Fish and aquaculture 0 199 0 68,486 302051 0 0 302051 217 0 217 0 0 0 302,268 253 370,501  
05 Mining of Coal and lignite 0 0 0 6,166 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7764 0 7764 7,764 35 13,894  
 Human health and social                   
86-88 work activities 0 0 36 1,657 96663 47308 329080 473050 0 0 0 0 0 0 473,050 0 474,707  
 Creative, arts and                   
90-93 entertainment activities 0 0 0 58,419 16248 25633 93749 135630 11 0 11 0 0 0 135,641 48 194,011  
94-99 Other Services activities 0 0 41104 708,866 636130 2263 0 638394 0 0 0 0 94814 94814 733,208 0 1,442,074  
 Direct purchases abroad by                   
 residents 0 0 0 0 85,530 0 0 85,530 0 0 0 0 0 0 85,530 0 85,530  
 Purchases on the domestic                   
 territory by non-residents 0 0 0 0 -836,613 0 0 -836,613 836,613 0 836,613 0 0 0 0 0 0  
 Total Inputs at basic price 4,474,691 116,945 498,335 57,902,885 34,099,517 224,480 4,832,145 39,815,981 13,778,305 304,003 12,972,589 79,502,500 19,852,768 96,084,731 148,873,301 2,435,158 204,341,028  
 Other taxes on products 2144 11 0 0 0 0 0 0   0    0 0 0  
 
TOTAL AT 
PURCHASERS'                   
 PRICES 4476835 116956 498335 57,902,885 34,099,517 224,480 4,832,145 39,815,981 13,778,305 304,003 12,972,589 79,502,500 19,852,768 96,084,731 148,873,301 2,435,158 204,341,028  
 Compensation of employees 92290 834 306,008 14,626,616               
 Other net taxes on                   
 production -5478 3 41,548 296,267               
 Consumption of fixed                   
 capital 11158 31 5,506 2,450,720               
 Operating surplus, net 12565490 134,852 546,960 37,232,856               
 Value added at basic prices 12,663,460 135,721 900,023 54,606,459               
 TOTAL INPUTS 17,140,295 252,677 1,398,358 112,509,345               


















! ISIC! 01! 05! 06! 10! 12! 13! 17! 19! 20+21! 25! 29! 31! 36.39! 41.43! 45! 46! 47! 49! 55!+56! 61!
01! Crop!and!Animal!production,!hunting!
and!related!service!activities!
0.20376! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.62054! 0.01769! 0.00282! 0.00018! 0.00000! 0.15735! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.31098! 0.31098! 0.00000! 0.09251! 0.00000!
05! Mining!of!Coal!and!lignite! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00006! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00026! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000!
06! Extraction!of!crude!petroleum!and!
natural!gas!
0.00000! 0.00000! 0.11127! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00004! 0.80787! 0.00004! 0.00000! 0.00001! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.09361! 0.09361! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000!
10! Manufacture!of!Food!Products! 0.00008! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.18777! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.02683! 0.00000! 0.27197! 0.00000! 0.00275! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00005! 0.00000! 0.27956! 0.27956! 0.00002! 0.15486! 0.00007!
12! Manufacture!of!Tobacco!! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00580! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00089! 0.00089! 0.00000! 0.00108! 0.00000!
13! Manufacture!of!Textiles! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.70051! 0.00009! 0.00000! 0.00027! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00003! 0.00000! 0.04450! 0.04450! 0.00000! 0.00310! 0.00000!
17! Manufacture!of!paper!and!paper!
products!
0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.04799! 0.00000! 0.03473! 0.00000! 0.01605! 0.00000! 0.00228! 0.00000! 0.00007! 0.00019! 0.00000! 0.00224! 0.00224! 0.00188! 0.00030! 0.00250!
19! Manufacture!of!coke!and!refined!
petroleum!products!




0.00210! 0.00000! 0.00605! 0.00251! 0.05271! 0.00000! 0.26814! 0.00006! 0.03254! 0.00000! 0.00302! 0.00000! 0.00071! 0.00093! 0.00000! 0.00513! 0.00513! 0.00746! 0.00506! 0.00771!
25! Manufacture!of!!fabricated!metal!
products!
0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00053! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00008! 0.00000! 0.00007! 0.00503! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000!
29! Manufacture!of!motor!vehicles,!
trailers!and!semiKtrailers!
0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.86049! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00371! 0.00000! 0.00710! 0.00710! 0.05479! 0.00054! 0.00678!
31! Manufacture!of!furniture! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.81150! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000!
36K39! Water!collection,!waste!collection,!
Remediation,!and!Sewage!!
0.00039! 0.00000! 0.00001! 0.00006! 0.00116! 0.00000! 0.00214! 0.00001! 0.00173! 0.00000! 0.00031! 0.00000! 0.98506! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00018! 0.00018! 0.00044! 0.00166! 0.00004!
41K43! Construction!! 0.00002! 0.06098! 0.00005! 0.00002! 0.00048! 0.00000! 0.00001! 0.00001! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00008! 0.48799! 0.00000! 0.00004! 0.00004! 0.00055! 0.00064! 0.00041!
45! Repair!of!motor!vehicles!and!
motorcycles!
0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000!
46! Wholesale!trade!! 0.01577! 0.00274! 0.00879! 0.06240! 0.04790! 0.07321! 0.04513! 0.03682! 0.05092! 0.00000! 0.03473! 0.07719! 0.00038! 0.02444! 0.03399! 0.05868! 0.05868! 0.01950! 0.02308! 0.00514!
47! Retail!trade!! 0.01577! 0.00274! 0.00879! 0.06240! 0.04790! 0.07321! 0.04513! 0.03682! 0.05092! 0.00000! 0.03473! 0.07719! 0.00038! 0.02444! 0.03399! 0.05868! 0.05868! 0.01950! 0.02308! 0.00514!
49! Land!transport!and!transport!via!
pipelines!
0.00126! 0.00085! 0.00263! 0.00538! 0.08535! 0.00731! 0.00392! 0.00001! 0.00197! 0.00000! 0.00982! 0.01574! 0.00035! 0.01313! 0.00495! 0.00901! 0.00835! 0.15534! 0.00205! 0.04389!
55+56! Accommodation!and!Food!and!
beverage!service!activities!
0.00003! 0.00000! 0.00001! 0.00004! 0.00081! 0.00019! 0.00116! 0.00000! 0.00686! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00003! 0.00150! 0.00000! 0.00064! 0.00064! 0.00972! 0.00752! 0.00477!
61! Telecommunications!! 0.00007! 0.00000! 0.06864! 0.00081! 0.01696! 0.00000! 0.04030! 0.00003! 0.01912! 0.00033! 0.00000! 0.00000! 0.00006! 0.01138! 0.00000! 0.00198! 0.00198! 0.10666! 0.05990! 0.13062!
! TOTAL! 1.00! 1.00! 1.00! 1.00! 1.00! 1.00! 1.00! 1.00! 1.00! 1.00! 1.00! 1.00! 1.00! 1.00! 1.00! 1.00! 1.00! 1.00! 1.00! 1.00!
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Appendix 3 Rankings of Backward and Forward Linkages for 2010 
  Backward Linkages  Forward Linkages  
  CW Rasmussen CW Rasmussen 
ISIC   Activities UBL WBL UBL WBL UFL WFL UFL WFL 
01 Crop and Animal production, hunting and related service activities 46 3 47 3 6 1 2 1 
02 Forestry and logging  38 39 6 26 22 12 23 18 
03 Fish and aquaculture 28 34 30 35 34 14 39 16 
05 Mining of Coal and lignite 39 46 39 46 45 34 46 34 
06 Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas 45 4 44 4 4 2 5 2 
07 Mining of metal ores 42 47 43 47 44 33 44 35 
08 Other Mining and Quarrying 24 33 18 34 40 28 37 24 
10 Manufacture of Food Products 13 2 21 5 2 36 4 ــــ 
11 Manufacture of Beverages 7 18 11 18 32 36 31 ــــ 
12 Manufacture of Tobacco  15 42 17 43 46 36 45 ــــ 
13 Manufacture of Textiles 5 15 4 13 18 36 10 ــــ 
14 Manufacture of Wearing apparel 14 36 8 37 31 36 26 ــــ 
15 Manufacture of Leather Footwear 11 14 10 16 26 36 30 ــــ 
16 Manufacture of wood and wood products 27 32 19 32 37 21 38 20 
17 Manufacture of paper and paper products 30 41 24 41 25 25 28 29 
19 Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products 17 11 25 14 15 10 17 11 
20+21 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products and pharmaceutical preparations 25 22 23 23 5 16 12 22 
22 Manufacture of rubber and plastics products 21 37 26 40 27 23 27 26 
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23 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products including Cement  18 23 20 27 23 18 25 21 
24 Manufacture of basic metals 22 27 7 25 38 27 35 25 
25 Manufacture of fabricated metal products 10 28 32 38 39 36 40 ــــ 
26+27 Manufacture of electronic and optical products and electrical equipment 20 9 9 9 20 30 22 33 
29 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 16 7 2 2 13 19 3 19 
28+30 Manufacture of machinery and equipment 9 17 5 15 29 36 33 ــــ 
31 Manufacture of furniture 6 40 3 29 16 36 9 ــــ 
32 Other Manufacturing 33 12 27 11 7 11 15 13 
35 Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 36 45 38 45 30 13 32 17 
36-39 Water collection, waste collection, Remediation, and Sewage  12 49 1 49 12 15 1 9 
41-43 Construction  19 1 13 1 21 7 20 7 
45 Repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 1 19 16 20 49 36 49 ــــ 
46 Wholesale trade  2 5 14 6 9 36 8 ــــ 
47 Retail trade  3 5 15 7 9 36 7 ــــ 
49 Land transport and transport via pipelines 4 10 12 10 19 36 18 ــــ 
50 Water Transport 31 38 28 36 33 31 24 32 
51 Air Transport 23 35 29 39 36 26 34 27 
52 Warehousing and support activities for transportation 37 30 34 28 17 20 19 23 
53 Postal and courier activities 47 48 45 48 42 32 41 31 
55+56 Accommodation and Food and beverage service activities 26 26 31 31 35 17 36 15 
58+59+60 Publishing activities, Motion picture, video and television programme production, 
sound recording and broadcasting activities 
 ــــ 42 32 41 12 22 42 8
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61 Telecommunications  29 8 36 8 1 3 6 3 
64+65 Financial services, insurance and pension funding  49 25 48 22 8 6 13 6 
68 Real estate activities 48 24 49 24 11 4 14 4 
69-75 Professional, scientific and technical activities 35 16 41 17 3 5 11 5 
77 Administrative and support service activities 43 21 40 19 14 22 16 28 
84 Public administration  40 13 35 12 28 8 29 8 
85 Education  34 20 42 21 47 29 47 12 
86-88 Human health and social work activities 32 31 33 33 48 35 48 30 
90-93 Creative, arts and entertainment activities 41 43 37 42 43 24 43 14 
94-99 Other Services activities 44 29 46 30 24 9 21 10 
UBL- Unweighted Backward Linkages, WBL- Weighted Backward Linkages, UFL- Unweighted Forward Linkages, WFL- Weighted Forward Linkages 
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CHAPTER 3: Literature Review and the Nigerian Context 
3.1 Theories of FDI 
FDI theories encompass concepts of international production and international trade. 
International trade theories are developed to explain the motive underlining trade, trade 
patterns and benefits to nations as well as to individual firms. The theory of international 
production also tries to explain patterns and the reason for production activities in a foreign 
nation, envisaging that the propensity for a firm to engage in foreign production depends on 
the target market size. Kojima (1975) suggested that both trade and investment should be 
carried out according to the same principles of international division of labour and 
comparative costs. 
This study looks at relevant theories such asneoclassical trade theory, industrial organisation 
theory, transaction costs theory, the OLI paradigm, entry mode theory, product cycle theory, 
international trade theory, International production theory, monopolistic and oligopolistic 
theories. 
 
3.1.1 Neoclassical Trade theory  
The initial attempt to explain the theory of FDI was madewithin the neoclassical trade theory. 
The trade theory known as the Heckscher-Ohlin1 model gave the foundations for the 
formulation of FDI theory. The Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) model essentially advanced on the 
Ricardian model by introducing a second factor of production, capital (Markusen, 1995). 
Specifically, the model is based on three key assumptions: The first is that there are two 
factors of production (capital and labour); secondly, two countries exist (for example country 
A and B); and two perfectly competitive goods are produced. Hence the H-O model is 
characterised as a “2x2x2” model. A basic departure from the Ricardian model is the 
assumption that technologies between countries are identical. Thus the main difference 
between countries in the H-O model is the difference in factor endowments. By implication, 
countries have different factor intensities and different factor prices. Furthermore, it is 
assumed that factors are mobile within countries, but immobile between countries.  
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To illustrate the H-O model, assumptions are made based on two countries, A and B, where 
each produces two goods: a capital-intensive good and a labour intensive good. A is the 
abundant capital country, and B is the abundant labour country. The H-O theorem asserts that 
country A will export the capital-intensive good to country B while country B will export the 
labour intensive good (trade takes place). It is important to note that the due to the difference 
in factor prices between countries, the price of the capital-intensive good will be higher in the 
abundant labour country and vice versa2. Hence both countries will continue trading until the 
prices of the two goods are equal in both markets. The equality of price of the two goods 
implies equality of the factors between the two countries, as the price of factors is equivalent 
to their marginal products.  
 
A significant departure from the H-O model to the FDI theory involves the relaxation of the 
assumption that factors are immobile between countries. Thus, this makes provision for the 
fact that factor movements can also occur in the absence of trade. Mundell (1957) extended 
the analysis to argue that restrictions to trade would enhance factor movements and vice 
versa. The factor movements would be in the form of movements from a country of lower 
return to a country of higher return. In the case of capital movements, firms would move to 
countries where the returns to capital were relatively higher, in the quest for higher profits. 
The implication of Mundell’s assertion is that trade and capital movements are substitutes. In 
summary, the difference in returns to capital between countries is the basic reason for capital 
movements from one country to another. This capital movement from one country to another 
was regarded as a direct investment by neoclassical economists (Kindleberger, 1969).  
 
However, the neoclassical view towards FDI received criticism by some prominent scholars. 
In a doctoral dissertation, Hymer (1960) was the first to provide a credible criticism of the 
neoclassical theory of FDI. He questioned the notion that disparity in interest rates was the 
basis for capital movements and that FDI would not exist in the perfectly competitive market. 
According to Hymer, direct investment is the control (indicated by the extent of ownership) 
of an enterprise of a country by an enterprise of another country which involved capital 
movements. Moreover, the desire to undergo direct investment led to movements in direct 
investment which resulted in capital movements. This desire to undergo investment was the 
motivation for direct investment and not the differences in interest rates (Hymer, 1960). He 
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noted that the evidence for this viewpoint was seen in cases where capital moved from a 
country with the high-interest rate to a country with the low-interest rate. According to the 
neoclassical theory, the preceding statement would have been seen ascounter-intuitive. To 
contest the idea of perfect competition, Hymer noted that specific advantages which firms 
possessed were the main motivation for direct investment. Thus, Hymer viewed the direct 
investor as an oligopolist (Grubaygh, 1987; Sun, Tong & Yu, 2002). Therefore, imperfection 
in the market was seen as a necessary condition for direct investment.  
 
In a similar vein, Kindleberger3 (1969) elaborated on Hymer’s theory and explained the 
monopolistic advantages required for direct investment. He noted that local firms already 
possessed some advantages which the foreign investor needed to overcome. These 
advantages possessed by the foreign firm could be in the form of product differentiation, 
superior managerial and marketing skills, advanced technology, economies of scale, etc. 
(Kindleberger, 1969). Caves (1971) focused on product differentiation as a necessary 
condition for direct investment. He added that product differentiation stimulated rivalry 
through activities such as advertising. Furthermore, he noted that in addition to the merits of 
the unique/special asset they possessed, foreign firms should also prefer direct investment to 
alternative forms of acquiring foreign rent. These points implied that perfect competition 
assumed in neoclassical trade theories would not permit FDI, as it was not characterised by 
product differentiation.  
 
A different approach was taken by Vernon (1966) in the product life hypothesis. The main 
objection of this hypothesis to trade theories lay in its approach of de-emphasisingfactor-
proportions theory of comparative advantage and emphasisingthe timing of innovation, scale 
economies effects and the role of uncertainty in trade patterns (Vernon, 1966). To explain the 
reason for FDI, Vernon asserted that at some stage after the introduction of a new product, 
the producers switched from exporting to foreign production. Thus after a new product 
emerged, it was gradually transformed from a differentiated product to a standardised 
product. At the standardised or maturity stage, the product experienced a threat of 
competition from local products in the export target countries. According to Vernon, this 
threat was a significant motivation for shifting production abroad. In summary, Vernon’s 
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3.1.2 Industrial Organisation theory: Internalisation  
Hymer’s work marked a turnaround point from the neoclassical trade theory to the industrial 
organisation theory (Dunning and Rugman, 1985). It changed the focus of multinational 
theory from the nation (macro) to the firm (micro) (Hennart, 2001). The question (Dunning, 
2001) that remained unanswered at that point was: ‘Why do firms, rather than markets 
internalise cross-border transactions?’ Buckley and Cason (1976) made the first 
comprehensive attempt to show how cross-border transactions involving intermediate 
products were internalised within MNCs rather than within markets. The theory was based on 
Coase’s (1937) market failure theories. The basic assumption underlying these theories was 
that profit maximisation occurred in the midst of imperfect markets. These theories assumed 
that modern businesses extended their activities to include interdependent activities such as 
marketing, research and development, training, and managerial skills. These activities were 
linked by flows of intermediate products which required a separate market. Buckley and 
Cason (1976) opined that due to the imperfect nature of these intermediate markets, internal 
markets emerged to avoid the demerits of imperfections in the external market. Thus, the 
existence of imperfect markets created theincentive for internalisation of the firm. Another 
theory of internalisation was developed by Hennart (1977) under the inspiration of McManus 
(1972). He asserted that the existence of imperfect competition generated transaction costs 
which could be eliminated through internalisation.   
 
3.1.3 Transaction costs theory 
This theory started with the work of Coase (1937), who argued that the boundaries of a firm 
could be determined by the relative costs of carrying out a transaction within a firm’s 
hierarchy. However, in Coase’s work, he did not make any categorical mention of 
international firms; his framework in transaction cost was applied to the question of 
international production by Hymer in 1960. It was thereby credited to Hymer as he was the 
first to address the question of why firms carry out activities outside their home country. 
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3.1.4 The OLI paradigm 
By the late seventies, there was a need to unify the theories of foreign direct investment, as 
previous theories had focused on particular directions in their analysis. This was intended to 
consolidate the different reasons why a firm would decide to engage in FDI. Thus in 1976, 
during a Nobel symposium at Stockholm, John Dunning introduced a comprehensive blend 
of the trade theories with internalisation theory to develop the OLI eclectic theory of FDI. 
OLI is an acronym for Ownership-Location-Internalisation advantages. According to 
Dunning, a firm will engage in FDI if these three conditions of ownership advantage, 
locationadvantage and internalisation advantageare satisfied (Dunning, 1979). At this 
juncture, each of these conditions is explained in turn.  
 
In an attempt to respond to the criticisms associated with the transaction cost theory, the OLI 
paradigm was developed by John Dunning in 1977. He argued that a firm would engage in 
international production if there were ownership advantages, location advantages and 
internalisation advantages. When talking about ownership advantages, it referred to some 
unique assets or knowledge that firms mightpossess from which they could generate profit. 
Also, they could refer to a firm’s competitive advantage.  
The Location advantages, on the other hand, referred to advantages of one potential FDI host 
country relative to another and this could include natural resources, input prices, investment 
incentives, cultural differences and more.  
Internalisation advantages described why a firm would exploit the advantages mentioned 
above by FDI rather than through licensing or export. Within the internationalisation 
advantage, the theory of transaction cost was well expanded by Kogut and Zander (1993) as 
well as by Williamson (1985). 
3.1.4.1 Ownership (O) advantages  
These are unique advantages which a firm possesses relative to its competitors in the foreign 
market. By Dunning’s theory, FDI would occur when the merits of implementing the 
advantages were higher than its opportunity costs. These “O” advantages could be in 
different forms (Dunning, 2000). It could be in the form of monopoly advantages possessed 
by firms as shown in Bain (1956) and Hymer (1960). The creation of barriers to entry could 
also depict ownership advantages as identified in Caves (1971, 1982) and Porter (1980, 
1985). In the same vein, the ability of managers to detect and explore resources and potentials 




In recent times, “O” advantages appear in the form of alliance capitalism, which involves 
synthesising assets with comparative advantages of a firm and that of its competitors. 
Dunning (2000) indicates that the following theories explain the “O” advantages: Product 
Cycle theory (Vernon, 1966), Industrial Organisation theories (Caves, 1971, 1974; Dunning, 
1958; Hymer, 1960); Internalisation theory (Buckley and Casson, 1976; Hennart, 1982).  
 
3.1.4.2 Location (L) advantages  
This explains the advantages that determine where FDI is situated. Particular countries 
possess advantages that enhance the ownership advantages. These “L” advantages could be in 
the form of complementary assets (Dunning, 2001).  
 
Dunning (2000) pointed out that the idea of L advantages had different perspectives 
according to disciplines. Economists have investigated the impact of exchange rates on the 
location of FDI (Cashman, 1985; Froot & Stein, 1991; Rangan, 1998). Business scholars 
asserted that a competitive advantage involved the optimal location of portfolio assets 
(Enright, 1991, 1998; Porter, 1994, 1996). In the nineties, economists and industrial 
geographers explored the clustering of economic activity in certain geographic regions 
(Audretsch, 1998; Krugman, 1991, 1998; Scott, 1996; Storper, 1995; Storper and Scott, 1995; 
Venebles, 1998). According to Dunning (2000), theories that explained location advantages 
included Traditional Location theory (Hoover, 1948; Hotelling, 1929; Isard, 1956); 
Internationalisation related theories (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986; Cavusgil, 1980; Daniels, 
1971); Agglomeration theories (Audretsch, 1998; Enright, 1991, 1999; Forsgren, 1990) 
Spatial Concentration related theories (Florida, 1995; Scott, 1996; Storper and Scott, 1995) 
Complementary Assets related theories (Chen & Chen, 1998, 1999; Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 
1997); Government Induced Incentives theories (Loree & Guisinger, 1995; UN 1996a) and 
Exchange Rate theories (Aliber, 1971; Cashman. 1985; Froot & Stein, 1991).  
 
 
3.1.4.3 Internalisation advantage  
Following the acknowledgement of the fact that a firm with ownership advantages would 
decide to invest in a country with location advantage, an important question will be: why 
would the firm choose to carry out the foreign investment by itself instead of engaging in 
other arrangements such as licensing or exportation? The answer to this question was given 
in the various forms of internalisation theory. When transaction and organisation costs of 
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these other arrangements outweigh the costs of internalising the market, the firm will choose 
to engage in FDI. These transaction costs are known to rise as imperfections in the market 
rises (Dunning, 2000). It should be noted at this juncture, that one of the distinctive features 
of I advantages is that it requires O and L advantages. Dunning (2000) outlines the following 
theories that explain internalisation advantages: Orthodox Internalisation theory (Buckley & 
Casson, 1976; Caves, 1996; Ghoshal, Hahn & Moran, 1997) and Efficiency related theories 
(Caves, 1982; Liu, 1998; Teece, 1981). It is important to note that the eclectic theory assumes 
that all the three advantages must be present before there is aforeign direct investment. In 
other words, all three advantages are necessary, but no one of them is alone sufficient 
(Sodersten & Reed, 1994).  
 
3.1.5 Product cycle approach 
Vernon (1966) developed this approach which focused on consumer durables; this was a US 
experience in the post-war period. This approach was in response to the observation that US 
firms were among the first to develop new labour-saving methods in response to large 
domestic market and the high cost of skilled labour. Vernon suggested that the role of FDI 
followed a 3-stage life cycle which included innovation, growth and maturity. The 
principalassumption of the theory was that firms which developed the products in their 
domestic markets would shift the production plants to countries with abundant unskilled 
labour rather than sell or license their technology to host-country competitors. 
3.1.6 Entry mode theory 
Canabal and White (2008) explained this theory as one of the major research areas in the 
international business discipline concerning trade and investment. If companies made entry 
mode choice that entailed the investment of equity capital in local operation, then FDI inflow 
would occur. The OLI theory and transaction cost theory has been used to look at this 
particular phenomenon. 
 
3.2 Types of FDI  
The OLI framework led to the classification of FDI into four different types, namely: natural 
resource seeking FDI, market seeking FDI, efficiency-seeking FDI, and strategic asset 
seeking FDI (Dunning, 1998). Identification of these types of FDI underpins most empirical 
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literature on the determinants of FDI. These types of FDI are now discussed in the following 
sections.  
 
3.2.1 The Natural Resource Seeking FDI  
Some countries or regions are known to possess certain resources in abundance. Thus it is not 
surprising for MNCs which use such resources to choose to locate subsidiaries in such 
locations. However, what are these resources and what type of MNCs seeks them? The 
answers to these questions lie in the further categorisation of natural resource seekers. 
According to Dunning (2008), there are three groups of natural resource seekers.  
The first group is the seekers of the physical natural resource. This comprises mainly MNCs 
engaged in primary production and manufacturing, seeking for resources in mostly two broad 
categories: fossil fuels led by crude oil, coal, gas, metals, diamonds, etc. and agricultural 
products such as palm oil, cocoa, rubber, sugar, etc. Africa is known to be the hub of natural 
resources (Adams, Gurney, Hook & Leydesdorff, 2014). This could explain the recent surge 
in FDI flows to Africa, particularly from China and India (UNCTAD, 2006) where the main 
attraction of MNCs to Africa is its abundance of natural resources. The second group is the 
seekers of cheap and efficient labour. Recently, this motive for FDI has been increasing due 
to the emergence of industrialising developing countries such as Mexico, Taiwan an Malaysia 
which seek cheap and resourceful labour in China, Morocco, Vietnam, and Turkey (Dunning, 
2008). The manufacturing and services sector is the main undertaker of cheap labour seeking 
FDI. Due to the desired impact on host nations’ economies, especially on employment, host 
countries have implemented free trade and export processing zones (EPZs) to attract such 
FDI.  
The third group is the seekers of technological know-how, managerial and organisational 
skills. This motive usually leads to collaborative alliances between countries and regions.  
 
3.2.2 Market-seeking FDI  
The motive for FDI could be to invest in a country due to the size/growth potential of its 
market, or of the countries within the same region. This motive that entails seeking for 
suitablemarkets for goods and services is known as market-seeking FDI. It has been noted 
that most MNCs that engage in this form of investment were previously exporters to the host 
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country, who decided to carry out direct investment due to unfavourable tariffs and other 
barriers levied on their exports (Dunning, 2008; Nicholas, 1986). Thus, host governments 
play an active role in encouraging this form of investment through imposing controls and 
barriers on imports. In addition to the size of the market, there are other reasons for market-
seeking FDI. These other reasons were outlined in Dunning (2008). The first reason was that 
some firms reacted to the decision to invest abroad by their suppliers and customers. Thus, it 
became economically reasonable for them to follow them to invest overseas. Another reason 
for engaging in this type of investment arose due to the need for products to adapt to the 
culture and tastes of the host country. As a result, firms decided to engage in direct 
investment to ensure that their products remained competitive in the midst of local products. 
The third reason was to reduce production and transportation cost by supplying in the market 
or the regions around it. A final reason for market-seeking FDI was to respond to 
competitors’ investments in major markets across the globe. This situation was also known as 
the “follow your leader” or “bandwagon” strategy (Dunning, 2008; Knickerbocker, 1973).  
3.2.3 Efficiency-seeking FDI  
One motive for FDI could be to reduce the cost of production or to achieve economies of 
scale. Due to structural differences among countries, firms can take advantage of the 
favorable factor costs and product prices to diversify risk. This type of FDI is known as 
efficiency-seeking FDI and it entails rationalisation of the structure of international activities 
by firms to improve efficiency.  
3.2.4 Strategic asset seeking FDI  
To protect O advantages, firms may acquire or purchase the assets of existing firms. The aim 
is to strengthen their global competitiveness as part of their long-term strategic objectives 
(Dunning, 2008). Thus, strategic seeking FDI involves the pursuit of physical assets, R & D, 
market knowledge, human capital, etc., to enhance ownership advantages on the one hand 
and subdue those of the competitors (Dunning, 2008). The existence of strategic assets stems 
from the imperfections of the intermediate product market.  
3.3 Determinants of FDI to Nigeria 
Foreign Direct Investment is considered as desirable for host countries, especially in 
emerging markets. Following the Asian debt crisis of 1997, FDI is seen as a more stable 
source of capital than portfolio investment (Lipsey, 2001). FDI is also said to have important 
spill-over effects for host countries, such as transfer of technology and managerial expertise 
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(Lipsey, 2001; Meyer & Sinani, 2009). Hence, many emerging economies, including those in 
the African region, have been taking steps to encourage FDI.  
The question as to what the determinants of FDI flows areis,therefore, an important one for 
policymakers and academics alike. A number of studies have considered either the 
importance of individual elements on FDI flows, (for example, Bénassy-Quéré, Coupet & 
Mayer, 2007; Globerman & Shapriro, 2002) or have attempted to construct an overall model 
of the determinants of FDI flows (Chakrabarti, 2001; Jun & Singh, 1995; Sethi, Guisinger, 
Phelan & Berg, 2003). Emerging or transition economies have received particular attention in 
this area, given the importance of FDI in their development (Bevan & Estrin, 2000; Jun & 
Singh, 1996; Nunnenkamp, 2002). Despite the growing academic interest in FDI in emerging 
markets, the evidence for the determinants of FDI flows into developing markets is 
incomplete, particularly as far as the relationship between FDI, natural resource endowments 
and the more traditional FDI determinants found in the literature is concerned.  
Regarding overall FDI flows into a country, existing research has concentrated on factors 
related to market size, a country’s openness to trade and environmental risk factors (both 
political risk and business operating conditions).  
3.3.1 Market size 
The least controversial factor associated with FDI inflows is a country’s market size, usually 
measured by a country’s GDP (Gross Domestic Product). Large economies can reasonably be 
expected to attract more FDI than smaller economies. Other measures of market size or 
market attractiveness such as GDP per capita or GDP growth can have a more ambiguous 
impact. Considering GDP per capita, for market-seeking FDI, high levels of per capita GDP 
indicate markets with high spending power and would, therefore, seem to promote FDI. 
However, for efficiency-seeking FDI, high per capita GDP is typically associated with high 
wage rates, making the country less attractive for investments in, for example, export-
oriented manufacturing industries. Artige and Nicolini (2005) state that market size as 
measured by GDP or GDP per capita seems to be the most robust FDI determinant in 
econometric studies. This is the main determinant for horizontal FDI. It is irrelevant for 
vertical FDI. Jordaan (2004) mentions that FDI tends to move to countries with larger and 
expanding markets and greater purchasing power, where firms can potentially receive a 
higher return on their capital and by implication receive higher profit from their investments. 
Chakrabarti (2001) states that the market-size hypothesis supports an idea that a large market 
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is required for efficient utilisation of resources and exploitation of economies of scale: as the 
market-size grows to some critical value, FDI will start to increase after that with its further 
expansion. This hypothesis has been quite popular, and a variable representing the size of the 
host country market has emerged as an explanatory variable in nearly all empirical studies on 
the determinants of FDI.  
In ODI (1997), it is stated that econometric studies comparing a cross-section of countries 
point to a well-established correlation between FDI and the size of the market, which is a 
proxy for the size of GDP, as well as some of its characteristics, such as average income 
levels and growth rates. Some studies found GDP growth rate to be a significant explanatory 
variable, whereas GDP was not, probably indicating that where the current size of national 
income wasvery small, increases might have less relevance to FDI decisions than growth 
performance, as an indicator of market potential. 
Econometric results on market size are far from being unanimous. Edwards (1990) and 
Jaspersen, Aylward and Knox (2000) use the inverse of income per capita as a proxy for the 
return on capital and conclude that real GDP per capita is inversely related to FDI/GDP, but 
Asiedu (2002),Schneider, Friedrich and Frey (1985) and Tsai (1994) find a positive 
relationship between the two variables. They argue that a higher GDP per capita implies 
better prospects for FDI in the host country. Pärletun (2008) finds that the variable GDP is 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. She argues that the enlargement of 
market size tends to stimulate the attraction of FDI to the economy. Ang (2008) finds that 
real GDP has a significant positive impact on FDI inflows. He also finds that growth rate of 
GDP exerts a small positive impact on inward FDI. 
Market size has been the single most widely accepted factor as a significant determinant of 
FDI flows (Chakrabarti, 2001). The larger the host area’s (country, region, and sub-region) 
total income and its potential for development, the greater the amount of the FDI investment 
(Billington, 1999). A large market is necessary for efficient utilisation of resources and 
exploitation of economies of scale (Chakrabarti, 2001). On the other hand, Asiedu (2002) 
argues that market size is not a determinant for a developing country due to low income.  
The market size itself cannot be easily ascertained (Billington, 1999). Regressions of 
Schimitz and Bieri (1972) are estimated for the USA’s FDI to Canada, the EEC and EFTA. 
Their market size proxy is GNP and growth of GDP. Root and Ahmed (1979) identify 
unattractive, moderately attractive and highly attractive countries regarding FDI per capita 
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for 58 countries based on 38 variables. The unattractive category represents FDI per capita as 
less than $1, the moderately attractive as between $1 and $4.1, and the attractive as more than 
$4.1. They use GDP, GDP per capita and growth per capita as a proxy for market size. They 
argue that the absolute size of GDP is more likely to reflect population size rather than per 
capita income. They conclude that developing countries that have attracted FDI have a 
relatively advanced infrastructure, comparatively high growth rates and per capita GDP and 
political stability. 
Culem (1988) tests the impact of market size for 14 countries for the period 1969-1982. A 
bigger market allows the benefits of large-scale production to be more readily captured. 
Moreover, investors naturally prefer faster-growing markets, which offer more promising 
prospects. Billington (1999) is the first author to consider population as a variable; she uses 
population density as a determinant of FDI. Population density implies a more concentrated 
consumer and labour market as well as a more integrated infrastructure (Billington, 1999). 
However, Chakrabarti (2001) is more cautious, stating that total GDP is a poor indicator 
since it reflects the size of the population rather than the income per capita.  
Larger market size should receive more inflows than that of smaller countries having lesser 
market size. Market size is measured by Gross Domestic Product (GDP), GDP per capita 
income and size of the middle-class population. It is expected to be a positive and significant 
determinant of FDI flows (see: Bevan & Estrin, 2000; Duran, 1999; Garibaldi, 2002; Lankes 
& Venables, 1997; Nunes, Oscategui Artera & Peschiera, 2006: Resmini, 2000; Sahoo, 
2006). In contrast, Asiedu (2002) and Holland and Pain (1998) consider growth and market 
size to be insignificant determinants of FDI flow. 
Besides these traditional factors, market size has gained a relative vital place in the literature 
on FDI for developing and emerging economies. Among the many authors who acknowledge 
the role of market size in attracting FDI inflows are Bandera and White (1968), Pistoresi 
(2000), Schmitz and Bier (1972) and Wheeler and Mody (1992). Moreover, more recently, 
Asiedu (2006), Mlambo (2006) and Zhang (2008) have explored the pivotal importance of 
market size in attracting FDI inflows. These authors argued that increased market size was a 
motivational factor for a foreign investor. 
Asiedu (2006) recognises the market size benefit of regionalism. The study suggests that 
there are three reasons for FDI enhancement due to regional economic cooperation. The first 
is that regionalism can promote political stability by restricting membership only in order to 
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elect a democratic government. Secondly, is the coordination of policies among member 
countries which reveals curbing corruption, implementing sound, stable macroeconomic 
policies and investor-friendly frameworks to be important. The third reason is that it expands 
the size of the market, which makes the region more attractive for FDI. The study also 
highlights the importance of regionalism to those countries which are small in sizeand 
income. Small countries can also attract FDI in a better manner as they join a coalitionto 
achieve large market size. Thoughregionalism provides an opportunity to enhance FDI, 
policy coordination among member nations of a bloc remains a major issue to be addressed. 
The regional distribution in huge market size may also have regionalised FDI determinants. 
Zhang (2008) narrates that regional distribution factors affecting FDI are incentives, 
historical and cultural linkages with foreign investors along with other location factors. 
Many studies have cited the host country’s market size (measured by the Gross Domestic 
Product, GDP) as an important determinant of FDI inflows (Chakrabarti, 2001; Masayuki & 
Ivohasina, 2005: Moore, 1993; Raggazi, 1973; Wang & Swain, 1995). However, if the host 
country is only used as a production base due to low production costs to export their products 
to another or home market, then the market size may be less influential or insignificant 
(Agarwal,1980). Bajo-Rubia and Sosvilla- Rivero (1994) and Yin Yun Yang, Groenewold 
and Tcha (2000) discovered that rising prices (inflation) also influenced FDI.  
3.3.2 Openness to trade 
The impact of a country’s openness to trade on FDI flows can be argued to be one of either 
increasing or reducing FDI flows into a country. On the one hand, openness to trade 
(particularly exports) can encourage export-oriented FDI in a country. On the other hand, 
trade barriers can be said to attract tariff-jumping FDI. In the literature, the empirical 
evidence points towards a positive relationship between openness to trade and FDI inflows as 
demonstrated by Jun & Singh (1995) and Nunnenkamp (2003). Chakarbarti (2001) also 
found a positive relationship between openness to trade and FDI, but not as strong as between 
market size and FDI. Similarly, a UN study on the determinants of FDI (Pearce, Islam, 
Sauvant, 1992) quotes some older studies that find no evidence of the tariff-hopping’s 
argument that FDI would be positively related to trade protection (and therefore lead to a 
negative relationship between FDI and openness to trade).  
Charkrabarti (2001) states that there is mixed evidence concerning the significance of 
openness, which is measured mostly by the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP, in 
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determining FDI, as well. The maintained hypothesis is: given that most investment projects 
are directed towards the tradable sector, a country’s degree of openness to international trade 
should be a relevant factor in the decision. Jordaan (2004) claimed that the impact of 
openness on FDI depended on the type of investment. When investments are market-seeking, 
trade restrictions (and therefore less openness) can have a positive impact on FDI. The reason 
stems from the “tariff jumping” hypothesis, which argues that foreign firms that seek to serve 
local markets may decide to set up subsidiaries in the host country if it is difficult to import 
their products to the country.  
In contrast, multinational firms engaged in export-oriented investments may prefer to invest 
in a more open economy since increased disadvantages that accompany trade protection 
imply higher transaction costs associated with exporting. Wheeler and Mody (1992) observe 
a strong positive support for the hypothesis in the manufacturing sector, but a weak negative 
link in the electronics sector. Culem (1988), Edwards (1990) and Kravis and Lipsey (1982) 
find a strong positive effect of openness on FDI and Schmitz and Bieri (1972) obtain a weak 
positive link. Pärletun (2008) finds that trade openness is positive but statistically 
insignificant from zero. In ODI (1997), it is stated that while access to specific markets – 
judged by their size and growth – is important, domestic market factors are predictably much 
less relevant in export-oriented foreign firms. A range of surveys suggests a widespread 
perception that “open” economies encourage more foreign investment. 
Anyanwu (1998) places a particular emphasis on the determinants of FDI inflows into 
Nigeria. He identifies a change in domestic investment, change in domestic output or market 
size, indigenisation policy and change in the openness of the economy as major determinants 
of FDI inflows into Nigeria and thereby maintains that effort in this wise must be made to 
raise the nation’s economic growth to be able to attract more FDI. Ayanwale (2007) 
investigates the empirical relationship between non-extractive FDI and economic growth in 
Nigeria and also examines the determinants of FDI inflows into the Nigerian economy. He 
adopts both single equation and simultaneous equation models to examine the relationship. 
His results suggest that the determinants of FDI in Nigeria are market size, infrastructure 
development and stable macroeconomic policy. Openness to trade and human capital are not 
found to be FDI inducing.  
In this study, the authors focus on trade openness as a significant factor affecting FDI inflows. 
Although openness can be considered a social or socio-economic indicator, Kosteletou and 
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Liargivas (2000) are only concerned, in their study, with the economic (i.e. trade) dimension 
of openness.  
Trade openness induces export-oriented FDI, while trade restriction attracts ‘‘tariff jumping’’ 
FDI, the first target of which is to take advantage of the domestic market  (Kosteletou & 
Liargovas, 2000). 
Theoretically, trade restrictions or openness could affect FDI inflows positively or 
negatively. Some policies on trade openness might produce a significant impact in attracting 
FDI. For example, through the implementation of free trade agreements (FTA), several Latin 
American countries have been able to attract greater flows of foreign direct investment. 
Goldberg and Klein (1999) suggest that FDI fosters exports, import substitution, or greater 
trade in intermediary inputs. On the other hand, Raff (2004) argues that under certain 
conditions, an FTA does not lead to FDI, even though FDI would be welfare improving.This 
may happen, because equilibrium external tariffs are too low to induce FDI or because there 
are multiple equilibria and countries are stuck in one that does not support FDI. There are 
studies which have found a positive relationship between trade openness and FDI flows (see 
for example Biglaiser & DeRouen 2006; Chakrabarti 2001). On the other hand, some authors 
(e.g. Seim, 2009), find a negative relationship between FDI inflows and the degree of 
openness for countries in transition. In other terms, the relationship between trade openness 
and FDI inflows is very complex, needs careful explanation and may depend on the 
characteristics of each case. Theoretically, the effect of trade openness on the inflow of FDI 
varies according to the motivation for engaging in FDI activities (Dunning 1993; Markusen 
& Maskus 2002).  
Asiedu’s work on FDI determinants, in 2001, explored whether factors that affected FDI in 
developing countries in sub-Saharan Africa were different. The result indicated that a higher 
return on investment and better infrastructure hadpositive impacts on FDI to non-SSA 
countries but had no significant impact on FDI to SSA andthat openness to trade promoted 
FDI to SSA and non-SSA countries, althoughthe marginal benefit from increased openness 
was less for SSA (Asiedu, 2001).  
Open economies of the developing countries is a vehicle for succesful FDI penetration 
compared with closed economy countries, which hardly permits room for external 
intervention. There are numerous findings that suggest the fact that open economy is a great 
determinant of FDI inflow. Ajayi (2006) indicates that exports, particularly manufacturing 
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exports, are a significant determinant of FDI flows and tests show that there is strong 
evidence that exports precede FDI flows. China has been identified, in particular, as 
attracting much foreign investment into the export sector. Several studies also find a greater 
positive effect of openness on inward FDI.  
3.3.3 Environmental risk (external uncertainty) 
Environmental risk in the context of FDI can be defined as the unpredictability of an entrant’s 
external environment (Anderson & Gatignon, 1988) and is also referred to as external risk or 
country risk (since environmental risk is usually measured at a country level). Sometimes, the 
term political risk is used, although this is more accurately considered to be a component of 
environmental risk rather than equivalent to it. Agarwal and Ramaswami (1992) use the term 
external risk and define it as the uncertainty over the continuation of present economic and 
political conditions and government policies which are critical for the survival and 
profitability of a firm’s operations in that country. Root (1994) uses the term political risk 
and states that political risk arises from uncertainty over the continuation of present political 
conditions and government policies in the foreign host country that are critical to the 
profitability of an actual or proposed equity/contractual business arrangement.  
Root (1994) distinguishes four main types of political risks to be evaluated by investors; 
general instability, expropriation risk, operations risk and transfer risk. The concept of 
environmental risk is closely related to that of institutional stability and business operating 
conditions. As countries develop stable and effective institutions, political change is less 
likely to have a significant impact on business operating conditions.  
Foreign investors who expand into a foreign market, thus, have tobe concerned about the 
political risk of the host economy, since political volatility and violence may damage the 
investment, diminish the efficiency of the overall market and, thus, impair the profitability or 
survival of their investment. Political risk is an important determinant of foreign investors’ 
location decisions, also due to the nature of FDI.  FDI, “while mobile ex-ante, is relatively 
illiquid ex-post” (Vernon, 1971 cited in Jensen, 2003a, p.24); for example, when affected by 
unfair trade policies, exporting MNCs can easily deflect their goods to other markets. 
However, when protectionist pressure, for example, leads to an unfair policy change that 




The sunk cost of FDI makes it extremely costly for foreign investors to withdraw investments 
they have already made in the host market (Tarzi, 2005). This is based on the knowledge that 
the host country can exploit or expropriate foreign assets, although they initially promised 
fair and favourable terms and policies to foreign investors to attract FDI (Berger, Busse, 
Nunnenkamp & Roy, 2010a; Büthe & Milner, 2008; Jensen, 2008; Neumayer & Spess, 2005; 
Vernon, 1971). Foreign investors, thus, have tomaximise the profitability of investment by 
taking advantage of the lower factor-costs and location advantages of the host economy but, 
at the same time, weigh the dangers and potential losses incurred by investing in politically 
unstable countries. Political risk, thus, is one of the major constraints on foreign investors 
who seek to expand into foreign markets.  
Time-inconsistency problem, - changing FDI-related policies to be less favourable to foreign 
investors, and, thus, violating the initial terms of foreign investment−can occur in both 
developing and advanced economies. However, developing nations often suffer from the 
shortage of capital and resources, and they “have an even greater incentive than governments 
in advanced industrialised countries” to “change the terms of existing foreign investment” 
(Büthe & Milner, 2008, p.743). Based on the data collected by the World Bank “in Latin 
America since the late 1980s, 40% of all concessions were renegotiated, with the average 
time for renegotiation being only 2.2 years” (Ramamurti & Doh 2004, p.158). According to 
the UNCTAD, “10 percent of all FDI-related regulatory changes were less favourable for 
foreign investors” in 2003 and by 2007 it was 25 percent, and even before the recession in 
2008 “in Latin America, as much as 60 percent of policy measures taken in 2007 were less 
favourable to FDI” (UNCTAD, 2009, p.10). Political instability and abrupt policy changes 
can handicap the productivity and profitability of foreign investment. 
The ranking of political risk among FDI determinants remains rather unclear. According to 
ODI (1997), where the host country owns rich natural resources, no further incentive may be 
required, as is seen in politically unstable countries, such as Nigeria and Angola, where high 
returns in the extractive industries seem to compensate for political instability. In general, as 
long as the foreign company is confident of being able to operate profitably without 
excessive risk to its capital and personnel, it will continue to invest. For example, large 
mining companies overcome some of the political risks by investing in their infrastructure 
maintenance and their security forces. 
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3.3.4 Natural resource endowments 
Natural resource endowments such as oil and gas are believed to attract resource-seeking FDI 
(Dunning, 1998; Estrin & Meyer 2004), but the topic has not been the subject of much 
empirical research until recently. Dunning (1998) drew attention to the availability 
ofnaturalresources as one of the possible location determinants for resource seeking FDI. The 
availability of such resources is a necessary but not sufficient condition for natural resource-
seeking FDI, as Dunning acknowledges by listing infrastructure, government restrictions on 
FDI and investment incentives as other relevant location factors.  
The availability of natural resources might be a major determinant of FDI to the host country. 
FDI takes place when a  country richly endowed with natural resources lacks the amount of 
capital or technical skill needed to extract or/and sale to the world market. Foreign firms 
embark on vertical FDI in the host country to produce raw materials or/and inputs for their 
production processes at home. This means that certain FDI may be less related to profitability 
or market size of host country than natural resources which are unavailable to the domestic 
economy of the foreign firms. 
The availability of natural resources is of great interest to any nation domestically and also to 
bring the foreign investors into the country. Africa influenced FDI basically because of the 
presence of resource in the region. Traditionally, about 60% of Africa‘s FDI is allocated to 
oil and natural resources UNCTAD (1999). The rising profits in the sector induced a flow of 
investment. Asiedu (2006) concludes that, besides market size, natural resources are the key 
determinants for FDI in Africa. Nigeria is blessed with enough resources to attract the interest 
of FDI in the country, but the major problem facing the country, in terms both of 
improvements in domestic investments and foreign investment, is leadership problem.  
 
3.3.5 Labour Costs and Productivity 
Charkrabarti (2001) claims that wage as an indicator of labour cost has been the most 
contentious of all the potential determinants of FDI. Theoretically, the importance of cheap 
labour in attracting multinationals is agreed upon by the proponents of the dependency 
hypothesis as well as those of the modernisation hypothesis, though with very different 
implications. There is, however, no unanimity even among the comparatively small number 
of studies that have explored the role of wage in affecting FDI; results range from higher host 
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country wages discouraging inbound FDI to having no significant effect or even a positive 
association. 
There is no unanimity in the studies regarding the role of wages in attracting FDI. Culem, 
(1988), Flamm (1984), Goldsbrough (1979), Saunders (1982), Schneider and Frey (1985) and 
Shamsuddin (1994) demonstrate that higher wages discourage FDI. Tsai (1994) obtains 
strong support for the cheap-labour hypothesis over the period 1983 to 1986, but weak 
support for the periodfrom 1975 to 1978. In ODI (1997), it is stated that empirical research 
has also found relative labour costs to be statistically significant, particularly for foreign 
investment in labour-intensive industries and for export-oriented subsidiaries. However, 
when the cost of labour is relatively insignificant (when wage rates vary little from country to 
country), the skills of the labour force are expected to have an impact on decisions about FDI 
location. 
The idea of investing in the developing countries is considered advantageous due to the low 
labour cost and wages. According to Pigato (2001), all other factors remaining unchanged, 
lower labour cost reduces the cost of production, but the availability of cheap labour justifies 
the relocation of a part of the production process in foreign countries. Pigato shows that with 
FDI moving toward intensive technological activities, low-cost unskilled labour is not in 
vogue; rather it is the demand-qualified human capital that counts. Konings and Murphy 
(2001) found that, in the post-1992 United States, FDI in EU periphery was discouraged in 
high labour cost countries. Braconier et al. (2005) found that about 20% of U.S. multinational 
sales are based on low wages of skilled labour. Konings and Murphy (2001) argued that wage 
level may not be the only labour-related factor that determines FDI investment decisions, but 
it is the availability of skilled labour and its productivity that also seems to be important for 
firms. Azemar and Desbordes (2009) and Suliman and Mollick (2009) analyse FDI flows to 
developing countries and conclude that the relatively low FDI flows into sub-Saharan Africa 
are partly explained by poor human capital and illiteracy. Noorbakhsh, Paloni and Youssef 
(2001) wonder why FDI flows to developing countries have reached only a limited part of 
them. Both affordable labour cost and the quality of labour with a high level of education 





Infrastructure covers many dimensions ranging from roads, ports, railways and 
telecommunication systems to institutional development (e.g. accounting, legal services, 
etc.). According to ODI (1997), poor infrastructure can be seen, however, as both an obstacle 
and an opportunity for foreign investment. For the majority of low-income countries, it is 
often cited as one of the major constraints. However, foreign investors also point to the 
potential for attracting significant FDI if host governments permit more substantial foreign 
participation in the infrastructure sector. Jordaan (2004) claims that good quality and well-
developed infrastructure increases the productivity potential of investments in a country and 
therefore stimulates FDI flows towards the country. According to Asiedu (2002) and 
Ancharaz (2003), the number of telephones per 1,000 inhabitants is a standard measurement 
in the literature for infrastructure development. Nevertheless, Asiedu (2002) contends that 
this measure falls short, because it only captures the availability and not the reliability of the 
infrastructure. Furthermore, it only includes fixed-line infrastructure and not cellular (mobile) 
telephones. 
Infrastructure availability promotes both types of FDI, with comparatively more impact on 
vertical FDI as it reduces operational costs. Khadaroo and Seetanah (2007) claimed that 
gainsrendered by infrastructure growth were associated with greater accessibility and 
reduction in transportation costs. Furthermore, public goods reduce the cost of doing business 
for foreign enterprises which leads towards maximisation of profit. Recent empirical studies 
also propose that public goods have an important impact on cost structure and productivity of 
private firms (Benassy-Quere, Coupet & Mayer, 2007; Morrison & Schwartz, 1996). 
Erenberg (1993) assumes that if such kinds of infrastructure were not extended to local and 
multinational enterprises publicly, then these enterprises would be operating with less 
efficiency as they would have to build their infrastructure which results in duplication and 
wastage of resources and so public inputs reduce their transportation cost. Nadiri and 
Mamuneas (1994) reported a cost elasticity forecastconcerning infrastructure capital range 
from -0.1 to -0.21 depending on the business sector. In contrast, Bae (2008) recognised that 
investment in public inputs did not pose statistically substantial direct influence on 
production performance in private business firms. However, Haughwout (2001) took an 
opposite position arguing that availability of public goods lowered the cost of private firms 
even if there was no direct role of infrastructure in the production performance and cost 
structure of private firms. 
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Poor infrastructure causes an increase in transaction cost and limits access to both local and 
global markets which ultimately discourages FDI in developing countries. A greater 
efficiency can be achieved in extending infrastructure facilities by considering economic 
principle and shifting liability for provisioning of infrastructure facilities through 
management contracts or leases such as build-operate-transfer (BOT), build down operate 
(BOO) and full privatisation. Privatisation has emerged as a useful means of attracting 
inward FDI (Mlambo, 2006). 
Although thequality of infrastructure has an impact on FDI, it also facilitates export 
performance which ultimately is a motivational factor for inward FDI for a country as well as 
trading blocks. Iwanow and Kirkpatrick (2006) argue in favour of the significant contribution 
of quality infrastructure improvement in export performance. Furthermore, the study 
indicates quantitative results that an improvement of 10% in infrastructure will yield 8% 
improvement in export performance in a developing country. Moreover, Suh and Khan 
(2003) explore the impact of infrastructure in the form of increased exporting level of major 
trade blocks CEFTA and ASEAN/AFTA. 
In emerging economies, the role of infrastructure is twofold: the promotion of FDI and 
greater return on investment to business owners. Fung, Garcia-Herrero, Iiazaka and Siu 
(2005) classify infrastructure as hard in the form of roadways, communications installations 
and highways and soft infrastructure is associated with transparent institutions and intensive 
reforms. Soft infrastructure is far moreimportant as overly hard infrastructure for FDI.  
Infrastructure can have a different impact on developing and developed nations. In 
developing economies, infrastructure has a significant attractiveness for FDI inflows (Asiedu, 
2006; Khadaroo & Seetanah, 2010). 
Sekkat and Varoudakis (2007) contend that infrastructure has a significant attractiveness for 
FDI even than that of openness and investment climate in developing countries. Addison et 
al. (2006) acknowledge such promotional impact only for developed nations but, on the other 
hand, that such a situation does not exist for developing countries. In contrast, Bae (2008) 
stated that, in developed countries, infrastructure was not a motivator but rather an indicator 
to attract FDI in large emerging economies. 
Poor infrastructure is one of the main obstacles hindering FDI inflow in any country, and 
good infrastructural facilities will ensure that a nation is more attractive to foreign investors 
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as well improving the qualities of the domestic investment. Infrastructure covers many 
dimensions, ranging from roads, ports, railways, and telecommunication systems to 
institutional development (e.g., accounting, legal services) Ajayi (2006). Asiedu (2002b) 
stated that good infrastructure increases the productivity of investment and can, therefore, 
stimulate FDI flows. With the use of cross-section data, Alfaro et al. (2003) found that poorly 
developed financial infrastructure could adversely affect an economy’s ability to take 
advantage of the potential benefits of FDI. In a study by Bhinda, Griffith-Jones, and Martin 
(1999), it was found that problems related to funds mobilisation were on the priority list of 
the factors discouraging investors in Uganda, Tanzania, and Zambia. Surveys in sub-Saharan 
Africa indicated that poor accounting standards, inadequate disclosure, and weak 
enforcement of legal obligations had damaged the credibility of financial institutions to the 
extent of deterring foreign investors. Bad roads, delays in shipments of goods at ports, and 
unreliable means of communication have added to these disincentives (Ajayi, 2006). FDI 
depends highly on the infrastructure of the host countries, so it is most imperative for every 
nation to develop her infrastructure to improve her domestic investments and also to attract 
the foreign investors. 
 
3.3.7 Growth 
The role of growth in attracting FDI has also been the subject of controversy. Charkrabarti 
(2001) stated that the growth hypothesis, developed by Lim (1983), maintained that a rapidly 
growing economy provided relatively better opportunities for making profits than the ones 
growing slowly or not growing at all. Culem (1988), Lunn (1980), and Schneider and Frey 
(1985) find a significantly positive effect of growth on FDI, while Tsai (1994) obtainsstrong 
support for the hypothesis over the period 1983 to 1986, but only a weak association for the 
period from 1975 to 1978. On the other hand, Nigh (1985) reports a weak positive correlation 
between growth and FDI attractiveness in the less developed economies and a weak negative 
correlation in developed countries. Ancharaz (2003) finds a positive effect with lagged 
growth for the full sample and the non-Sub-Saharan African countries, but an insignificant 
effect for the Sub-Saharan Africa sample. Gastanaga, Nugent and Pashamova (1998) and 
Schneider and Frey (1985) found significant positive effects of growth on FDI. 
The growth rate of the economy or the absolute annual changes of GDP may be used to 
measure the economic growth. The greater output growth means,a possible investment may 
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be attracted. It is obvious that the market and economy that are thought to grow fast should 
be favourable for absorbing FDI inflows. Thus, economic growth should be expected to have 
a positive effect on FDI inflows. The Economic developing level is expressed by per capita 
GDP. A higher economic developing level shows the strong purchasing power and good 
economic performance.  
In the meantime, this variable also means that an economy with high per capita GDP has high 
labour productivity, good local infrastructure and investment environment. Thus, economic 
development level should have a positive relationship with FDI inflows. A rapidly growing 
economy provides relatively better opportunities for making profits than one growing slowly 




The literature remains fairly indecisive regarding whether FDI may be sensitive to tax 
incentives. Some studies have shown that host country corporate taxes have a significant 
negative effect on FDI flows. Others have reported that taxes do not have a significant effect 
on FDI. Cassou (1997), Grubert and Mutti (1991), Hartman (1981), , Hines and Rice (1994), 
Kemsley (1998) and Loree and Guisinger (1995) find that host country corporate income 
taxes have a significant negative effect on attracting FDI flows. However, Jackson and 
Markowski (1995), Lim (1983), Porcano and Price (1996), Root and Ahmed (1979), Wheeler 
and Mody (1992) and Yulin and Reed (1995) conclude that taxes do not have a significant 
effect on FDI. Swenson (1994) reports a positive correlation. The direction of the effects of 
determinants mentioned above on FDI may be different. A variable may affect FDI both 
positively and negatively. For example, factors, such as labour costs, trade barriers, trade 
balance, exchange rate and tax have been found to have both negative and positive effects on 
FDI. In the empirical studies, various combinations of these determinants as explanatory 
variables have been used.  
Moosa (2002) states that due to the absence of any consensus on a theoretical framework to 
guide empirical work on FDI, there is no widely accepted set of explanatory variables that 
can be regarded as the “true” determinants of FDI. 
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Fakile and Adegbile (2011) and Morisset (2003) supported the view that tax incentive was a 
tool to attract FDI. In fact, Edmiston, Mudd andValev (2003), opined that government often 
sought to attract FDI by offering tax incentives to firms in exchange for certain benefits. 
Curiously, the empirical evidence of the benefits of offering tax incentives both at the firm 
level and at the national level remains ambiguous. Although trade theory expects FDI inflows 
to result in the improved competitiveness of host countries' exports, the pace of technological 
change in the economy as a whole will depend on the innovative and social capabilities of the 
host country, together with the absorptive capacity of other enterprises in the country 
(Carkovic & Levine, 2002). 
However, in attracting FDI, there is no doubt that more important are such factors as basic 
infrastructure, political stability and the cost and availability of labour. According to Morisset 
(2003), some empirical analysis and surveys have confirmed that tax incentives are a poor 
instrument for compensating for negative factors in a country’s investment climate, but that 
still does not mean that tax incentives do not affect FDI. Morisset (2003) expressed the view 
that in recent years there has been growing evidence that tax incentives influenced the 
location decisions of companies with regional economic groupings such as the European 
Union, North American Free Trade Area and Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Also, 
in the United States of America, incentives can play a decisive role in the final location 
decisions of foreign companies once the choices are narrowed down to a handful of sites with 
similar characteristics. Fakile and Adegbile (2011), elaborated on the effectiveness of tax 
incentives in Nigeria.The effectiveness of tax incentives is likely to vary depending on a 
firm’s activity and its motivations for investing abroad. Growing evidence shows, for 
example, that tax incentives are a crucial factor for mobile firms and firms operating in 
multiple markets, such as banks, insurance companies, and Internet-related businesses. This 
is because these firms can better exploit different tax regimes across countries.  
 
3.4 FDI and Job Creation in Nigeria 
Labour unemployment persistence in developing economies remains worrisome as 
unemployment data reveals a yearly rise in most of the countries. However, the type of labour 
under consideration will determine the explanation of unemployment as a general equilibrium 
phenomenon. In a three, sector general equilibrium model with simultaneous existence of 
both unskilled and skilled labour unemployment, Chaudhuri and Banerjee (2010) analysed 
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agricultural land in a developing economy in respect of the consequences of FDI. They 
revealed that unemployment of unskilled and skilled labour and national welfare 
improvements unequivocally improvedas a consequence of FDI in agriculture. Theoretically, 
the study supports the view that FDI inflow to agriculture in the developing economies is 
very desirable. 
Despite the large rents from oil exportation, export growth rate does not contribute 
meaningfully to employment growth in the country, implying that the large revenue from oil 
is not used to generate employment for Nigeria’s surplus labour. Nigeria is the most populous 
country in Africa, and it is blessed with a large pool of surplus labour. Nigeria’s labour 
market is dualistic as it is characterisedby both formal and informal employment with the 
bulk of its labour force engaged in agriculture particularly at the substance level (Ogunlela & 
Mukhtar, 2009). Oni (2006) argues that reducing the level of unemployment will increase the 
income level in the economy and thereby reduce the level of poverty. To increase the level of 
employment, some scholars have argued that the flow of goods and services (trade flows) 
could propel employment generation, especially in developing countries. Growth in 
employment has feedback on economic growth, such that an increase in labour incomes 
would expand domestic demand, which in turn would lead to sustainable GDP growth and 
reduce the risks of excessive reliance on uncertain foreign markets (Wheeler & Moody, 
1992).  
According to the diagram below (Figure 3-1), the total number of jobs created on a yearly 
basis has been dwindling for the last twelve yearsin comparison with the level of capital 
invested. Job creation has notbeen totally reflectedcurrently in the influx of foreign 
investment within the country; this could be due to lack of systemic policy on the role of 
multinationals and foreign firms.  U.S. FDI in Nigeria was estimated at $6.1 billion in 2010, 
down 29% from $8.65 billion in 2009 (UNCTAD World Investment Report, 2007). 
According to UNCTAD World Investment Report (2007), the decline in US FDI in 2010 was 
due to ongoing uncertainty related to the proposed Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) as well as 
political unrest in Nigeria. UNCTAD World Investment Report (2007) further states that 
Nigeria’s unemployment is concentrated in the younger age group, with unemployment rates 
of 41.6% among 15-24 years old, 11.5% among the 45-59 years old, and 16.7% among those 
over 65. Unemployment rates are higher for females (24.9%) than for males (17.7%). The 
states with the highest unemployment rates are concentrated in the North Eastern part of the 
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country and the Niger Delta, and the unemployment rate increased from 21.1% in 2010 to 




Figure 3-1.Jobs Created from 2003-2015 
(Source: fDi Intelligence report 2016) 
 
Baldwin (1995) investigated the impact of trade and foreign direct investment on 
employment and relative wages using factor content methodology. Although he found 
support for a small impact of trade on employment in OECD countries, yet, the employment-
creating effects of increased exports usually dominated the employment displacing effects of 
increased imports. Morawezynski and Wach (2003) investigated whether Polish foreign trade 
impacted on employment by pooling data for 28 sectors between 1993 and 1999 using 
regression analysis. They analysed employment effect of trade using employment, export and 
import and output. Their results found moderate evidence for traditional theories linking trade 
and employment as they found that import growth negatively affected employment changes 
in all the 28 sectors. Badwin (1995) found that international trade has little or no association 















3.5 Domestic Investment and SME in Nigeria 
3.5.1 Overview of Domestic Investment in Nigeria 
Domestic investment, which comprises private and public investment, is a vital component of 
total investment. For most economies, especially developed countries, the share of domestic 
investment is significantly large, sometimes higher than foreign capital; this is, however, a 
visibly opposing feature for most developing economies, where internally sourced capital is 
insufficient and inhibits targeted investment. For these economies, Nigeria in particular, 
public and private investment as a percentage of the GDP is significantly small, and her 
economy relies heavily on foreign capital.  
During the first decade following independence, public investment as a percentage of GDP in 
Nigeria was, on the average, below 5%. Most social capital projects were mainly 
concentrated in urban areas, while the rural areas were wholly disconnected from the 
investment web. Following the discovery of oil in huge reserves in the Niger Delta and 
backed with foreign preference for Nigerian sweet crude, government revenue generation 
received a boost, and the capital expenditure of the government soared.  
Empirically, public investment (as % of GDP) increased by 400%, from a staggering value of 
3.6% in 1970 to 14.9% in 1975. This impressive rate remained relatively stable, maintaining 
an average of 15% of the GDP until the oil market crashed in the late 70s, which resulted in 
falling revenues and declining public investment by the government. Public investment 
plummeted from 13% to 9% in 1982 and 1983, respectively. Though a value of 12.3% was 
recorded in1986, resulting from the augmentation of domestic revenue by the IMF and World 
Bank, public investment has stayed below 10% after that, except for an anticipated rise 
fuelled by the electoral process in 1998 and 1999.  
The poor rates of public investment in the mid-2000s could be linked to the global financial 
crisis of the period that affected government revenue earnings from crude oil export. Gross 
capital formation, which measures total investment undertaken by private individuals in the 
domestic economy, complements public investment. Similarly, private investment in Nigeria 
has trended the same pattern with public sector investment. In the late 70’s and 80’s, private 
investment as a percentage of GDP was averaging 25% annually, and during this period, was 
higher than public investment. However, since 1995, private domestic investment has been 
on a decline, averaging below 10% annually. The figure below reveals the trend analysis of 




Figure 3-2. Relationship between Private Domestic and Foreign Investment 
#
(Source: Central Bank of Nigeria Bulletin 2009) 
 
 
The poor trend of private investment in Nigeria is linked to unfavourable investment climate 
occasioned periodically by dysfunctional infrastructural base, insecurity, institutional failure, 
and unsupportive economic policies. The collective effect of these irregularities is an increase 
in the cost of doing business in Nigeria, which hampers firms’ formation, shutting down of 
existing ones and the repatriation of foreign capital.  
 
3.5.2 Overview of SMEs in Nigeria 
Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in Nigeria are seen as the backbone of the economy 
and a key source of economic growth, dynamism and flexibility. A study conducted by the 
Federal Office of Statistics shows that 97% of all businesses in Nigeria employ less than 100 
employees, implying that 97% of all businesses in Nigeria are "small businesses". The SME 
sector provides, on average, 50% of Nigeria’s employment and 50% of its industrial output 
(General Statistics Office 2007). Indeed, there appears to be agreement that the development 
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of SMEs in Nigeria is a step towards building a vibrant and diversified economy (Mahmoud, 
2005).There are over 1.7 million SMEs in Nigeria, and most of them are within the retail and 
manufacturing sector. 
The definition of SMEs depends mainly on the level of development of the country. In most 
developed market economies such as the United States of America (USA), U.K. and Canada, 
the definition criterion adopted a mixture of annual turnover and employment levels. In 
Nigeria, the Small and Medium Industries Enterprises Investment Scheme (SMIEIS) defines 
SME as any enterprise with a maximum asset base of N200 million (GB£423) excluding land 
and working capital and with staff numbers not less than 10 or more than 300. Nwokoye 
(1988) defines a Small and Medium-Scale business as any enterprise employing between five 
and one hundred workers and which has an annual turnover of approximately 400,000 Naira 
(N400, 000). The Federal Ministry of Commerce and Industry defines SMEs as firms with a 
total investment (excluding the cost of land but including capital) of up to N750, 000, and 
paid employment of up to 50 persons. SMEs exist in the form of sole proprietorship and 
partnership, though some could be registered as limited liability companies and 
characterisedby simple management structure, informal employer/employee relationship, 
labour intensive operation, and simple technology, a fusion of ownership and management 
and limited access to capital. The seven major sources of funding available to SMEs in 
Nigeria include personal resources, family and friends, partners or business associates, 
informal financial markets, banks, specialised funding facilities, e.g. NERFUND and 
specialised financial institutions, e.g. NBCI, BOI, NIDB etc (Owualah, 1999). Their role in 
economic development includes: technological/industrial development, employment 
generation, technology acquisition, capacity building, promotion of economic growth, 
increased standard of living, industrial dispersal or spread, servicing of large-scale industries, 
export promotion, structural transformation of rural areas, flexibility and low take-off 
requirements (Odubanjo, 2000). 
3.6 FDI, SME and Industrial Policy in Nigeria 
Nigeria's government is currently implementing a policy to promote small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) while encouraging the inflow of FDI. The relation between domestic 
firms and FDI inflow needs a critical study to analyse whether better opportunities are 
available to build linkages between domestic and foreign firms.  
The government of Nigeria has laid out four strategic policies for its development. They are 
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•! Investment in infrastructure (particularly electricity and transportation, but also water 
and irrigation for agriculture, with a focus on attracting private sector investment. 
•! Building capacity in financial markets and increasing credit access to productive 
sectors of the economy; 
•! Improving governance and institutional capacity (notably by aligning policy 
formulation and implementation across federal and state level, and up-scaling the 
fight against entrenched corruption); and 
•! Improving the business and investment climate (in particular by adopting a holistic 
legal investment framework, reversing the trend towards informality, accelerating the 
privatisation of state enterprises and improving the ease of doing business. 
Among these four main policies, the role of investment and SMEs has been emphasised by 
the fourth policy - the private sector development and employment - which has the following 
priorities in implementing the policy: (1) strengthening the private sector and attracting 
investment, (2) creating jobs and ensuring improved working conditions, (3) promoting 
SMEs, and (4) creating social safety nets for civil servants, employees and workers. Thecore 
development programme of the government outlined above, points out the two important 
issues of this study, that is, the promotion of SMEs and attracting FDI. These two issues are 
related to one another because attracting FDI while trying to build its linkages with SMEs 
will help achieve these two priorities. 
3.6.1 FDI and Incentive Policies 
Policies that affect FDI in Nigeria have been alternating between promotion and restriction of 
various degrees. The foremost FDI policies were enacted in the colonial administration. Thus, 
their economic interest was a major motivation. The Aid to Pioneer Industries of 1952 and 
Industrial Tax relief of 1958 were enacted to promote investments from both British and non-
British MNCs. The later policy involves granting a 5-year tax relief to foreign companies on 
entry into Nigeria (Aremu, 2003). This development was soon overridden by desperate calls 
from Nigerian citizens to “Nigerianise” the economy after independence in 1960 (Ekundare, 
1972). The Exchange Control Act of 1962 came as the first post-independence restrictive 
measure on FDI by prohibiting the transfer of money outside Nigeria without the consent of 
the Nigerian Federal Ministry of Finance. Thus, the act went against the basic precepts of 





Of greater scale and intensity regarding FDI restriction, was the Indigenisation Decree which 
began with the enactment of Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree, No. 4 of 1972. This 
imposed ceilings on foreign ownership of 60% on a total of 22 business activities, and 
minimum capital requirement. The business activities affected included advertising, 
electronic manufacturing, basic manufacturing and road transport, among others (UNCTAD, 
2009). Further restrictions on foreign ownership came with the Nigerian Enterprise 
Promotion Decree of 1977, which lowered foreign ownership limit from 60% to 40% and 
expanded the list of business activities restricted. The 1977 amendment was known as the 
most severe cases of government control on foreign ownership in Africa and the developing 
world (Biersteker, 1987; UNCTAD, 2009). However, a further amendment of the decree in 
1989 led to the relaxation of some of the restrictions previously imposed, but the controls 
were still present at that time.  
 
Part of the objectives of the Structural Adjustment Programme of 1986, was to privatise 
major public institutions in Nigeria, especially those of the oil sector. However, foreign 
investors were excluded from the privatisation process, as domestic Nigerian firms became 
the beneficiaries. The actual opening up of Nigerian economy to foreign investment came 
with the establishment of the Nigerian Investment Promotion Decree in 1995. According to 
the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission (NIPC) charter, the decree mandates the 
commission to provide investment services such as investment promotion, investor relations, 
investment-friendly policy advocacy and to build associations with multilateral institutions 
such as UNIDO, Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and Foreign Investment 
Advisory Service (FIAS) among others.Thus,the Nigerian economy was transformed from 
being a rather FDI restrictive economy to a FDI promotion one, allowing up to 100% foreign 
ownership in many sectors, especially in non-oil sectors (Kehl, 2009).  
 
The government has provided various incentives to attract FDI, which has been mentioned in 
the Law of Investment of 1988 and later amended in 2002. The incentive according to article 
12 is aimed at the following sectors: pioneer or high-technology industries, job-creating 
industries, export-oriented industries, tourism industry, agro-industry, transformation 
industry, physical infrastructure and energy, provincial and rural development, environment 
protection and investment in the export promotion zone (EPZ). Some of the incentives given 
are as the follows: corporate income tax rate of 20%, corporate tax exemption with the rule of 
a trigger period + three years + n, 5 years loss carried forward, full import duty exemption on 
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the machine, intermediate goods, raw material, no export tax and reinvestment of profit to 
receive special depreciation rate. 
A free trade zone is a designated area that eliminates traditional trade barriers, such as tariffs, 
and minimises bureaucratic regulations. The goal of a free trade zone is to enhance global 
market presence by attracting new business and foreign investments. It also seeks to limit 
trade restrictions, promote employment and alsoto stimulate export by giving the exporter a 
hedge against duties on the raw materials used in production. In these zones, trade is not 
limited by customs, trade tariffs or other barriers that can impede the exchange of goods.  
The Nigeria Free Trade Zone Act 1992 established the Nigerian Export Processing Zone 
Authority (NEPZA) which is mandated to grant all approvals for operators within the free 
trade zones to the exclusion of other government bodies and agencies. The purpose of free 
trade zones in Nigeria is to help facilitate an environment conducive to organisations 
becoming profitable.  
Some of the business opportunities available in the free trade zones across Nigeria include 
supply of raw materials, provision of cleaning services, freight forwarding services, cold 
storage facilities, warehousing facilities, security services, manufacture of electrical and 
electronic products, leather products, plastic products, petroleum products, rubber products, 
cosmetics, garments, chemical products, metal products, educational materials and 
equipment, sports equipment and material amongst others. 
The term free trade zone is often used interchangeably with export processing zones. The 
former refers to specially designated geographical areas within a nation that are exempted 
from the regulations and taxation normally imposed on business while the latter refers to a 
designated area in a country in which production for export is encouraged, usually by special 
tax treatment and by permitting firms to import duty-free so long as the imports are used as 
inputs in production of export. 
Overall, there are 25 special economic zones. These zones are established to provide ‘one-
stop service’to investors who are willing to reduce the time and other procedures in the 
investment process. The one-stop service is an on-site-service and enables the investor to 




Table 3-1. List of Special Economic Zones in Nigeria (Source: Nigeria Export Promotion 
Zone Board) 
!
No Name Location 
1 Calabar Free Trade Zone (CFTZ) Cross River 
2 Kano Free Trade Zone (KFTZ) Kano 
3 Tinapa Free Zone & Resort Cross River 
4 Snake Island Int. Free Zone Lagos 
5 Maigatari Border Free Zone Jigawa 
6 Ladol Logistics Free Zone Lagos 
7 Airline Services EPZ Lagos 
8 ALSCON EPZ Akwa Ibom 
9 Sebore Farms EPZ Adamawa 
10 Ogun Guandong FT Zone Ogun 
11 Lekki Free Zone Lagos 
12 Abuja Tech. Village Free Zone FCT 
13 Ibom Science & Tech. FZ Akwa Ibom 
14 Lagos Free Trade Zone Lagos 
15 Olokola Free Trade Zone Ondo & Ogun 
16 Living Spring Free Zone Osun 
17 Brass LNG Free Zone Bayelsa 
18 Banki Border Free Zone Borno 
19 Oils Integrated Logistics Services Free Zone  Lagos 
20 Specialized Railway Industrial FTZ Ogun 
21 Imo Guangdong FTZ Imo 
22 Kwara Free Zone Kwara 
23 Koko Free Trade Zone Delta 
24 Oluyole Free Zone Oyo 




3.6.2 SMEs Related Policies 
The regulatory environment constitutes an important component required to ensure the 
growth and development of a viable and vibrant SME sub-sector of the economy. It has been 
posited that the operating environment such as government policies, effects of globalisation, 
activities of financial institutions, local government policies, and SMEs’attitude to work and 
their inherent characteristics were factors responsible for the challenges that SMEs faced in 
their operations (Onugu, 2005). Regulation is part and parcel of contemporary business life as 
it helps to shield the businesses, the employees, and the general public from unwarranted 
risks just as it protects the environment from pollution. Besides, regulation is the medium 
through which government targets her policy aims and objectives. The regulatory 
environment includes all the stipulated conditions, rules and regulations, as well as the 
government policies and guidelines that dictate the setting up of SMEs and that influence 
their mode of operations. In this context, therefore, the regulatory environment includes the 
legal framework, financing regulations, tax administration, as well as ownership and 
management structure among others. 
Policies and regulations targeted at the promotion of SMEs in Nigeria can be traced to 
include the Nigeria Enterprises Promotion Act No. 3 of 1997; Patent Right and Design Act 
No. 60 of 1979; and Industrial Development Tax Act No. 2 of 1971 among others. Some 
microlending institutions established to enhance capacity and development of SMEs were 
identified in Ogechukwu (2006) as including the defunct Nigerian Bank for Commerce and 
Industry (NBCI), National Economic Reconstruction Fund (NERF) and the National Export 
and Import Bank (NEIB). Others are the Bank of Industry (BOI), Small and Medium Scale 
Enterprises Development Agency of Nigeria (SMEDAN), National Poverty Eradication 
Programme (NAPEP), National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategies 
(NEEDS), Small and Medium Industries Equity Investment Scheme (SMIEIS), Small and 
Medium Enterprises Credit Guarantee Scheme (SMECGS) and the Microfinance 
Development Fund (MDF). 
The government of Nigeria has adopted a framework for the development of SMEs in 
alignment with the core rectangular strategy. The framework for the development of SMEs 
focuses on three main issues: (1) regulatory and legal framework, (2) access to finance and 
(3) SMEs support activities. The main interest of the thesis lies in the third key issue, SMEs’ 
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support activities. There is no need for government intervention when the market is efficient. 
However, with the presence of public goods or the failure of markets, the role of government 
is needed. According to the SMEs’ development framework, the supporting activities will 
include support for improved access to the market, upgrading the technology and human 
resource and developing linkages, especially with large enterprises.  
 
3.7 Conclusion 
Over the years, the structure of the Nigerian economy moves along a transformation and 
transition trajectory of its structures. Before late 1980, the country adopted the planned 
economy, where the agricultural sector was the main sector of the economy regarding 
revenue, growth and investment. After the introduction of the structural adjustment 
programme in 1988, the country adopted the free-market economy, and the growth of 
manufacturing and service sectors has been noticeable. After 2009, the growth of the service 
industry superseded that of the agricultural and industrial sector. The growth of the country 
regarding GDP has been dwindling however in the last ten years and the petroleum sector has 
contributed to the GDP more than ever before. 
The service sector with high potential growth includes the telecommunication, financial 
services and trade sectors. The industrial sector with high-potential to grow are the crude 
petroleum and natural gas sector, solid mineral sector and food and beverages and tobacco 
sector.Major export markets include the US, EU, South American countries and Asia. The 
agricultural sector seems sluggish regarding exportation and external revenue creation and 
alsoregarding output; however, the crop production sector has produced significantly more 
than other sectors within the agricultural industry. 
Industry linkages in Nigeria based on the input-output table created reveal that the country 
tends to have a considerable amount of strong forward and backward linkages. The growth 
and investment of the petroleum sector do induce growth on other related sectors through 
those linkages. After adopting the free market policies in 1988, and with the integration of 
membership in world organisationssuch as the WTO, the country experiences a high inflow 
of FDI. The top investors in Nigeria are the EU, US, Canada, China and South American 
investors. The most favoured sector for foreign investment is between the industrial and 
service sector especially the petroleum sector, communication sector and the financial sector. 
Compared to other sub-Saharan states, Nigeria can attract more FDI. However, Nigeria still 
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receives less amounts of FDI than South-Africa and Egypt. In fact, the role of FDI in 
promoting growth and generating employment and transferring technology is very significant 
for Nigeria. 
The next couple of chapters capture various estimations from productivity through to the 
inclusion of horizontal and vertical industry integration. Chapter 4 provides an empirical 
approach toward productivity spill-overs, FDI and industry linkages. The chapter analysed 
intra-sectoral spill-overs and inter-sectoral spill-overs; which included forward and backward 
linkages. The chapter also introduced new proxies for absorptive capacity and defines 
technology gap through mathematical formulation. Chapter 5 explores the role innovation 
inproductivity and defines firm-level innovation empirically. Chapter 6 provides both a 
theoretical and empirical approach towards spill-overs and industry linkages by looking at the 
impact of export-platform FDI on backward linkages in the host country. Chapter 7 provides 
an empirical approach toward FDI and financial constraints of domestic firms using a 
modified Euler framework. Chapter 8 provides the overall conclusion of the thesis which 
points out how the research questions were answered and indicated issues where there was 




CHAPTER 4: Productivity Spill-overs, FDI and Industry Linkages 
4.1 Introduction 
The host country expects that the technology brought by FDI can spill-over to domestic firms 
and promote growth because theories of multinational firms and FDI suggest that foreign 
firms possess superior knowledge, which is their competitive advantage (Markusen & 
Venables, 1999; Penrose, 1956). Furthermore, the experience of the emerging economies 
shows that such spill-overs promote growth.  
In Nigeria, the amount of FDI has rapidly increased from 2003 to 2016; totalling about US$ 
107.36 billion in capital investment. The most-favoured investment sector is the coal, oil and 
natural gas sector which account for 60% of total investment. Moreover, along with policies 
to attract FDI, the Nigerian Government is also implementing several policies to support 
domestic small and medium-scale enterprises (SMEs).  
Developing country governments often provide investment incentives targeting foreign firms 
to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) boost capital formation and enhance the quality of 
capital stock in their economies. FDI is often seen as a vehicle for increases in productivity 
and consequently, as a driver for economic growth. Specifically, foreign presence in each 
sector is often associated with the transfer of superior technical and managerial know-how, 
better organisational practices, etc., that not only improves the productivity of firms that are 
recipients of FDI, but also spills over into the surrounding economy through worker turnover 
and/or demonstration effects (Damijan & Knell, 2003; Vahter, 2004). Not surprisingly, 
developing countries go to great lengths to provide investment incentives targeted at foreign 
firms. According to the 2005 World Investment Report, no fewer than 2156 regulatory 
changes in investment regimes were introduced by 102 countries between 1991 and 2004, of 
which 93% were more favourable to FDI, and only 7% were less favourable to FDI 
(UNCTAD, 2005). 
FDI spill-overs can be broadly defined as the impact of foreign firms’presence on domestic 
firms’economic performance. The standard approach in the empirical literature is to analyse 
spill-overs as complementaryanalysis explaining total factor productivity (TFP) in a 
production function framework.  Spill-overs are based on different types of linkages between 
MNEs and local firms. First, spill-overs can flow from foreign to local firms (international 
spill-overs) or, conversely, from local to foreign firms (reverse spill-overs). A second 




and vertical spill-overs (between firms and their suppliers or customers). Furthermore, the 
presence of specific vertical relationships between firms, such as outsourcing, or the 
absorptive capacity of firms may influence spill-overs.  
In this literature, horizontal spill-overs are distinguished from vertical effects. Horizontal 
spill-overs occur between firms in similar stages of the production chain, while vertical spill-
overs occur between firms in customer-supplier relationships. Horizontal spill-overs have 
received widespread attention at least since Caves (1974).  The vertical spill-over discussion 
launched by Lall (1980) and McAleese and McDonald (1978) languished for nearly two 
decades before the theoretical work by Markusen and Venables (1999) andRodriguex-Clare 
(1996) and empirical work by Jaxorcik (2004) revived the interest in vertical spill-overs as a 
more likely channel for (positive) productivity spill-overs.Since then, a considerable amount 
of empirical work has focused on vertical spill-overs and has found that especially backward 
spill-overs are more likely to generate a substantial positive impact on domestic firms’ TFP, 
often outweighing horizontal spill-overs, for which the empirical evidence is much more 
mixed (see Crespo & Fontoura, 2007; Görg & Greenaxay, 2004; Meyer & Sinani,  2009).  
Based on a meta-analysis of 1996 estimates of backward spill-overs (covering literature up to 
March 31, 2010), Havranek and Irsoxa (2011) confirm that the average spill-over to suppliers 
is economically significant. 
The studies of the 1980s and 1990s use a pipeline model: they presume that spill-overs are 
independent of domestic firms’ capabilities. In the 2000s, a shift occurs toward the domestic 
capability model. This new strand of the literature assumes that spill-overs do not occur 
automatically, but may depend on the capabilities of domestic firms. The findings, however, 
remain contradictory. Blyde, Kugler and Stein (2004) for Venezuela, Bwalya (2006) for 
Zambia, Chudnovsky, Lopez and Rossi (2008) andMarin and Bell (2006) for Argentina, and 
Mebratie and Bedi (2013) for South Africa did not find any spill-overs. Jordaan (2008a, 
2008b) for Mexico and Waldkirch and Ofosu (2010) for Ghana found negative FDI effects. 
In contrast to these findings, studies of Asian countries report positive spill-overs (Khalifah & 
Adam, 2009 for Malaysia; Nguyen & Nguyen, 2007, for Vietnam; Taymaz & Yilmaz, 2008, 
for Turkey). Because of the possibility of spill-over effects from FDI, empirical studies that 
model the productivity gains from foreign presence often include gains to domestic firms that 
are not direct recipients of foreign investment. However, the evidence on whether FDI is the 
source of positive (or negative) productivity spill-over effects is decidedly mixed (for a good 




more likely to find positive intra-sectoral spill-overs from FDI (Driffield, 2001;Globerman, 
1979;Liu et al., 2000). For developing countries, however, data is often incomplete and, 
historically, there have been few studies of productivity spillovers from FDI. More recently, 
the increasing availability of better datasets for a larger number of countries has produced a 
significant increase in the number of such studies, but the results across countries remain 
inconclusive.  
FDI is often seen as a catalyst for a country’s development and economic growth, which is 
the reason for attracting FDI to a country. The expectation of higher return from investment 
than domestic counterparts leads a plant to operate in a foreign country. Local firms could 
indirectly benefit from the presence of foreign firms if foreign firms could not prevent 
technological externalities. There is a large economic literature that stresses the importance of 
FDI and its spill-over effects to the host economy (Görg & Greenaway 2004). Spill-over 
effects may take place when the entry or presence of foreign firms leads to productivity and 
efficiency benefits in the host country’s local firms (Blomström & Kokko 1998). Such 
benefits, however, may raise the productivity of indigenous plants without compensating the 
foreign firms. The spill-over effects of foreign firms to the local industries can be divided into 
two groups; Inter- and Intra- industry spill-over effects:  
 
4.2 Intra- Sectoral (horizontal) spill-overs 
This is the most researched topic in the literature as far as benefits of FDI are concerned. 
Horizontal spill-over arises from the presence of MNCs in a sector and its influence on the 
host sector’s competitors (Halpern and Muraközy 2007). According to Görg and Greenway 
(2004), there are four transmission channels through which horizontal spill-over effects might 
occur. These are (a) imitation: This is the classic type of technology spill-over (Görg & 
Greenaway 2004; Wang & Blomström 1992). It mainly involves imitation of proprietary 
technology, management and marketing skills of the foreign firms (Halpern & Muraközy 
2007). In other words, as such, imitation of new technologies may enhance the productivity 
of local firms. (b) Human capital and labour turnover: when domestic workers trained by or 
having worked in MNCs’ affiliates may decide to leave and join an existing domestic firm, or 
open up a new domestic firm, taking with them some or all of the MNC-specific knowledge 
(Fosfuri et al. 2001). Thus, this can generate productivity improvement via two mechanisms 




labour working alongside unskilled labour tends to raise the productivity of the latter. 
Second, workers that move carry knowledge with them of new technology; new management 
techniques and consequently can become direct agents of technology transfer. Human capital 
is a very important factor for a company. Human capital is determined by the quality and 
equity of the domestic educational and training system. MNEs’ main reason to go abroad is 
often that of low wages. At the same time, they demand relatively skilled labour (ibid). This 
can be arranged through training. They create exposure to modern technology and 
management techniques. (c) Competition: when the increase in competition that occurs 
because of foreign entry forces domestic firms to introduce new technology and increase their 
efficiency (Glass & Saggi 2002). However, the competition effect may entail adverse effects 
on the part of the domestic firms if their cost of production drastically increases because of 
the competition. (d) Export: through cooperation, or most likely imitation, local firms can 
acquire penetration tactics which are deemed to be essential for the export market (Görg & 
Greenaway 2004). Hence, local firms may experience a reduction in costs associated with 
exportation due to the presence of foreign firms. 
Externalities may also be observed through industrial management. According to Blomström 
and Sjöholm (1999), when more foreign affiliates operate in a sector of the host economy, 
domestic firms enhance their productivity by imitating foreign production technologies. They 
will also invest more in product development and quality assurance, or simply allocate 
resources more efficiently to stay competitive. Likewise, domestic business partners of 
jointly-invested projects can apply management skills acquired from their foreign partners in 
projects of their own.  
Other channels for the diffusion of information on foreign market conditions are trade 
associations and other industry organisations, of which MNEs are often a member. This kind 
of market access spill-overs may be most important where the indigenous resources are 
weakest, especially in developing countries (Blomström & Kokko, 1996,1998) 
However, spill-over effects may depend on the technological gap between foreign and 
indigenous firms. It is believed that before the technologyis widely spread in the market, local 
companies have little information about the benefits of the technology (Blomström and 
Kokko 1996). This makes it risky to implement the technology, but when they come in touch 
with the existing users, more information will be available, and uncertainty will be removed. 




However, it is unlikely to anticipate spill-over benefits having a huge technological gap 
between the foreign and domestic firms (Blomström & Sjöholm 1999).  
MNCs may try to prevent the leakage of technology to the domestic firms. This mainly 
occurs when MNCs afraid to lose their intangible assets to a local partner;therefore they may 
abandon investing or else, bring technologies of low quality to their subsidiaries (Blomström 
& Kokko 1998). In other words, MNCs may try to internalise their intangible assets. 
Consequently, in such circumstances, the possibility of acquiring positive externalities will be 
low. Also, leakages of the MNCs’ technology do not occur automatically. Local companies 
must be active to search for information, reverse engineering, personnel training for the new 
production methods, etc. This makes it costly and time-consuming.  
According to the literature, foreign subsidiaries are expected to be more productive than local 
firms (Aitken & Harrison 1999; Blomström & Kokko 1996). This is due to higher technology 
inputs and a more efficient production and distribution process. MNEs affiliates work on 
lower production and distribution costs than local firms and are therefore able to compete 
more successfully. On the other hand, their knowledge of local markets and consumer 
preferences may be a disadvantage. Their higher productive efficiency helps to increase the 
productivity in their industries, which is beneficial for the general productivity of the host 
country.  
There is little or no consensus in the empirical literature regarding the effect of horizontal 
spill-overs. Keller and Yeaple (2009) highlight a positive horizontal effect for the U.S. 
manufacturing firms, and Sánchez-Sellero, Rosell-Martínez and García-Vázquez (2014) 
report evidence of horizontal spill-overs in Spain. However, Reganati and Sica (2007) find 
limited evidence of horizontal spill-overs for Italian manufacturing firms and Kugler (2006) 
obtains similar mitigated results for Colombian firms. 
Horizontal spill-overs can also operate in the opposite direction, i.e. from local firms to 
MNEs’ affiliates (Blanchard & Mathieu 2016; Driffield & Love 2003; Potterie & Lichtenberg 
2001). The same arguments apply to these reverse spill-overs as to international spill-overs. 
According to Driffield and Love (2003), whose study was based on the U.K. manufacturing 
sector over the 1984–1992 period, reverse spill-overs were sectorally limited to relatively 
R&D-intensive industries and were geographically restricted to locations with a high degree 




period, Blanchard and Mathieu (2016) report that reverse spill-overs were present not only in 
R&D-intensive manufacturing industries but also in knowledge-intensive service industries. 
 
4.3 Inter-Sectoral (vertical) spill-overs 
Vertical spill-overs occur when the knowledge held by MNEs in the host country reaches the 
suppliers and customers of their affiliates in the upstream and downstream sectors, 
respectively. These spill-overs primarily occur through transactional processes (outsourcing 
contracts, cooperative agreements or arm’s length transactions) and are either backward, 
when MNEs’ affiliates are supplied by local firms in the upstream sector, or forward, when 
local firms purchase their inputs from foreign firms (Clark, Highfill, de Oliveira Campino & 
Rehman, 2011; Gorg & Greenaway 2004;). 
It occurs through foreign companies’ impact on the local suppliers/buyers. Vertical spill-
overs take place when the foreign firm and a local supplier/buyer, in different sectors, are 
engaged in a long-term relationship (Halpern and Muraközy 2007). Inter-sectoral spill-overs 
appear through the creation of linkages between the foreign company and domestic firms, and 
it is a process that is mostly multi-sectoral (Javorcik 2004). There exist two types of linkages 
between the domestic and foreign firms, i.e., backward and forward linkages. Spill-overs in 
the downstream sectors, which are known as backward linkages, occur when the local 
suppliers have to meet the demand from the foreign firm in the form of higher quality, price 
and delivery standards (Javorcik 2004). Another implication of inter-industry spill-over 
effects is the increased demand by the MNC for local intermediate inputs, thus increasing 
production possibilities in the host economy (ibid). Similarly, MNCs may provide new and 
better intermediate inputs with affordable prices to local customers. Hence, this interaction in 
the upstream sector may be vital for the transmission of technology. In support of these 
theories, there are case studies which show that knowledge is transferred from downstream 
foreign affiliates to upstream domestic suppliers through intensive monitoring, training, and 
assistance as well as supervision in the implementation of new technologies (Moran, 2001). 
Moreover, if there is a technology gap between the foreign and the domestic firms, there is 
potential for technological improvement in the host economy. The local firms must upgrade 
their products to meet the foreign firm’s demand for advanced products. In summary, the lack 
of observed positive horizontal spill-overs from FDI leads researchers to search for spill-




In contrast, forward FDI is the FDI in the input industry that supplies high-quality 
intermediate goods to domestic producers of final products. By supplying intermediate goods 
of high quality, foreign firms indirectly help improve the productivity of their domestic 
buyers. This relationship was empirically studied by Javorcik (2004).  
Although it is clear in the theory how backward or forward FDI facilitates the productivity 
spill-over, empirical evidence of the effect of these two channels is mixed. Some researchers 
find positive productivity spill-over (Bitzer, Geishecker & Gorg, 2008; Blalock & Gertler, 
2009; Jabbour & Mucchielli, 2007; Javorcik, 2004) while other researchers report only 
limited or weak vertical productivity spill-over (Girma & Gong, 2008; Giuliani, 2008).  
There is greater empirical consensus for vertical spill-overs than for horizontal spill-overs, as 
noted previously by Havranek and Irsova (2011) in a quantitative review of the literature on 
international vertical FDI spill-overs. Conducting a meta-analysis (a collection of 3,626 
estimates covering 47 countries) and accounting for misspecification and publication biases, 
the authors argue that there is evidence of a large positive effect of backward spill-overs and 
a small effect of forward spill-overs. 
Outsourcing relationships between MNEs’ affiliates and local firms may amplify backward 
spill-over effects. Indeed, affiliates may demand a greater volume of specific intermediate 
inputs from their local upstream outsourcers than they can purchase on the local market. 
MNEs’ affiliates may perceive that a large share of their technology must be transferred to 
local outsourcers to allow the latter to meet MNEs’ quality requirements for intermediate 
products (Pack and Saggi 2001). Regarding forward linkages between MNEs’ outsourcers 
and local customers, knowledge transfers arise through three main channels: product 
embodied knowledge, exchanges with sales employees and exchanges with customer service 
employees. The availability of higher quality inputs and services as a result of inward FDI 
enhances the productivity of local firms, provided that such firms can absorb this foreign 
knowledge. Conversely, if inputs are overly expensive or are not adapted to local 
requirements, then the effect will be negative. Paradoxically, the potential amplification 
effect of outsourcing relationships has not been explored, except in Girma and Görg (2004). 
Using a panel of the UK manufacturing establishments over the 1980 to 1992 period, they 
demonstrate that MNEs’ affiliates have a greater propensity to outsource than local firms do. 
The magnitude of vertical spill-overs may also depend on the technological capacity of local 




associated with greater externalities, as shown by Liu (2008) for knowledge spill-overs in the 
UK and by Behera (2015) in India. Here, the absorptive capacity of firms determines their 
ability to assimilate and utilise the available external information (Cohen & Levinthal 1989). 
In a recent contribution, Barrios and Strobl (2011) challenged some of the implicit 
assumptions underlying the measure for vertical spill-overs proposed by Javorcik (2004). For 
a panel of Irish firms, they found that alternative measures yielded different results. Although 
Barrios and Strobl (2011) dealt with several important issues, including the use of input-
output tables in constructing spill-over variables, they did not consider the level of industry 
aggregation in these tables as potentially affecting spill-over effects. However, given the way 
horizontal and vertical spill-over variables were typically defined and constructed, the level 
of industry aggregation was crucial in discriminating between horizontal and vertical spill-
overs. Following Caves (1974), most empirical work defined the variable to capture the 
horizontal spill-over potential as the share of industry output produced by foreign firms. 
Because firm-level data on linkages with foreign affiliates were usually unavailable, variables 
to capture vertical spill-over potential were calculated -following Javorcik (2004)- as a 
weighted average of foreign presence (measured by the horizontal variable) in industries 
upstream and downstream of a domestic firm in a given industry. These weights are technical 
coefficients derived from input-output (IO) tables, conveying industry-level relationships 
with upstream and downstream industries. Therefore, the input-output tables’ level of 
industry aggregation determines the definition of horizontal and vertical spill-overs. The 
more aggregated the input-output tables used, the more likely that the horizontal spill-over 
variable will also capture customer-supplier relationships. Recent work by Alfaro and 
Charlton (2009) makes a similar point in a closely related matter: the classification of 
multinational firms’ investment as horizontal or vertical. They show that for a large sample of 
multinational firms, that due to a finer level of detail in industry classification,considerably 
more multinational investment than previously thought should be classified as vertical rather 
than horizontal. 
What explains these differentials in the findings on productivity spill-over? Among the 
myriad factors, two important explanations are technology gap and absorptive capacity of 
domestic firms. 
Existing conceptual debates suggest that the technology gap between domestic firms and 




over, but it is unclear whether a large gap or a small gap is better. Findlay (1978) argues that 
the rate of technological progress in the relatively “backward region” is an increasing 
function of the gap between its level of technology and that of the “advanced region”. The 
gap indicates the existence of new technological knowledge for domestic firms to learn. 
However, this disparity must not be too wide for the thesis to hold. In contrast, Wang and 
Blomstrom (1992) explain that the profit of the domestic firm is negatively related to the 
technology gap, while that of the multinational firm is positively related to the gap. 
Conversely, firms which are already technologically advanced are thought to have little room 
for further advancement. This is supported by the works of Chuang and Hsu (2004), Jordaan 
(2008, 2013), Lai, Wang, and Zhu (2009), Sjöholm (2007), Smeets (2008), Tian, Jiang, and 
Jiang (2010), Xu and Zhao (2012) and Yin and Zhou (2014). The other strand of the literature 
emphasises the importance of a small technology gap in aiding technology transfer from 
foreign firms, given that these firms have the basic skills level to follow and adopt the 
technology being used by foreign-owned firms (Cantwell, 2009). This is endorsed by the 
works of Dimelis (2005), Farole and Deborah (2015), Hamida and Gugler (2009), Jabbour 
and Mucchielli (2007), Marcin (2008), Takii (2005), Ubeda and Pérez-Hernández (2016) and 
Wang et al. (2016). Thus, the current literature either accepts or rejects the sweeping 
statement that absorptive capacity matters for FDI spill-overs, but is devoid of differentiating 
whether intra- or inter-industrial linkages between local and foreign affiliates may respond 
differently to changes in absorptive capacity (Imbriani, Pittiglio, Reganati & Sica 2014; 
Khalifah, Salleh & Adam 2015). 
Therefore, when the gap is small, foreign firms transfer more advanced technology as they 
need to compete with domestic firms to guarantee their profits (Glass & Saggi, 1998).  
Existing empirical studies also report conflicting findings on the effect of the technology gap 
on productivity spill-over. In the case of Mexican manufacturing firms, Kokko (1994) shows 
that large gap (ratio of value added per worker of foreign firms to that of domestic firms) is 
an obstacle to productivity spill-over. Using the ratio of total factor productivity (TFP) to the 
maximum TFP in the UK’s electronic and engineering sector, Girma and Gorg (2007) 
showed that reduction in the technology gap enhanced the ability of domestic firms to benefit 
from the productivity spill-overs. In contrast, Castellani and Zanfei (2003), measuring the 
technology gap by using the ratio of domestic firms’ TFP to their industries’ average TFP, 




Nelson and Phelps (1966) were among the first to assert the crucial role of absorptive 
capacity on growth, emphasising the link between higher education and technological 
diffusion. Their approach assigned an indirect role for human capital (through its incidence in 
technology), rather than the more conventional consideration of human capital as an 
additional input of production. In the same line, Cohen and Levinthal (1990) argued that the 
ability to exploit external knowledge is largely a function of prior related knowledge, which 
depends, among other factors, on the advanced technical training of workers; whereas 
Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) claimed that the ability of an economy to adopt and implement 
external technology depended on its human capital stock. Recent empirical evidence has 
provided support for the role of human capital as a key determinant of absorptive capacity. 
For example, results on the entrepreneurial activity in the U.S. metropolitan areas studied by 
Qian et al. (2013) led the authors to conclude that the chief contribution of human capital was 
on building entrepreneurial absorptive capacity rather than creating knowledge-based 
entrepreneurial opportunities. On the other hand, technological diffusion soon became linked 
with geography. For instance, Keller (2002) found that technological spill-overs were local, 
not global, as the benefits from foreign externalities decreased with distance. The idea of 
spatially bounded spill-overs, in addition to the stylized fact of a spatial distribution of wealth 
and poverty in the world, plus the development of the New Economic Geography literature 
(see for instance, Krugman, 1991) made the spatial dependence patterns almost impossible to 
ignore in the analysis. In recent years, Ertur and Koch (2007), Fingleton and L´opez-Bazo 
(2006), Koch (2008, 2010) and L´opez-Bazo, Vaya and Artis (2004) proposed growth models 
that explicitly accounted for spatial dependence and externalities. Basile, Capello and 
Caragliu (2012) even claimed that other forms of proximity, such as technological, relational 
and social, reinforced the effects of geographical proximity. 
On the other hand, the question arises as to precisely how absorptive capacity affects 
productivity spill-over. Firstly, Cohen and Levinthal (1989, p. 128) define the term 
“absorptive capacity” as “the ability to recognise the value of new information, assimilate it 
and apply it for commercial end”. They explain that an organisation needs prior related 
knowledge to assimilate new knowledge (Cohen & Levithal, 1989,1990). So far, existing 
studies have employed various indicators of absorptive capacity, including research and 
development (R&D) and non-R&D, to investigate the effect of absorptive capacity on 
productivity spill-over. R&D represents the absorptive capacity of firms because investment 




from foreign firms. They also postulate that there are costs associated with the imitation of 
new knowledge, but those costs are minimisedby existing R&D conducted by the firm to 
enhance its absorptive capacity in the relevant field.  
Findings from existing studies consistently suggest the positive impact of absorptive capacity 
on productivity spill-over. For example, Cohen and Levinthal (1989) studiedUS firms and 
found that they hada high level of ability to acquire new knowledge due to their munificent 
investment in R&D activities. Similarly, Kinoshita (2000) and Griffith, Redding and Reenen 
(2004) have found that R&D enabled domestic firms to imitate the technology of foreign 
firms in the case of the Czech Republic and in 12 OECD countries. Regarding non-R&D 
indicators, Barrios and Strobl (2002) and Girma, Gorg and Pisu (2008) showed that the 
export status of domestic firms in Spain and UK, as an indicator of absorptive capacity, 
affected their ability to benefit from the productivity spill-over. 
The previous literature’s application of quantile regressions to productivity spill-overs is 
limited to the works of Békés, Kleinert, and Toubal (2009), Dimelis (2005), Görg and Girma 
(2005), Kim (2015) and Kosteas (2008). The first two studies explicitly allow for the role of 
absorptive capacity onto FDI spill-overs originating from intra-industrial linkages, while 
ignoring inter-industrial linkages altogether. Görg and Girma (2005) found that absorptive 
capacity mattered and that a U-shaped relationship existed between productivity growth and 
FDI interacting with absorptive capacity. This implies that any increase in absorptive 
capacity beyond a certain threshold level translates into an increase in the benefits from 
horizontal spill-overs, and if it is below this threshold, it results in a decrease in firm-level 
productivity. For the UK electronics sector, the firms located in the lowest quantiles benefited 
the most from an increase in absorptive capacity beyond the threshold level while, in the 
engineering sector, firms located in the highest quantiles tended to benefit the most. Using 
firm-level data for Greece, Dimelis (2005) also found evidence that the significance of the 
interaction term between horizontal spill-overs and absorptive capacity varied across 
quantiles, wherein the highest impact was noted for firms located in the middle and upper 
quantiles of the growth distribution. Similarly, Kim (2015) allows for interaction between 
absorptive capacity and FDI-induced intra- and intersectoral spill-overs to conclude a 
heterogeneous response to an increase in absorptive capacity across quantiles, with firms 
located in higher quantiles possessing greater ability to capture the positive horizontal spill-
overs as absorptive capacity increases. As for forward spill-overs, an increase in absorptive 




quantiles, while absorptive capacity retarded backward spill-overs for firms operating in the 
median quantile. This heterogeneous response of intra- and inter-sectoral linkages across 
quantiles suggests the need to identify the profile of firms which benefited the most as a 
result of an increase in their absorptive capacity. 
Kosteas’ (2008) study, which does not explicitly incorporate the technology gap into its 
regression model, finds a positive and significant impact of horizontal spill-overs for Mexico; 
however, these benefits are only experienced by firms operating in the higher quantiles. 
Békés, Kleinert, and Toubal (2009), using firm-level data for Hungary and incorporating the 
effects of both intra- and inter-industry spill-overs on firm-level productivity, reveal that 
horizontal and backward spill-overs have a negative impact on local TFP for the least 
productive firms, i.e., for firms operating in the lower quantiles. However, the impact 
monotonically increases and becomes positive for higher quantiles. As for forward linkages, a 
positive impact emerges for Hungarian firms, which decreases with higher quantiles. Békés, 
Kleinert, and Toubal (2009), however, fall short of incorporating the role of absorptive 
capacity into the model. 
This study is conceived with the aim of filling two substantial gaps in the existing literature 
(see Figure 4-1 for the analytical framework). Firstly, very few studies have examined the 
effect of vertical FDI and the technology gap on the productivity spill-over on domestic 
firms. Moreover, notwithstanding the fact that the productivity spill-over can occur through 
vertical and horizontal channels, only a limited number of studies have been conducted to 
examine the effect of vertical productivity spill-over and the technology gap together (see, for 
example, Marcin, 2008; Girma et al., 2008; Wang, 2010). Most of the existing studies on 
technology gap and productivity spill-over focus principally on the horizontal productivity 
spill-over. This study, therefore, extends the literature by incorporating both vertical and 
horizontal channels into the investigation. To put it another way, this paper examines how 
backward and forward FDI affect the productivity of domestic firms when there is a gap in 









Figure 4-1. Analytical Framework of Industry Linkages and FDI 
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Secondly, this study attempts to introduce two new proxies of absorptive capacity to measure 
the effect of absorptive capacity on productivity spill-over. In the case of labour-intensive and 
service firms, the proxies of workers’ education and training seem more suitable than those of 
R&D for two reasons. Firstly, as it is labour-intensive, FDI often brings less complicated 
technology to host countries; hence, domestic firms do not necessarily invest heavily in R&D 
activities to catch up with foreign firms. The high level of workers’ education and additional 
training may do the work. Secondly, although R&D is probably needed, SMEs may not have 
a sufficient budget to spend on it. For these reasons, R&D is probably less visible in the case 
of labour-intensive and service industries. Wang (2010) also uses workers’ education to 
examine the effect of absorptive capacity in the vertical channel. 
This study chooses to analyse evidence of spill-overs in Nigeria for three reasons. Firstly, 
Nigeria has enjoyed impressive economic growth due to the largeinflow of FDI. Secondly, 
along with efforts to attract FDI, the Nigerian Government is also working hard to promote 
SMEs. Finally, although there are a few studies examining the productivity spill-over in 
manufacturing firms in Nigeria (see, for example, (Adejumo, 2013, Dutse, 2012; Dutse, 
Okwoli & Kurfi, 2011; Onyekwena, 2012) and reporting positive spill-over from FDI, they 

















The findings show that domestic firms can benefit from the productivity spill-over when the 
level of their technology is moderately below that of the foreign firms. The absorptive 
capacity measured by workers’ education and training do not have statistically significant 
effects on the productivity spill-over.  
The next section will look at how best to analyse productivity spill-overs and absorptive 
capacity and what model econometrically can be used. The section will look at previous 
methods used and willjustify the selected model as best fitting the objective of this research 
work. Also, the model will include capturing problems of unobserved variables as well as 
simultaneity bias. 
 
4.4 Methodology and Data 
4.4.1 Model specification 
It is widely believed that FDI is an important resource to increase a domestic firm’s 
productivity and efficiency through positive spill-over effects. Due to this strong belief in the 
positive effects of FDI, governments of developing countries try to attract more FDI by 
providing many types of incentives such as tax holidays and regulatory exemptions. Since 
multinational firms are usually technologically and managerially superior to domestic firms 
in developing countries, the presence of multinational firms benefit domestic firms through 
technology and information spill-over. As discussed in the previous literature (Blomström 
1986; Blomström & Kokko 1998; Liu 2008; Suyanto et al. 2012; Suyanto & Salim 2013) 
show that FDI generates positive knowledge externalities such as new technology and 
advanced managerial skills in the host country. These knowledge spill-over effects of FDI 
may enhance efficiency and raise the productivity of a domestic firm. However, there exists 
mixed empirical evidence that proves the beneficial spill-over influence of FDI on the 
productivity of a domestic firm. 
Spill-overs of FDI on the productivity of domestic firms linked to the production chain are 
analysed in many empirical studies. There exists a large body of literature that focuses on 
horizontal spill-over from FDI including Aitken and Harrison (1999) on Venezuela; Djankov 
and Hoekman (2000) on the Czech Republic and Haddad and Harrison (1993) on Morocco. 
According to Aitken and Harrison (1999), horizontal spill-overs are less likely to be found or 




force domestic firms to contract by stealing business from them, resulting in a decrease in the 
productivity of the domestic firms. 
To estimate the productivity spill-over, the researcher follows the conventional method by 
regressing domestic firms’ production level (productivity) on the presence of FDI in the same 
industries (horizontal FDI), upstream industries (forward FDI) and downstream industries 
(backwards FDI). Gorg and Greenaway (2004) and Smeets (2008) conducted a thorough 
literature survey of this conventional method. The effect of productivity spill-over is present 
if the coefficient of FDI is positive. However, this conventional method, as pointed out by 
Blalock and Gertler (2009) and Javorcik (2004), has problems of unobserved variable and 
simultaneity bias. This study deals with these problems by using panel data and random and 
fixed effect models.  
To study how the absorptive capacity and technology gap affect the productivity spill-over, 
this study uses interaction terms of FDI with proxies of the absorptive capacity and 
technology gap. The interaction method is used due to its simplicity and the convenience of 
interpretation. Girma (2005) explains that this method permits identification of the threshold 
level of absorptive capacity (see also Marcin, 2008; Girma et al., 2008; Blalock and Gertler, 
2009).  
Following Dimelis and Louri (2004), the production function in Cobb-Douglas form is: 
!"#$ = &∝"#$()"#$*+"#$,-"#$.
/01/2345678 + :;<="#$ ∗ ?@"#$ + A?@"#$ + B;<="#$ ∗ CDEF"#$
+ GCDEF"#$ + H"#$ ……………………………………………………(1)#
Where Yijt, Lijt, Kijt, Mijt and Eijt are output, labour, capital, materials and energy of firmI in 
sector j at time t respectively. AC is an alternate for absorptive capacity, and TGap is the 
technology gap. Eijt is the error term. The Foreign direct investment includes horizontal, 
backward and forward FDI. 
By taking the logarithm of both sides of (1), I have: 
MN!"#$ = O0 + PMN&"#$ + QMN("#$ + RMN*"#$ + SMN,"#$ + O;<="#$ + :;<="#$ ∗ ?@"#$ + A?@"#$
+ B;<="#$ ∗ CDEF"#$ + GCDEF"#$ + H"#$ …………………………… . . (2)#
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Where] = P + Q + R + S − 1 .#
Marcin (2008) used the interaction method in his work, and it explained the threshold level of 
absorptive capacity. His work examined the existence of externalities associated with a 
foreign direct investment (FDI) in a host country by exploiting firm-level panel data covering 
the Polish corporate sector. Also, he aimed at distinguishing between horizontal spill-overs 
(from foreign to domestic firms operating in the same industry) and two types of vertical 
spill-overs: backward (from FDI in downstream industries) and forward spill-overs (from 
FDI in upstream industries). The findings from hiswork suggested that local firms benefited 
from a foreign presence in the same industry and downstream industries. The absorptive 
capacity of domestic firms was highly relevant to the size of spill-overs: vertical spill-overs 
were larger for R&D-intensive firms, while firms investing in other (external) types of 
intangibles benefit more from horizontal spill-overs. Competitive pressure facilitated 
backward spill-overs, while market power increased the extent of forward spill-overs. 
Horizontal spill-overs were particularly strong in services, while the remaining results, 




mainly driven by manufacturing. Host country equity participation in foreign firms was 
consistent with higher unconditional productivity spill-overs to domestic firms. 
Blalock and Gertler (2009) also used the interaction term when measuring technology gap. 
Their findings suggested that the marginal return to new knowledge was greater for firms that 
hadmore room to ‘catch up’ than it was for already competitive firms. 
Also, the works of Ubeda and Perez–Hernandez (2016) used the interaction method to 
investigate the effect of the foreign direct investment on productivity in the Spanish 
manufacturing industries. The results showed that Spanish domestic firms with high 
absorptive capacities benefited from positive spill-overs and had sufficient capacity to 
internalise the more complex knowledge provided by multinational firms. The remainder of 
the firms were negatively affected by the presence of multinational firms. 
The next sub-heading focuses on the description of the data and various variables used in this 
research work. Descriptive statistics based on the Nigerian context are discussed as well as 
various sources of data are also explained. The main variables are explained carefully, and 
the application of mathematical formulas are also explained as well as the symbols used. 
4.4.2 Data Description and main variables 
From 2003 to early 2016, the total amount of FDI received wasapproximately US$ 107.36 
billion, according to the FDI intelligence report 2016. Regardingsome projects, the 
communication sector received most of the projects in this period. The sector accounted for 
11.7% of the total project. The project volume in this sector peaked in 2012 with 14 projects 
tracked with a capital investment of US$ 15.62 billion from 2003 to 2016. However, the oil 
sector contributed the highest amount of investment with a bountiful sum of US$ 64.07 
billion, and the sector created additional jobs.Regarding industry, the manufacturing industry 
accounted for most the projects recorded, as it accounted for 27.6% of the projects tracked. 
In this study, data from a firm survey conducted in 2013 by the World Bank (data available 
on the website of the World Bank enterprise surveys) are used. Although the sample target 
was 2660, there were only 580 firms with complete information which were included in the 
sample. The surveyed firms consist of both manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms. All 
the firms were asked about their sales and input used in 2009 and 2013. If the foreign share 
was 50% or more, the firm was regarded as a foreign firm. The table below shows the 




Based on the input-output table constructed in chapter 2 of this research work, the 
distribution of firms in the sample indicates that this survey is very suitable for the analysis 
because it has a similar distribution of the whole population of firms in Nigeria. The table 4-1 
below in the appendix shows that the sector is receiving the largest number of foreign firms 
in the manufacturing industry (35 firms) and is followed by the service industry (9 firms). 
Food products absorbed the highest number of foreign firms in the manufacturing industry 
(10 out of 35 firms). Regardingsome foreign firms based on the ownership structure, the food 
sectorreceived more foreign firms than any other sector. It could be argued that the oil sector 
in Nigeria captured more foreign investment but, based on the available data and as noticed, 
there quite an amount of missing data; I have decided to use a uniformed database that 
records sales and other very important variables.For this reason, some sectors are dropped. 
However, based on capital structure, the petroleum sector captures more foreign investment. 
The distribution of firms in Nigeria also follows a similar pattern. 
To study the linkages between sectors, the input-output table (I-O Table) of Nigeria is used. 
There has been one other I-O table for Nigeria. The I-O table was developed in the year 1999 
Patrick Osakwe from the trade and regional integration division of the UNECA. Ever since 
then, there has not been any symmetric I-O table done for Nigeria, at least to the knowledge 
of the researcher. To this end, a more updated symmetric I-O table has been developed in this 
research work in other to build the robustness of the findings. The I-O table developed in this 
work has used data from 2001 through to 2010 to capture the inter-relationship between 
sectors within the Nigerian economy. The sectors within this I-O table comprises 33 different 
production sectors, and input is classified into four factors; capital, unskilled labour, skilled 
labour and land. The second chapter of this research explains in detail what methodology was 
used to develop the table and speaks about the data sources. 
In this chapter, the developed I-O table is used basically because it is more updated than the 
1999 table and also because the classification of sectors in the table is very suitable for 
studies at the firm level. Also, the developed I-O table is more aggregated than the 1999 
table. For example, the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) constructed an I-O table for 
Nigeria based on 2006 data, but it only focused on the agricultural sector and did notconvey a 
full picture of the whole economy. 
To estimate equation five the following four main variables are defined. Output Y is taken 




dollars4. Labour L is the number of permanent workers in the survey questionnaire. Capital K 
is measured by spending on investment in land, building and equipment. The spending on 
investment is chosen to represent capital because there is no panel data on the book value of 
fixed assets. The information on Material M and Energy E are directly taken from firms’ 
expenditure on material and energy. All relevant variables are deflated using consumer price. 
All relevant variables are deflated using consumer price index (CPI).  





………… . . (6)#
Where Σ"_#indicates, the summation is taken over firms in given sector j. ;`a.bcN_!"#$ is 
equal to the amount of sales !"#$ of firm i if this firm is foreign and 0 if not (otherwise). 
As defined in the first section, the backward FDI is the FDI in the final goods sectors that 
create demand for intermediate goods produced by domestic firms. Similar, to Marcin (2008), 
it is calculated as follows: 
g;<=#$ = Eh#^;<=h$ ……… . (7)
h(j#)
#
The coefficient E#h is the share of sector j’s output supplied to sector k in its total output, 
which is taken from input-output table5. Therefore, i can assume that FDI invested within 
sector k at time t,^;<=h$, induces the backward FDI of E#h^;<=h$ of sector j which supplies 
intermediate goods to sector k. If that is the case, g;<=#$ defined in equation (7) might be a 
plausible index of the backward FDI of sector j at time t. 
Furthermore, the forward FDI is the FDI in the input industry that supplies intermediate 
goods to domestic producers of final products. It is calculated as follows;#








4There are many studies that use deflated sales as dependent variable such as Altomonte and Pennings (2009), Barbosa and Eiriz (2009), Bekes, 
Kleinert, and Toubal (2009), Buckley, Wang, and Jeremy (2007), Chudnovsky, Lopez, and Ross (2008), Damijan and Knell (2005), Du, Harrison, 
and Jefferson (2011), Monastiriotis and Alegria (2011). 





The coefficient Eh# is the share of sector j’s input bought from sector k in its total input, 
which is taken from the input-output table. Therefore, I can assume that FDI invested within 
sector k at time t,^;<=h$, induces the forward FDI of Eh#^;<=h$ of sector j which buys 
intermediate goods from sector k. If that is the case, ;;<=#$ defined in equation (8) might be 
a plausible index of the forward FDI of sector j at time t.6 
The table 4-2 in the appendix below presents horizontal, backward and forward FDI indexes 
calculated by sector. The result shows that the retail sector has significant high indexes when 
compared to other sectors across the indexes. For example, the horizontal, backward and 
forward FDI indexes of the retail sector are 0.37, 0.199 and 0.123 respectively. HFDI index 
of this sector is relatively acceptable because most of the output is produced by foreign firms. 
Additionally, HFDI index in other sector induces 0.199 unit of backward FDI to the retail 
sector by supplying intermediate goods to them. Similarly, HFDI in other sector induces 
0.123 units of forward FDI to the retail sector by buying intermediate goods from them. 
However, based on individual indexes, the machinery and equipment sector is the highest 
within the HFDI index, indicating that all the output of the sector is produced by foreign 
firms. The service of motor vehicle sector also has a very high HFDI consisting of 0.993 
units.  
Regarding absorptive capacity, this study uses the percentage H of workers with low 
secondary education (grade 7th or higher) and a dummy variable TR which indicates whether 
or not firms offer training to their workers. The table 3-3 in the appendix below presents 
means of these variables. Although the food sector absorbs the largest number of foreign 
firms, only 27% of the firms in this sector provide training to their workers. On the other 
hand, the paper sector, despite its small share in the manufacturing industry, offers the largest 
amount of training. The construction sector provides the highest amount of training in the 
service industry. More sectors in the service industry employ workers with secondary 
education or higher than sectors in the manufacturing industry. Within the manufacturing 
industry, the paper sector hires the least number of workers with this level of education at 
27%. 
The technology gap is the difference between a firm’s average labour productivity over the 
period (2009 and 2013) and that of all foreign firms in the same sector. The technology gap is 
######################################## #################### #
6 Equation (8) is slightly different from the forward FDI defined by Javorcik (2004): ;;<=mo= Pnm;oa.bcNphEa.bno∗(!bno−qbno) b∈n / (!bno−qbno) 
b∈nn(≠m) where ForeignShare is used as weight to sum up over firms, while equation (8) uses zero weight for non-foreign firms whose share of equity 
owned by foreign investors falls short of 50%. Note also that equation (8) does not subtract export. Equation (8) is used because data on foreign share 




the natural logarithm of the knowledge stock ratio; according to this specification below, the 
gap (TGap) is positive if ns > nu and it is zero ifns = nu; and negative ifns < nu, at which 
case the follower has over taken the leader’s position. The technology gap TGapijcan be 














.  &w∗# Is the mean of 
*.EN(&w"#$) of all foreign firms I in sector j
7. (s is the technological knowledge stock of the 
leader (in most cases the foreign firm), while (u is the technological knowledge stock of the 
follower (in most cases the domestic firm). Positivity technology gap means the firm’s 
productivity is below that of foreign firms. A negative technology gap means the opposite. 
Table 4-3, presents the mean of the technology gap for each of the sector. It showed that 
onaverage, a large majority of firms are below the international frontier except for wood and 
furniture sector. However, technology gaps in some sectors are positive with a high amount 
of training, and this could be as a result of low human capital. 
 
4.5 Estimation Results 
Table 4-4 (below in the appendix) indicates that correlations between the horizontal and 
backward FDI are very low, while the correlation between horizontal FDI and forward FDI is 
moderately acceptable. The correlation between forward and backward FDI is very high, and 
this could be because of different factors. Also, table 4-5 below in the appendix also shows 
proxies of absorptive capacity and technology gap which are included in the estimation 
equation, and they have a high correlation with each other.The high correlation between the 
backward and forward FDI could be as result of the foreign firm having an impact on both 
the production and distribution processes in various industrial sectors. Examples of such 
industrial sectors are the manufacturing sector and the publishing and printing sector. 
The two-year panel data are used to estimate equation (5).To deal with unobservable effects, 
the author adopts the fixed effect (FE) estimation. Moreover, the Hausman test is used to test 
the random effect model (RE) against the fixed effect model (FE) estimator for the three 
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types of FDI (horizontal, backward and forward). Table 4-6 below in the appendix presents 
the results of estimated coefficients as well as Hausman test. The result shows that the null 
hypothesis is strongly rejected. Therefore, the fixed effect is preferred to the random effect. 
Based on the results of fixed effect model (FE) estimation, I now examine the interaction 
terms between technology gap or absorptive capacity and the three types of FDI in table 4-6. 
The coefficients are positive but not statistically significant. Only in the case of horizontal 
FDI (HFDI) is it significant at 10%. However, the coefficients become statistically significant 
when all the three types of FDI interact with the technology gap (TGap*HFDI, TGap*BFDI 
and TGap*FFDI). The coefficients of the interactions terms between FDI and human capital 
(H*HFDI, H*BFDI and H*FFDI) are negative and statistically insignificant. As for the case 
of the other interaction term (Training) and the types of FDI (TR*HFDI, TR*BFDI and 
TR*FFDI), TR*HFDI is negative but statistically significant, while the other two types of 
FDI are negative and statistically insignificant. 
The estimation results can be interpreted as follows. In the case of horizontal FDI, the 
positive and statistically significant coefficient of the interaction terms between horizontal 
FDI and the technology gap (TGap*HFDI) suggests the potential role of the technology gap 
in enabling the horizontal productivity spill-over. When the technology gap exists, it indicates 
an available learning opportunity from their foreign competitors for domestic firms. The 
resulting outcome validates the works of Dutse et al. (2011) by providing empirical evidence 
that indicates that significant technology spill-over is most likely to occur among subsidiary 
firms that are technologically active as well as domestic firms with absorptive capability 
while those that are not active are unlikely to do so. In the works of Dutse (2012), empirical 
results also so show that there is positive and significant effect between technology gap and 
horizontal FDI in Nigeria. These findings are consistent with those of Keller and Yeaple 
(2009) and Sánchez-Sellero, Rosell-Martínez and García-Vázquez (2014). Also, the works of 
Khalifah et al. (2015) showed that the positive (negative) coefficient of the interaction term 
between the forward (horizontal) spill-over variable and the technology gap supports the 
‘catching-up’ (technology accumulation) hypothesis.  However, some research work such as 
that of Aitken and Harrison (1995), Hadad and Harrison (1993), Zukowska–Gagelmann 
(2000) and Adejumo (2013) among others have revealed insignificant or even negative spill-




Similarly, the positive and statistically significant coefficient of the interaction term between 
backward FDI and the technology gap (TGap*BFDI) implies that the technology gap leads to 
backward productivity spill-over in two ways. In the case of contracted foreign buyers, they 
need to improve the productivity of their domestic suppliers, since they want higher quality 
intermediate goods. In another relationship, domestic suppliers, aiming at attracting foreign 
buyers, must improve their productivity up to a level that enables them to gain confidence 
from potential foreign buyers. The works of Pittiglio et al. (2016) buttress this finding that 
technology gap matters considerably for a spill-over effect both in the horizontal forward and 
backward FDI level. The results indicated that there isa positive relationship between forward 
FDI and technology gap. However, Italian enterprises exhibit a negative effect from 
backward linkages with foreign affiliates, probably because MNEs benefit from their 
knowledge of the market to diversify their supply network and thus to impose low prices on 
their suppliers. Bai (2012) and Ferragina and Mazzotta (2014) also found a positive and 
significant relationship between technology gap and vertical (forward) FDI. 
Finally, the positive and statistically significant coefficient of the interaction term between 
forward FDI and the technology gap (TGap*FFDI) shows that, due to the presence of the 
technology gap between the domestic firms in the final goods sector and their foreign 
competitors, domestic firms need to improve their productivity by using higher quality 
intermediate goods produced by foreign suppliers. This purchasing channel leads to forward 
productivity spill-over.In addition, in the work of Khalifah et al. (2015), the results indicated 
that there was a significant relationship between backward FDI and technology gap, and this 
was because foreign presence was measured in terms of the abundance of capital. Foreigners 
built their local supply chain by transferring technology to foreign establishments in Malaysia 
with sufficient absorptive capacity. Onyekwena (2012) recorded in his work the presence of 
FDI spill-over to domestic firms within the Nigerian Manufacturing, by estimating 
productivity variables which showed that the result of this research work was in line with 
previous research works. 
On the other hand, the statistically insignificant coefficients of the interaction term between 
FDI and two proxies of absorptive capacity may be explained in the following way. It may be 
caused partly by relatively small variations in H (percentage of workers with higher 
education) and TR (training dummy). Also, the survey used in this study reported that less 
than 50% of domestic firms offered training. It also reported that most of the domestic firms 




their operation, which means their workers did not have sufficient skills for their jobs. These 
situations were likely to weaken effects of those proxies on productivity spill-over from 
increased FDI. 
To check robustness of these results, value addedÖ"#$ = !"#$ − *"#$ − ,"#$, instead of the 
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Where ] = Rå + RÑ − 1. The technology gap in equation (10) is calculated based on equation 
(9) where value-added based labour productivity is used instead of output per worker. The 
table 4-7 in the appendix below presents the estimation results of equation (10). It shows 
quite similar results to table 4-6 regarding coefficients of the interaction terms between TGap, 
H, TR and FDI indexes suggesting robustness of the estimation results. However, the results 
from table 4-7contradicts the findings of Adejumo (2013) as he used the value-added 
approach to measure labour productivity of domestic firms in Nigeria and his 
findingsconcluded that in the long run, FDI will have negative effects on the manufacturing 
sector in Nigeria. The reasons for the negative effect could be as a result of old data, as he 
used data from the period of 1970 through to 2009. 
 
4.6 Using Total Factor Productivity to Estimate Productivity Spill-overs from 
FDI 
4.6.1 Specification of Total Factor Productivity Model 
To further check the robustness of the analysis in the previous section, productivity spill-over 
from FDI is also estimated using total factor productivity (TFP). The total factor productivity 
(TFP) index is widely used to measure agricultural productivity performance because it 
provides a broad indication of how efficiently farmers combine all inputs to produce outputs 
(Liua et al. 2016). According to Amann and Virmani (2014), recent trends show that the 
emerging and developing economies have been experiencing rapid TFP growth since the 
early 2000s. Compared with the advanced economies where the growth rate dropped from 
0.4% per year between 1995 and 2005 to -0.1% between 2005 and 2008, the emerging 




Comin (2007) describe Total Factor Productivity (TFP) as the portion of output not explained 
by the number of inputs used in production. As such, its level is determined by how 
efficiently and intensely the inputs are utilised in production. Gains in total factor 
productivity (TFP), reflecting the more efficient use of inputs, has long been recognised as an 
important source of improvements in income and welfare. Cross-country differences in 
income levels and growth rates are mostly due to differences in productivity (Easterly & 
Levine 2000;Klenow & Rodriguez-Clare 1997). 
Total factor productivity analysis in this chapter is a complementary analysis to the various 
computation done in this chapter. It measures the level of output produced, by calculating the 
growth in domestic output unexplained by the growth in all input in the production process. 
The TFP analysis refers to the combined efficiency of labour inputs and capital; inputs 
relative to the growth in GDP or value added.  In addition, TFP measures disembodied 
technological change as exemplified in its original application by Solow Residual as 
indicated in Solow (1957). TFP analysis also includes growth impact of unmeasured inputs 
such as the expenses on certain “soft” or “intangible” inputs such as R&D, software, human 
capital skills development and branding & marketing. 
Measuring TFP is therefore important in assessing countries’ past and potential economic 
performance. However, it is also difficult, for two reasons. Fairly innocuous differences in 
assumptions can lead to very different estimates of TFP growth. Moreover, the interpretation 
of measured TFP growth can be problematic when such growth reflects factors other than 
purely technical change— such as increasing returns to scale, markups due to imperfect 
competition, or gains from sectoral reallocations. 
Following Pavcnik (2002), the specification below to assess the productivity spill-over of 
FDI on TFP is used. 
MNC;w"#$
= R0 + Rå;<=#$ + RÑ;<=#$ ∗ ?@"#$ + RÜ?@"#$ + Rá;<=#$ ∗ C;wDEF"#$ + RàC;wDEF"#$ + E"
+ }$ + H"#$…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..…….åå#
Where TFPGap is technology gap based on TFP, which will be introduced in section 3.6.2. E" 




Similarly, to Schoar (2002) and Blalock and Gertler (2009), I used a method developed by 
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) to calculate TFP.8
C;w"#$ = .çF MN!"#$ − QåMN("#$ − QÑMN&"#$ − QÜMN*"$
− QáMN,"#$ ………………………… . .12#
Q" is the estimate of Q" of the following production function.8
MN!"#$ = Q0 + QåMN("#$ + QÑMN&"#$ + QÜMN*"$ + QáMN,"#$ + é"#$
+ Z"#$ …………………………13#
é"#$ is productivity shock observed by the firms but not by econometrician and Z"#$ is error 
term. 
4.6.2 Detailed Estimation Methods and Calculation of TFP 
For the calculation of TFP, I use the method proposed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) which 
uses intermediate input as an instrument to estimate production function. The estimation is 
based on the assumptions that firms adjust input usage across time according to the change in 
productivity. There is an alternative method proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996). It is similar 
to that of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), but it uses investment as an instrument. However, 
Olley and Pakes (1996) control for survival and use unbalanced panel data, which is not 
suitable for the balanced panel data used in this paper. Moreover, data on investment are not 
available. Ackerberg et al. (2006) have suggested the use of dynamic estimation structure for 
production parameters, but the estimation requires a long lag-length, which is impossible for 
two-year panel data in this study. Due to the limited availability of data and the absence of 
data on investment, this study uses the method developed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) 
To simplify the notation, equation (13) is rewritten as:#
è$ = Q0 + QåM$ + Qhn$ + Qêë$ + é$
+ Z$ ……………………………………………………… . . .14#
Where è$, M$, EN}8ë$ are the logarithms of !$, &$, ($, EN}8*$,  respectively. For simplicity of 
explanation, ,$ is omitted and subscripts for firms and sectors are omitted. The error has two 
components: the transmitted productivity component (é$) and the error term which is 
uncorrelated with the input’s choice (Z$). é$ is not observed by econometricians and affects 




function. Ignoring this problem will yield inconsistent estimates. Firm’s demand for 
intermediate input ë$ is assumed to depend on n$8EN}8é$: 
ë$ = 8ë$ n$, é$ ………………………………………………………………………………… . .15#
The assumption that the demand function (15) monotonically increases in é$ allows the 
inversion of this function. Hence, é$ can be written as a function of n$8EN}8ë$. 
é$
= 8é$ n$,ë$ ………………………………………………………………………………… . . . . .16 
That é$ can now be expressed as a function of observed variables n$8EN}8ë$ enables us to 
rewrite equation (14) as below: 
è$ = QåM$ + ì$ n$,ë$
+ Z$ ……………………………………………………………………… . .17 
Where ì$ n$,ë$ = Q0 + Qhn$ + Qêë$ + é$ n$,ë$ . 
Estimation of Qå proceeds using OLS with a third-order polynomial approximation in 
n$8EN}8ë$ in place of ì$ n$,ë$ . For any candidate of the first step estimates of 
Q∗h8EN}8Q
∗
ê, i can estimate é$ as 




êë$88îℎ.a.8ì$ = è$ − QsM$ 
If I assume that é$ follows the first order Markovian process, then I get: 
,[é$|é$ò]
= R0 + Råé$òå ………………………………………………………………………… . . .18 
Now, the original equation (13) can be re-written as:  
R$ − QsM$ = Q0 + Qhn$ + Qêë$ + , é$|é$òå
+ Z$ + ö$ ………………………………………19 
Where ö$ = é$ − , é$|é$òå . 




Z$ + ö$ = R$ − QsM$ − Q∗hn$ − Q
∗
êM$
− , é$|é$òå ………………………………………………20 
To estimate QhEN}8Qê, Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) use these two moment conditions. 
, Z$ + ö$ n$ = 08EN}8, Z$ + ö$ ë$òå
= 0……………………………………………… .…21 
Therefore, there are two instruments (n$,ë$òå) for the estimaton of Qh8EN}8Qê. Over-
identification moments are given by , Z$ + ö$ M$òå = 0 and , Z$ + ö$ n$òå = 0. These 
can be used to improve efficiency and test specification in the Generalised Method of 








= n$,ë$òå,M$òå,n$òå ……………………………… .22 
 
4.6.3 Calculation of Technology Gap Using TFP 











. C;w∗# is the mean of *.EN(C;w"#$) of all 
foreign firm i in sector j. (s is the technological knowledge stock of the leader (in most cases 
the foreign firm), while (u is the technological knowledge stock of the follower (in most 
cases the domestic firms). Positive technology gap means the firm’s productivity is below 
that of foreign firms. A negative technology gap means the opposite. 
Table 4-9 in the appendix below presents the technology gap calculated by using labour 
productivity and TFP. Column 3 from the table shows the results of the technology gap 
measured by TFP while column 4 shows the results of technology gap measured by labour 
productivity. By comparing them, I find that labour productivity gap did not result in more 




restaurant sectors tend to have higher gaps than their foreign competitors. However, using 
labour productivity, firms in the wood and furniture sector have the negative gap. 
4.7 Estimation Results 
Similarly, in the case of using labour productivity gap in the previous section, TFP Gap is 
relatively very low with both proxies of absorptive capacity. The table 4-10 below in the 
appendix indicates the there is a weak linear relationship between the absorptive capacity 
used and a strong relationship between TFPgap and the absorptive capacity used in this 
research work.  
The dependent variable in this segment of the analysis is total factor productivity (TFP). The 
purpose of calculating TFP is to identify changes in output that cannot be attributed to 
changes in input. Knowing that the objective is to analyse the effect of technology transfer on 
the productivity of domestic firms; I have estimated TFP in equation (12). I have in the 
earlier analysis in this chapter investigated labour turnover with a combination of horizontal 
and vertical spill-overs including both forward and backward spill-overs and also addressed 
the absorptive capacity of local firms.  
Therefore, I now analyse technological spill-overs and absorptive capacity of a local firm 
from the standpoint of TFP. The mixed results of empirical studies have led economists to 
question the existence of specific factors conditioning FDI spill-overs (Lipsey and Sjoholm, 
2005). This implies a potential non-linear effect on the mechanism of technology transfer. 
Typically, the observed negative effects for developing countries are explained by lack of 
adequate absorption capacity. Campos and Kinoshita (2002) argue that some European 
countries have the relatively backward technology, being far from the world technological 
frontier. However, they have a high potential of positive spill-overs mainly due to their 
skilled labour force. 
The estimation results for equation (11) for the interaction terms between the technology gap 
and absorptive capacity and FDI, as well as the Hausmantest, are presented in the tables 4-11, 
4-12 and 4-13 in the appendix below with asymptotic standard errors in square brackets. On 
two occasions the Hausman test strongly rejects the null hypothesis (HFDI and FFDI), and it 
accepts the null hypothesis on one occasion (BFDI). I found similar results to the previous 





For table 4-11, 4-12 and 4-13; I examined three different sub-model which are the restricted 
forms of the econometric model given in equation 13. In table 4-11, TFP is regressed on all 
forms of FDI which includes HFDI, BFDI and FFDI as well as other explanatory variables. 
Also, table 4-11 tests whether a country with higher technological distance to leaders can 
absorb more technological spill-overs from FDI. In table 4-12, I used training (TR) and 
human capital (H) to calculate TFP for all forms of FDI, i.e. including HFDI, BFDI and 
FFDI; as well as the TFPgap. In table 4-13, I dropped H*FDI and TR*FDI from the model to 
check whether the effect of FDI or TFPgap was robust to possible multicollinearity in the 
model. Multicollinearity can occur when two variables are interacted to generate a third 
variable where the interaction terms can highly correlate with one of the variables from which 
it has been created. 
Table 4-11 presents the baseline result. I find a statistically significant positive effect from 
some of the forms of FDI on TFP in the first model, i.e. table 4-11. The table indicates that 
there a positive effect of HFDI and FFDI on TFP. This indicates that FDI is an important 
source of technological transfer. The positive findings on the effects of FDI contrast with the 
finding of Alfaro et al. (2004), Durham (2004) and Azman-Saini et al. (2010a, 2010b) who 
do not find any direct positive effect of FDI on growth. On the other hand, the results support 
the empirical findings of Liu and Liu (2005) and Woo (2009) which reveal positive effects 
from FDI on income and TFP growth, respectively.  
The analysis of the advantage of relative backwardness supports the theoretical assumptions 
of Findlay (1978) and Wang and Blomstrom (1992). This is seen from the significant positive 
sign of the interaction of all forms of FDI with TFPgap in the table 4-11, 4-12 and 4-13. This 
suggests that the positive effect of FDI is important and significant only with larger 
technology gaps between a country and the technology leader. 
The significance of the interaction term is not due to multicollinearity as suggested by Table 
4-13. Notably, both the size and significance increase when I drop H*FDI and TR*FDI. One 
can interpret the model in table 4-13 as a “catching-up” process taking place through the 
adoption of FDI technologies, although direct autonomous catching-up is also present (as 
suggested 1% level of the significant positive sign of TFPgap). When I drop the interaction 
terms, HFDI and FFDI are still positively significant at 1% level. 
TFPgap is positive and significant in all the models, i.e. table 4-11 to 4-13, which is 




technology gap is -0.08 for HFDI, -0.096 for BFDI and -0.067 for FFDI and significant at 1% 
in table 3-11. Thiscan be compared to the findings of Griffith et al. (2004) who reported an 
estimate of 0.08 on TFPgap with annual data. Regarding other control variables, I find 
training to be positive but statistically insignificant for all forms of FDI. The sign of human 
capital variable is negative although insignificant. Thissuggests that human capital measured 
as the average years of schooling for the population over 25 years of age does not affect TFP 
growth. However, when I looked at the relationship of H*HFDI on TFP, it was negative but 
statistically significant at 5% level; and the same is the situation with TR*HFDI on TFP. 
I also used the Hausman test to differentiate between fixed effect model and random effect 
model. In some cases, the random effect model is preferred due to higher efficiency while in 
other cases the fixed effect model is preferred due to consistency. 
The theoretical literature emphasises the role of firm heterogeneity in international trade 
(Helpman, Melitz & Yeaple, 2004) and studies that investigate technology transfer are 
becoming increasingly interested in catalyst factors for spill-overs. It is assumed that 
domestic firms need a minimum level of absorptive capacity to reap positive spill-overs 
(Blomstrom & Kokko, 1998; Glass & Saggi, 1998; Nicolini & Resmini, 2010). Most of these 
studies focus on the characteristics of domestic firms, although there are exceptions that 
analyse the characteristics of foreign investors as well (Javorcik & Spatareanu, 2008). Thus, 
in this analysis, I consider the absorptive capacity of local firms given by human capacity, 
training and technology gap. 
The role of human capital as an absorptive capacity was initially stated by Borensztein et al. 
(1998), in the context of FDI growth effects. Plant level studies are often constrained by the 
lack of information on skill levels and thus can rarely consider this aspect of the absorptive 
capacity. Exceptions such as Blalock and Gertler (2009) and Gorodnichenko, Svejnar and 
Terrell (2007) use specific survey datasets8  and proxy human capital by the share of 
employees with higher education. They find that firms with highly educated employees adopt 
more foreign technology than others.  
The third measure I used for absorptive capacity is the technology gap. There are studies that 
show that the ability of domestic firms to reap positive spill-overs is higher if the 
######################################## #################### #
8The World Bank Enterprise survey does contain information on the skills structure of employments. However, for most developing countries, it does 





technological gap concerning foreign firms is not too large (Girma, 2005; Kolassa, 2008; 
Nicolini & Resmini, 2010). Other studies, on the contrary, argue that a high gap leaves rooms 
for significant improvements and pressure firms to restructure. Thus, the larger the gap, the 
more likely is the firm to benefit from positive spill-overs (Blalock & Gertler, 2009; Campos 
& Kinoshita, 2002; Griffith, Huergo, Mairesse & Peters, 2004). An additional argument in 
investigating the role of the technological gap in the transmission of spill-overs is that it has 
rarely been studied at the inter-industry level, most studies focusing on its capacity to 
overcome horizontal competitive pressure. 
For each domestic firm,I compute the technological gap using equation (23). In doing so, I 
assume that the most productive foreign firms operate on the production possibilities frontier 
and the gap proxies the distance of domestic firms towards this frontier. 
I introduce all the three measures of absorptive capacity in the estimation of the equation (11) 
together with interaction terms with spill-over variables. Results are presented in Tables 4-11 
to 4-13 in the appendix. Human capital proves to be a significant determinant of TFP as 
expected. I also note that vertical technology transfer is not affected by human capital; none 
of the two interaction terms is significant. The only type of spill-overs that depends on human 
capital is the Horizontal one. However, unlike the sign I would expect (positive), I obtain a 
negative coefficient for the variable H*HFDI.  
Training does not significantly influence the productivity of local firms. This result is 
probably explained by very low values of training performed by local firms. Concerning its 
influence on the spill-over channels, the only significant interaction is the horizontal spill-
overs. At the labour productivity estimation, it is only significant at the Horizontal level. 
In what follows if I turn to the third conditioning factor, namely the technological gap. I am 
interested to see whether the more advanced local firms benefit more from FDI induced spill-
overs, or whether it is the back-warded firms that reap most of the benefits. The results 
following the introduction of the technological gap and its interactions with spill-over 
variables are presented in Tables 4-11 to 4-13 in the appendix. As a general remark, a large 
technological gap is associated with lower productivity. Instead, all interaction variables are 





From equation 11 and estimation results in tables 4-11, 4-12, and 4-13 in the appendix, there 
was not any effect of Training on vertical spill-overs, as indicated in the estimation. 
However, firms with an important technological gap enjoyed positive and significant spill-
over effect, following with foreign firms in the same sector. Looking at the levels of 
technology, local downstream firms were negatively affected by linkages with foreign 
suppliers (negative sign of TFPgap*FFDI). Nevertheless, low technological levels mitigated 
this negative spill-over (the effects become positive from the FE estimation). The backward 
variable, on the other hand, remains positive, and its interaction with technology-gap is also 
positive and significant. FDI is actively involved in the technological upgrading of their 
suppliers, to help them fulfil quality standards and later benefit from better inputs. 
From this estimation in tables 4-11 to 4-13, I see that human capital does not have an 
absorptive role. Moreover, it generates negative horizontal effects due to the losses of the best 
employees in favour of foreign firms. Training activities have a limited role as well as 
facilitating technology transfer only at intra-industry level. Thus, the absorptive capacity 
hypothesis is not valid for vertical transfers (at least for the variables I considered). 
Regarding firm technological level, a large gap seems to favour both horizontal and vertical 
spill-overs. 
The results confirm previous studies on direct technology transfer, in the sense that horizontal 
and vertical spill-overs are strongly confirmed. Additionally, the vertical transfer is also much 
less sensitive to the presence of absorptive factors. Being in the supplier position brings in 
significant productivity gains, foreign companies being directly interested in the quality of 
supplied input. Moreover, the benefits associated with backward spill-overs are more 
important for domestic suppliers than other foreign suppliers, probably due to the higher 
technological gap. For clients in downstream sectors, instead, the situation appears less 
favourable. The complexity of new inputs, combined with higher prices, frequently generates 
efficiency losses in downstream sectors. The magnitude of negative forward spill-overs is not 
higher than that of positive backward spill-overs. Therefore, local clients who buy their 
inputs from the same suppliers as FDI are, in the end, not affected by a second order negative 
spill-over. The free-rider hypothesis is thus validated for the Nigerian economy. 
Technological gap favours positive spill-overs at all level. The less advanced a firm’s current 
technology, the more likely it is for the firm to gain by engaging in trade with FDI. Since 




producers are particularly favoured by the important gap. The results also show that the 
benefits associated with upstream technology cannot be exploited by other downstream firms 
besides the FDI.  
The presence of foreign firms can influence a local business environment in many ways; it 
may either increase competition or introduce new know-how, thereby contributing to 
productivity spillovers. The presence of foreign firms will be beneficial for the local 
economic environment provided that the productivity gains be larger than the competition 
losses. If the competition losses outweigh the productivity gains, then the host company’s 
productivity will be negatively affected (Wei, Liu, and Wang 2008). Whereas the debate first 
focused mainly on the existence of productivity spillover effects, it now also includes the 
mechanisms through which these effects occur (Zámborský 2012a). The literaturehas defined 
several spillover mechanisms through which productivity spillovers can occur. The 
mechanisms most commonly discussed in the literature are labour mobility/skills acquisition 
(Ben Hamida 2011; Blomström & Kokko 1998; Fosfuri, Motta & Rønde 2001; Girma, 
Greenaway & Wakelin 2001; Görg & Greenaway 2004; Halpern & Muraközy 2007; Smeets 
2008; Wang & Yu 2007), demonstration/imitation effects (Görg & Greenaway 2004; Smeets 
2008; Zahra & George 2002; Zhang et al. 2010), competition effects (Aitken & Harrison 
1999; Barrios & Strobl 2002; Görg & Greenaway 2004; Halpern & Muraközy 2007; Tian 
2007), and backward/forward linkages (Blomström & Kokko 1998; Ferragina & Mazzotta 
2014; Javorcik 2004; Smeets 2008). 
 
4.8 Conclusion 
It is acknowledged in the literature that the technical capabilities of both local and foreign 
firms play an important role in the strength of productivity spillovers (Wei & Liu, 2006). 
Often, the research examines the technology gap between foreign and local firms to discuss 
the extent of productivity spillovers. The technology gap is defined as the difference between 
the technology in an industry’s local and foreign firms (Gerschenkron 1962); in the case of 
developing economies, it is assumed that the foreign firms possess the more advanced 
technology. That said, there are two opposing views of how the technology gap affects 
productivity spillovers and, therefore, the extent to which firms can adopt new knowledge 
and technologies. The first stream believes that potential gains from technology spillovers are 
negatively related to the technology gap between local and foreign firms (Lapan & Bardhan, 




degree to which outside knowledge can be exploited by local firms depends on both their 
level of absorptive capacity and the complexity of their external knowledge. If the technology 
possessed by local and foreign firms is too different, or if the technology possessed by the 
foreign firm is too advanced, it is quite possible that local firms cannot adopt the foreign 
technology because it is too difficult for them to comprehend (Sinani & Meyer, 2004). Also, 
it is believed that if there is a technology gap, lower-quality technology is transferred because 
that is all that the local firms can comprehend, resulting in a lower potential for positive 
spillover effects (Glass & Saggi, 1998). In short, the first stream believes that productivity 
spillovers are more likely when the technology gap between foreign and local firms is 
relatively small (Franco & Kozovska, 2011). 
The second stream is driven by Findlay (1978) and is known as the catching-up hypothesis. 
Unlike the first stream, this stream argues that a larger technology gap between local and 
foreign firms is more beneficial for productivity spillovers. These scholars believe that 
technology transfer will be quicker when foreign firms rapidly create their downstream and 
upstream networks, thus, not only enabling the local firms that are part of these distribution 
and supply networks to access the new technology, but also facilitating technology diffusion 
(Findlay 1978). In other words, the catching-up hypothesis predicts that a relatively larger 
technology gap between foreign and local firms is more likely to stimulate spillover effects 
(Franco & Kozovska, 2011). However, Schools and van der Tol (2002) argue that in the 
presence of a large technology gap, productivity effects will only take place when human 
capital is well developed. Again, absorptive capacity proves to be an important element of 
productivity spillovers. 
This chapter aimed at studying the effects of horizontal and vertical productivity spill-over 
from FDI to domestic firms. By using the data of 580 firms in the enterprise survey of the 
World Bank conducted in 2014 and regression analysis of the random effect and fixed effect 
models, the study lends support to findings of existing studies on the effects of the technology 
gap on productivity spill-over. The estimation results show that FDI leads to productivity 
spill-over only under the condition of a positive technology gap. Only a few existing studies 
examine this effect in the contexts of both horizontal and vertical FDI. This study finds that 
technology gap has positive effects on productivity spill-over from horizontal and vertical 
FDI to domestic firms, as confirmed in the works of Keller and Yeaple (2009), Bai  (2012), 
Dutse (2012), Ferragina and Mazzotta (2014), Sanchez-Sellero et al (2014), and Pittiglio et al 




gap in the context of vertical FDI. On the other hand, this study could not find the significant 
effect of education and training on productivity spill-over. 
In this chapter, I have studied the impact of FDI stock on Nigeria’s TFP growth and found 
FDI to be an important factor of technological transfer. The positive results of FDI are in line 
with the empirical findings of Li and Liu (2005) and Woo (2009). I have also tested whether 
the technology gap can enhance the positive role of FDI in TFP growth. I also find evidence 
for this, which is indicated by statistically significant positive effects from the interaction of 
the FDI variable with technology gap. With this finding, I confirm the theoretical proposals 
of Findlay (1978) and Wang and Blomstrom (1992). The works of Li and Liu (2005) report 
that large technological gaps decreasea country’s ability to absorb technology from 
multinationals; however, research work by Blalock and Gertler (2009) supports the findings 
in this chapter that larger technology gaps do improve productivity spillovers. 
However, the results, as well as Li and Liu’s, should be interpreted with caution. These two 
different findings might very likely be due to different measures of the dependent variable, 
estimation methods, a sample of the country as well as the measure of FDI. For example, 
results might differ whether FDI stock or flow is used. While Li and Liu (2005) use FDI 
flows in GDP, the positive results come from the measure of FDI stock in GDP. It is quite 
possible that initial competition from incoming FDI flows would see some domestic firms 
lose market share and efficiency. Some inefficient firms might even be forced out of the 
market or have to invest in learning and new technologies to compete with FDI firms, which 
would result in some decline in output (Liu, 2008). Hence, I would expect FDI flow to reduce 
the output growth in Nigeria. On the other hand, FDI stock is a measure of all the inflows 
accumulated over time and, although it increases when new firms arrive, a large amount of 
stock will be already available from established firms. So the domestic companies that lag 
behind the multinationals would be able to learn a great deal from them. 
The policy implication of the analysis is straightforward: multinational firms should be 
welcomed as they do not cause negative externalities in the form of productivity reduction in 
the economy. They can, in fact, improve the countries’ technology adoption through this 
channel and Nigeria is likely to benefit more. Although I report a positive effect from FDI, 
some future work may be necessary to advance the FDI growth literature to the next level.  
The result of the effect of the technology gap provides a significant policy implication for the 




have a technology gap when compared to foreign competitors. The gap indicates the need for 
domestic firms to improve their productivity. In their position as competitors, buyers or 
suppliers of domestic firms, FDI can help domestic firms directly or indirectly to overcome 
this technology gap and thus lead to improvement in the domestic firm’s productivity. 
Therefore, with the existence of the technology gap, the Nigerian government should aim at 
policies that attract both horizontal and vertical FDI. 
The strength of this approach is simply the inclusion of vertical spill-overs through the robust 
construction of the I-O table for Nigeria. The I-O table helps us to specifically capture 
vertical spill-overs across all the industrial sectors that were represented in the World Bank 
enterprise survey. The approach also provides a distinctive way to capture technology gaps 
through the inclusion of knowledge stock data. Also, I have included both the labour 
productivity estimate using a value-added approach, and the results are consistent with that of 
the TFP estimate.  
To produce a better estimation result, future research should focus on two things. Firstly, this 
study analyses the productivity spill-over by pooling firms across sectors due to the problems 
of small sample size. The finding can be enriched by using a large sample, which enables the 
estimation of the production function for each sector separately, as done in the works of 
Akulava and Vakitova (2010), Du et al. (2011) and Javorcik and Spatareanu (2010). At the 
micro-level, the hypothesis of the advantage of the technology gap can be tested under a 
consistent framework. Studies carried out so far use the share of FDI firm sales in total sales, 
or FDI employment share as the level of foreign penetration in the industry, neither of which 
takes into account how long the FDI firm has been operating in the industry. Future firm-
level studies should incorporate the length of FDI existence into FDI penetration measures. 
Secondly, this research uses a simple method of fixed effect model to deal with endogeneity 
issues. One limiting factor of this method is that it works well only with unobservable 
variables that are invariant across time. Therefore, future studies, should take care of the 
unobservable variables that are time-variant. An alternative method proposed by Blundell and 
Bond (2000) and Bond (2002) should be used if it is possible. Finally, since deflators for each 
sector are not available, the study uses the overall consumer price index (CPI) to deflate 
relevant variables. Although deflating with overall CPI may at least give better-estimated 




To further understand the issues of productivity, the next chapter will look at the innovative 
outcomes of domestic firms as it leads to productivity and performance. In order to do so, 
extensive definition and description will be provided as it relates to investment in knowledge 





Table 4-1 Distribution of Domestic and Foreign Firms in Each Sector 
Name of Sector N N1 FOR DOC FOR% DOC% 
Food 544 134 10 124 7.463 92.537 
Garments 94 24 2 22 8.333 91.667 
Wood 114 25 2 23 8.000 92.000 
Paper 14 9 1 8 11.111 88.889 
Publishing, Printing and 
Media 
328 47 7 40 14.894 85.106 
Non-Metallic mineral 
products 
364 113 4 109 3.540 96.460 
Basic Metals 84 10 2 8 20.000 80.000 
Fabricated Metal Products 304 52 1 51 1.923 98.077 
Machinery and Equipment 42 4 2 2 50.000 50.000 
Furniture 382 105 4 101 3.810 96.190 
Construction 104 5 3 2 60.000 40.000 
Services of motor vehicles 360 5 2 3 40.000 60.000 
Retail 902 33 2 31 6.061 93.939 
Hotel and Restaurants 494 14 2 12 14.286 85.714 
#
Note: DOC: number of domestic firms; FOR: number of foreign firms; N: original sample; N1: sample after 
removing observation with the missing value.  











Table 4-2 Horizontal FDI, Backward FDI and Forward FDI Indexes by Sector 
Name of Sector HFDI2013 BFDI2013 FFDI2013 
Food 0.040 0.019 0.003 
Garments 0.024 0.001 0.002 
Wood 0.027 0.001 0.002 
Paper 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Publishing, Printing and Media 0.399 0.009 0.016 
Non-Metallic mineral products 0.002 0.000 0.000 
Basic Metals 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Fabricated Metal Products 0.010 0.000 0.000 
Machinery and Equipment 1.000 0.040 0.081 
Furniture 0.027 0.001 0.002 
Construction 0.107 0.000 0.012 
Services of motor vehicles 0.993 0.000 0.034 
Retail 0.371 0.199 0.123 














Table 4-3 Means of Two Proxies of Absorptive Capacity and Labour Productivity Gap 
Name of Sector Number of Firms Training (TR) Human Capital 
(H) 
TGap 
Food 134 0.269 0.630 2.626 
Garments 24 0.500 0.677 0.658 
Wood 25 0.000 0.522 -0.480 
Paper 9 0.667 0.271 1.707 
Publishing, Printing and Media 47 0.234 0.670 1.626 
Non-Metallic mineral products 113 0.248 0.467 1.502 
Basic Metals 10 0.300 0.414 0.579 
Fabricated Metal Products 52 0.327 0.668 1.275 
Machinery and Equipment 4 0.000 0.450 1.386 
Furniture 105 0.276 0.570 -0.031 
Construction 5 1.000 0.760 1.566 
Services of motor vehicles 5 0.400 0.402 1.476 
Retail 33 0.515 0.385 0.927 














Table 4-4 Correlation among Horizontal FDI, Backward FDI and Forward FDI 
 HFDI BFDI FFDI 
HFDI 1   
BFDI 0.455 1  




Table 4-5 Correlation among Proxies of Absorptive Capacity and Technology Gap 
 Training Human TGap  
Training 1   
Human -0.161 1  









Table 4-6 Effect of FDI on Labour Productivity of Domestic Firms 
 (1) Horizontal FDI  (2) Backward FDI  (3) Forward FDI 
Independent  
Variables 
Log (Sale/Labour) Independent  
Variables 
Log (Sale/Labour) Independent  
Variables 
Log (Sale/Labour) 
OLS RE FE OLS RE FE OLS RE FE 
Constant 8.029*** 7.99*** -10.562*** Constant 8.328*** 8.289*** -10.271*** Constant 8.046*** 8.04*** -11.092*** 
 (0.288) (0.333) (3.064)  (0.29) (0.346) (3.179)  (0.296) (0.36) (3.002) 
Ln L 0.112** 0.103* 1.466*** Ln L 0.167*** 0.142** 1.475*** Ln L 0.146*** 0.12* 1.486*** 
 (0.054) (0.06) (0.293)  (0.054) (0.063) (0.301)  (0.056) (0.065) (0.292) 
Ln (K/L) 0.02 0.02 0.05 Ln (K/L) 0.01 0.01 0.06 Ln (K/L) 0.01 0.01 0.06 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.06)  (0.02) (0.03) (0.06)  (0.02) (0.03) (0.06) 
Ln (M/L) 0.223*** 0.233*** 1.918*** Ln (M/L) 0.186*** 0.199*** 1.927*** Ln (M/L) 0.214*** 0.227*** 1.967*** 
 (0.024) (0.028) (0.229)  (0.025) (0.029) (0.236)  (0.025) (0.03) (0.224) 
Ln (E/L) 0.173*** 0.205***  Ln (E/L) 0.184*** 0.22***  Ln (E/L) 0.177*** 0.221***  
 (0.034) (0.04)   (0.035) (0.041)   (0.036) (0.043)  
HFDI 2.762*** 2.811*** 2.506* BFDI 2.948 3.529 1.494 FFDI 16.743*** 11.604** 3.812 
 (0.562) (0.625) (1.492)  (2.645) (2.842) (4.299)  (4.633) (5.277) (10.147) 
H  -0.275 -0.338  H  -0.452** -0.554**  H  -0.237 -0.38*  
 (0.192) (0.219)   (0.184) (0.216)   (0.183) (0.22)  
TR 0.136 0.253  TR 0.214 0.356**  TR 0.238* 0.351**  




R&D 0.009 0.113  R&D -0.054 -0.165  R&D -0.051 -0.163  
 (0.041) (0.162)   (0.039) (0.104)   (0.038) (0.194)  
TGap  -0.139*** -0.148*** Tgap  -0.16*** -0.166*** Tgap  -0.077*** -0.08***  
 (0.021) (0.025)   (0.02) (0.024)   (0.019) (0.022)  
H*HFDI -2.024** -1.604 -1.464 H*BFDI -1.392 1.155 0.087 H*FFDI -13.097** -5.753 5.535 
 (0.927) (1.003) (1.902)  (3.402) (3.65) (5.832)  (6.031) (6.773) (13.12) 
TR*HFDI 1.726** 1.199 -2.184* TR*BFDI 4.312 1.766 -3.538 TR*FFDI 1.132 0.611 -12.507 
 (0.700) (0.749) (1.31)  (2.719) (2.911) (4.636)  (4.632) (5.186) (10.015) 
R&D*HFDI -0.163 -1.724 -1.661 R&D*BFDI 0.488 1.995 2.002 R&D*FFDI 1.232 2.112 1.039 
 (0.132) (0.653) (0.772)  (0.564) (0.775) (1.712)  (1.159) (3.099) (2.067) 
Tgap*HFDI 0.679*** 0.726*** 0.88** Tgap*BFDI 1.643*** 1.708*** 3.659** Tgap*FFDI 5.72*** 5.987*** 11.161** 
 (0.109) (0.125) (0.39)  (0.211) (0.254) (1.831)  (1.501) (1.768) (4.867) 
R2 0.518  0.304 R2 0.494  0.297 R2 0.471  0.306 
N 580 580 580 N 580 580 580 N 580 580 580 
Hausman test of RE against FE  Hausman test of RE against FE  Hausman test of RE against FE  
Chi-squared 76.3 Chi-squared 66.2 Chi-squared 85.1 
P-value 0 P-value 0 P-value 0 
Note: 1) In OLS sectors and time dummies are included while in RE and FE time dummy and firm fixed effect are taken into account. 2) *, **, ***: significant at 10, 5 and 1%; ( ): standard 









Table 4-7 Effect of FDI on Labour Productivity of Domestic Firms Using Value-Added Per Worker 
 
 (1) Horizontal FDI  (2) Backward FDI  (3) Forward FDI 
Independent  
Variables 
Log (Value added/Labour) Independent  
Variables 
Log (Value added/Labour) Independent  
Variables 
Log (Value added/Labour) 
OLS RE FE OLS RE FE OLS RE FE 
Constant 10.94*** 11.463*** 13.784*** Constant 10.89*** 11.467*** 14.347*** Constant 10.837*** 11.548*** 13.926*** 
 (0.257) (0.28) (0.645)  (0.247) (0.269) (0.779)  (0.261) (0.288) (0.637) 
Ln L 0.145** 0.112 -0.403* Ln L 0.214** 0.17** -0.415* Ln L 0.181** 0.131 -0.458** 
 (0.072) (0.081) (0.219)  (0.071) (0.08) (0.219)  (0.074) (0.085) (0.224) 
HFDI 2.516*** 2.702*** 4.322** BFDI 4.285 5.615 7.928 FFDI 19.757*** 14.497** 2.913 
 (0.756) (0.841) (2.129)  (3.439) (3.707) (6.07)  (6.101) (6.89) (14.669) 
H  0.05 0.059  H  -0.124 -0.167  H  0.188 0.135  
 (0.257) (0.292)   (0.236) (0.272)   (0.237) (0.279)  
TR 0.106 0.233  TR 0.105 0.276  TR 0.157 0.289  
 (0.194) (0.221)   (0.184) (0.212)   (0.185) (0.218)  
R&D 0.045 0.192  R&D 0.011 0.145  R&D 0.015 0.199  
 (0.05) (0.112)   (0.010) (0.161)   (0.050) (0.111)  




 (0.029) (0.033)   (0.025) (0.03)   (0.025) (0.029)  
H*HFDI -1.605 -1.23 -2.322 H*BFDI -2.254 0.618 2.992 H*FFDI -16.95** -9.466 11.653 
 (1.249) (1.351) (2.724)  (4.42) (4.754) (8.225)  (7.947) (8.867) (18.941) 
TR*HFDI 1.615* 1.259 -2.812 TR*BFDI 7.27** 4.292 -10.728 TR*FFDI 2.946 3.111 -16.868 
 (0.939) (1.009) (1.872)  (3.524) (3.787) (6.519)  (6.111) (6.801) (14.466) 
R&D*HFDI 0.058 1.441 0.565 R&D*BFDI 0.700 1.220 1.120 R&D*FFDI 1.890 1.998 1.897 
 (0.176) (1.881) (0.872)  (0.730) (1.205) (1.001)  (1.510) (1.002) (0.128) 
Tgap*HFDI 0.892*** 0.974*** 1.654** Tgap*BFDI 2.269*** 2.423*** 6.094** Tgap*FFDI 8.008*** 8.518*** 17.563** 
 (0.146) (0.167) (0.549)  (0.27) (0.317) (2.582)  (1.973) (2.288) (7.007) 
R2 0.248  0.068 R2 0.269  0.078 R2 0.213  0.053 
N 575 575 575 N 575 575 575 N 575 575 575 
Hausman test of RE against FE  Hausman test of RE against FE  Hausman test of RE against FE  
Chi-squared 11.9 Chi-squared 15.4 Chi-squared 18.5 
P-value 0.029 P-value 0 P-value 0.001 
Notes: 1) In OLS the dummy for sectors and time are included while in RE and FE, time dummy and firm fixed effect are taken into account. 2) *, **, ***: significant at 10, 5 and 1%; ( ): 
standard error. 3) Hausman test with null hypothesis H0: RE is a consistent estimator. 4) The variable TR denotes a dummy variable which indicates whether or not firms offer training to 
their workers. The variable H denotes the percentage of workers with lower secondary education (grade 7th or higher). 5) The number of observations is 560 because eight observations have 














































Food 0.1878 0.0000 0.0026 0.0268 0.0065 0.0090 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2796 0.1549 0.0000 0.0001 
Garments 0.0000 0.7005 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0445 0.0031 0.0000 0.0000 
Wood 0.0001 0.0000 0.0245 0.0125 0.0001 0.0024 0.0086 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0212 
Paper 0.0000 0.0000 0.0032 0.0347 0.0218 0.0151 0.0298 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0022 0.0003 0.0000 0.0002 
Publishing 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0105 0.0000 0.0000 0.0213 0.0000 0.0000 0.0006 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
Non-metallic 
Mineral 
0.0010 0.0000 0.0056 0.0000 0.0000 0.0466 0.0992 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0027 0.0000 0.0000 0.0503 
Basic Metal 0.0000 0.0000 0.0084 0.0004 0.0000 0.0024 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0099 
Fabricated Metal  0.0000 0.0000 0.0015 0.0000 0.0000 0.0037 0.0001 0.0000 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0050 
Machinery & Equip 0.0001 0.0000 0.0033 0.0000 0.0001 0.0003 0.0350 0.0000 0.0025 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0013 
Furniture 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0358 0.8115 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Retail 0.0624 0.0732 0.0286 0.0451 0.0060 0.0426 0.0758 0.0000 0.0446 0.0772 0.0587 0.0231 0.0340 0.0244 
Hotel & Restaurant 0.0000 0.0002 0.0024 0.0012 0.0062 0.0005 0.0014 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0006 0.0075 0.0000 0.0015 
Services of Motor 
Vehicles 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 





Table 4-9 Comparing Technology Gap Using TFP and Labour Productivity 
Name of Sector Number of Firms TFP Gap  Labour Productivity Gap 
Food 134 -0.166 2.626 
Garments 24 0.321 0.658 
Wood 25 1.004 -0.480 
Paper 9 2.578 1.707 
Publishing, Printing and Media 47 2.507 1.626 
Non-Metallic mineral products 113 2.775 1.502 
Basic Metals 10 1.764 0.579 
Fabricated Metal Products 52 0.374 1.275 
Machinery and Equipment 4 2.500 1.386 
Furniture 105 2.764 -0.031 
Construction 5 2.579 1.566 
Services of motor vehicles 5 2.494 1.476 
Retail 33 2.094 0.927 




Table 4-10 Correlation among Proxies of Absorptive Capacity and TFP Gap 
 Training Human TFPgap 
Training 1   
Human -0.161 1  






Table 4-11 Effect of FDI on Total Factor Productivity 
 (1) Horizontal FDI  (2) Backward FDI  (3) Forward FDI 
Independent  
Variables 
Ln(TFP) Independent  
Variables 
Ln(TFP) Independent  
Variables 
Ln(TFP) 
OLS RE FE OLS RE FE OLS RE FE 
Constant 9.046 8.742 8.961 Constant 9.249 8.966 9.014 Constant 9.131 8.837 8.939 
 (0.138) (0.142)*** (0.095)*** (0.138) (0.142)*** (0.074)*** (0.136) (0.139)*** (0.081)*** 
 [0.149] [0.156]*** [0.13]***  [0.147] [0.121]*** [0.117]*** [0.151] [0.124]*** [0.092]*** 
HFDI 2.665 2.444 1.97 BFDI 1.888 1.118 0.057 FFDI 11.58 11.725 6.905 
 (0.559) (0.603)*** (1.659)  (2.655) (2.792) (4.788)  (4.607) (4.971)** (11.002) 
 [1.353] [1.036]** [1.647]  [3.355] [2.999] [5.001]  [6.506] [7.768] [11.285] 
H  -0.036 -0.062  H  -0.219 -0.21  H  -0.155 -0.183  
 (0.186) (0.203)   (0.179) (0.198)   (0.174) (0.192)  
 [0.184] [0.221]   [0.211] [0.19]   [0.185] [0.177]  
TR 0.087 0.108  TR 0.162 0.161  TR 0.219 0.223  
 (0.142) (0.155)   (0.139) (0.154)   (0.135) (0.149)  
 [0.154] [0.164]   [0.158] [0.165]   [0.135] [0.149]  
R&D 0.025 0.021  R&D -0.052 -0.048  R&D -0.042 -0.039  




 [0.455] [0.179]   [0.079] [0.102]   [0.089] [0.110]  
TFPGap  -0.072 -0.08  TFPGap  -0.093 -0.096  TFPGap  -0.063 -0.067  
 (0.013) (0.013)***   (0.013) (0.013)***  (0.01) (0.011)*** 
 [0.033] [0.033]**   [0.031] [0.068]   [0.032] [0.046]  
H*HFDI -2.538 -2.495 -2.223 H*BFDI -3.137 -4.115 -3.576 H*FFDI -6.166 -6.289 1.181 
 (0.916) (0.974)** (2.114)  (3.395) (3.563) (6.236)  (5.868) (6.284) (13.367) 
 [1.429] [1.257]** [1.396]  [4.043] [3.871] [7.67]  [6.644] [7.872] [13.134] 
TR*HFDI 1.673 1.442 -2.106 TR*BFDI 4.421 4.51 -1.893 TR*FFDI 1.636 0.9 -11.665 
 (0.689) (0.73)** (1.41)  (2.716) (2.847) (5.073)  (4.535) (4.857) (10.606) 
 [1.147] [1.146] [1.256]*  [2.648] [2.664]* [6.047]  [5.719] [7.32] [12.11] 
R&D*HFDI -0.259 -0.241 -1.291 R&D*BFDI 0.308 0.212 0.179 R&D*HFDI 0.344 0.212 0.110 
 (0.130) (0.771) (1.451)  (0.563) (0.651) (0.111)  (1.120) (1.511) (1.002) 
 [0.221] [0.991] [1.972]  [0.872] [0.917] [0.432]  [1.225] [1.781] [1.220] 
TFPgap*HFDI 0.043 0.103 0.246 TFPgap*BFDI 0.472 0.503 0.435 TFPgap*FFDI -0.397 -0.019 2.803 
 (0.079) (0.08) (0.104)**  (0.192) (0.186)*** (0.227)*  (0.59) (0.639) (1.361)** 
 [0.211] [0.215] [0.443]  [0.914] [1.064] [3.252]  [1.121] [1.35] [3.859] 
R2 0.237  0.031 R2 0.191  0.021 R2 0.203  0.021 




Hausman test of RE against FE  Hausman test of RE against FE  Hausman test of RE against FE  
Chi-squared boot 17.009 Chi-squared boot 4.27 Chi-squared boot 11.87 
P-value boot 0.02 P-value boot 0.16 P-value boot 0.009 
Chi-squared 23.69 Chi-squared 5.37 Chi-squared 13.23 
P-value 0 P-value 0.251 P-value 0.01 
Note: 1) In OLS sectors and time dummies are included while in RE and FE time dummy and firm fixed effect are taken into account. 2) * p<0.10; **p<0.05;***p<0.01. 3) ( ): asymptotic 
















Table 4-12 Effect of FDI on Total Factor Productivity (TR and H Used in TFP Calculation) 
 (1) Horizontal FDI  (2) Backward FDI  (3) Forward FDI 
Independent  
Variables 
Ln(TFP) Independent  
Variables 
Ln(TFP) Independent  
Variables 
Ln(TFP) 
OLS RE FE OLS RE FE OLS RE FE 
Constant 9.035 8.751 8.971 Constant 9.158 8.904 9.012 Constant 9.095 8.816 8.95 
 (0.081) (0.069)*** (0.093)*** (0.081) (0.069)*** (0.073)*** (0.081) (0.067)*** (0.079)*** 
 [0.09] [0.078]*** [0.128]*** [0.086] [0.071]*** [0.091]*** [0.067] [0.054]*** [0.102]*** 
HFDI 2.391 2.209 2.069 BFDI 1.879 1.157 0.201 FFDI 10.405 10.715 7.995 
 (0.498) (0.539)*** (1.628)  (2.394) (2.533) (4.707)  (4.234) (4.582)** (10.794) 
 [1.139] [0.885]** [1.659]  [3.043] [2.345] [5.31]  [7.59] [8.816] [13.935] 
TFPGap  -0.067 -0.074  TFPGap  -0.084 -0.087  TFPGap  -0.059 -0.063  
 (0.011) (0.012)***   (0.011) (0.012)***   (0.009) (0.01)***  
 [0.026] [0.044]*   [0.019] [0.024]***   [0.036] [0.032]**  
H*HFDI -1.745 -1.814 -2.212 H*BFDI -2.515 -3.317 -2.234 H*FFDI -4.555 -5.027 -0.156 
 (0.736) (0.793)** (2.074)  (2.942) (3.121) (6.133)  (5.215) (5.61) (13.083) 
 [1.257] [1.055]* [1.76]  [3.435] [2.918] [7.112]  [7.826] [9.857] [14.159] 
TR*HFDI 1.308 1.147 -2.112 TR*BFDI 4.149 4.19 -1.681 TR*FFDI 2.813 2.035 -11.098 




 [0.942] [0.8] [1.427]  [2.151] [1.89]** [5.714]  [6.612] [7.916] [12.876] 
TFPgap*HFDI 0.036 0.092 0.243 TFPgap*BFDI 0.433 0.46 0.441 TFPgap*FFDI -0.405 -0.06 2.704 
 (0.074) (0.074) (0.097)**  (0.183) (0.176)*** (0.213)**  (0.543) (0.588) (1.262)** 
 [0.171] [0.131] [0.272]  [0.711] [0.615] [2.966]  [0.782] [1.204] [4.604] 
R2 0.213  0.033 R2 0.167  0.02 R2 0.181  0.021 
N 580 580 580 N 580 580 580 N 580 580 580 
Hausman test of RE against FE  Hausman test of RE against FE  Hausman test of RE against FE  
Chi-squared 
boot 
9.32 Chi-squared boot 7.2 Chi-squared boot 5.76 
P-value boot 0.22 P-value boot 0.4 P-value boot 0.109 
Chi-squared 4.7 Chi-squared 7.21 Chi-squared 11.9 
P-value 0.003 P-value 0.05 P-value 0 
Note:1) In OLS sectors and time dummies are included while in RE and FE time dummy and firm fixed effect are taken into account. 2) * p<0.10; 









Table 4-13 Effect of FDI on Total Factor Productivity with H*FDI and TR*FDI Dropped (H and TR Used in TFP Calculation) 
 (1) Horizontal FDI  (2) Backward FDI  (3) Forward FDI 
Independent  
Variables 
Ln(TFP) Independent  
Variables 
Ln(TFP) Independent  
Variables 
Ln(TFP) 
OLS RE FE OLS RE FE OLS RE FE 
Constant 9.025 8.742 9.016 Constant 9.158 8.897 9.01 Constant 9.092 8.812 8.971 
 (0.081) (0.07)*** (0.09)***  (0.081) (0.07)*** (0.072)*** (0.081) (0.067)*** (0.077)*** 
 [0.082] [0.075]*** [0.113]*** [0.073] [0.084]*** [0.082]*** [0.07] [0.055]*** [0.096]*** 
HFDI 1.969 1.676 -0.323 BFDI 2.4 1.174 -1.56 FFDI 9.669 9.334 1.466 
 (0.311) (0.332)*** (0.69)  (1.254) (1.306) (2.264)  (2.127) (2.279)*** (4.85) 
 [0.645] [0.613]*** [0.825]  [1.328] [1.184] [1.988]  [2.515] [2.907]*** [5.52] 
TFPGap  -0.066 -0.074  TFPGap  -0.084 -0.087  TFPGap  -0.059 -0.063  
 (0.011) (0.012)***  (0.011) (0.012)***   (0.009) (0.01)***  
 [0.028] [0.044]*   [0.026] [0.028]***   [0.035] [0.042]  
TFPgap*HFDI 0.025 0.085 0.22 TFPgap*BFDI 0.438 0.464 0.433 TFPgap*FFDI -0.452 -0.12 2.563 
 (0.074) (0.074) (0.096)**  (0.183) (0.176)*** (0.211)**  (0.528) (0.574) (1.242)** 
 [0.302] [0.25] [0.468]  [0.965] [1.054] [2.33]  [1.267] [1.2] [3.696] 
R2 0.202  0.021 R2 0.159  0.019 R2 0.179  0.016 




Hausman test of RE against FE  Hausman test of RE against FE  Hausman test of RE against FE  
Chi-squared 
boot 
13 Chi-squared boot 6.6 Chi-squared boot 11.2 
P-value boot 0.4 P-value boot 0.06 P-value boot 0.15 
Chi-squared 6.3 Chi-squared 7.21 Chi-squared 5 
P-value 0.003 P-value 0.05 P-value 0.215 
Note:1) In OLS sectors and time dummies are included while in RE and FE time dummy and firm fixed effect are considered. 2) * p<0.10; 




CHAPTER 5: Innovation Outcomes on Productivity 
5.1 Introduction 
Globally, foreign direct investment (FDI) is sought for the potentials it holds in facilitating 
technology transfers, increasing domestic production, providing employment opportunities 
and international market networks amongst other things. There has been a steady rise in FDI 
with increased integration across countries of the world in the last twenty years driven by the 
dynamic and speedy advances in technological change. According to the 2011 World 
Investment Report, global FDI flows have been rising even though not at the same rate as the 
pre-global crisis periods. Specifically, it rose to $1.24 trillion in 2010 about 15% below the 
pre-crisis average. On the other hand, global industrial output and trade have returned to the 
pre-crisis levels. While FDI inflows to developed countries continue to nosedive 
phenomenally, developing and transition economies together attracted more than half of 
global FDI flows, with their outward FDI (mostly directed towards other countries in the 
south) also rising to heights (Gachino, 2007; UNCTAD, 2011). 
Innovation is the outcome of firms’ investments in knowledge capital and management 
decisions. The ultimate objective of these investments is to produce innovations that 
positively impacts on firms’ performance by increasing productivity, employment, sales, 
profits, market shares, or mark-ups. However, there is uncertainty regarding the extent to 
which firms can convert knowledge capital investments into innovation outcomes and 
furthermore, whether these innovation outcomes are likely to impact on firm performance. 
Innovation is risky since it is almost impossible to determine, ex-ante, whether the 
introduction of a new product, process, or organisational change will lead to an increase in 
sales or productivity. 
In general, most of the evidence of the impact of innovation on productivity and firm-level 
performance has been focused on developed countries. Regarding the connection to 
employment, the case study literature has emphasised the possibility that innovation acts as a 
mechanism to reduce employment, and, as a force for skill bias, as it increases the relative 
demand for skilled labour. While this is very important, this argument suffers from a real 
deficit of evidence, especially regarding developing countries and firm-level information. In a 
recent survey of the literature, Vivarelli (2012) suggests that the more recent micro-
econometric literature tends to support a positive link between technology, proxied as R&D 




Vivarelli (2012) also finds significant evidence in favour of the skill-biased hypothesis across 
different OECD countries, different economic sectors, and different types of innovation. 
In one of the few existing micro-econometric studies, Harrison et al. (2008) study the impact 
of innovation on employment using a comparable dataset of firms from France, Germany, 
Spain, and the UK. The authors find that product innovation has a positive impact on 
employment, but that process innovation has a displacing effect on employment. However, 
the positive impact of product innovation generating employment is larger than the 
displacement effect of process innovation and the net effect of innovation on employment 
tends to be positive. Using a similar methodology, Hall, Lotti and Mairesse (2009) find a low 
but positive effect of product innovation on employment in Italy and no displacement effect 
from process innovation. Thus, the limited evidence in existence suggests an overall positive 
impact of innovation on employment, but more research is needed to understand if these 
results also hold for firms in developing countries that are further away from the 
technological frontier. 
In relation to the impact of innovation on productivity, Hall (2011) provides a comprehensive 
survey of the empirical work. The survey mainly focuses on 16 existing empirical studies 
using the workhorse empirical model, the Crepon-Douget-Mairesse (CDM) model (Crepon, 
Duguet & Mairesse, 1998), implemented using firm-level data in OECD countries and a few 
emerging markets. Hall’s (2011) main finding is that, in general, most studies find a positive 
correlation between product innovation and productivity, but the impact of process 
innovation is ambiguous. According to Hall (2011), the problem with process innovation is 
that it cannot be measured in the surveys beyond the dichotomous variable of whether or not 
the firm implements process innovations. In general, these studies suggest that innovation has 
a positive impact on productivity. 
The evidence for developing countries, however, is scarce. One relevant study is Goedhuys et 
al. (2008), which examines the main drivers of productivity in Tanzania. The authors do not 
find any link between R&D, product and process innovations, licensing of technology, or 
training of employees and productivity. The results suggest that Tanzanian firms are 
struggling to convert knowledge inputs into productivity improvements due to the 
weakenabling environment for business, which is the main constraint on productivity 




Also, there are indications that in developing countries, investments in knowledge capital are 
smaller than in developed countries. For example, Goni and Maloney (2014) demonstrate that 
investments in R&D as a share of GDP are smaller in developing countries than in developed 
countries. One plausible explanation for this is the absence of complementary factors to 
enable R&D, such as education, the quality of scientific infrastructure, and the private sector, 
which is weaker in countries far away from the technological frontier. 
 
A related strand of the literature has empirically analysed some of these complementary 
factors. Polder et al. (2010) find significant complementarities between different knowledge 
inputs and innovation outcomes in the Netherlands. The authors find that:(i) ICT investment 
and usage are important drivers of innovation; (ii)there is a positive effect on theproductivity 
of product and process innovation when combined with organisational innovation; and (iii) 
there is evidence that organisational innovation is complementary to process innovation. 
Miravete and Pernias (2006) find evidence of complementarity between product and process 
innovation in Spain’s tile industry, and Cassiman and Veugelers (2006) find important 
complementarities between internal R&D and external knowledge acquisitions. 
A final element is the lack of an enabling business environment in many developing countries 
and existing market failures in the supply of technical infrastructure, human capital or 
technology, as well as recent evidence of low management quality in firms in developing 
countries (Bloom et al., 2012). This raises questions about the efficiency of transformation of 
knowledge inputs by firms into innovation outcomes, and further, into improvements in firm 
performance. 
To boost productivity, there is aneed for broad-based innovation and investment in 
knowledge capital. Innovation is the engine of the ‘creative destruction’ process that spurs 
economic dynamism and transformation and is at the centre of the development process 
(Schumpeter 1942). Innovation contributes to the twin goals of shared prosperity and poverty 
reduction by generating productivity gains that increase employment, raise wages, and 
improve access for the poor to products and services. Investing in innovation increases the 
capabilities of firms, enabling them to integrate into global value chains and compete in 
international markets while facilitating the adoption of new technologies that improve labour 




This chapter aims to provide a rich description of the nature of firm-level innovation and 
investments in knowledge capital in Nigeria, and the link between innovation activities and 
productivity. 
The chapter is structured as follows. Following this introduction, section 5.2 describes 
Nigeria’s policy framework for innovation. Section 5.3 defines the different measures of 
innovation and describes the datasets used in the analysis. Section 5.4 provides the 
methodology of the firm level innovation landscape in Nigeria. Section 5.5 analyses the main 
determinants of innovation in the manufacturing and services sectors as well as the 
relationship between innovation and firm performance. The last section provides conclusions 
and policy recommendations regarding firm-level innovation in Nigeria. 
 
5.2 FDI and Innovation Policy in Nigeria 
Most developing African countries are dependent on FDI as a source of foreign capital for 
development and employment.  For instance, the government of Nigeria works hard to make 
the environment conducive for FDI by providing a growing infrastructural base, 
facilitatingthe development of human capital, openness to trade and other forms of regional 
cooperation, providing a viable financial infrastructure and a liberalised economy without 
exchange or price controls. According to the 2007 ranking of competitiveness, Nigeria was 
placed 10th over 29 African countries. Even though the country is still characterisedas a 
factor-driven economy, with high dependence on commodity prices and world economic 
cycles it is fast being transformed into an innovation-driven economy. In Nigeria, skilled 
labour is playing a greater role in the economy than in the past. The financial sector is also 
becoming more and more innovative. It is worthy of note that Nigeria’s skill mix and human 
resource base makes Nigeria a repository necessary for the achievement of its development 
agenda. Nigeria’s private sector has increased its ability to harness existing technologies 
required for its transition to be an innovation-driven economy. Business sophistication, 
increased goods and labour market efficiency which is Nigeria’s experience is driven by its 





Nigeria’s Vision 20:2020 documents the essence of raising the productivity of the 
manufacturing industry by encouraging increased involvement of foreign and domestic 
investment in the economy: 
“An analysis of the Nigerian manufacturing industry indicates that large firms are 
responsible for the bulk of non-oil, value-added exports. However, small and medium firms 
make up the bulk of the manufacturing and processing firms. Most of these firms are so small 
that they are unable to participate in foreign markets significantly.   Increasing the volume of 
value-added exports can only be achieved by targeting investment in key sub-sectors and 
creating large firms focused solely on value-added exports. In the light of this, actions will be 
taken to increase the number of large manufacturing firms in the industry. This will be 
achieved by creating an enabling environment so that small/medium firms can grow and 
prosper through increasing direct investment – both domestic and FDI - in the manufacturing 
industry.” (National Planning Commission, NPC, 2009, p.10) 
The fundamental objectives of the Nigerian economic transformation agenda include the 
achievement of economic diversification, transformation of the structure of exports from 
primary commodities to processed and manufactured goods and the attainment of high levels 
of efficiency and productivity, to be globally competitive. Process innovation in the 
manufacturing industries may be labour-saving and job-displacing based on the complexity 
of the relationship. In a drive to build capacity and innovation, the Nigerian economic 
transformation blueprint recognises that capacity building needs to be based on clear and 
dynamic strategies and policy measures that would foster innovation and entrepreneurship, 
facilitate the diffusion of Information and Communication Technology (ICT), foster the 
development of Research and Development and promote worker education and training, inter 
alia.The promotion of business and technology innovation is being driven by the development 
of incubators. Also, effective linkages formed with local universities and research institutions 
are forged to encourage innovation and promote indigenous research and development. 
 
To engender a favourable policy environment, the Nigerian Investment Promotion 
Commission (NIPC) serves in removing unnecessary controls and creating an atmosphere of 
trust and transparency to encourage innovation and entrepreneurship of businessmen, 
industrialists and traders; all of which should facilitate the development of Nigeria as a global 




focus areas which would generate additional employment opportunities. Also,promoting 
sustainable development and application of acceptable and profitable technologies through 
strategic investments in biotechnology research and development to support innovation and 
economic development is one of the strategies of the NIPC. 
 
In its incentive policy for investment, the NIPC4 seeks to promote micro, small and medium 
scale enterprise (MSMEs) utilisation of modern and appropriate technology and innovations 
from research and development institutions. This would increase the capacity and diversity of 
the private sector by providing opportunities for international and local investors and 
contractors in public infrastructure, encouraging efficiency, innovation, and flexibility at 
minimum cost. An impact evaluation of such programmes engaged by the government to 
drive these policies will enable NIPC through investment promotion to create more jobs in 
the economy. The timing of this study is therefore apt as it will, in a substantial measure, 
provide a basis for evaluating the performance of the existing policies on innovation in 
Nigeria and the effectiveness of the frameworks for achieving their current national plans. 
 
5.3 Data Description and Measurement of Innovation 
To examine the innovative behaviour of firms in Nigeria, I use the World Bank 2014 
Enterprise Survey (ES) and its linked innovation module. This is the most comprehensive 
survey on innovation information carried out in Nigeria to date. It complements the first 
national innovation survey conducted by the NBS in 2012 involving 300 firms, as well as a 
pilot innovation survey conducted in 2013 involving 310 establishments, mainly in the 
services sector. The 2014 ES, which corresponded to the period of analysis 2007-2014, 
covered information regarding innovation activities and outcomes for 1853 firms, but only 
905 were used for the main econometric analysis; including micro firms and those in the 
services sectors. Table 5-10 shows the distribution of firms by sector and size. The survey 
uses a stratified sampling strategy, where firms are stratified by industry, size, and location. 
Despite its small sample size, the 2014 ES improves on the previous one of 2007, which was 
less sector representative. Furthermore, it is the largest and most representative survey 
available, as it includes innovation information.  An additional advantage is that the survey 
collects substantial balance sheet data and other information regarding the investment 




obstacles.The sample selection for this chapter is based on the completed available data from 
the Enterprise survey database developed by the World Bank. The enterprise survey includes 
an innovation survey that captures various industrial sectors using the ISIC classification. 




5.3.1 Measuring Innovation 
Innovation requires the transformation of knowledge capital or innovation inputs, both 
tangible and intangible—such as training, equipment, R&D or intellectual property 
acquisitionsinto innovation outcomes such as the introduction of new and improved products, 
new production processes, or organisational changes. Firms invest in knowledge capital 
inputs to increase their capabilities and produce innovative outcomes. As well as requiring 
tangible assets such as technology, equipment, and the physical production facilities, 
innovation needs intangible assets such as human capital, scientific and creative capital, and 
organisational capital. In turn, these inputs require specific innovation activities. Firms invest 
in training to increase the available human capital. Also, firms invest in R&D, software, and 
digitalisation or copyrights, patents and licenses to increase their scientific or innovative 
capital. In the case of the creative industries, innovation involves investment into developing 
these creative assets. Finally, innovation also requires organisational capital through 
investments in marketing and branding, adoption of new business models, design and 
prototyping, or corporate alliances and networks. 
 
As illustrated in Figure 5-1, the combination of these inputs yield innovation outcomes in the 
form of new or improved products and services, production and delivery processes, business 
organisation, and patented intellectual property. However, achieving the outcomes is heavily 
dependent on the ability of the firm in question, on the specific sector and country context, 

































(Source: Author’s adaptation) 
 
The innovation outcomes can impact on firm performance in different ways. Successful 
innovations are likely to increase firm-level productivity by improving the capacity to 
transform factors of production into more and better quality products, and by more efficiently 
creating products of higher value. Second, the increase in productivity is expected to increase 
the marginal productivity of labour, and as a result, increase the quality of jobs, i.e., more 
productive jobs. Third, more productive firms are expected to push less productive firms out 
of the market, thereby increasing the overall efficiency of the economy. This will improve 
allocative efficiency. All this, however, depends on the quality of the innovation and the 
ability of firms to translate innovation outcomes into improved performance. 
 
To measure innovation, one can focus on both measuring inputs and innovation activities, 
and measuring innovation outcomes. The early innovation measurement literature focused on 
a specific set of innovation inputs that were easier to quantify, for instance, R&D, or the 
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intensity of the technology used. These early efforts were followed by the implementation of 
the Oslo Manual type of surveys, which mainly focus on measuring innovation outcomes 
such as product/process improvements or patents at the firm level. The third generation of 
synthetic innovation indicators, such as the OECD STI scoreboard, were developed later. 
These indicators combine innovation inputs and outputs/outcomes to facilitate cross-country 
benchmarking and comparisons. 
 
Innovation input indicators are often calculated at the aggregate level using different sources 
such as national accounts or by aggregating firm-level or sector information. On the other 
hand, innovation outcomes are mainly gauged by using firm-level innovation surveys. 
 
 
A challenge of measuring innovation outcomes is the subjective nature of many of the 
questions used in the surveys. The Oslo Manual, which is the main reference for these types 
of surveys, defines innovation as “…the implementation of a new or significantly improved 
product (good or service), or process, a new marketing method, or a new organisational 
method in business practices, workplace organisation or external relations.” Most surveys use 
this definition to identify innovations by directly asking firm managers and owners whether 
they have implemented “new” or “significant” changes or improvements in the last three 
years. This is problematic since “significant” is a highly subjective term, and is also self-
reported. It is therefore important to supplement analysis of innovation outcomes with some 
measures of revealed expenditure on innovation inputs. 
Several authors have advocated a focus on knowledge capital assets as a better measure of 
innovation, and in recent years there has been a renewed effort to better measure and capture 
investments in intangible assets using data from different sources (Corrado, Hulten & Sichel, 
2006). While this approach offers a clearer and broader measure of firms’ capabilities, it 
faces the challenge of being unable to obtain the information required from existing 
innovation surveys. Moreover, it is important to highlight that this measure of innovation 
assets is not equivalent to innovation outcomes; inputs can be efficiently used, and therefore, 
there is some uncertainty about the type and extent of innovation outcomes that can be 




In general, any sound analysis of innovation activity should combine a focus on both 
knowledge capital inputs and innovation outcomes.  Although the ES innovation survey does 
not provide enough information on some of these intangible assets, it provides information on 
various sources of knowledge capital and innovation outcomes 
5.4 Methodology 
To estimate the impact of innovation activity on performance, the authorfollows a logical 
framework, which is the basis of the CDM model (Crepon et al., 1998). The framework holds 
that firms invest in knowledge inputs that can be transformed into innovation outcomes 
according to the efficiency of their innovation function. At a later stage, these innovation 
outcomes impact productivity which is contingent on the capacity of firms to transform 
innovation outcomes into improvements in product quality and efficiency. As a result, the 
CDM model requires the estimation of three main components: the knowledge function; the 
innovation equation; and the productivity equation. 
 
When estimating these components, there are two critical choices that need to be considered. 
The first is to define the scope of the knowledge inputs and innovation outcomes to be 
included in the analysis. This is often related to the availability of data in the innovation 
surveys. In most CDM applications, data is restricted to the use of R&D for knowledge 
activities; for innovation outcomes, either product and process innovation dummies, or the 
number of patents and the revenue associated to new products, are used. This chapter extends 
the traditional CDM model to include R&D as well as two other main knowledge activities: 
(i) the acquisition of equipment for innovation, and 
(ii) the training of workers for innovation activities.  
 
Regarding innovation outcomes, in addition to product and process innovations, the chapter 
focuses on organisational innovations, since as was seen earlier, some of the literature 





The second choice when examining these three innovation components relates to how the 
model is solved. Decisions regarding knowledge inputs and innovation outcomes can be 
made simultaneouslyand there can be feedback effects, especially on innovation outcomes 
and productivity. There are two main approaches in the literature on how to solve the model. 
Crepon et al. (1998) suggest solving the model simultaneously using Asymptotic Least 
Squares. Meanwhile, Griffith et al. (2006) assume that there are no feedback effects and solve 
the model sequentially, instrumenting knowledge activities in the innovation equation, and 
innovation outcomes in the productivity equation, to avoid endogeneity. 
 
The approach in this chapter is closer to the one advocated by Griffith et al. (2006), and 
solves the model sequentially, although for robustness I also estimate the model using a 
similar method to the original CDM approach. There are,however, two main assumptions that 
this chapter follows when solving the model: (i) firms first determine the intensity of input 
choices; and (ii) choices about the different types of innovation outcomes (product, process, 
or organisation) are made simultaneously. 
5.4.1 The knowledge function 
The first step of the model is to specify the choice of knowledge capital investment intensity. 
To this end, I extend the CDM model in two main directions. First, when measuring 
knowledge intensity, I also include other knowledge capital investments in addition to R&D, 
such as equipment and training for innovation. Second and differently from Griffith et al. 
(2006), who only used data on R&D activities for innovators, the enterprise survey asks the 
question of knowledge activities to all firms. As a result, in the dataset zero research intensity 
is an important outcome of knowledge capital investments that I need to incorporate this into 
the model. Therefore, rather than using a generalised Tobit model, often implemented in 
CDM model, I use a generalised Poisson estimator to better cater for the number of zeroes in 
the data. 
Specifically, I estimate the following model 
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Where $% is knowledge intensity for firm i; '% is a vector of determinants of knowledge 
intensity and ( is a vector of estimated coefficients. I follow the literature on the 
determinants of knowledge activities in the Schumpeterian tradition and use as determinants 
variables to represent market share, diversification and demand conditions, and firm level 
characteristics such a size and technological opportunities. To avoid simultaneity between 
knowledge activities and market share I use firm’s market share before the introduction of 
any innovation activities from three years ago. For diversification and demand conditions I 
use whether domestic or external demand is decreasing for the firm and whether the firm is a 
two-way trader, exporter and importer. Technological opportunities are captured by ISIS 2 
digits sector dummies. In addition, I control for firm size, age and whether the firm is foreign 
owned. Finally, and more importantly, I extend the model and introduce variables that 
represent the perceptions about the business environment for the firm. Specifically, I use 
indices reflecting firms’ perceptions on how much of an obstacle is presented by lack of 
finance, trade costs, telecommunications and government policies and regulations. 
5.4.2 The innovation function 
The second step is to determine the innovation equation. One crucial element in the decision 
to innovate is that firms decide simultaneously what innovation outcomes to produce based 
on existing knowledge capital investments. As a result, one should expect some correlation 
between the decisions to carry out product and process innovations, and perhaps 
organisational innovations. To incorporate these correlations in the empirical estimation, I 
use a multivariate Probit framework, which allows the author to estimate the decision to 
innovate in the different areas simultaneously and, therefore, correcting for potential 
correlation in these decisions. 
 
Specifically, I estimate m Probit equations for the probability of innovating, where m equals 




′ 2%/ + 4%/,/ = 1, . .38(2)!
!
















Moreover, allowing for correlation in the errors across equations, matrix Ω elements are: 
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The likelihood function depends on the multivariate standard normal distribution (Capperlari 
and Jenkins, 2003). As a determinant for the innovation equations,I follow the literature and 
control for size and capital intensity, proxied by the ratio of capital to labour. One important 
input of the innovation function is the number of technical staff in the establishment that can 
facilitate the transformation of knowledge inputs into innovation outcomes. Given that the 
data on skilled labour is uncompleted,I proxy skilled labour by an index of how much of an 
obstacle is presented by an inadequately trained labour force. 
 
Finally, given the potential endogeneity of knowledge capital investments in the innovation 
outcomes, Iuse the predicted values from the Poisson process in the first stage to instrument 




5.4.3 The productivity Equation 
The final stage to estimate the impact of innovation on firm performance is to derive the 
productivity equation. I approximate productivity using a Cobb-Douglas function where sales 
(Y) are a function of capital (K), labour (L) and innovation outcomes (H). 
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Equation (7) can be estimated by OLS. However, given the potential simultaneity between 
innovation outcomes and performance, I use the predicted values of the innovation outcomes 
as instruments and correct the standard errors by removing the mean squared error from the 
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Robustness 
The set of equations (1), (4) and (8) above are solved sequentially and instrumented at each 
stage following Griffith et al. (2006). This, however, assumes no major feedback effects from 




robustness test, I re-estimate the second and third stages, innovation functions and 
productivity, simultaneously by maximum likelihood and compare the results with the 
sequential method. 
 
5.5 Estimation Result 
In the context of developing countries innovation has been described as a process by which 
firms master and implement the design and production of goods and services which are new 
to them, irrespective of whether they are new to their competitors, their countries or the world 
(Mytelka, 2000). Hence, innovation takes place when products and processes that are new to 
a country or an individual enterprise are commercially introduced, whether or not they are 
new to the world (UNCTAD, 2007). In this respect, a wider set of changes in products, 
processes, organisation and marketing, including the purchase of new machinery and 
equipment as well as recent licensing-in of technology, are accepted as activities directly 
geared towards innovation. The obvious conclusion is that minor and incremental changes, 
including innovative approaches to organisation and marketing, constitute the bulk of what is 
called innovation in developing countries. In particular, marketing and organisational 
innovations are of major importance for firms in this context. A very extensive discussion of 
this can be found in Annex A of the Oslo Manual (OECD, 2005).  
 
One of the main sources of the differences between firms in developed and developing 
countries is the costly nature of innovation. In backward economies, firms find it much more 
difficult to muster sufficient financial and knowledge resources for innovation (Schmitz, 
1982). In the specific case of Nigeria, Biggs et al. (1995) noted that the context for 
manufacturing is of a harsh economic and institutional nature. One specific way by which 
firms substitute for their resource deficiencies is through networking. In a Nigerian case 
study, it was found that, among the many sources of information that was available to the 
firm, the ad-hocsectoral network institution created by the firms themselves particularly 
supported technological learning and innovativeness (Egbetokun et al., 2010). In Tanzania, 
the evidence presented by Goedhuys (2007a) showed that collaboration could support 
innovation in local firms in developing countries, even when they are seen to invest less in 
new machinery and to engage less in training and research, development and design activities 




particular, these firms prove to be more embedded in the domestic industrial structure and 
also source information from the internet. Furthermore, in a comparative study of two 
enterprise clusters in Nigeria, Oyelaran-Oyeyinka (2005) reported that collaboration, largely 
in the form of informal ties, among enterprises, grew over time, induced mainly by 
competitive forces and that these ties were in the face of common threats. 
Economists agree that innovation is a source of a large share of productivity growth. There is 
much less consensus, however, relevant to determinants of decision firms to innovate 
andinvest in research and development of new ideas. 
Business R&D expenditures were, for a long time,considered to be crucial and direct 
determinants of a firm’s innovation activity and its ability to absorb external knowledge 
which on the company level increases productivity and profit (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989). 
R&D spending was expected to increase productivity by reducing the cost of production of 
existing goods (process innovation) or expanding the choice of products (product 
innovation). Also, R&D isa relatively well defined and measurable variable and earlier 
studies actually considered expenditures for R&D to be a substitute for measuring firm 
innovation activity (Griliches, 1986). Later, however, it has been acknowledged that R&D 
spending is an innovation input that cannot be used as adirect measure of innovation output 
as not all R&D investment leads to successful innovation. Moreover, it is not easy to measure 
innovation output. Innovation activity started to be analysed as a process starting decision on 
R&D investment, followed by innovation output and productivity growth. 
 
Factors influencing innovation activity include firm age, the firm’s size, and strategic features 
such as being a member of a group or orientation on foreign markets, barriers to finance 
innovation, level of market competition, the economic situation of a country, R&D etc. 
Variables that are expected to determine different components of the innovation process are 
so numerous that the selection (and omission) of variables is very likely to influence results 
of empirical studies. 
 
5.5.1The determinants of investing in Knowledge input in Nigeria 
Table 5-1(see Appendix) shows the results of the first stage, the determinants of the intensity 




estimator to account for the number of firms with zero investments. Columns (1) and (2) 
show the results for R&D intensity and research (sum of R&D, training and equipment) 
intensity. 
Regarding R&D intensity (column 1), two-way traders and firms that face shrinking demand 
domestically or internationally have larger R&D intensity. Also, firms with greater 
perceptions of being financially constrained invest less on knowledge inputs. This suggests 
that international competition and pressure for diversification are important predictors of 
R&D intensity, while access to finance is likely to be an important inhibitor of these 
investments. Interestingly, firms with foreign ownership tend to invest less on R&D, while in 
line with some of the literature size does not appear to matter for these investments. Finally, 
neither market power position nor none of the obstacles explored; telecommunications, trade 
or government obstacles appear to have an impact on knowledge capital investments 
intensity. Thisemphasises the role of external demand factors in explaining R&D intensity. 
 
According to theresults, foreign ownership decreases theprobability of innovation decision, 
probably due to direct transfer of knowledge and technology from the mother firm as R&D in 
multinational companies is generallycentralised in headquarters (Cantwell & Zayas, 2003). 
This result is in line with the analysis of Srholec (2005) who used data from the third 
Community Innovation Survey (CIS) and found that foreign affiliates tended to engage less 
in internal R&D compared with domestically owned firms.  Also, Zemplinerova (2010) 
showed that there exists a negative relationship between foreign ownership of the firm and 
numbers of R&D employees - in comparison to domestic firms, foreign firms have fewer 
R&D employees. I find that intuitively consistent; economic factors such as lack of finance 
for innovations are negatively correlated with innovation investment.  
An examination of column (2), with a broader measure of knowledge-capital investments, 
including equipment and training, reveals very similar results to the ones on R&D, but with 
only two differences. First, lack of finance does not have a significant role in explaining 
knowledge intensity investments when broadening the definition; so it appears less binding 
when including machinery, equipment and training. Second, foreign-owned firms appear to 
invest more in knowledge inputs when considering machinery, equipment and training, which 




Columns (3) and (4) estimate the same specifications for robustness as (1) and (2), but this 
time looking at the decision (not the intensity) to invest. Thus, I use a Probit model to 
estimate the probability that firms incur any R&D (3) or R&D, machinery, equipment and 
training (4) investments. 
In the case of R&D, the only variables that appear to explain the decision to invest are having 
a decreasing domestic or international demand, larger market share at the beginning of the 
period in 2008(t-3), the perception of greater incidence of government obstacles and the 
perception of how important is access to finance as an obstacle. Firms that claim to be more 
financially constrained are less likely to engage in R&D, while firms that have larger sector 
market shares and that have more incentive to diversify due to contracting demand are more 
likely to implement R&D. The coefficient of government obstacles is, however, puzzling. 
Firms which perceive government regulations to be more of an obstacle are also more likely 
to engage in R&D, which could be explained by the potential endogeneity of these 
perceptions to firm performance. 
 
The existing literature suggests that developing countries should invest very heavily in 
research and development (R&D). The estimates of the return to Research and Development 
expenditure (R&D) for advanced countries have been argued to be so high as to justify levels 
of investment multiples of those found (Jones & Williams, 1998). The case is arguably even 
stronger for poor countries where a long literature argues that R&D is essential to the 
absorptive" or national learning" capacity required to exploit technological advance in the 
advanced countries.  
Empirically, Griffith et al. (2004) for the OECD demonstrate that the estimated returns to 
R&D, in fact, rise with distance from the technological frontier and increasingly reflect the 
greater gains from catch-up afforded to follower countries. Extrapolating their estimates out 
of sample to even middle-income countries, the implied returns are truly large and suggest a 
much larger effort in R&D is justified in developing countries than found in the advanced. 
In the advanced countries, roughly 65% of R&D is undertaken by the productive sector while 
in poorer countries this share falls to 30%. With government undertaking or subsidisinga 
large share of R&D that is not economically justified, the country-wide return falls below that 




investment in Singapore constituted high tech white elephants. Such investment is completely 
wasted,and by drawing resources away from other competing demands or by raising taxes in 
the private sector, it may cause returns to become negative. This result has precedent in the 
literature on the level and composition of fiscal spending. Devarajan, Swaroop and Zhou 
(1996), for instance, found a negative impact with an increased share of government spending 
devoted to capital expenditures, arguing that when such spending became excessive the 
marginal return became negative. Alesina et al. (2003), more recently, found negative 
impacts of government spending due to crowding out through higher wages, etc. These may 
be exacerbated in LDCs where the benefit of R&D spending to the private sector, as I 
document, is low, but the competition for very scarce resources may be more intense. 
According to panel data methodology used in the work of Goni and Maloney (2014), their 
work confirms that despite presumed gains from Schumpeterian backwardness, developing 
countries tend to conductvery little R&D. They document that global returns to R&D across 
the whole sample are consistent with those found earlier, although they do fall with the 
introduction of internal and external instruments. 
Their findings are consistent with a countervailing effect of increasingly scarce complements 
to R&D spending with distance from the frontier that eventually offsets the gains from 
Schumpeterian backwardness. Developing countries lack thehigh-level human capital, 
research infrastructure, and a sophisticated private sector that could both exploit knowledge 
transfer and provide feedback to the R&D process, as well as weaker investment climates that 
depress overall profitability. 
Their results suggest that for middle-income countries, a great window of opportunity exists, 
and a strong effort to lift the quality and magnitude of R&D spending is merited. However, 
with poorer countries, focus on R&D spending alone is likely to yield poor results. Though it 
is difficult to document empirically, the findings, along with a substantial literature, suggests 
that complementary efforts in improving the quality of human capital, strengthening research 
institutions, ordering the national innovation system, and raising the sophistication of the 
private sector are necessary complements to increased spending on R&D. China and India's 
spectacular growth in R&D may be justified by the fact that multinationals do most of the 
patentable R&D and hence provide the necessary complementary factors. 
Finally, the results for the expanded decision to invest in knowledge activities in general 




the model only captures that larger firms and two-way traders are more likely to engage in 
these investments. Also, there are indications that in developing countries, investments in 
knowledge capital are smaller than in developed countries. For example, Goni and Maloney 
(2014) demonstrate that investments in R&D as a share of GDP are smaller in developing 
countries than in developed countries. One potential explanation for this is the absence of 
complementary factors to enable R&D, such as education, the quality of scientific 
infrastructure, and the private sector, which is weaker in countries far away from the 
technological frontier. 
A related strand in the literature has empirically analysed some of these complementary 
factors. Polder et al. (2010) find significant complementarities between different knowledge 
inputs and innovation outcomes in the Netherlands. The authors find that:(i) ICT investment 
and usage are important drivers of innovation; (ii)there is a positive effect on the productivity 
of product and process innovation when combined with organisational innovation; and(iii) 
there is evidence that organisational innovation is complementary to process innovation. 
Miravete and Pernias (2006) found evidence of complementarity between product and 
process innovation in Spain’s tile industry and Cassiman and Veugelers (2006) found 
important complementarities between internal R&D and external knowledge acquisitions. 
A final element is the lack of an enabling business environment in many developing countries 
and existing market failures in the supply of technical infrastructure, human capital or 
technology, as well as recent evidence of low management quality in firms in developing 
countries (Bloom et al., 2012). This raises questions about the efficiency of transformation of 
knowledge inputs by firms into innovation outcomes, and further, into improvements in firm 
performance. 
5.5.2 Innovation Function 
Sveiby and Lloyd (1987) were the first to define knowledge capital as a micro-level concept 
by categorising it into human capital (the education and experience of workers), structural 
capital (ability to organise) and relationship capital (stakeholder relations). This definition of 
knowledge capital is followed by, for example, Antola, Kujansivu and Lönnqvist (2005), 
Black and Lynch (2005), Edvinsson and Malone (1997), Nurmi (1998), and Piekkola (2011). 





Lev (2001) uses the term intangibles dividing it into discovery, organisational practices and 
human resources. Corrado, Hulten and Sichel (2005) write about knowledge companies, but 
mostly use the term intangibles dividing it into three categories: computerised information 
(software and databases), innovative property or discovery (patents, copyrights, designs, 
trademarks), and economic competencies (brand equity, networks of people and institutions, 
firm-specific human know-how, etc.). 
Kaplan and Norton (2004) divide intangible capital into human capital, knowledge capital 
and organisational capital. The Meritum-workgroup (2001) recommended using the term 
intellectual capital, which is divided between human capital and internal and external 
structural capital. Piekkola (2011) refers to capital created within a firm as the company’s 
intellectual capital as opposed to intellectual capital purchased from external sources. He 
divides the intellectual capital of a firm into three fields: knowledge capital and 
communication technology capital, research capital and development capital, and 
organisational capital. In the same research report, Piekkola also uses the term human capital 
when referring to the knowledge of workers. 
 
As suggested in 5.5.1, although firms invest in knowledge, there is uncertainty as to whether 
these investments will result in specific innovations. Therefore, the second stage of 
understanding the relationship between innovation and performance is to determine the role 
that knowledge capital investments play in producing innovation outcomes. 
 
It is important to start by analysing the subjective reasons to innovate, as stated in the survey 
by the firms’ managers. Figure 4-2 shows the main reasons for the product (panel (a)) and 
process (panel (b)) innovation. For product innovations, the main reasons given are to 
diversify existing products via increasing market share or improving their quality, rather than 
replacing existing products. For process innovations, the main reasons are very much related 


















(Source: Enterprise survey (2014)) 
 
To measure the impact of knowledge capital investments on innovation, I estimate the 
probability of introducing an innovation, as expressly defined in equation (4) above. Table 
5.2 in the appendix shows different estimates of equation (4). The first six columns estimate 
individual Probit equations for product, process and organisation innovations and using 
observed R&D and research and equipment intensity. Columns (7) to (10) show the bivariate 
Probit estimates allowing for correlation between product and process innovation decisions, 
and instrumenting knowledge intensity with the predicted values of the previous stage. 
Finally, columns (11) to (16) implement the multivariate framework to also include 
organisation innovation. 
In general, the individual equations without instruments show very little predictive value of 
the model. Knowledge capital investments do not appear to impact on the probability of 
introducing innovations; I only find a negative sign associated with R&D and organisational 
innovation. However, these estimates are likely to be biased given the potential endogeneity 
between knowledge capital investments and innovation outcomes. 
To correct for this endogeneity, I instrument knowledge intensity with the predicted values 
estimated in the previous stage. Also, I allow for simultaneity in the decision to innovate for 




equations (7) to (10) that consider only product and process innovations show a negative and 
statistically significant correlation between the two equations, which suggest simultaneity 
between product and process innovation decisions and the need to control for this correlation. 
The estimates also indicate that firms that are more capital intensive are more likely to 
introduce product or process innovations. Larger firms are more likely to introduce product 
innovations, while firms with a largerperceived obstacle in theeducation of the labour force 
are less likely to introduce process innovations. The most surprising result is thefact that 
similarly to the non-instrumented results, investment in knowledge activities, both R&D and 
broad knowledge inputs, are not statistically significant in increasing the probability of 
product and process innovation. 
Columns (11) to (16) replicate the estimations but add organisational innovation to the 
simultaneous equations. Adding organisational innovation implies a loss of observations 
since the organisational module was only implemented to firms considered medium and large 
in the sampling frame. The decision to introduce product and process innovations are still 
correlated, but the correlations with the residuals of the organisational innovation equation 
are not statistically significant, which suggests that organisational innovation decisions are 
made independently from product and process innovations. The results again suggest the 
importance of large firms and capital intensity, although only for product innovation and 
education of the labour force as an obstacle for both product and process innovation. 
Medium-sized firms appear to be more likely to implement organisational innovations. 
Again, I do not find evidence that investments in knowledge capital are statistically 
significant in affecting the probability of innovation, except for a marginally significant 
coefficient of R&D on organisation innovation. 
Given these reasons for innovation, a key question surrounds the extent to which firms invest 
in R&D, equipment, and training to increase these quality attributes. Table 5.2 in the 
appendix shows that in Nigeria, the percentage of product, process, andorganisation 
innovators is larger in firms that have some investment in R&D or research in general, than 
firms that do not have any investments. However, a significant number of firms still carry out 
innovations without any knowledge capital investments stated. For example, table 5.3 in the 
appendix shows that 28% of firms not performing knowledge capital investments are product 
or process innovators. For these firms, the results raise questions about the degree to which 




knowledge capabilities to develop them. The works of Goedhuys (2006) validates the 
findings on the impact of knowledge capital on investment. In her work, R&D and innovation 
output measures turn out to be insignificant.  
Overall, the results of the innovation equation suggest that in the case of Nigerian firms’ 
investments in knowledge and acquisition of capabilities in the form of R&D, equipment and 
training do not necessarily translate into firm-level innovations. This result is not surprising 
for R&D since it is likely that the type of small incremental innovations do not require 
significant acquisition of capabilities via R&D, but is more surprising for total knowledge 
capital investments, since even imitations tend to require some degree of acquisition of 
machinery and training of workers. 
5.5.3 Innovation and Productivity 
The final stage to determine the impact of innovation on performance is to estimate equation 
(8). As productivity measure, I use two proxies of labour productivity: the logarithm of sales 
per worker and the logarithm of value added per worker. Although value added per worker is 
a better measure of labour productivity, the existence of missing observations for material 
inputs in some firms reduces the sample significantly when using this variable. To control for 
potential endogeneity of innovation decisions to firm performance when trying to estimate 
causality in equation (8), I instrument the different type of innovations using the predicted 
values of the multivariate framework described in the previous section and correct the 
standard errors of the regression as proposed in Greene (2012). Table 5.4 shows the results of 
the OLS estimates without instrumenting for comparison and Table 5.5 shows the 
instrumental variables estimates using the logarithm of sales per workers. Columns (1) to (4) 
in Table 5.5 show the results when using R&D intensity as knowledge input to predict 
innovation, while columns (4) to (8) uses the instruments of innovation estimated using 
research, training and equipment for innovation intensity to explain innovation. 
The main result that emerges from the table is that innovation is not statistically significant in 
increasing productivity for the sample of Nigerian firms, with or without instrumenting. Only 
column (6) in table 5.4 show statistically significant signs for a positive impact innovation on 
value added per worker. However, these results are likely to be biased given the endogeneity 
problems discussed above. When I introduce instruments, and correct the standard errors in 




statistically significant in the sales per worker specifications using R&D to predict 
innovation. 
Also, I introduce interactive innovation dummies to capture complementarities between 
different types of innovation. However, the coefficients are not statistically significant. 
As proposed in the previous section, as a robustness test I estimate stages 2 and 3 
simultaneously as a system of equations by maximum likelihood and allowing for 
correlations in the innovation decisions. Table 5.7 shows the results for sales per worker. The 
results confirm the lack of statistically significant impact of innovation on productivity. One 
difference, however, is that when estimating the innovation equation and the productivity 
equation jointly, the knowledge intensity coefficients are statistically significant in explaining 
innovation outcomes. The estimates using research, equipment and training investment 
intensity also show a positive and statistically significant impact of knowledge capital 
investments on innovation outcomes, but no impact of innovation on productivity. There is 
limited evidence from developing countries; however, the works of Goedhuys (2007a) 
indicated that there was no link between R&D, product and process innovations and 
productivity.  
Ensuring sustained economic growth and creating productive capacities to reduce poverty 
and foster employment is still the major concern in development economics and development 
policy. As a majority of developing countries open up their economies, manufacturing firms 
in these countries are facing the tough competitive conditions that today govern the global 
economy. The process of globalisation, heavily criticised in the industrialised world,is seen as 
both a challenge and an opportunity in the developing economies. Depending on their 
competitiveness they may catch-up faster or fall behind even further. Global competitiveness 
increasingly depends on the ability to assimilate, master and improve technologies to produce 
high-quality products for international markets. While the importance of knowledge is 
recognisedfor high- or medium-tech industries, it has long been neglected for low-tech 
industries (von Tunzelmann and Acha, 2005). 
Empirically, it remains an open question as to how important different sources of knowledge 
acquisition are for firm performance and what explains the heterogeneity of productivity of 
firms in developing countries. The conditions for technological learning may differ across 
countries, industries and firms. Countrywise, firms are part of a system in which institutions 




As such, the level of development of financial markets, supportive innovation policies, 
regulatory and administrative burdens but also more subtle habits and practices and trust 
within the local business community may affect the learning process (Mytelka, 2000). 
Competencies are also very much industry-specific (Fai and Tunzelmann, 2001) and the 
drivers of innovation and technological change are equally so (Malerba, 2004, 2006; Pavitt, 
1984). Malerba (2006) refers to sectoral systems of innovation to indicate the differences 
across sectors in the organisation of innovative activities, actors and characteristics involved. 
Overall, the evidence emerging from the literature suggests a positive impact of innovation 
on firms' performance measured as either profit or employment growth. However, recent 
studies on the role of innovation in firms' productivity found a much weaker impact. 
Goedhuys et al. (2008, 2014) focused on the importance of various sources of productivity in 
developing countries. In Tanzania, they found that firm productivity was not enhanced by R& 
D or by product or process innovation, but business environment seemed to play a more 
relevant role. Those conclusions suggest that the relationship between R & D, innovation, 
and productivity is weaker in developing than in developed countries. 
Thus, to explain productivity differences in Nigerian firms only a limited number of 
technology variables turn out to be significant. Some of the more traditional measures of 
know-how and innovation – research and development, product and process innovation, 
technology licensing, skills and training – do not produce any measurable impact on the 
productivity of the firm, in contrast to what could be expected from the mainstream literature 
often based on case studies. 
 
Fagerberg et al. (2010) review the literature and provide strong and ample evidence on how 
worldwide countries that are more active in innovation have higher productivity and income 
than the less-innovative ones. Many scholars have argued that in developed economies the 
growth of firms depends on their ability to learn about their environment, linking their 
strategies to the changing environment (Geroski, 1989; Klepper, 1996). This is even more 
relevant in low-income countries, where infrastructure is often poor, markets tend to be 
underdeveloped, and potential local customers have limited disposable income. In such an 
environment micro, small, and medium-size firms - many of them working in the informal 
sector - are particularly vulnerable because of the limited absorptive capacity and restricted 




successfully undertake innovation activities survive and the innovating firms that can make 
the best use of the resources available have the potential to lead the market. 
One needs to interpret these results with caution, given the low number of observations and 
the lack of panel structure of the dataset. However, overall, the main result of the estimates is 
that firm-level productivity appears to be largely unexplained and there is no statistically 
significant impact of innovation on productivity. 
 
5.5.4 Innovation and employment 
A final important element to analyse when looking at the impact of innovation on 
performance is employment. As suggested above, most of the evidence regarding the impact 
of innovation on employment in OECD countries suggests that: (i) although process 
innovation can have a negative effect on firm-level employment, the positive impact of 
product innovation more than offsets this potential negative effect, which makes the overall 
effect positive; and, (ii) innovation is skill-biased and tends to increase the demand for skilled 
labour relatively more than the demand for unskilled labour. 
 
The author is not very conversant with the employment dynamics associated with innovation 
in developing countries. Therefore, it is important to analyse the impact of innovation on 
employment in Nigeria. This is particularly important, given the need for the country to 
absorb a large number of people entering the labour market every year. 
 
Before starting the analysis, it is important to stress that the overall impact of innovation on 
employment cannot be measured only by using firm-level data. Firm-level surveys allow the 
capture of direct impacts of innovation on the employment levels in the firm. However, there 
are other general equilibrium effects of innovation on employment, such as potentially 
changing markets shares, competition, and prices that affect the demand for labour and that 
can be very difficult to identify and quantify. 
The Enterprise Survey allows the exploration of the hypothesis of skill-biased labour growth 
based on the responses from firm managers to questions about the impact of innovation. 




each innovation type has had on skilled and unskilled workers. One caveat for the analysis is 
that the respondents only report whether employment has increased or decreased, rather than 
the numbers of workers, so the author cannot precisely gauge the total level of employment 
generated or destroyed as a result of the innovation. 
Changes in labour associated with product and process innovation are remarkably similar. 
The results are summarised in Figure 5-3. The first three bars represent the share among 
innovators about changes in skilled workers associated with the particular innovation, and the 
last three bars are related to unskilled labour. The percentages are remarkably similar when 
comparing labour changes associated with product and process innovations. 









(Source: Enterprise Survey (2014) 
 
 
Innovation increases skilled labour. Starting with product innovations, half of the product 
innovators (62.5%) increased the number of skilled workers, while only 3.7% reduced the 
number of skilled workers, and 49.4% did not change skilled labour.  
The impact of innovation on unskilled labour is small in size and uncertain in sign. Regarding 
unskilled labour, 19.8% of product innovators increased the number of unskilled workers, 
while 18% decreased the number, and 65.2% did not change unskilled employment. The 




showing a decrease in the number of unskilled workers (19.6%) as a result of process 
innovation. 
 
Although it is not possible to know the precise number of workers, if I assume relatively 
similar size in the variation in increases or decreases of employment, the results suggest three 
important findings: (i) the numbers of skilled labourers seems to increase as a result of 
innovation; (ii) the numbers of unskilled labourers appear to remain the same for product 
innovation and perhaps decrease for process innovation; and (iii) there is clear skill-bias 
arising from innovation in the demand for employment. 
 
To further understand the potential differentiated impact on employment of both product and 
process innovation, I focus the analysis on those firms that introduced both types of 
innovation during the period and examine what happened to net employment. Although this 
group represents 25.14% of firms in the innovation survey, it allows us to compare the 
impacts of product and process innovations simultaneously. 
 
Table 5.8 in the appendix tabulates the number of firms introducing both product and process 
innovations, and the impact on skilled workers (upper part of the tables) and unskilled 
workers (middle part of the table). The cells in blue denote firms where there has been an 
increase in employees, either because the effects of product and process innovations are 
positive at least in one case or because they remained the same in the other case. The red cells 
indicate where there has been no impact on employment, according to the manager. Finally, 
the cells in yellow indicate firms where employment levels have decreased. Firms, where 
there are increases in one type of innovation and decreases in another, are classified as 
uncertain. The last column summarises the net impact on employment. 
 
The impact on skilled workers is largely positive, and only in 6.57% of firms has there been 
an unambiguously negative impact on skilled workers. Although I do not know the size of 




increase in 66.3% of firms. Therefore, it is plausible to conclude that innovation increases 
skilled employment for product and process innovators. 
 
Looking at unskilled labour changes reveals that the pattern changes somehow. Employment 
stays the same for most firms, and the percentage of firms where unskilled labour increased 
and decreased is similar to 30% vs 27.5%. Assuming similar trends in the increases and 
decreases would imply a slight increase in unskilled employment associated with innovation, 
but this is not comparable to the positive change in skilled labour. 
 
Finally, at the bottom of the table,I add the impacts on skilled and unskilled workers. The 
‘uncertain effect’ category is much larger now (36.1%), and this is likely because firms show 
a simultaneous increase and decrease in labour, when examining skilled and unskilled labour 
changes, for both product and process innovations. Most firms (40%) experience an increase 
in net employment, while in 24% of cases, employment levels remained the same, and in 8% 
of cases, firms experienced an unambiguous negative reduction in employment. Unless the 
firms in the uncertain effect category experienced a large employment reduction, it is likely 
that the net impact of product and process innovations on employment is positive. 
 
As a further check for the impact of innovation on employment, I use the retrospective 
information in the survey on full-time employment and sales and estimate a model of 
employment growth. I follow Harrison et al. (2008) and decompose sales growth into the 
share linked to new products and the share linked to old products using the share of sales 
attributed to product innovation. I assume that this share accounts for the growth of the entire 
three years period in the estimate equation (9) below, where the change in permanent 
employment is determined by the growth in sales of old products and product innovation 
(new), process innovations; and a set of controls X that include region to control for labour 
market conditions, whether the firm is a two-way trader, the size of the firm, the age and 
sector dummies. 
!





Table 4.9 shows the OLS estimates of equation (9). I start estimating in column (1) the 
specification considering only sales growth and province and sector dummies. Surprisingly, I 
found that the coefficient on sales growth was not statistically significant in affecting 
employment growth in the period. In columns (2) I add a specification with more controls: 
including firm characteristics such as ownership, trading status, age and size, to better capture 
the impact of sales growth. However, the coefficient is still not statistically significant. 
Equations (3) and (4) apply the decomposition of sales growth between old and new products 
and also introduce process innovation, but the coefficients associated with innovations 
remain statistically non-significant. 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
Central to the attainment of this goal is increasing knowledge capital investments and 
innovation activity. This chapter has provided a snapshot of the degree of firm-level 
innovation in Nigeria as well as its links to economic performance for the period 2007-2014 
to more accurately measure how Nigerian firms in the manufacturing and services sectors can 
contribute to achieving this objective.The result of this chapter points out the importance of 
the institutional setup in explaining productivity differences among manufacturing and 
services firms in a developing country like Nigeria, and the lack of importance attached to 
direct innovation factors. 
 
Although the absence of panel structure in the dataset and the small sample do not facilitate 
the estimation of very robust statistical effects, this chapter provides some important findings. 
The main conclusion of this chapter is that firm-level innovation activity in Nigeria appears 
to be high and even larger than in similar countries, but the extent of innovativeness is low or 
very incremental. While it is expected that innovations in countries far from the technology 
frontier are not radical innovations, the question is to what extent these incremental 
innovations contribute to productivity growth as compared to innovations in OECD 
countries. The answer that I found in the empirical analysis is that the innovations do not 
have a statistically significant impact on productivity. Therefore, the positive causal chain, by 
which knowledge inputs are translated into innovation outcomes and then into productivity, 




countries, some of the innovations implemented are so minor, or are based on imitation, to 
the extent that they do not have a significant impact on productivity (survival innovation). 
Although similar results have been found in other developing countries, more research is 
needed to better understand the nature of this incremental innovation. 
 
It is difficult to identify the main obstacle that hinders a positive linkage to productivity, but 
the empirical analysis in this chapter has some important suggestions. First, innovation 
outcomes in Nigeria are more common than in other countries with similar GDP per capita, 
but investments in knowledge inputs are like that of other countries. This suggests a 
mismatch in relative terms between inputs and outcomes, and the need for greater investment 
in knowledge inputs to make innovation outcomes more innovative and transformational. 
Second, and related to the first point, the empirical analysis suggests that a lack of access to 
finance significantly holds back investment in R&D. Third, there is an over-reliance by 
Nigerian firms, at least when comparing them to other countries, on internal sources for 
knowledge capital investments and innovation sources, which may indicate the absence of 
solid research and knowledge infrastructure, as well as a lack of cooperation with other firms 
and institutions. Forth, the inadequate educational levels of the labour force affect the 
capacity of firms to transform knowledge inputs into innovation outcomes, which reinforces 
the complementary role of skilled labour for innovation, and the need to support appropriate 
technical skillsets in the labour force. 
 
Regarding the impact of innovation on employment, the analysis of the qualitative 
information regarding labour changes associated with innovations suggests the likelihood that 
innovation activities have increased employment levels. However, the results differ 
significantly between skilled and unskilled workers. While there is a clear increase in the 
demand for skilled labour resulting from product and process innovations, the impact on 
unskilled labour is still likely to be positive, but less so and more uncertain. This suggests 
two levels on which innovation policy should be focused. 
At the firm level, it is important to: 
•! Enhance the capacity to convert innovation outcomes into productivity gains. 




to gather the required information, resources and know how to innovate, increase the 
uncertainty to innovate due to potential failure and also affect the quality of 
innovations. Thisis exacerbated by coordination failures where the individual costs of 
improvements are very high, especially for SMEs since the supply of services is 
insufficient and tends to target large firms. This requires support programs that target 
productivity and innovation by improving firms’ information, capabilities and 
management skills. Technology extension services can address these market failures 
and help to realise improved organisational, managerial, and technological changes. 
These services provide information on managerial and production practices and how 
to adopt them, to increase productivity and competitiveness. 
•! Enhance R&D financing and cooperation among firms and academic institutions. In 
the presence of financial failures to fund innovation, R&D support is likely to be 
required to boost knowledge investments. The international experience suggests that 
gradual partial subsidies to high-quality projects are more effective than indirect 
support by tax exemptions. Supporting these high-quality projects, in conjunction 
with firms and university projects (see below) can have a positive impact on the 
amount and quality of R&D. Support should be provided to enhance cooperation 
between firms, encourage private sector-university linkages and remove coordination 
failures by providing subsidies to high-quality innovation projects that involve several 
firms and academic institutions. 
At the sector level, it is imperative to: 
•! Improve the quality of the physical and human capital infrastructure for innovation, 
including research labs, as a means of improving the availability and quality of 
innovation services for firms. Enhance the supply of skilled labour, especially in areas 













Table 5-1 Knowledge Function 
 Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 
 R&D per workera Researchc per workera R&Db Researchb 
 
Two-way traders 2.2068*** 1.6164*** -0.3313 0.6213* 
 (0.5308) (0.6021) (0.2957) (0.3506) 
Demand (-) 1.1358** 0.6906** 0.4990** 0.3860 
 (0.4602) (0.2687) (0.2168) (0.2512) 
Share(t-3) 0.0816 0.1294 0.1121** -0.0300 
 (0.1789) (0.0822) (0.0509) (0.0509) 
Lack finance -1.0077*** -0.2799      -0.2169***      -0.0800 
 (0.2323) (0.2384) (0.0839) (0.1020) 
Telecom_obstacle 0.1638 -0.1330 -0.0596 0.0611 
 (0.1788) (0.1375) (0.0738) (0.0770) 
Government_obstacle 0.0519 -0.1024 0.2279*** 0.1143 
 (0.2125) (0.1670) (0.0833) (0.0909) 
Trade cost-obstacle 0.0741 0.2695 0.0706 -0.0382 
 (0.1894) (0.1703) (0.0861) (0.0928) 
Foreign -2.6251** 1.4251** 0.0153 0.2597 
 (1.0939) (0.6933) (0.3457) (0.4803) 
Age 0.0223* 0.0056 0.0041 -0.0004 
 (0.0124) (0.0073) (0.0058) (0.0062) 
Medium -0.6479 0.3018 -0.1275 0.4967** 
 (0.6092) (0.4088) (0.2450) (0.2505) 
Large 0.9423* 0.8550 -0.0415 1.0750*** 
 (0.5720) (0.5436) (0.3259) (0.3833) 
Constant 9.5586*** 12.0140*** 0.4488 -0.4120 
 (1.0723) (0.8891) (0.5277) (0.5885) 
Observations 388 347 427 339 




Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
a Poisson non-linear model estimator on the level of expenditure 
b Probit model on the decision to invest in R&D or research and equipment 
c Research and equipment defined as expenditure for knowledge activities including R&D, both intramural and extramural, training 




Table 5-2 Innovation Function 
Individual regressions Bivariate probit Multivariate probit 


































































Log(K/L) 0.52*** 1.63 0.11 0.01 0.43 1.01 0.11**  0.17***  0.17***  0.14*** 0.16 0.02** 1.08 0.25 1.15** 1.77 
 (0.21) (0.57) (0.19) (0.35) (0.17) (0.58) (0.43) (1.11) (2.71) (1.05) (1.41) (0.11) (0.16) (1.99) (1.91) (1.76) 
Educ_obstacle -0.17 -0.23 -0.98 -0.32 -0.15***  -0.24 -0.05 -0.91**  0.03 -0.08***  -0.02** -0.19** -0.17 -0.01***  -0.29 -0.12 
 (0.29) (1.65) (0.38) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (1.02) (0.12) (1.14) (0.15) (0.02) (0.19) (0.08) (0.05) (0.17) (0.54) 
Medium 1.71 1.01 0.94*** 2.05 1.99 2.09*** 1.7** 0.22*  0.34 0.31 0.32 0.93 0.27* 0.35 0.03 0.11** 
 (0.82) (1.09) (2.11) (1.55) (1.98) (1.77) (1.17) (0.73) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (1.96) (0.11) (0.02) (0.11) (0.13) 
Large 1.08 0.23 1.15 -2.61 1.99** -1.66 2.01** 0.81 0.12**  0.17 0.14*** 1.94 0.14 0.11**  0.11 0.14 
 (0.16) (1.01) (1.91) (0.12) (1.72) (2.11) (3.75) (0.23) (0.2) (0.03) (0.12) (0.65) (0.12) (0.04) (0.16) (0.12) 
R&D 0.02 0.01 -0.12**               
 (0.02) (1.19) (0.09)              
Research    0.25 0.11 -0.91 1.03 0.82   2.14 1.51*** -1.89    
    (1.72) (2.54) (0.02) (0.76) (0.49)   (1.11) (0.34) (0.83)    
R&D_hat         0.31** * 0.17***     0.12***  0.25**  1.43** 
         (0.12) (0.22)    (1.61) (1.34) (0.89) 
Research_hat         0.32 0.15    0.21 0.69 0.09 




Constant 2.17** 6.32** 3.27** 2.87* 6.85*** 2.43** 3.71** 1.99*** 9.21* 3.72*** 1.92* 6.85*** 2.43** 9.71*** 4.03** 4.42** 
 (1.33) (0.97) (1.44) (0.91) (6.18) (2.12) (2.02) (0.65) (1.11) (1.62) (1.88) (6.18) (2.12) (1.06) (1.22) (0.33) 
Observation 904 904 904 904 904 904 904 904 904 904 904 904 904 904 904 904 
ISIC-2digits dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 


















Table 5-3 Percentage of firms engaging in knowledge capital investments by innovator 
group 
 Product innovators Process innovators Organization Product/process 
No R&D 21.76% 14% 9.32% 34.60% 
R&D 66% 42.90% 59% 73.43% 
No knowledge inputs 17.31% 20.90% 18.40% 27.54% 
At least one knowledge input 55.10% 47% 46% 70.33% 
All knowledge inputs 45.21% 36.29% 29.98% 83.40% 





Table 5-4 Productivity Equation- No Instruments 
 Col 1 Col 2 Col 3 Col 4 Col 5 Col 6 Col 7 Col 8 
















































Log(K/L) 0.23* 0.72** 0.07** 0.17** 0.19** 0.03* 0.11* 0.14** 
 (0.41) (0.18) (0.11) (0.29) (0.82) (0.62) (0.12) (0.04) 
Log(L) 0.33*** 0.18*** 0.02** 1.71** 2.11** 0.64** 0.19** 1.88** 
 (0.12) (0.81) (0.11) (0.82) (0.77) (0.13) (0.19) (0.32) 
Prod inno 1.08*** 1.94*** 1.95** 1.08* 1.33** 1.79* 0.93* 1.11** 
 (1.05) (0.65) (0.99) (0.16) (1.06) (1.44) (1.96) (0.33) 
Process_inno 0.23*** 0.15*** -0.11 0.12*** -1.06 -1.12 -0.56 1.17 
 (0.69) (0.11) (0.12) (0.18) (1.11) (1.75) (1.76) (1.12) 
Organinno   0.66* 0.02**   0.23* 0.18*** 
   (1.75) (0.11)   (0.12) (4.33) 
Prod*process  1.09***  0.19**  0.14**  1.21* 
  (0.99)  (0.19)  (0.04)  (0.29) 




    (1.96)    (0.03) 
Process*org    1.94***    0.23*** 
    (0.65)    (0.39) 
Prod*proc*org    1.11**    1.94*** 
    (0.33)    (0.65) 
Constant 3.16** 5.34** 4.05**  7.12**  1.05**  3.26*** 1.11** 3.22** 
 (0.93) (1.62) (0.02) (0.06) (0.03) (0.05) (9.22) (1.62) 
Observations 904 904 904 904 904 904 904 904 
R-squared 0.07 0.42 0.11 0.21 0.58 0.19 0.09 0.22 




Table 5-5 Productivity Equation – Instrumented (Sales Per Worker) 
 Col 1 Col 2 Col 3 Col 4 Col 5 Col 6 Col 7 Col 8 
















































Log (K/L) 0.14**  0.23***  0.17** 0.12***  0.27* 0.11***  0.003**  0.11 
 (0.34) (0.21) (0.13) (0.16) (0.11) (0.18) (0.11) (0.13) 
Log (L) 0.17 0.11  0.18 0.11 0.12 0.17 0.14 0.16 
 (0.54) (0.59) (1.27) (0.43) (0.09) (2.71) (1.05) (1.41) 
Prod inno 0.35 0.34 0.31 0.32 0.15 0.24 0.12 0.14 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (1.95) (1.11) 
Process_inno -0.52 -1.19 -1.13 2.19 -1.83 -0.18 -1.03 1.72 
 (1.13) (2.44) (1.12) (3.11) (1.12) (1.42) (1.95) (1.93) 
Organ inno   1.03 0.23  0.11  0.17 
   (0.78) (0.54)  (2.77)  (0.11) 
Prod*process  0.27  0.93   2.13 0.07 
  (1.22)  (0.17)   (0.09) (0.14) 
Prod*organ    0.01    0.12 
    (0.15)    (0.17) 




    (0.34)    (0.19) 
Prod*proc*org    0.17    0.08 
    (1.66)    (1.01) 
Constant 3.11** 1.71** 4.59** 2.15** 6.87*** 1.21** 3.16** 5.34 
 (0.71) (1.28) (1.84) (0.11) (0.92) (1.11) (0.93) (1.62) 
Observations 722 722 722 722 722 722 722 722 
R-squared 0.21 0.26 0.34 0.24 0.72 0.58 0.19 0.94 















Table 5-6 Productivity Equation- Instrumented (Value Added Per Worker) 
 Col 1 Col 2 Col 3 Col 4 Col 5 Col 6 Col 7 Col 8 
















































Log (K/L) 0.15 0.93 0.21 0.38 0.13 0.72 0.92 0.19 
 (0.51) (0.78) (0.17) (0.18) (0.56) (0.16) (0.18) (1.39) 
Log (L) 1.23 -0.98 -0.52 1.63 -0.11 -0.01 -0.43 1.01 
 (0.26) (0.38) (0.21) (0.57) (0.19) (0.35) (0.17) (0.58) 
Prod inno 1.78 0.94 2.05 1.99 2.09 1.7 3.03 1.72 
 (1.05) (2.11) (1.55) (1.98) (1.77) (1.17) (0.06) (1.43) 
Process_inno -0.63 -1.15 -2.61 -1.99 -1.66 -2.01 -0.94 2.12 
 (0.65) (1.91) (0.12) (1.72) (2.11) (3.75) (1.45) (1.09) 
Organ inno   0.61 0.09  0.16  0.23 
   (1.02) (1.34)  (0.09)  (1.65) 
Prod*process 0.34  0.28   0.72 1.01 
  (1.45)  (1.21)   (1.12) (1.09) 
Prod*organ    0.11    0.23 




Process*org    0.07    0.01 
    (1.99)    (1.19) 
Prod*proc*org   1.72    0.99 
    (1.32)    (0.73) 
Constant 1.22*** 4.14* 1.73*** 6.85*** 2.43** 3.61** 3.26*** 1.11** 
 (1.18) (2.09) (1.42) (6.18) (2.12) (1.34) (0.05) (9.22) 
Observations 701 701 701 701 701 701 701 701 
R-squared 0.18 0.21 0.54 0.64 0.12 0.28 0.25 0.74 





















Table 5-7 Structural Modelling- Innovation and Productivity 
 Col 1 Col 2 Col 3 Col 4 Col 5 Col 6 Col 7 Col 8 








Log (K/L) 0.05**  0.01 0.03 0.08 0.02** 0.60 0.17 0.51 
 (1.02) (0.05) (1.14) (0.15) (0.02) (0.13) (0.08) (0.29) 
Log (L) 0.08    0.16    
 (0.14)    (0.36)    
Prod inno 0.52    0.18    
 (0.35)    (4.33)    
Process_inno 1.47    1.21    
 (1.01)    (0.29)    
Organ inno     1.09*    
     0.03    
Prod*process 0.12    0.23    
 (0.99)    (0.39)    
Prod*organ     0.67    
     (0.06)    
Process*org     0.39    
     (0.21)    
Prod*proc*org     0.39    
     (0.15)    
R&D_hat  1.12***  1.53*** 1.39***   0.12***  0.25**  1.43** 
  (1.05) (0.99) (0.11)  (1.61) (1.34) (0.89) 
Education-obstacle 0.54 1.08 0.06  1.42 0.94 0.05 
  (1.23) (0.99) (0.32)  (2.02) (1.64) (1.78) 
Medium  -0.21***  0.69***  -0.09***   -0.06***  0.62***  0.80***  




Large  0.34** 0.76** 0.21***  0.18** 0.51** 0.22** 
  (0.15) (0.27) (0.83)  (0.19) (0.07) (0.23) 
Constant 4.05**  7.12**  1.05**  8.05* 1.07***  6.12**  2.04*  4.05** 
 (0.02) (0.06) (0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.06) 
Observations 722 722 722 722 722 722 722 722 




Table 5-8 Distribution of changes in skilled and unskilled employment for product and process innovators (number of firms) 
Skilled workers     
As a result of product/process innovation Increased Remained the same Decreased Net impact (% of firms) 
Increased 81 12 5 66.3% 
Remained the same 11 55 5 40.1% 
Decreased 0 6 3 6.57% 
Uncertain effect    1.32% 
     
Unskilled workers     
As a result of product/process innovation     
Increased 33 6 11 30.0% 
Remained the same 5 65 6 55.2% 
Decreased 0 7 22 27.45% 
Uncertain effect    6.65% 
     
All skilled and unskilled workers     
Increased    40% 
Remained the same    24.2% 
Decreased    8% 
Uncertain effect    36.1% 




Table 5-9 Employment and Innovation 
 Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 
     
Sales growth 0.0018 0.0015   
 (0.0013) (0.0012)   
Sales growth old 
products 
  0.0015 0.0009 
   (0.0020) (0.0019) 
Sales growth new 
products 
  0.0013 0.0011 
   (0.0027) (0.0024) 
Process_inno2   0.0504 0.0419 
   (0.0453) (0.0474) 
Age  - 0.0024**  -0.0035*** 
  (0.0010)  (0.0013) 
Two-way traders  0.0356  0.0163 
  (0.0679)  (0.0778) 
Foreign  0.1326  0.1022 
  (0.0834)  (0.0946) 
East Region 0.3046*** 0.2998*** 0.2677*** 0.2561*** 
 (0.1008) (0.1061) (0.0940) (0.0974) 
Lagos & South 
Region 
0.1393*** 0.1310** 0.1310** 0.1194* 
 (0.0522) (0.0576) (0.0571) (0.0608) 
North Region 0.1766*** 0.1649*** 0.1693*** 0.1576** 
 (0.0525) (0.0590) (0.0603) (0.0655) 
Medium  -0.0172  -0.0290 
  (0.0532)  (0.0604) 
Large  0.0064  0.0446 
  (0.0574)  (0.0661) 
Constant 0.0002 0.0547 -0.0117 0.0747 
 (0.0395) (0.0512) (0.0441) (0.0539) 
Observations 722 722 722 722 
R-squared 0.0856 0.0981 0.0984 0.1164 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variable change in permanent 































Chemicals and paints  Number of firms 82 31 21 12 8 154 41 80 33 15 
 Total employment 2409 2104 2726 3569 11138 21946 7452 11059 3435 421946 
 Average nber of employees/firm  29.4 67.9 129.8 297.4 1392.3 142.5 181.8 138.2 104.1 142.5 
 Standard deviation nber of empl.  7.9 13.3 26.7 67.5 491.9 321.1 404.9 333 103.3 321.1 
Food and beverage ind.  Number of firms 218 60 40 48 32 398 136 124 138 398 
 Total employment 6034 3792 5574 1570 47448 77418 16706 43536 17176 77418 
 Average nber of employees/firm  27.7 63.2 139.4 303.5 1482.8 194.5 122.8 351.1 124.5 194.5 
 Standard deviation nber of empl.  8 12.6 27 81.9 1185.3 513.8 264.7 790.4 320.8 513.8 
Metal  Number of firms 142 42 27 19 1311 243 62 102 79 243 
 Total employment 3979 2832 3753 5413 109 27086 7869 12628 6589 27086 
 Average nber of employees/firm  28 67.4 139 284.9 854.5 111.5 126.9 123.8 83.4 111.5 
 Standard deviation nber of empl.  8.1 12.7 31.6 66.8 549.6 228.1 341.3 189 151.1 228.1 
Non-metal  Number of firms 78 14 12 13 4 121 27 32 62 121 
 Total employment 2066 883 1670 3760 4657 13036 4199 3609 5228 13036 
 Average nber of employees/firm  26.5 63.1 139.2 289.2 1164.3 107.7 155.5 112.8 84.3 107.7 




Paper, printing, publish. ind.  Number of firms 94 36 17 12 6 165 32 98 35 165 
 Total employment 2800 2355 2098 3454 4911 15618 2236 10742 2640 15618 
 Average nber of employees/firm  29.8 65.4 123.4 287.8 818.5 94.7 69.9 109.6 75.4 94.7 
 Standard deviation nber of empl.  7.7 13.9 23 67.7 324.9 168 88.4 206.6 75.3 168 
Pharmaceuticals  Number of firms 17 13 5 5 3 43 6 28 9617 43 
 Total employment 542 828 663 1 1476 2019 5528 279 4632 68.6 5528 
 Average nber of employees/firm  31.9 63.7 32.6 295.2 673 128.6 46.5 165.4 100 128.6 
 Standard deviation nber of empl.  10.9 12.5 22.8 82 295.3 185.7 16.3 220.9 49 185.7 
Plastic  Number of firms 80 34 25 12 15 166 40 74 52 166 
 Total employment 2588 2300 3477 3548 16144 28057 5008 16981 6068 28057 
 Average nber of employees/firm  32.4 67.6 139.1 295.7 1076.3 169 125.2 229.5 116.7 169 
 Standard deviation nber of empl.  8.3 14.5 28.9 65.5 522 333 127.6 460.2 183.2 333 
Textile and leather ind.  Number of firms 236 39 31 22 24 352 88 155 109 352 
 Total employment 6338 2559 4029 6138 38205 57269 4882 22580 29807 57269 
 Average nber of employees/firm  26.9 65.6 130 279 1591.9 162.7 55.5 145.7 273.5 162.7 
 Standard deviation nber of empl.  7.3 13.5 27.7 57.5 652.3 577.3 161.5 397.3 902.7 577.3 
Wood industry  Number of firms 166 31 2 8 4 211 41 132 38 211 
 Total employment 4600 1944 247 1 2220 3784 12795 1264 8872 2659 12795 
 Average nber of employees/firm  27.7 62.7 23.5 277.5 946 60.6 30.8 67.2 70 60.6 




            
Total Number of firms 1113 300 180 151 109 1853 473 825 555 1853 
Total employment 31356 19597 24237 44148 139415 258753 49895 134639 74219 258753 
Average nber of employees/firm  28.2 65.3 134.7 292.4 1279 139.6 105.5 163.2 133.7 139.6 





CHAPTER 6: Export-platform FDI on Backward Linkages 
6.1 Introduction 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is often seen as an engine of economic growth and 
development, an assumption that has led many governments around the globe to try and 
attract multinationals by offering generous financial incentives. Giroud (2003) underlined the 
importance of backward linkages and noted that these linkages were of importance for host-
developing countries as they provided opportunities for production and employment of 
domestic suppliers. Moreover, Giroud (2003) argued that backward linkages offered a direct 
channel for knowledge diffusion. Lall (1996) also mentioned the importance of backward 
linkages, as they involved greater interaction than normal market relations between 
anonymous buyers and sellers, e.g., transfer of information. The channels that include direct 
knowledge transfer from foreign affiliates to local suppliers are various (Javorcik, 2004). For 
instance, affiliates can transfer knowledge to local firms by offering technical assistance, by 
providing management training, by improving quality control, by assisting in the purchase of 
raw materials or by supporting in the organisation of production processes. Another channel 
arises through the higher requirements for product quality and on-time delivery to MNEs 
which forces domestic suppliers to upgrade management or technological capabilities and 
become more efficient. Also, the entry of MNEs increases the demand for intermediate 
products. As a result, local suppliers can reap economies of scale (Javorcik, 2004). 
Over the last two decades, the number of trade agreements has grown at a high rate. About 
85% of the 210 notifications in force today was concluded during this period (WTO, 2017). 
This increase in trade agreements has a significant impact on overseas operations of 
multinational firms (MNFs) leading to the appearance of a new foreign investment, namely 
Export-platform foreign direct investment (Export-platform FDI). It is defined as foreign 
investment in a host country to export most of the output to third countries. In 2000, exports 
to third countries as shares in total sales by American manufacturing affiliates accounted for 
28%of exports. Particularly for affiliates located in Ireland, Holland, and Belgium, those 
shares respectively accounted for 71%, 60% and 57% (Ekholm, Forslid & Markusen  2007). 
According to Ito (2013), American firms in countries such as Luxembourg, Hong Kong, 
Singapore, Netherlands and Switzerland have high ratios of exports to third countries over 





Export-platform FDI differs from traditional foreign investments of MNFs (that is, vertical 
and horizontal FDI) on some important aspects. On the one hand, the final destination of the 
goods produced is different from horizontal FDI. The output of Export-platform FDI mainly 
serves third countries, whereas the host country market is the target of horizontal FDI. On the 
other hand, Export-platform FDI differs from vertical FDI regarding the nature of goods 
produced. By using vertical FDI, MNFs produce intermediate goods to export back to the 
home country or other countries for the assembly of final goods. Conversely, by using 
Export-platform FDI, MNFs produce final goods to serve the final customers in third 
countries (Antrs and Yeaple, 2014). 
 
There is a rich literature examining Export-platform FDI as a strategic behaviour of MNFs. 
To serve a free trade area, outsider MNFs may have three entry modes: exporting, tariff 
jumping, or Export-platform FDI. Export-platform FDI is used when intra-regional costs are 
low, and the common market size is sufficiently large (See for example Ekholm, Forslid & 
Markusen, 2007; Montout & Zitouna, 2005; Motta & Norman, 1996; Nguyen & Minda, 
2012).  Therefore, some MNFs, particularly from the United States, China and Japan, have 
located subsidiaries in a country of the European Union (EU) to export the output to other 
member countries (Kumar,1998; Blonigen et al., 2007; Neary 2008). The American MNFs 
also use their subsidiaries in Singapore and Brazil to export to sub-Saharan countries, 
respectively (Ito, 2013). Likewise, some outsider MNFs are implemented in Mexico to export 
production to the North American market after the formation of NAFTA (Hanson et al. 2001; 
Markusen 2004).   Other factors influencing the location of Export-platform FDI are the 
similarities between the host and the third countries, skilled and unskilled labour endowments 
of the third countries and the low labour cost of the host countries (Baltagi, Egger & 
Pfaffermayr, 2007; Ekholm, Forslid & Markusen, 2007). 
 
While Export-platform FDI is widely analysed as a strategic behaviour of MNFs in the 
literature, its impacts on the host country have been scantily studied, particularly in the case 
of developing countries. For instance, Geishecker, Pawlik and Nielsen (2008) and 
Omelanczuk (2013), by using Polish manufacturing industries data, argued that there was a 
significant effect of Export-platform FDI on export performance of local firms. Similarly, 




Ireland. However, the impact was higher for the Singaporean firms. The purpose of this 
chapter is to fill this gap by investigating impacts of Export-platform FDI on backward 
linkages. The author is particularly interested in such a relationship because it is one of the 
main channels through which foreign firms may affect the host country (UNCTAD 2001; 
Carluccio and Fally 2013). 
The model belongs to the basic game-theory type models analysing impacts of FDI on 
backward linkages (Lin & Saggi, 2007). However, it differs from Lin and Saggi (2007) for 
three reasons. First, the model proposes a typology of competition effect and input demand 
creation effect. The former could lead to a net exit of domestic producers in the market as 
well as to a lower production of each of them. As for input demand creation one, it could be 
directly generated by the production of foreign producers in the host country. One may also 
be indirectly engendered by the greater total production of domestic ones. Second, the model 
underlines impact of input intensity of foreign producers’ technology on backward linkages. 
Lastly, the model deals with a three-country model, instead of a two-country model, since the 
latter is not considering the economic integrations phenomenon. 
The work of Lin and Saggi (2007) develops a simple model that explores FDI’s effect 
onbackward linkages and that accommodates both preceding views. Their model considers 
the effects of a multinational’s entry that enjoys market power and transfers technology to the 
local economy. 
They argued that the degree to which FDI created linkages with the rest of the economy 
should be a function of the technology transferred by multinational firms. They explored the 
connection between technology transfer and linkages by focusing on a single industry with a 
two-tier production structure. 
 
 
To deal with this question, I develop a three-country model which is, in turn, applied in the 
case of supporting industries in Nigeria. This chapter provides some interesting findings. 
From a theoretical point of view, Export-platform FDI improves backward linkages if and 
only if spill-overs exceed a critical threshold. Second, the local content requirement of the 
host country has an ambiguous effect on backward linkages, and there may be an optimal 




country size and trade agreements. Turning to the case of Nigeria during the period 2007-
2014, Export-platform FDI is proxied to foreign investments in export-oriented industries. 
The estimates suggest that the latter has a negative impact on backward linkages. On the 
contrary, the latter is positively impacted by trade agreements signed with other countries 
while impacts of third market size are ambiguous. 
 
This chapter is organised as follows. In Section 6.2, I develop the three-country model to 
examine the different impacts of Export-platform FDI on backward linkages. In Section 6.3, I 
test the model on the Nigerian supporting industries. Section 6.4 describes the data, section 
6.5 describes the empirical strategy used; and section 6.6 summarises the main findings and 
provides further implications of this chapter’s findings. 
 
6.2. The three-country model 
I consider a three-country model including a host developing country L, a home country M 
and a third country A. Country L is less developed than the two other countries. Furthermore, 
countries L and A may sign a bilateral trade agreement (BTA), or else create a free trade area 
(FTA)9. I am interested in the consumption of a final good in country A. This good can be 
produced either by a representative domestic firm in country L (denoted by l) or by a 
representative MNF in country M (also called the foreign firm and denoted by firm m). 
Firm’s l and m compete with another one in a Cournot fashion, that is, each firm chooses her 
output level by taking that of her competitor as given. 
 
There are two main reasons impelling the researcher to use a Cournot model. On the one 
hand, such a model is much developed and becomes an interesting way to analyse the 
competition between firms in the FDI topic. This framework is initially used to study 
strategic behaviours of MNFs between export and horizontal FDI, as in the seminal work by 
Smith (1987) and a series of subsequent papers (Motta, 1992; Belderbos & Sleuwaegen, 
1997; Qiu & Tao, 2001; Lahiri & Mesa, 2009 among other). It is then developed to study 
MNFs’ strategies in a regional integration context in which Export-platform FDI appears (see 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !
9 The literature on export-platform FDI is based on the assumption of a FTA created by the host and the third 
countries. For this chapter, I extend this assumption by refereeing to a BTA. Therefore, the model can apply in a more 




for example Montout & Zitouna, 2005; Motta & Norman, 1996; Nguyen & Minda, 2012).  
On the other hand, using a Cournot model is helpful to study impacts of MNFs on backward 
linkages, as it is shown in Belderbos and Sleuwaegen (1997); Lin and Saggi (2007a) or 
Kadochnikov and Drapkin (2008). 
 
I assume that for each unit of the final good produced, one unit of intermediate goods (also 
called inputs) and one unit of labour are required. Nevertheless, the inputs produced in 
country !"(local inputs) are more expensive than those produced in country#. By contrast, 
labour is cheaper in country !"than in country#. Let $%  be the price of inputs in country ! 
and &'be the labour cost in country#. The price of inputs in country # and the labour cost 
in country ! are respectively represented as ($%, *&'(0" < "*, (" < "1). Hence, δ (γ) can be 
considered as the comparative advantage of country !"(#). 
 
To establish a benchmark for this analysis, the model takes place in two moments. First, in an 
Export economy, there is no trade agreement between country"! and country 1. Firms 
2"345"6 enter into the third country by exporting. Second, in an Export-platform economy, a 
BTA (or in this case, a FTA) is signed by the two countries, following a lower intra-regional 
export cost. Firm l continues to export while firm m uses Export-platform FDI as her entry 
mode into the third country. 
 
The inverse demand function for final good in the third country is given by 
78
9 = ;8 − = >%
9 + >'
9        (1) 
where 
- ;8: third country size. 
- @: Export economy (Exp) or Export-platform economy (B7). 
- 789: price of final good in economy @. 





In what follows, I study the equilibria of the final good market in the third country (Section 
6.2.1). Then, I deal with the impacts of Export-platform FDI on backward linkages and the 
role of different structural variables (Section 6.2.2). 
 
6.2.1. Third market equilibria 
Export economy 
In the Export economy, there is no trade agreement between ! and 1. Firm m exports from 
country # and firm"2"exports from country ! to serve country 1. Let denote C%and C'the 




















EFG − ($% + *R' + C%)>%




EFGare profit of a firm 2and firm 6, respectively. 
Each firm takes the output level of her rival as given, and maximises her profit by choosing 
the quantity of the final good to produce. The Cournot-Nash equilibrium under the Export 

















Proof.  See Appendix A.1. 
 
In this economy, local inputs are only required by firm"2. Hence, the level of backward 






[;8 − 2 *R' + $% + C% + R' + ($% + C' ]                              (4) 
 
Export-platform economy 
Under the Export-platform economy, the host country and the third country sign a BTA (or 
an FTA), followed by smaller intra-regional export cost. Let Cdenote the new intra-regional 
cost, hence C < C%. As aforementioned, firm m now applies an Export-platform FDI as her 
entry mode to country A while firm l continues to export. 
 
An interesting discussion in the literature about the MNF location is the existence of local 
content requirement (LCR) imposed by the host countries, particularly the developing ones 
(Belderbos & Sleuwaegen, 1997; Lahiri & Mesa, 2009; Qiu & Tao, 2001). Indeed, to 
increase the local added value in the Global Value Chain, the government of those countries 
can impose such requirements on the production process of MNF as a condition allowing the 
latter to produce in their countries. However, to compensate for the high local inputs’ cost 
eventually, MNF can benefit from low and zero tariff duty of imported inputs. In this model, 
LCR is measured by the degree of local inputs used by firm m. Assuming now that for each 
unit of final good produced in country !, firm 6 uses \"3unit of local inputs (0" ≤ "\" ≤ "1), 
the resting (1" − "\) unit of inputs is imported abroad and/or from the home country (\ is 





Another important aspect in the FDI’s topic is associated with FDI spill-overs generated by 
the MNF. Those spill-overs can be positive or negative depending on the development level 
of the host country (Blomstrom & Kokko. 1998; Görg, & Greenaway, 2004; Crespo & 
Fontoura, 2007). I suppose that the foreign production in country ! generates some positive 
(negative) FDI spillovers reducing (increasing) the production costs of domestic firm. Let ^ 
denote the degree of FDI spill-overs on each unit of final good produced by firm 2. Hence, 
her unit access costs to country 1 becomes $% + *R' − ^ + C. 
 
Remark 1.  When ^" > "0, FDI spill-overs are positive and conversely, when ^" < "0, these 
spill-overs become negative. 
 
Given the demand function in the third country (cf. Equation1), the profit function of each 



















EFG − ($% + *R' − ^ + C%)>%
EFG]                                                     (5) 
 
where D'
EFGis the profit of firm 6 and D%
EFG is the profit of firm 2. 
 















[;8 − 2 *R' + $% − ^ + C + *R' + \$% + 1 − \ ($% + C ](6) 
 
Proof.  See Appendix A.1. 
 
Under this economy, local inputs are used by both firms’ 2 and 6. Therefore, the level of 









One can wonder about the reason preventing firm m from investing in country ! before the 
BTA (FTA). Likewise, what reason forces this firm not to continue to export after the BTA 
(FTA). Proposition 1 gives the answer. 
 
Proposition 1.  The foreign firm exports in the Export economy, and invests in the host 
country in the Export-platform economy; if and only if the following condition is satisfied 
 
C% − C' > 1 − * R' − 1 − ( \$% > C − C'(8) 
 
Proof.  See Appendix A.2. 
 
It is noted that the term (1" − "*)R' in Condition (8) represents the gain (due to low labour 
cost) for firm 6 from producing in country ! while (1" − "()"\$% measures the loss of this 
production, due to the existence of LCR. Furthermore, C% − C' (respectively, C% − C') 
indicates the difference in export cost of country L and country M before the BTA/FTA 




(i.e., before the BTA/FTA), high export cost from country ! to country 1 discourages firm 
6from investing in the developing country. Exporting (from the home country #) is 
therefore her entry mode to the third country 1. Conversely, in the Export-platform economy 
(i.e., after the BTA/FTA), export cost between the two countries considerably falls driving 
the foreign firm to use an Export-platform FDI in the host country !. 
I now consider the case where Condition (8) is fulfilled,and aninterior solution exists.10 
6.2.2 Impacts of Export-platform FDI on backward linkages 
The production of firm m in the host country may have opposite impacts on backward 
linkages. On the one hand, firm m sources inputs locally, thereby creating supplemental 
demand for inputs and increasing the level of backward linkages (direct demand effect). 
Moreover, such production may even increase the output level of firm l leading to higher 
demand for local inputs (indirect demand effect). On the other hand, foreign production may 
lower output level of firm l through competition effect that in turn results in smaller demand 
for local inputs. 
 
Let denote ∆m%""= " >%
EG "−">%
EFG. Hence, there is a competition effect when ∆m%< 0 and 
inversely, an indirect demand occurs when ∆m%> 0. I state that 
 






[ 1 − * R' − 1 − ( \$% − C% − "C − C% − C' ] 
 Proof.  Replacing ^ by^ , I have ∆m%= 0. 
Given Condition (8) and C" < C%, I have ^ < "0. It follows that the foreign production in the 
developing country can generate negative spill-overs and once the latter are high enough, a 






2 is that although there are some negative spill-overs, an indirect demand effect can still be 
generated (i.e.,  ∆m%> "0) if the condition ^ < "^" < "0 is fulfilled. In this case, this effect is 
only associated with the fall in export cost after the BTA/FTA. I have the following corollary. 
Corollary 1. Without FDI spill-overs, there is no competition but a direct demand effect. 
Let ∆Z[" = "Z[EG "−"Z[EFG denote the difference level of backward linkages between the 
Export-platform economy and the Export economy. Given Equations (4) and (7), I have 
 
∆Z[ = ""∆m% "+ "\>'
EG                                                                                                             (9) 
I note that in Equation (9),  \>'
EG  indicates the direct demand effect while  ∆m% represents a 
competition or an indirect demand effect. It is straightforward that when ∆Z[" > "0, Export-
platform FDI has a positive impact on the level of backward linkages. This happens when 
there is (i) a high direct demand effect that dominates a low competition or (ii) no 
competition effect, but a direct and an indirect demand. In the opposite case, the impact 
becomes negative, owing to a strong competition effect that dominates a direct demand. 
Since the competition effect is generated through negative FDI spill-overs, I have the 
following proposition. 
Proposition 3.  There exists a threshold ^ such that 
(i)! ∆Z[" > "0 if and only if ^" > ^ where 
^
≔




(ii)! ^ decreases in ;8, ∆j∶= " Cq "− "C. 
(iii)! ^ < "^. 
 
Proof.  Point (i): Replacing ^ by ^I have ∆Z[" = "0. Hence, I have ∆Z[" > "0 if and only if 




Point (ii): I have  ri
rk









Point (iii): It is straightforward. 
Proposition 3 shows that Export-platform FDI increases the level of backward linkages in the 
developing country if and only if FDI spill-overs exceed a threshold. Below it, the foreign 
production creates strong negative FDI spill-overs, and the competition effect becomes 
stronger than the direct demand one, following a smaller level of backward linkages. 
However, it should be noted that such a threshold decreases with the third market size, and 
the power of the BTA/FTA measured by ∆j . Indeed, the higher the third market size, the 
higher the foreign firm’s output level, generating thereby a stronger direct demand effect. 
Therefore, the latter can suffer a higher competition effect. Likewise, the higher the value of 
parameter ∆j , the more export cost between the host and the third counties fall after the 
BTA/FTA, leading to higher output level of the foreign firm. In addition, the higher the∆j , 
the lower firm 2’s access costs to country 1, following a fewer competition effect. 
 




Corollary 2. ∆Z[" > "0 if and only if 
(i) ;8 > ;8  where 
;8 ≔ 2\ 1 − ( $% + *R' + ^ + C − 2 − 3( $% +




(ii) or ∆j> ∆j where 
∆j≔ 2λ
e 1 − ( $% − λ ;8 + 2 − 3( $% − *R' + θ + τ





Hence, Corollary 2 implies that Export-platform FDI improves the level of backward 
linkages if only if the third market size is high enough, or the power of BTA/FTA measured 
by parameter ∆j is strong enough. 
 














where ∆z ≔" (1" − "*)R' "−"(1" − "()"\$% "− "∆j "−"(C% − C'). 
 
Hence, ^ and ^ can be represented in Figure 1, which allows us to examine different impacts 
of Export-platform FDI on the level of backward linkages. 
 
Case 1.  Export-platform FDI has no impact on backward linkages 
In this case, there is a competition effect which is completely compensated for by the direct 
demand effect. I am on the line ^ of Figure 5-1. The foreign production in the host country 
replaces some parts of the domestic production, following a fall in the demand for inputs. 
However, this fall is fully offset by the direct demand effect. The total demand for inputs 



















This is the so-called 100% crowding-out effect discussed by Markusen and Venables (1999).  
In their framework, the authors mention that the multinational production may replace that of 
domestic firms in an exactly offsetting way. Consequently, there is no effect of FDI on the 
industry producing intermediate goods. 
 
Case 2. If ^" ≤ "^, Export-platform FDI has an ambiguous impact on backward linkages 
In this case, there is no indirect demand effect, but a competition effect. If the latter is 
stronger than the direct demand effect (that is ^" ≤ "^), Export-platform FDI lowers the level 
of backward linkages (Area 1 of Figure1). This is the situation where the foreign production 
in the developing country generates strong negative FDI spill-overs such that the domestic 
firm’s output level significantly falls. Therefore, the decline in demand for inputs by firm 2 is 
high and cannot be compensated for by the direct demand by firm 6. Such negative impact 



















On the other hand, if the direct demand effect becomes stronger than the competition effect 
(that is ^" ≥ "^" ≥ "^), Export-platform FDI improves the level of backward linkages (Area 2 
of Figure 6-1). In this situation, negative FDI spill-overs are at an intermediate level. Hence, 
the decline in demand for inputs by firm 2"is low and dominated by the direct demand effect. 
 
Case 3. If ^" > ^, Export-platform FDI highly increases the level of backward linkages. 
In this case, the foreign production in country L creates no competition effect, but an indirect 
demand one (Area 3 of Figure1). Indeed, under the Export-platform economy, the domestic 
firm gains from low export costs and strong positive FDI spill-overs. Therefore, the output 
level of this firm considerably improves, increasing her demand for inputs. Given the 
existence of the direct demand effect by the foreign firm, the level of backward linkages 
significantly increases. 
 
This case is related to the host countries in which the output level of the domestic firm is 
small under the Export economy, due to high entry costs to the third country (either high 
production cost or high export cost). That leads to a small demand for inputs and so small 
level of backward linkages. By contrast, the domestic firm’s entry cost significantly 
decreases under the Export-platform economy (thanks to the existence of positive FDI spill-
overs and low export cost). That, in turn, leads to a high output level and so high demand for 
inputs. Given the demand for inputs by firm m, the level of backward linkages increases 
significantly. 
 
This result seems to be consistent with Markusen and Venables (1999).  In their framework, 
the authors also state the case where foreign production in the host country significantly 
increases the level of backward linkages. Consequently, FDI may be considered as a catalyst 
for industrial development. 





Proposition 4. There exists an optimal level of λ maximising ∆BK if the following conditions 
are satisfied 
I.! *R' "+ "^" + "C" < ;8 "+"(2" − "3()$% 
II.! ;8 < " (2" − "()$% "+ "*R' "+ "^" + "C 
III.! C" −"C' < 1" − "* R"' −"
bc` edXk hTd fgK`i`j"
|
< C% − C' 
 
In this case, the optimal level of λ is 
λ∗ =
;8 + 2 − 3( $% − *R' + ^ + C"
4(1 − ()$%
 
Proof.  See Appendix A.3. 
 
Proposition 4 implies that an increase in \ has an ambiguous impact on ∆Z[ and so on the 
level of backward linkages under the Export-platform economy. Indeed, this increase 
influences the backward linkages by two opposite ways. On one hand, it leads to a greater 
output level of firm l and so, demand for inputs. On the other hand, it shrinks the output level 
of firm m and thereby lowers the demand for inputs. If the threshold \∗ exists, then below this 
threshold, the higher the LCR, the greater the level of backward linkages. Conversely, above 
this threshold, the higher that LCR, the smaller level of backward linkages. 
 
In summary, the framework above shows an ambiguous impact of Export-platform FDI on 
the level of backward linkages. Positive impact occurs when FDI spill-overs exceed a critical 
threshold.  Likewise, the beneficial impactis associated with large third market size andstrong 
power of the BTA/FTA.  Besides, there is an optimal level of LCR that maximises the level 
of backward linkages.  In Section 6.3 following, I examine the framework in the case of 
Nigerian supporting industries. 
 
6.3 Evidence from Nigeria supporting industries 
Building on the framework above, I develop an empirical study in the case of Nigeria from 




is a very interesting case-study because during the analysed period, the inflow and outflow of 
investment increased; and the Nigerian government signed different improved trade 
agreements with its trade partners. First, the improved BTA with the United States in 2012 
from which Nigeria faced non-tariff barriers or got tariff reductions for its exporting goods to 
the American market. Second, there are several economic and trade agreements between 
Nigeria and the European Community, particularly the economic partnership agreement in 
2014 on market access and cooperation. More improved trade agreements have been signed 
with countries such as India, China and Australia in the time-period mentioned above. 
Nigeria has been a member of the WTO since January 1995, thereby received the most 
favoured nation status with the other members. Also, in 2009, Nigeria signed an agreement of 
tariff reduction by at least 20% on some 70% of goods exported during the Global System of 
Trade Preference (GTSP) meeting. GTSP has been a framework of the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development and an affiliate of the WTO. 
 
6.4 Data Description 
The official data on Export-platform FDI is not available in Nigeria.  Hence, the database 
used in this study is identified, checked and matched from two major sources: The World 
Bank enterprise surveys and the National Bureau of Statistics. 
 
The enterprise's surveys began in 2007 and were conducted periodically by the World Bank, 
with help through the Nigerian Bureau of Statistics. The surveys refer to all business entities 
existing at the end of the surveyed year and cover annual data on their commercial activities 
(for example, standard industrial classification, labour, capital, wage, asset, debt, production 
value, profit, investment, corporate tax, and so forth). Up until 2014, seven surveys had been 
conducted covering firm-level annual data from 2000 to 2012. 
 
Based on these surveys, I first selected the export-oriented industries in which foreign 
investments were used to identify Export-platform FDI. According to the Foreign Investment 
Law (the decree No. 24 of July 31, 2000), the industry is considered as export-oriented 
whenever most of its production (that is, more than 50%) is for exporting. I matched all 




value). Then, I obtained the total domestic and foreign demands for a given input by using 
the Input-Output Matrix calculated in the earlier chapter of this work. Second, I selected the 
supporting industries that supplied those export-oriented industries. After examining the raw 
data and deleting firms with missing key information, I had a database including 1136 year-
industry observations. The database included different variables such as the number of 
foreign firms, labour force, capital stock, production value, investment, wage, and so forth. 
 
To search for the role of third-country size, I use the GDP of the principal trade partners of 
Nigeria. According to National Bureau of Statistics, these countries include China, United 
States, United Kingdom, the members of the EU and ECOWAS. During the period studied, 
the exporting of Nigerian manufacturing products to these countries always covered more 
than 80 percent of the total export value. Using the World Bank database, I obtained the GDP 
of those countries (at a constant price) from 2007 to 2014. Then, I matched them with the 
initial database (Table 5-1 in Appendix). 
 
6.5 Empirical strategy and testable hypotheses 
6.5.1 Empirical strategy 
The dependent variable, denoted by Ä,Å, is the production value of a supporting industry Ç in 
year É. This variable is calculated byÄ,Å = " ÑÄÖ,Å where ÑÄÖ,Å represents the production value 
of a typical firm Ü located in industry Ç during year É. The benchmark regression is given by: 
 
24"ÄÅ = """á" +"àW
â "24"äZ!ÄÅ "+ "(ãÄÅ +"åÄÅ                                                      (10)  
 
Moreover; to examine the impacts of Export-platform FDI, I have the following regression     
 





The index represents supporting industry Ç in year É and åÄ,Å is the error term. The vector ãÄ,Å  
regroups control variables, including industrial investment level (denoted   by 
Ç45éè_Ç4ëíèÉÄ,Å), industry size (denoted by Ç45éè_èÇìíÄ,Å) and labor qualification (denoted 
by &Ä,Å). These covariates are calculated as: 
 












                                                                                                                     (14)     
 
Where the indices ÜÄÅ respectively represents firm Ü"located in supporting industry Ç during 
year É. The investment level and labor force of a given firm are denoted by Ç4ëíèÉÖÄÅ and 
!ü†°, respectively.  In this chapter, wage was used the as a proxy to indicate labour 
qualification. All things being equal, an increase in wage can be considered as an 
improvement in labour qualification (Liu et al. 2000; Nguyen-Huu 2016; Todo et al.2009). 
 
The domestic and foreign demand (respectively denoted by äZ!†° and çZ!†°) are calculated 
as: 
 





çZ!ÄÅ = "" 3Ä¢¢îW ç£¢Å                                                                                                       (16)  
 
where 
-! ä£¢Å (ç£¢Å): the total domestic (foreign) production of an export-oriented industry 
§"throughout year É. 
-! 3Ä¢: the proportion of output level of a typical supporting industry Ç’s that supplies an 
export-oriented industry j. The parameter 3Ä¢ is taken from the Input - Output Matrix 
by excluding all export-oriented industries which supply themselves or supply other 
export-oriented industries. 
 
The estimate of àe  identifies the power of direct demand effect. Hence, the parameter is 
estimated to be positive (àe > 0). Otherwise, parameters àW  and àWâ   represent the extent of 
domestic demand for inputs. 
To examine the role of different structural variables, I use the following regression  
 
24"ÄÅ = """"á" +"à;•Å "+ "(ãÄÅ "+ "åÄÅ                                                                             (17) 
 
Where ;•Å is a vector of structural variables. It first includes improved trade agreements 
signed between Nigeria and other countries during the period studied. This means the BTA 
with the United States (denoted by éè3Å,éè3Å= 0 if t < 2012 and usa = 1 if not), and, the 
GSTP (WTO) agreement with Nigeria (denoted by &É¶Å, &É¶Å= 0 if t < 2009 and wtot = 1 if 
not). Second, parameter dbf 2 (dbf 2: = log FBL ∗ log FBL) is used to identify impacts of 
LCR. Indeed, information about LCR is not available in the database. Therefore, the 
calculated Input-Output matrix can be useful because the parameter aij in this matrix reports 
the proportion of output level of a given supporting industry i that supplies an export-oriented 
industry j including foreign production. Third, ;•Åalso contains the size of the United States, 
China and the EU&UK, the principal export destination of Nigeria (respectively denoted by 





The estimate of à in Equation (17) is interpreted as the impact of the structural variables 
mentioned above on the production value of a typical supporting industry (that is the level of 
backward linkages). 
It should be noted that over the roles of Export-platform FDI and structural variables (as the 
third market size, the power of BTA, or LCR), the production value of a typical supporting 
industry (the dependent variable) can be affected by different observed characteristics which 
can create endogeneity if they are not controlled for. Hence, to deal with this problem, labour 
qualification, industry investment, and industrial size were added in Regressions (10), (11), 
and (17). Also, there might exist unobserved factors being different across industries, but 
time-invariant within industries such as sophisticated, nature of the produced inputs, etc.  If 
these factors are correlated with the regressors, the fixed effects model capturing unobserved 
industrial effects is used to estimate the three regressions mentioned above. Hence, the 
problem with omitted variables’ bias is solved. However, once industrial characteristics are 
not corrected with the regressors, the fixed-effects model become unsuitable. In this case, 
random effects may become relevant (Green, 2012). 
 
6.5.2 Testable hypotheses 
Based on the framework developed in Section 5.2, Itested the following hypothesis 
Hypothesis 1. Foreign investments in export-oriented industries have an ambiguous impact 
on the production of a supporting industry in Nigeria. 
Using Equations (10) and (11), I can determine the net impact of Export-platform FDI on 
backward linkages. I consider three cases: 
I.! àW > àWâ  . There exists an indirect demand and no competition effect. The location of 
FDI in export-oriented industries significantly increases the production of supporting 
industries (Area 3 of Figure 1). 
II.! àW < àWâ < àW "+"àe. There is a competition effect. However, its impact is low and 
dominated by the direct demand effect. The net impact of Export FDI on backward 




III.! àW "+"àe < àWâ  . There exists a strong competition effect such that it dominates the 
direct demand effect. Export FDI has a net negative impact on backward linkages 
(Area 1 of Figure 1). 
 
Hypothesis 2.  LCR has an ambiguous impact on the production of a supporting industry. 
Given Regression (17), if the associated parameter of variable ß=22takes a positive value, 
then the higher the LCR, the higher the production value of the typical supporting industry. 
Conversely, if it is negative, then the higher the LCR, the smaller the considered production 
value. 
 
Hypothesis 3. Trade agreement between Nigeria and a third country positively impacts the 
production of a typical industry if and only if the power of this agreement is sufficiently 
strong. 
 
I note that if the estimated parameter for variable usa (wto) is negative, then the power of this 
agreement is weak leading to a negative impact on the production value of a supporting 
industry. Inversely, if the estimated value is positive, the related agreement improves the 
production value. 
Hypothesis 4. Third country size has a positive impact on the production value of a 
supporting industry if and only if it is sufficiently high. 
 
If the estimated value of variable éèèÇìí"($ℎÇ43èÇìí, íéèÇìí) is negative, the size of the 
related market is small and negatively impacts on the production value of a supporting 






6.6 Empirical results 
The conventional binary categorisation of FDI into horizontal and vertical FDI is attributed 
toHelpman and Krugman (1985). Horizontal FDI is a substitute for trade in the conventional 
mode of FDI (Markusen (2002); however, Bergstrand and Egger (2007) constructed a model 
where horizontal FDI coexisted with trade between same countries. Yeaple (2003) 
constructed a model where a firm might engage both in horizontal and vertical FDI for a 
medium range of trade costs. 
 
Motta and Norman (1996) is presumably the first theoretical work on the export-platform 
type FDI. By constructing an oligopoly model of one-stage (final-product) production, they 
succeeded in explaining why a significant amount of FDI takes place between countries 
within regional trading blocs. Ekholm, Forslid & Markusen (2007) also explained this by 
constructing a partial equilibrium oligopoly model that consisted of two production stages 
(intermediate and final-product) and in which the export-platform FDI was driven by a trade-
off between the lower production costs of the South and trade costs. The empirical part of 
their paper showed that US firms in Europe had higher shares of third-country exports when 
compared with those of US firms in other regions. Although all of the above models assumed 
identical firms, Grossman et al. (2006), were motivated by the observation that various 
modes of supply coexisted within the same industry (Hanson et al. (2001) and Feinberg and 
Keane (2003)developed a model wherein firms faced a richer array of modes of supply, by 
allowing for firm heterogeneity and by incorporating several types of complementarities, first 
pointed out by Yeaple (2003). Neary (2009) developed a model based on the “proximity–
concentration” trade-off. Mrázová and Neary (2010) constructed a general model of how a 
firm would choose to serve a group of foreign markets through exports or FDI, and how 
many foreign plants it would want to establish, using the Super-modularity concept. Similar 
to Mrázová and Neary (2010) in its question, Ito (2012) constructed a model in which a 
multinational enterprise (MNE) determined the spatial extension of operations (number of 
FDI destinations) and the intensity of production (volume of sales), in which the export-
platform type FDI emerged. Ito (2013), on which this chapter draws for its theoretical 
prediction, constructed a model that nested five types of supply modes, that is, export, the 
conventional horizontal FDI, the conventional vertical FDI, the horizontal export-platform 
FDI, and the vertical export-platform FDI. Baldwin and Okubo (2012) proposed a new 




affiliates. They showed that the majority ofFDIs did not fit neatly into the existing 
categorisation. 
 
With export-platform FDI as a critical input in the global production process, multinationals 
are often reluctant to cooperate with local partners in order not to jeopardise the global 
production circle. However, Moran (2001) shows in some case studies that the parent-
affiliates relationships become more integrated, especially within export orientated firms.  
Besides purely looking for low-cost assembly sites, affiliates in developing countries are 
increasingly treated as an important part of the supply network11,although Moran (2001) does 
recognise that the number of linkages is still relatively small when foreign affiliates are a part 
of an international network. The reliance on imported input is still larger than input from the 
local markets. Hirschman (1958) warned that due to the lack of linkages, FDI might have 
limited impact on the economic growth of the host country.  
Developing a two-country model, some authors such as, Lin and Saggi (2005, 2007) 
Markusen and Venables (1999) and Rodriguez-Clare (1996)argued that the impacts of FDI 
on backward linkages could be examined through a competition effect and demand for inputs 
effect. On the one hand, the entry of MNCs in the host country lowered the degree of 
backward linkages by shrinking the output level of domestic producers that led to a decline in 
demand for inputs (competition effect). On the other hand, such entry also sourced theinput 
locally and thereby created an additional demand for inputs (demand effect). Therefore, the 
net impact of FDI on local input production is ambiguous (Lin and Saggi, 2005, 2007). For 
Rodriguez-Clare (1996), it will be positive upon the condition that MNEs are intensive in 
intermediate goods, that communication costs between the headquarter and the production 
plant are high and that the home country and the host country are not too different regarding 
the variety of intermediate goods produced. When these conditions are not fulfilled, the 
opposite happens: the entry of MNCs in the host country reduces the degree of backward 
linkages. In the same analyses line, Lin and Saggi (2005, 2007) suggested that the net effect 
of FDI on the level of backward linkages depended on the technological gap between MNEs 
and domestic producers, whenever this gap reached a critical threshold. In this case, MNEs 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !
11Examples, International electronics companies change their Asian production supply chain with the latest products 
development in the home market (Borus, Ernst, and Haggard (2000). General Motors equipped their high-
performance export affiliates in Hungary with special cylinder head equipment that can adapt to the ongoing 
development without rebuilding the production line. Regarding the assistances of the affiliates, Ford has facilities in 




improved the level of backward linkages because the demand effect was stronger than the 
competition effect. In the opposite case, if this condition was reversed, the entry of MNEs 
made the local market more competitive whereas the demand effect was weak. Hence, the 
level of backward linkages fell. 
 
To examine the impacts of Export-platform FDI on backward linkages over the period 2007-
2014, I used the fixed effects (FE) model and the random effects (RE) model. The empirical 
study is in the line of the econometric analysis of panel data which is largely developed on 
the topic of the impacts of MNE on the host country (e.g. Kejzar, 2006; Biterza et al. 2008). 
However, it differs from other studies by focusing on the production level instead of the 
productivity. Indeed, the main reason is that an improvement in productivity could not be 
associated with a greater production level. That is the case where the presence of MNEs in 
host-country incited domestic firms to become more efficient while their output level 
declined because some parts of their market shares were involved by these multinationals 
(Aitken and Harrison, 1999). 
 
6.6.1 Foreign investments in export-oriented industries and production of supporting 
industries 
I relied on Benchmark regression (10) and Regression (11) to investigate the impacts 
offoreign investment in export-oriented industries on the production of supporting industries.  
The estimates for these regressions are represented in Table 6-2 below.  Export FDI column 
from the table shows the estimations for Regression (10) using the RE and the FE models, 
respectively. Those of Equation (11) are in the production of supporting industries column, 
using the RE and FE models, respectively. 
 
The table 6-2 gives ratios F statistically significant at the 5% & 1% levels respectively. 
Hence, the individual effects are justified, and the FE model is more efficient than the 
grouped regression model. Similarly, the Lagrange multipliers (LM), is higher than the chi-





I state that over the period 2007-2014, all control variables are significant and have a positive 
influence on the production of supporting industries. Using the RE model (FE model), if the 
size of a given industry increases by 10%, its production will grow by 1.9% (1.1%). The 
same 10% increase in investment of the considered industry leads to an increase of 1.4% in 
its production. 
 
Table 6-2 also shows that estimated coefficient of FBL (presented in the production of 
supporting industry column), considered as a direct demand effect, and is positive and 
statistically significant in both modules. Using the RE method (FE method), if foreign firms 
in export-oriented industries increase their demand for a given input by 1%, the production of 
this input will increase up to 0.07% (0.12%). However, variable DBL is statically non-
significant. On the other hand, in the absence of foreign production, the domestic demand for 
inputs becomes statically significant for both the FE and RE models (cf. estimates in export 
FDI column). It follows that 1% increase of domestic demand for a given input leads to an 
increase of 0.15% (by the RE model) or 0.19% (by the FE model) in the production of this 
input. Such an increase is even higher than that generated by foreign demand (cf. 0.07% for 
the RE model and 0.12% for the FE model). Also, the workof Doan (2010) supports this 
hypothesis that the evidence for Export-Platform FDI is ambiguous.  
The results validate Hypothesis 1 and indicate that: 
I.! During the period 2007-2014, backward linkages were created by foreign firms rather 
than by domestic ones. 
II.! There is a strong competition effect so that it highly dominates the direct demand one. 






















Using the analysis developed in Section 5.2, it follows that the foreign production in export-
oriented industries creates strong negative FDI spill-overs. Therefore, the competition effect 
becomes very strong and dominates the direct demand effect that reduces the production 
value of supporting industries. 
 
Consequently, Export-platform FDI has no impact on backward linkages. Hence, the result 
seems to be similar to that of Markusen and Venables (1999), since these authors also 
observed the crowding-out effect of FDI on local industries. 
 
Competition effect, resulting from competition between foreign and domestic producers in 
downstream industries, could lead to a lower production of domestic producers or a net exit 
of them from the third market. Therefore, competition effect hurts backward linkages. On the 
other hand, demand creation implies a direct and indirect input demand created by the 
location of MNEs on the host country. Direct demand creation is caused by the production of 




















the third market or whenever each of them has a greater production. When competition effect 
is stronger than demand creation effect, Export-platform FDI has a negative impact on 
backward linkages. Conversely, if the former is weaker than the other, this investment 
improves backward linkages. 
 
Furthermore, if MNE and domestic firms are heterogeneous (they do not have the same 
production technology), then impacts of Export-platform FDI on backward linkages also 
depend upon input intensity of the technology used by MNE. Whenever this intensity does 
not reach a smallest or exceed the highest level, impacts appear to be negative. Inversely, 
between these two thresholds, this investment improves backward linkages in the host 
country. Also, the model showed that there is an optimal intensity of MNE production’s 
technology which maximises backward linkages. Below this threshold, the more technology 
of MNE is intensive in theinput, the greater benefits obtained from this investment are. 
Conversely, above this threshold, the higher this intensity is, the less the host country could 
benefit from Export-platform FDI. 
6.6.2 Impacts of trade agreements, LCR and third country size 
I now examine the impacts of trade agreements, LCR and third country size on the 
production value of supporting industries, by using Regression (17). The estimate results are 
shown in Table 6-3 below. 
 
Impacts of LCR:  
Local content policies to increase backward linkages can address either the supply or the 
demand for intermediate products and services. The first type aims to increase the quantity, 
quality and variety of inputs available for use in production. Such policies can target specific 
products and services (e.g. specific tax incentives) or operate affecting the general context 
and enable the operation of these sectors (e.g. infrastructure). Policies affecting the demand 
for goods and services aim to make existing sectors more compatible with the sectors to 






These policies operate under the premise that increasing domestic content is a desirable 
objective. Increasing the share of domestic value added in production and exports, in this 
view, should entail aiming for a domestic production and employment. This view is 
supported by approaches that consider the international trade a zero-sum gain and that the 
benefits of trade come from achieving and expanding a trade surplus. Consequently, 
replacing imported inputs with domestic substitutes is a way to achieve micro and 
macroeconomic objectives. 
 
Local content policies are frequently associated with trade restrictions, tariff and tax 
incentives, subsidies and other measures to increase the use of domestic inputs. In some 
cases, regulations entail quotas for the use of domestic inputs (e.g. domestically produced 
alcohol in petrol). Export taxes and restrictions, for example, can develop forward linkages 
by reducing the export supply and increasing the domestic supply of commodities (Mendez-
Parra et al., 2016). Meanwhile, the tariff structure can be modified by increasing the tariff on 
the final product and reducing the tariff on intermediate goods, increasing the effective rate of 
protection. Finally, bank regulations can be enacted to increase the availability of credit to 
purchase domestic inputs and reduce the availability of credit for imported inputs. These 
constitute just a small sample of the type of measures that can be considered. 
 
This policy approach is sometimes criticised from an economic perspective on two grounds. 
The traditional critique points to the inefficient allocation of resources that these measures 
generate. Although in the short run it is possible to employ some idle resources, an increase 
in the production of domestic inputs to supply downward industries, for example, is 
achievable only by subtracting resources from existing activities. Assuming these resources 
are currently employed in sectors with comparative advantages, the reallocation means a 
general reduction in efficiency. Moreover, the reallocation of resources is frequently 
associated with falls in output in the existing sectors; for a given demand, prices will tend to 
increase, reducing real wages and demand further. 
 
This critique suggests that the use of measures that alter the allocation of resources will affect 




costly. However, it also suggests that they tend to fail at generating globally competitive 
input sectors. Typical infant industry policies struggle to develop sectors that achieve 
efficiency and that are productive enough to remove the original protection. Consequently, 
the developed sectors tend to be expensive and frequently deliver poor quality, affecting the 
rest of the industries involved. Also, from the political economy point of view, protection 
leads to the development of groups that lobby for maintenance of the protection, making its 
removal complicated. 
 
In addition to the traditional critique is a more modern approach based on the idea of 
international value chains. The international fragmentation of production, whereby the 
different stages take place in different countries, requires a global look at the value chain. The 
increase in specialisation in the production of specific components leads to economies of 
scale that maximise the productivity of the firms involved, the stages and the chain in 
general. Stages take place in countries based on their capacity to contribute to this process. 
As firms in each stage use the most efficient and cost-effective goods and services in 
production, they guarantee the same standards to the stages taking place downstream. 
 
Any policy that aims to affect this international allocation, aiming to increase the number of 
stages taking place in a given country, will alter this configuration and affect the global 
productivity of the value chain. By affecting this allocation, productivity is expected to fall 
and inefficiency to rise. The reallocation of resources, explained above, will also operate. 
Regulations and taxes will tend to reduce output in the existing stages of the chain, reducing 
economies of scale. Moreover, it is unlikely that the uncompetitive stage will manage to 
achieve economies of scale and productivity levels as high as those achieved in other 
countries. 
 
It is expected that the value chain will reorganise the production by reallocating the now-
inefficient stages into other countries. After the measures have been taken in the domestic 
economy, firms in other countries will become more competitive and will absorb the stages, 
cutting out domestic firms from the value chain. This suggests a fundamental misconception 




world production, policy should be oriented towards increasing the value added generated 
through value chains, regardless of how much they represent the chain. Moreover, firms can 
participate in more than one chain, suggesting ample scope for increasing the value added, 
which will be revealed as productivity and efficiency grows. 
 
Rather than increasing the stages taking place in the country, participation in value chains can 
be increased through the upgrading of the tasks performed in the chain. Value chain 
upgrading suggests stepping into tasks and stages where the creation of value is higher.This 
implies a reconfiguration of the use of the same resources, increasing the capture of value 
added per unit. This frequently implies abandoning the previous stages of the chain rather 
than adding stages. ‘Moving up’ the value chain is more about being cooperative and 
increasing productivity than it is about aiming to conquer new stages of production. 
 
In this sense, the policies that work to upgrade value chain participation tend to be those that 
alter the productivity of the resources employed. They include a wide range of policies 
working at different levels. Some horizontal policies aim to create the enabling context for 
the development of new products and services that contribute to global productivity. This 
includes improving infrastructure, actions to improve employees’ capabilities, such as 
training, measures to increase credit and property rights enforcement, among many others. 
These measures tend to lift different constraints affecting the development of firms and 
sectors. Sometimes, when they hit the most binding constraint, they can be sufficient to 
generate the development of the targeted sectors. 
 
The associated coefficients of this variable are represented in the local inputs intensity 
column in table 6-3 below.  I state that the estimated is positive and statistically significant at 
0.1% level in both RE and FE models. Hence, I validate Hypothesis 2 and conclude that in 
the sample, the higher LCR, the higher the production value of supporting industries. 
 
Ramdoo (2015) highlights a range of factors that determine the success of local content 




was sourced locally, along with 80% of the sectors’ operational and maintenance input; to 
which domestic firms were productive enough to be globally competitive. In addition, 
Ogunleye (2014) explained that the inclusion of Norwegian firms was a compulsory 
requirement for international oil companies looking to bid on contracts, and international oil 
companies were required to undertake local capacity-building (e.g. through mentoring of 
domestic firms) as a condition of operating in Norway and offered tax rebates as an incentive 
to do so. These measures allowed for a gradual improvement of local capacity and knowledge 
along with the transfer of technological know-how (Senoo and Armah, 2015). The works of 
Nordas et al. (2003) also validate the impact of LCR on domestic productivity in the case of 
Brazilian oil sector. Amoako-Tuffour et al. (2015), reports that Ghana has already made good 
progress in raising the level of employment of local workers in the oil industry. Negara 
(2016) presents empirical evidence that local content requirements in Indonesian 
manufacturing have largely been ineffective in reducing firms’ dependence on imported 
inputs. He speculates this could be due to weak enforcement of local content laws. However, 
UNIDO (2016) argues that local content policies played a positive role in driving the rapid 
expansion of the garment industry in the post-independence period in Bangladesh, and that 
the higher the LCR, the higher the production value of domestic firms. 
 
According to McCulloch et al. (2017), level of local content varies not only with the sector in 
which the firm is situated but also with the size of the firm and its position in the relevant 
value chain. As a result, it is difficult to make generalisations about the scope and nature of 
backward linkages in Nigeria. This said, the detailed firm-level interviews presented a 
revealing picture of some aspects of backward integration. In all cases, the firms being 
interviewed were lead firms with a key role in the governance and management of the 
relevant value chain. They are the key to backward integration since they have the ability and 
resources to make the necessary investments in their suppliers or supply chain. 
Understanding the circumstances and constraints they face is therefore important to devise 
local content policies that are likely to be effective. The first finding from their firm 
interviews were related to the enormous complexity and variety of the value chains 
associated with even seemingly simple sectors. Each final product in the economy, whether it 
was sugar, cement or cars, had a wide array of inputs, both goods and services. Some of these 
were already sourced locally; others were sourced from imports but could in principle be 




findings also indicated, based on the firm interviews, that the higher the LCR, the higher the 
production value of domestic firms to which their competitive edge was enhanced. 
Nonetheless, the impact of LCR is ambiguous and has other meanings. This chapter has only 
considered it based on production value of domestic supporting industry. The work of Lahiri 
and Mesa (2004) has analysed the impact of LCR under exchange volatility, and they found 
that an increase in the volatility foreign exchange rate decreased optimal LCR, both under 
free entry and exit of foreign firms and when the number of foreign firms was fixed. 
 
Role of trade agreements:  
FTAs are an exercise in partial trade liberalisation and rule-making towards a limited number 
of partners and, as such, their effects are contested. Supporters argue that, as with any 
liberalisation, the removal of barriers to trade will result at an aggregate level in an increase 
in the welfare of both parties. The rules within FTAs are also perceived as providing a more 
predictable policy environment (and in this way to foster economic activity and investment) 
and as being a ‘cement’ to bind together regional integration schemes. 
 
However, FTAs are also criticised from both sides. Some trade liberals,such asRodrik(2018), 
identify potential negative effects from liberalising only partially. The essence of the liberal 
critique is that FTAs may ‘divert trade’ as well as ‘create trade’. The former is welfare 
reducing and, if it is relatively large, it may significantly reduce (or completely offset) the 
latter, which is welfare enhancing. 
 
Recall that during the period studied, there are two important trade agreements signed 
between Nigeria and third countries:  improved BTA with the United States in 2012 and 
Nigeria signing an agreement with GSTP (WTO) in 2009 on tariff reduction. The estimates 
for the impacts of these agreements, using the RE and the FE methods, are reported in the 
trade agreement column Table 6-3, respectively.  I observe that two variables wto and usa 
positively and statistically affect the production value of supporting industries. These 
findings support Hypothesis 3 so that the power of trade agreements between Nigeria and 





An analysis of ‘Jordan’s substantial liberalisation over the last two decades’ finds ‘the impact 
of trade agreement has been rather small’ (Busse and Gröning, 2012). Also, the works of 
Milton and Siddidque (2014), indicate an impact of the trade agreement on productivity in the 
FTA between Australia and Thailand. Similarly, Jean et al. (2012) documents small 
aggregate economic gainsbased on the effect of a trade agreement between the EU and Chile. 
Also, Peridy and Roux (2012) indicate the effect of the trade agreement on GDP growth in 
Morocco.  
 
Bergstrand et al. (2011) contended that trade agreements were fundamental to the removal or 
reduction of the tariff, which thereby made domestic productivity increase. Prior to this, 
Cheong and Cho (2009) analysed the trade agreements between Korea and Chile in specific 
sectors and found them to be mutually beneficial. The role of trade agreement also cuts 
across other fundamentals such as fiscal impacts (Tovais and al-Khouris, 2004), distributional 
and employment effects (Salamanca et al., 2009), and labour and environmental standards 
(Soto Montes de Oca, 2008). However, on the basis of this chapter, the research is confined 
to only looking at the role of trade agreements on improving production of supporting 
industries. 
 
Impacts of third countries size:  
The classical philosophers’ thinking about the size of nations has a normative nature. 
Historians have instead studied the evolution of the states often emphasising the role of wars 
in the creation of new states. As Tilly (1990) emphasised, military conflicts and military 
technology were crucial for the pattern of state formation. Economists, at least until very 
recently, have not worried about explaining national borders. One isolated attempt for the 
case of Medieval Europe was Friedman (1977). 
 
One way of thinking about the size of a state is the trade-off between the benefits of size 




trade-off helps both in defining the “optimal” size and the equilibrium size, that is, it is useful 
from both a normative and a positive perspective. 
 
What are the benefits of having a large size? First, the per capita costs of many public goods 
are lower in larger countries, where more taxpayers can pay for them. Think, for instance, of 
defence, a monetary and financial system, a judicial system, infrastructures for 
communication, police and crime prevention, public health, embassies, and national parks 
just to name a few. In many cases, parts of the costs of public goods are independent of the 
number of users/taxpayers or grow less than proportionally, thus the per capita costs of many 
public goods are declining with the number of taxpayers. Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) 
document that the share of governments spending over GDP is decreasing with GDP; that is, 
smaller countries have larger governments, even after controlling for several other 
determinants of government size. 
 
Second, a larger country (regarding population and national product) is less subject to foreign 
aggression. Thus, safety is a public good that increases with country size. Also, related to the 
“size of government” argument here, smaller countries may have to spend proportionally 
more for defence than larger countries given the economies of scale in defence spending. 
Empirically the relationship between country size and share of spending of defence is 
affected by the fact that small countries can enter into military alliances, but in general, size 
brings about more safety. Also, if a small country enters a military coalition with a larger one, 
the latter may provide defence, but it may extract some form of compensation, direct or 
indirect, from the smaller partner. 
 
The estimates for third market size, using the RE and the FE methods, are shown in the third 
country size column Table 6-3.  The estimated coefficient for U.S. and China market size 
appears to be positive and significant in both columns. Hence, given the BTA signed with 
China in 2007 and that of United States in 2012, the size of these countries positively affects 
the production value of supporting industries. Interestingly, given the GSTP (WTO) 
agreement with Nigeria in 2009, the size of the EU and UK market has a non-statistical 




the main reasons for this surprising finding is the subprime crisis and its persistence that it 
strongly hurts the GDP of these regions.  Hypothesis 4 can be validated. 
 
Grossman and Helpman (1991), Lucas (1988) and Romer (1986) provide models of growth 
in which various mechanisms imply that a larger size of production increases productivity. 
Market size is also the key for models of “take-off” of industrialisation, as in Shleifer and 
Vishny (1987). In that model, a certain size of the market (defined by the size of demand) is 
necessary for entrepreneurs and investors to step in, overcome fixed costs and spur 
development. 
The relationship between country size and market size depends on the trade regime. In a 
world of complete autarchy, political size and market size of a country coincide. It follows 
that if a country is small, it has a small market. In an economically integrated world, the 
market size of a country is larger, perhaps much larger, than its political size. In the extreme 
case, in which borders are irrelevant for economic interactions, the market size of each 
country is the world. If there are economies of scale to the size of the market, larger countries 
can be expected to do better economically than smaller countries (all other things being 
equal) insofar as economic integration and international openness are low, but political size 
should become less relevant as economic integration increases. 
 
According to the works of Baltagi et al. (2007), third country effects are significant, lending 
support to the existence of various modes of complex FDI. They also found out that the 
bilateral and third-country effects of changes in skilled and unskilled labour endowments 
tend to be substituted for vertical and complex vertical FDI. The works of Uttama (2010), 
further buttress on the impact of third-country size by looking at ASEAN countries; and he 
found an impact of bilateral and third-country effect on FDI and domestic productivity. 
 
6.7 Conclusion 
The second half of the twentieth century is characterised by a rapid growth of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) by multinational enterprises (MNEs). This investment brings an important 
source to finance the economic growth of the host country as well as new technologies to 




but also take advantage of its quality for sustainable development. Perhaps, one of the main 
channels is through vertical linkages, or in other words, backward linkages (UNCTAD, 
2001). The latter exists whenever the located affiliates of MNEs acquire goods or services 
from domestic suppliers. I notice that contrary to the expectations of the host countries, the 
literature underlines some conditional, even opposite impacts. 
The rising in the number of trade agreements over the world leads to the appearance of 
Export-platform FDI. While there is an abundant literature on this type of investment as a 
strategic behaviour of MNFs, its impacts on the host country are little studied,and hence this 
is the purpose of this chapter. 
 
I have developed a three-country framework which allowed for an examination of the 
impacts of such investment through the competition and the demand effects. The former is 
generated when foreign production generates negative FDI spill-overs and then replaces 
domestic production whereas the latter can be directly or indirectly created. I have shown that 
Export-platform FDI has ambiguous effects on backward linkages, and there exists a case 
through which this investment improves both the output level of thedomestic firm and the 
level of backward linkages. I have also studied the role of different variables of the economy 
as the third country size, the power of trade agreements and the LCR. In the case of Nigerian 
supporting industries over the period 2007-2014, a negative impact of this investment has 
been found. However, trade agreements between Nigeria and other countries, and LCR have 
a positive impact while the impact of market size is ambiguous. 
 
The estimates suggest that Export-platform FDI generates a 100% crowding-out effect. That 
means while making an Export-platform FDI in Nigeria, MNEs gain some market shares of 
domestic firms, following a lower demand in the local input. However, the production of 
MNEs in the country also increases demand in the local input. Whenever negative influences 
are fully offset by positive ones, Export-platform FDI does not have any impact on backward 
linkages. Also, I observed a positive correlation between production in upstream industries 
(i.e. supporting industries) and input intensity of technology used by foreign producers in 




technology is intensive in the input, the greater potential benefits that Nigerian suppliers 
could obtain from Export platform FDI. 
 
The model is in the basicgame-theory type of models analysing impacts of FDI on backward 
linkages (Lin & Saggi, 2005, 2007; Markusen & Venables, 1999; Rodriguez-Clare, 1996). 
However, it differs from others for three reasons. First, the model proposes a typology about 
competition effect and input demand creation effect. The former could lead to a net exit of 
domestic producers in the market as well as to a lower production for each of them. As for 
input demand creation model, it could be directly generated by theproduction of foreign 
producers in thehost country. One may also be indirectly affectedby thegreater total 
production of domestic ones. Second, the model underlines impacts of input intensity of 
foreign producers’ technology on backward linkages. Lastly, the model deals with a three-
country model, instead of a two-country model, since the latter is not taking into account the 
economic integrations phenomenon. 
 
In a second time, the three-country model is tested in the case of the Nigerian supporting 
industries between 2007 and 2014, using the RE and FE statistical models. Unlike other 
empirical studies focusing on productivity, I dealt with production in upstream industries, 
because in agreement with Aitken and Harrison (1999), an improvement in productivity does 
not necessarily lead to an increase in production. 
 
This chapter is in line with the literature concerning the relationship between FDI and 
backward linkages by examining the existence of the competition effect and the demand for 
inputs effect (Lin & Saggi, 2005, 2007; Markusen & Venables, 1999; Rodriguez-Clare, 
1996). In their framework, the authors only consider the existence of the demand effect 
created by MNFs while in the model, the demand for inputs effect can be generated by both 
foreign and domestic firms. Moreover, I developed a three-country model concept instead of 
a two-country model.  Given the increase in trade agreements across the world, the two-
country standard models on FDI have become irrelevant to study the complex strategies 
including Export-platform FDI used by MNFs Baltagi et al. (2007) andYeaple 




this investment. The framework is also different from that of (Lin & Saggi, 2005, 2007; 
Markusen & Venables, 1999; Rodriguez-Clare, 1996) by considering the impacts of third-
country size, trade agreement, and LCR on the level of backward linkages. 
 
This chapter opens some discussions for further investigation. First, I have worked entirely in 
a partial equilibrium framework.  Therefore, the final good’s price is endogenous. Wage, 
inputs’ price is taken as given.  Developing the three- country general equilibrium framework 
may be helpful to study the impacts of Export-platform FDI on wage, inputs’ price as well as 
the welfare of the host country. Second, the chapter only considers one MNF and one 
domestic firm. By endogenising the entry of firms, Icould study how this investment 
impacted on the market structure. It was also interesting to examine whether the domestic 
firms couldbecome more competitive than their foreign counterparts. Also, availability of 
more robust data could help simplify some of the issues in this chapter. 
 
The government of Nigeria is pursuing a set of policies with the objective of boosting local 
content and deepening backward linkages in the country. The review of international 
experience shows that such policies can be very beneficial if they have the effect of 
enhancing industrial capabilities and improving competitiveness. Nigeria’s application of 
local content policies in the oil and gas sector has been criticised for being heavy-handed – 
but there is also evidence that it has enabled the participation of local firms in supplying 
services to the major oil companies in a way that may well not have happened in the absence 
of the policy. Buoyed by this apparent success, the government is attempting to implement a 
Made-in-Nigeria agenda across some other sectors. 
 
There are some sectors where it makes much sense to deepen backward integration. There are 
others where it is not appropriate. Having a blanket policy that applies to all is not sensible. 
Backward integration policies must be nuanced by the circumstances of the sector. In 
particular, backward integration is appropriate where it is ‘comparative advantage following’ 
rather than ‘comparative advantage denying’ (Lin, 2011). In practical terms, this means that, 
after the various investments have been made, the level of costs should be lower than the cost 





In conclusion, boosting backward linkages is one element of a broader programme of 
structural transformation being undertaken by the government. I suggest local content 
policies should be done based on this three-country model. These policies will be much more 
effective if they are part of a coherent programme encompassing fundamental sector reform 
in energy, land and infrastructure, improvements to the business enabling environment and 
exchange rate and trade policies that encourage resources to flow to dynamic and competitive 


























Appendix A. Third-country model 
 
A.1. Equilibrium in the third market 
Let 1©#
@ , 1©2
@ respectively be the access cost to the third market in the Economy @. 
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In this model, firms compete in a Cournot fashion. In other words, each firm determines her 
output level by taking given that of her competitor. Hence, the best response strategies of firm 6 
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It should be noted that Equations (A3) and (A4) have a unique interior solution (>2
@, >6
@ > "0) 
only if the third market size (;1) is high enough. To investigate impacts of Export-platform FDI 
on backward linkages, we only consider the case where interior solution exists (>2
@, >6
@ > "0). The 
situation according to which firms are inactive (i.e., >2
@, >6
@ = "0) is widely analyzed in the 
literature. 
 
A.2. Strategy choice of the foreign firm 
Let D6
B™7(B7ß5Ç) be the profit of firm m when using an Export-platform FDI in the Export 
economy. This firm finally exports instead of using an Export-platform FDI in the Export 
economy if and only if D6
B™7 > D6
B™7(B7ß5Ç). The equivalent condition is 
 







;1−2 *R6+\$2+ 1−\ ($2+C6 +(*R6+$2−^+C2)
3=
                                                                                   (A10) 
or 
 
C2 − C6 > 1 − * R6 − (1 − ()\$2                                                                                           (A11) 
 
Likewise, let D6
B7(Exp)"be the profit of firm m when using an Export strategy in the Export-
platform economy. An Export-platform FDI is used instead of Exporting if and only if  D6
B7 >
D6
B7(Exp). This implies that the following condition must be fulfilled 
 
1 − * R6 − 1 − ( \$2 > C − C6                                                                                           (A12) 
Using Equations (A11) and (A12) yields the condition given in Proposition 1. 
A.3. Role of local content requirement 
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Since (1" − "()$% > "0, the function ß"(\) :"= "−2\e "− "()$% "+ (;"8 + "(2" − "3()$"% − "*R' "−
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However, \∗ exists if and only if 0" ≤ "\ ∗"≤ "1 that is equivalent to conditions (i) and 





A.4. Structural Variables 
 
éèèÇìíÉ = éè3É ∗ log ±57éèÉ 
$ℎÇ43èÇìíÉ = &É¶É ∗ log ±57$ℎÇ43É 




























Table 6-1. Descriptive analysis for supporting industries 
VARIABLES N mean(B$) STD(T) min(B$) max(B$) 
      
gdp United States 1136 17,348,075 7.40 9,263,855 18,945,325 
gdp China 1136 10,356,508 4.10 4,536,587 14,886,591 
gdp EU&UK 1136 18,527,116 11.60 11,997,122 25,812,615 
lnindus productivity 1136 7.21 0.74 2.17 18.3 
lnindus investment 1136 8.78 4.21 7.4 11.53 
labour qualification 1136 5.82 2.65 0.4 14.2 
lnlabour Regulations 1136 1.74 4.12 0.02 10.3 
indussize 1136 2.9 7.4 2.3 5.1 


















Table 6-2. Export FDI and Production of Supporting Industries 
Variable Label Export FDI production of supporting industries 
  OLS RE FE OLS RE FE 
Domestic demand DBL 0.013 0.15** 0.19** 0.13***  0.14***  0.11** 
  (0.01) (0.02) (0.06) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) 
  [0.149] [0.15] [0.131] [1.353] [1.064] [1.532] 
Foreign demand FBL 0.05 0.12 0.05 0.05** 0.07***  0.12**  
  (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.06) 
  [0.147] [0.152] [0.108] [1.888] [1.118] [0.057] 
Industry size indus_size 0.22***  0.19***  0.11***  0.17***  0.07***  0.13***  
  (0.04) (0.11) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.1) 
  [1.429] [1.325] [1.255] [1.147] [1.04] [1.26] 
Industrial investment indus_inves 0.13***  0.14***  0.24***  0.11***  0.14***  0.15***  
  (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
  [0.211] [0.251] [0.51] [0.151] [0.173] [0.1] 
Labor qualification w 0.35***  0.34***  0.31***  0.32***  0.15***  0.24***  
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
  [1.121] [1.318] [3.176] [0.09] [0.084] [0.126] 
Constant  3.3***  5.1***  6.5***  6.4***  2.14***  4.24***  
  (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
  [1.139] [1.289] [2.062] [1.257] [1.269] [1.899] 
Observation N 1136 1136 
R2  0.96 0.91 0.88 0.89 0.95 0.77 
Number of groups n 196 196 
Breusch et Pagan' test LM 1034.11*** 973.003*** 
Fisher' test F 732** 421*** 






Table 6-3.  Impacts of trade agreements, local inputs intensity and third country size 
Variable Label Local inputs intensity Trade agreements Third countries size  
  OLS RE FE OLS RE FE OLS RE FE 
Local inputs intensity FBL2 0.03*** 0.14***  0.1** 0.17* 0.003 0.005    
  (0.01) (0.13) (0.07) (0.11) (0.05) (0.12)    
  [0.942] [0.869] [1.554] [0.074] [0.074] [0.097]    
GSTP (WTO) Agreement wto    0.14* 0.03*  0.11*    
     (0.12) (0.16) (0.16)    
     [0.171] [0.209] [0.406]    
BTA with United States usa    0.18** 0.16***  0.14***    
     (0.19) (0.11) (0.16)    
     [0.081] [0.069] [0.073]    
Size of United States ussize       0.12* 0.11*  0.09** 
        (0.06) (0.16) (0.17) 
        [1.879] [1.157] [0.201] 
Size of China chinasize       0.11*** 0.12***  0.05*** 
        (0.1) (0.02) (0.01) 
        [0.081] [0.067] [0.079] 




        (0.09) (0.12) (0.1) 
        [0.067] [0.06] [0.113] 
Industry size indus_size 0.14**  0.23***  0.17** 0.12***  0.27* 0.11***  0.003**  0.11** 0.01***  
  (0.34) (0.21) (0.13) (0.16) (0.11) (0.18) (0.11) (0.13) (0.1) 
  [0.543] [0.588] [1.262] [0.405] [0.06] [2.704] [4.555] [5.027] [0.156] 
Industrial investment indus_inves 0.17** 0.11***  0.18*  0.11**  0.12**  0.17***  0.14*** 0.16*** 0.12***  
  (0.07) (0.11) (0.05) (0.04) (0.2) (0.03) (0.12) (0.15) (0.01) 
  [0.081] [0.07] [0.09] [0.082] [0.078] [0.092] [1.969] [1.676] [0.323] 
Labor qualification w 0.12**  0.1**  0.16**  0.12*  0.140 0.150 0.12** 0.05** 0.02** 
  (0.05) (0.2) (0.14) (0.1) (0.17) (0.03) (0.02) (0.1) (0.14) 
  [0.311] [0.332] [0.69] [0.645] [0.659] [0.591] [0.025] [0.085] [0.22] 
Constant  7.1** 3.6***  4**  8.2***  4.8*  6.2***  2.5* 6.2*  3.55*  
  (0.05) (0.01) (0.02) (0.13) (0.07) (0.01) (0.06) (0.15) (0.18) 
  [0.074] [0.074] [0.096] [0.302] [0.353] [0.359] [0.07] [0.066] [0.093] 
Observation N 1136 1136 1136 
R2  0.89 0.92 0.87 0.89 0.94 0.933 0.84 0.78 0.9 
Number of groups n 196 196 196 
Breusch et Pagan' test LM 884.51* 322.34*** 1275.8* 
Fisher' test F 183*** 88*** 312*** 




CHAPTER: 7 FDI on Financial Constraints of Domestic Firms 
7.1 Introduction 
FDI flows to Nigeria dropped by USD 4.52 billion to USD 5.12 billion, the lowest in nine 
years according to the National Bureau of Statistics. Furthermore, the CIA Factbook 
highlights Nigeria's FDI stock reached USD 98.73 billion in 2016, a 3.03% increase from 
2015. FDI stock abroad also increased to 13.71 billion USD, a 10.77% increase from 2015. 
Economic theory predicts that financial development improves firms’ access to external 
finance by mitigating information asymmetry and contracting imperfections that exist 
between the suppliers of finance and firms in need of the finance. External funds are 
generally thought to be costlier than internal finance because outsiders have less control over 
the borrower's actions (see for example, Jensen and Meckling, 1976) or because they know 
less about what the borrower will do with the funds (see Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981; Myers & 
Majluf, 1984). La Porta, et al. (1997) are of the view that the problem of firm’s access to 
finance is more severe in countries with weak financial development and weaker institutions 
that cannot properly protect investors’ interests. In such situations, external finance will be 
more expensive than internal finance, and as a result, firms will be financially constrained. 
Under the case of financial constraints, a firm’s investment (and ultimately growth) is more 
likely to be limited by the available internal resources. 
Firms in developing countries typically cite financing constraints as one of their primary 
obstacles to investment. Some argue that countries should eliminate restrictions on 
international transactions and encourage incoming capital flows, especially foreign direct 
investment (FDI). FDI may ease these firms’ financing constraints by bringing in the scarce 
capital. This is one reason why policymakers in developing countries have eased restrictions 
on inward FDI and, in many instances, provided special incentives for multinational firms. If 
foreign firms borrow heavily from local banks, they may exacerbate domestic firms’ 
financing constraints by crowding them out of domestic capital markets. Foreign investors 
may borrow on domestic capital markets for a variety of reasons, including as a hedging 
device against exchange rate fluctuations or in response to artificially low domestic interest 
rates. Most observers assume that joint venture activity and acquisitions by multinationals are 
accompanied by significant capital inflows (Feldstein 2000; Hellenier 1988; Stiglitz 1998). 
Although I cannot measure the amount of local borrowing by multinationals, I can examine 




The literature dealing with the issue of whether financial development reduces financial 
constraints is related to broad macro and micro literature that tries to relate financial 
development with economic growth. At the macro-level, the issue of whether financial 
development helps economic growth is largely a contested one. Early economists such as 
Schumpeter (1912) claimed that finance was helpful for growth whereas Robinson (1952) 
claimedreverse causality. King and Levine (1993) are of the view that finance is still 
important for economic growth. 
At the micro level, Modigliani & Miller (1958) showed that in the world of perfect capital 
markets, finance is irrelevant for investment decisions. Firms can easily substitute external 
finance for internal finance. However, the assumption of a perfect capital market is rather a 
utopian idea than a practical reality. Frictions due to information asymmetry and agency costs 
create a divergence between the costs of external and internal funds, thereby constraining 
firms in their ability to fund investment projects. As a result, many later studies showed 
finance was relevant for firm investment and thereby aggregated economic growth (see 
Hubbard, 1998 for a survey). 
Overall, even if the finance-growth nexus is a highly-debated topic, the dominant view is that 
finance is important for economic growth (see Levine, 2005 for a detailed discussion). Now 
the question is how finance assists growth. One of the channels through which finance helps 
growth is by reducing firm level financing constraints. Specifically, financial development 
mitigates information asymmetry and contracting imperfections, which create a wedge 
between the cost of internal and external finance. Under the situation of relaxed credit 
constraints, firms can invest optimally and bring the needed economic growth. 
Financing constraint severely affects developing countries, particularly African countries and 
this problem can inhibit firm growth and exacerbate poverty. Using enterprise-level datasets 
from the World Bank’s Enterprise Survey, Fowowe (2017) investigated the effects of 
financing constraints on the growth of firms in Africa using both objective and subjective 
measures of access to finance. Preliminary analysis showed that small banking systems 
characterised African financial systems. Banks in Africa are poor in channelling deposits to 
the most efficient uses, signalling low intermediation efficiency. This constraint leads to 
situations where banks prefer to invest in government securities rather than lend to the private 
sector. Also, African banks have low outreach, with banks enjoying high-interest rate spreads 




The extant research provides evidence consistent with the theoretical prediction. Rajan and 
Zingales (1998) empirically found that an increase in financial development would induce a 
more significant impact on industrial growth if the industry heavily depended on external 
finance than if the industry was not naturally a heavy user of external finance. In this way, 
financial development reduced the financing constraints of firms that were dependent on 
external finance. Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) found that firm growth financed by 
external finance (i.e. long-term external debt and equity) was positively associated with the 
level of a country’s financial development. Love (2003) found that financial development 
affectedfirm investments through its impact on firms’ cost of capital. Her results also 
supported the view that financing constraints decreased with financial market development. 
Wurgler (2000) also showed that financial development improved the capital allocation 
process and found that countries with higher levels of financial development increased 
investment more in growing industries and decreased investment more in declining industries 
than financially underdeveloped economies. 
Despite the above points, Tseng (2012) further suggested that financial development might 
have some adverse effects. He claimed that much of financial development was due to 
financial liberalisation and the latter was reported to have caused excess volatility and 
instability in the capital markets (Bae, et al., 2004; Stiglitz, 2004). Such instability might 
make raising external finance difficult for firms. 
From the preceding, it is clear that the notion that financial development eases the financing 
constraints of firms is an unsettled empirical issue. It is against this background this chapter 
investigates the issue using firm-level data of selected African countries. Most studies in this 
area focus on developed countries (Baum, et al. 2011; Becker & Sivandasany, 2010; Islam & 
Mozumdar, 2007; Khurana, et al., 2006; Love, 2003; Semenov, 2006). Since financial 
development and the financial constraints faced by firms differ across countries and regions, 
an empirical study of African countries might be insightful. Financial development in Africa 
is too low (see Allen, et al., 2011; Misati & Nyamongo, 2011; Yartey & Adjasi, 2007) and 
hence the extent of firm financial constraints is perceived to be high.  
Now that FDI has promoted economic growth at the macro level, has it also improved 
domestic firms’ financing at the micro level? Huang himself provides an affirmative answer 
based on a firm survey. By using data at the provincial level, Guariglia and Poncet (2008) 




FDI had provided an alternative source of finance. Similarly, utilising firm-level data, 
Hericourt´and Poncet (2009) also showed that FDI had reduced the credit constraints of 
private firms in central Asia, a result consistent with Huang’s finding. The viewpoints of this 
literature, supporting that FDI improves domestic private firms’ financing through inputting 
funds to local partners, echo the conclusion of a cross-country study of Harrison, et al., 
(2004) which proved that FDI has lessened local enterprises’ financial constraints by bringing 
them capital (Harrison and McMillan, 2003). 
The literature above discussing FDI and financial development from financial perspectives is 
insightful, particularly as policies toward foreign investment in Africa have been under major 
revisions in recent years. Moving beyond the relevant literature, this chapter explores whether 
and how FDI has loosened domestic firms’ financing difficulties. Based on the field 
investigation, the argument that ‘FDI directly injects capital into Nigeria’s private firms’ is 
untenable. First of all, in Nigeria, it is more often the case that foreign investors receive 
financing from financial institutions than that they provide domestic firms with capital. 
Second, if FDI has provided funds to local firms, the capital receivers should be joint-venture 
partners or upstream/downstream partners of foreign companies, excluding the competitors in 
the same industry. Finally, the point that FDI finances local firms through joint ventures is 
not well grounded. For a long period, because of the biased government policy in Nigeria, 
FDI usually chose state-owned firms as their joint-venture partners.  
According to these discussions, the argument that whether and how FDI affects local firms’ 
financing environment is a topic worthy of further exploration. Focusing on this issue, this 
chapter contributes to existing literature in three respects. First, I propose a hypothesis that 
FDI could alleviate the financing constraints of domestic firms by reducing the information 
asymmetry in the credit market. This hypothesis stems from the observation that it is often 
easier for FDI-related firms to obtain external financial support. In the credit market, FDI is a 
useful signal in evaluating firms, (Harrison et al., 2004). For financial institutions, an FDI-
related firm may be more qualified and has a lower risk of default. Second, I formalise this 
hypothesis within an improved Euler framework and carry out empirical studies with firm-
level data in Nigeria. Indicators representing FDI participation from different perspectives are 
constructed and then multiplied by the proxy variable of financial constraints. The resulting 
interactive terms are introduced to the investment equation. I expect them to be negative, 
which means that a firm which has FDI or having upstream/downstream relationship with 




resources easily. Third, the investigation of the impact of FDI on the financing constraints of 
domestic firms, in fact, links two strands of literature together. One is on FDI’s linkage 
effects, and the other is on FDI’s role in the financial markets of host countries. The 
remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 7.2 speaks about the function of a 
financial system, uses the Euler equation to formalise the hypothesis. Section 7.3 defines and 
detects credit constraints; section7.4 discusses the theoretical framework of this chapter. 
Section 7.5 introduces the data as well as the indicators measuring the presence of horizontal 
and vertical FDIs. Sections 7.6 and 7.7 carry out empirical analysis and robustness check, 
respectively. Conclusions and policy implications are given in Section 7.8. 
 
7.2. The Functions of a Financial System 
The extensive review by Levine (2005) shows that a financial system provides the following 
key functions, which helps for economic growth. They produce information ex-ante about 
possible investments and allocate capital; monitor investments and exert corporate 
governance after providing finance; facilitate the trading, diversification, and management of 
risk; mobilising and pool savings and easing the exchange of goods and services. The first 
two functions are very important for firms’ access to finance, and I discuss them at some 
length (Levine, 2005) 
Without intermediaries, each investor would face the large fixed cost associated with 
evaluating firms, managers, and economic conditions (Boyd and Prescott, 1986). By 
improving information on firms, managers, and economic conditions, financial intermediaries 
can accelerate economic growth. Assuming that many entrepreneurs solicit capital and that 
capital is scarce, financial intermediaries that produce better information on firms will 
thereby attract funds for more promising firms and induce a more efficient allocation of 
capital (Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990). Allen (1990) also develops models where 
financial intermediaries arise to produce information on firms and sell this information to 
savers. 
Without effective governance, providers of capital may hesitate to extend finance to firms. 
For instance, stock markets enable better governance (align the interest of owners and 
managers) by linking managerial compensation to stock prices (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). 
Further, the threat of takeover aligns managerial interest with owners in well-developed stock 




Debt contracts also may lower the cost of monitoring firm insiders and thereby improve 
corporate governance. Using Jensen’s “free cash flow argument”, Aghion, Dewatripont and 
Rey (1999) show that debt instruments reduce the amount of free cash available to firms. 
This, in turn, reduces managerial slack and accelerates the rate at which managers adopt new 
technologies. 
Financial intermediaries such as banks also improve governance. Diamond (1984) develops a 
theoretical model in this regard. The intermediary mobilises the savings of many individuals 
and lends these resources to firms. This “delegated monitor” economises on aggregate 
monitoring costs and eliminates the free-rider problem since the intermediary does the 
monitoring for all the investors. 
The two basic functions of financial systems in solving information asymmetry and corporate 
governance are very critical to firms’ access to finance. Empirical evidence in this regard, i.e. 
the role of financial development in relaxing credit constraints is found by Baum et al. 
(2011), Becker and Sivandasany (2010),  Islam and Mozumdar (2007), Khurana et al. (2006), 
Love (2003), Rajan and Zingales (1998), Semenov (2006) and Tseng (2012). 
Furthermore, financial development has other benefits. It facilitates the allocation of credit to 
profitable firms and those firms with good investment opportunities (Bertrand, Schoar and 
Thesmar, 2007). It also helps the firms to grow faster (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 
1998). 
In summary, it is reasonable to expect that firms in countries with more developed financial 
systems to be less financially constrained than firms in countries with less developed 
financial systems. With more access to external finance, firms will invest optimally. This 
leads to firms’ growth, which in turn is translated into aggregate economic growth. 
 
7.3. Defining and Detecting Credit Constraints 
There are two ways of analysing the distribution of credit constraints among enterprises. The 
exogenous way stipulates taking two distinct groups of enterprises whose members are a 
priori likely to face different levels of credit constraints – e.g. small and large enterprises or 
domestic and foreign-owned firms – and then measure differences in their activity related to 
financial markets. This strand of literature is represented by Bond and Meghir (1994), Terra 




Russo and Rossi (2001), or Rizov (2004) did, it is possible to make an endogenous separation 
of constrained and unconstrained enterprises. In the endogenous approach, the status of being 
financially constrained is determined by a few financial indicators (financing behaviour). The 
cited author defined credit constraint as a situation when a firm demands more loans than 
markets are willing to supply. He identified the credit-constrained firms as those who, on the 
one hand, have a high growth of sales and low cash flow (indirect signs of high demand for 
external financing) and, on the other hand, receive no bank loans or do receive some loans 
but also issue new shares. In general, a firm is credit constrained if it cannot borrow as much 
as it wants under the current interest rates. 
According to the work by Rizov (2004), it turned out that the tangible fixed assets, age of 
firm, working capital, and more advanced corporate governance (e.g. especially the status of 
public limited companies but also, though to lesser extent and with more uncertainty, private 
limited companies) reduce the probability of being credit-constrained. That is because of size, 
age, and the mentioned legal regimes, information asymmetry between the borrower and the 
lender is reduced. Lower collateral (higher debt-to-equity ratio) and higher labour intensity 
(employees-to-assets ratio) contribute to the higher probability of experiencing credit 
constraints. In the case of imperfect capital markets, with uncertainty about the future, less 
collateral means higher default risk. According to Rizov (2004), labour intensity is the proxy 
of the technological obsolescence and thus low expected profitability. The impact of 
ownership appeared unclear. 
Harrison and McMillan (2003) utilised the enhanced Euler model of intertemporal allocation 
of investment to detect credit constraints. The model explains the optimal future investment 
(relative to the capital stock) of an enterprise determined by the expectations based on the 
information available currently. In other words, all decisions concerning the future 
investment are taken at a point where information from the previous period is known. 
Harrison and McMillan (2003) used the following independent variables: investment-to 
capital ratio and the same ratio squared, real-cash-flow-to-capital ratio, individual cost of 
capital, and net-output-to-capital ratio. Their testing if foreign borrowing amplified credit 
constraints for the domestic enterprises was based on the idea that, with perfect capital 
markets, future investment should be determined only by a firm’s expected profitability and 





Harrison and McMillan (2003) showed that the future investment is expected to be positively 
influenced by the current credit constraints because “firms that are financially distressed 
today are forced to substitute investment tomorrow for investment today” (Harrison and 
McMillan 2003). They introduced two credit-constraint variables: current debt-to-assets and 
current interest-coverage ratios. 
 
7.4. Theoretical framework 
Most literature about credit constraints is built upon the Euler equation (Bond and Meghir 
1994; Love 2003;Whited 1992). Referring to Hericourt and Poncet (2009), I briefly introduce 
the theoretical model on this topic and formalise the hypothesis in a modified framework. 
Among related research in this field, the frequently cited paper written by Harrison and 
McMillan (2003) states that a firm subject to credit constraints if maximising the present 
discounted value of net cash flows would optimise its investment based on the following 
equation: 







                                                       (1) 
 
In equation (1), 567896: are investment and capital stock, respectively; R is the net revenue; 
#67896$ are depreciation rate and discount factor, respectively; Ω represents the financing 
constraints and E denotes the expectation operator. This equation means, that in equilibrium, 
the marginal costs of investment in periods ; and ;6 + 61 are equal. Bond and Meghir (1994) 
obtain the two partial derivatives on the right side of this equation by introducing an explicit 
adjustment cost function. On the basis of that, Hericourt´ and Poncet (2009) further simplify 
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In equations (2) and (3), = is the price of output and pI is the price of investment good; C6is 




firm does not have credit constraints (H = 0), substituting equations (2) and (3) into equation 

















+ NJK + O% + P*,JK,%&'  (4) 
 
In equation (4) I add two subscripts Q6and R to represent city and industry, respectively. SE is 
the output value =E(:, C) net of adjustment costs =G(5, :) and labor costs wL, represented 
by cash flows in the empirical section.6N and O denote the city–industry fixed effects (FEs) 
and the time effects, respectively. P is the error term. From equation (4), expected future 
investment is considered to be positively correlated with current investment but negatively 
with its square, and is positively related to the net output (Bond and Meghir, 1994). With 
regard to the negative correlation of current cash flow, Harrison and McMillan 2003) give an 
explanation, ‘A high level of current cash flow implies lower net marginal adjustment costs 
today. Because in equilibrium, marginal adjustment costs are equated across periods in 
expectation, this implies lower expected marginal adjustment costs and hence lower expected 
investment tomorrow’. 
If financing constraints exist,(H6 ≠ 60), the estimating equation needs to be reset. In the 
literature, the debt-asset ratio (denoted by EU8) is often used to proxy firms’ credit constraints 
(Harrison & McMillan 2003; Hericourt´ & Poncet 2009;Whited 1992). Including this 

















+ $VEU8*,JK,% + NJK +
O% + P*,JK,%&'                                                                                                                            (5)  
The significantly positive coefficient of EU8, i.e. the positive nexus between debt-asset ratio 
and future investment, indicates that a firm does have credit constraints. A firm with heavy 
debt burden has low repayment capacity; as a result, its further financing capability is 
restrained. Under this situation, it tends to defer investment. Equation (5) is the starting point 
of the empirical modelling. With some necessary modification, the following hypothesis can 
be tested. 
In the credit market, FDI is like a ‘visible hand’, which reduces the information asymmetry 




constraints. In the view of banks, firms with foreign capital participation usually have lower 
risk of default; industries with considerable FDI presence are often where Nigeria’s 
comparative advantage is, and thus their firms’ market prospects should be more stable; and 
firms having upstream or downstream relations with foreign-invested companies should have 
better credibility and stronger capacity. Loans to these clients are expected to improve the 
allocative efficiency of financial resources. 


















$WEU9*,JK,% + $XYE5Z*,JK,% + $[\E5Z*,JK,% + $]EE5Z*,JK,% + $'^EU8*,JK,%6. EU9=_`R`8Q` +
NJK + O% + P*,JK,%&'                                                                                                                   (6) 
 
In equation (6), EU9, a firm’s foreign capital share, is used to control the so-called ‘own-plant 
effect’ (Aitken and Harrison 1999). YE5Z, the extent to which FDI participates in an 
industry, is used to capture the ‘horizontal effect’ of foreign investment. \E5Z and EE5Z 
measure FDI’s connection with its upstream and downstream partners. They are used to 
examine the ‘vertical effect’ of foreign investment. Directly related to the hypothesis are the 
interactive terms between debt-asset ratio and FDI presence (EU9=_`R`8Q`, i.e. EU9*,JK,%, 
YE5Z*,JK,%, \E5Z*,JK,% and EE5Z*,JK,%). These terms help to capture how FDI affects firms’ 
financial constraints. If the hypothesis holds, the empirical results based on equation (6) will 
show the sign of debt-asset ratio is positive, while the sign of the interactive terms is 
negative. If the expectation is confirmed, it means that firms do have financial constraints and 
FDI has alleviated this situation. In particular, through channels of ‘within-firm’, ‘intra-
industry’ and ‘inter-industry’, FDI has positive effects on domestic financing environment. 
Different from Hericourt´ and Poncet (2009) who only introduce an interactive term between 
the ‘horizontal effect’ and debt-asset ratio, I further include ‘own-plant effect’, ‘vertical 
effect’ and their interactive terms with the debt-asset ratio in the estimating equation. 
 
7.5 Data Description and Methodology 
The data in this chapter are from a survey about Nigeria’s investment environment conducted 




service firms. Given data availability and FDI’s sector distribution in Nigeria, I selected 400 
manufacturing firms and constituted a panel. The selection is based on the upstream and 
downstream production rationalityand also based on complete data available. These firms 
were located in 5 regions as described in the survey questionnaire documents. They belonged 
to eight combined industries, food & beverage & garments, wood & furniture, machinery & 
equipment, garment, paper, publishing, printing & media, non-metallic minerals and basic& 
fabricated metals. The data information includes firms’ finance, ownership, industry and 
location. 
A key feature of the dataset used in this study is that it provides a set of subjective measures 
of access to finance which reflect firms’ perception of the business environment, as well as 
objective measures of the business environment (such as whether firms have an overdraft 
facility), which help overcome the potential shortcomings of subjective measures. The 
subjective measures suggest that financial constraint exerts a significant negative effect on 
firm growth. Also, Fowowe (2017) finds significant positive relationships between the 
objective measures of finance and firm growth; specifically, the objective measures show that 
firms that are not credit constrained experience faster growth than those that are credit 
constrained, thus prompting the author to conclude that participation in financial markets 
promotes firm growth.  
The constraints have led to several outcomes. First, African firms have limited access to 
external finance; only about 23% of African firms use loans, while about 46% of non- 
African firms have loans or lines of credit. The author attributes this state of affair to high-
interest rates, complex application procedures, and high collateral requirements, among 
others. Second, African firms rely extensively on banks for external finance, with the sample 
firms obtaining over 75% of external finance from banks. Third, African firms face high 
account fees, high minimum balance, and restrictive documentation requirements. All these 
factors inhibit firms’ ability to obtain credit. A policy implication emanating from the results 
is that firms that wish to grow must overcome credit constraints and obtain more external 
finance. Also, the development of credit rating agencies and better risk assessment 
departments in banks to ensure effective risk assessment of borrowers can reduce loan default 




Beforeconducting empirical research, I need to calculate three indicators measuring FDI 
participation. For the horizontal presence of FDI in industry s, I follow the definition of 
Javorcik (2004), which is given as follows: 
YEZ5JK,% = E9U*,JK,%* ∗ D*,JK,%]/ D*,JK,%*                                                                              (7) 
In equation (7), Fdi is the foreign capital share of the ith firm in industry s and city c; Y is its 
output level, and here I use sales value instead. FDI has a bigger presence in an industry 
where more firms have foreign capital. 
Regarding the vertical linkage of FDI, I adopt the method of Blalock (2001) and Schoors and 
van de Tol (2001). Specifically, the backward linkage with the upstream partners (such as 
suppliers of raw materials and intermediate goods) is calculated as follows: 
\EZ5JK,% = <KccdK ∗ YEZ5JK,%                                                                                            (8) 
In equation (8), HFDI is FDI’s horizontal presence, s is the upstream industry, k is the 
downstream industry (k, s = 1, . . . , 7, k _= s) and <Kc is the row vector of the input–output 
coefficient matrix, measuring the ratio of inputs from the up-stream industry s to the output 
value of the downstream industry k. The calculated BFDI measures FDI’s backward linkage 
with upstream partners. For an industry, the higher the horizontal presence of FDI and the 
more the inputs coming from the upstream industry, the more evident the backward linkage 
of foreign investment. 
The forward linkage with downstream firms (such as sellers of final products, users of 
intermediate goods) is calculated as follows: 
EEZ5JK,% = #eKedK E9U*,Je,% ∗ (D*,Je,% − f*,Je,%) / (D*,Je,% − f*,Je,%)**                   (9) 
 
In equation (9), E9U and D have the same meanings as before; since only domestic sales of a 
firm matter in forward linkage, I deduct export X from the total sales; m and s, respectively, 
are the upstream and downstream industries (m, s = 1, . . . , 7, m _= s); δms is the column 
vector of the input–output coefficient matrix, measuring the ratio of inputs from the upstream 
industry m to the output value of the downstream industry s. The calculated EEZ5 measures 




presence of FDI and the more inputs provided to the downstream industry, the more is the 
forward linkage of foreign investment. 
The constructed input-output table, including 49 industries and sub-sectors, will be used to 
calculate the vertical linkage of FDI. I take data for eight industries involved in my sample. 
The input-output table is not published annually, so I use the constructed table as the source 
of input-output coefficients on account of the sample time 2007–2014. Also, because the city-
level input-output information is not available, actually whatI rely on is the national-level 
input-output table. The variables in the empirical section include the ratio of current and next 
period investment to fixed assets, the ratio of sales to fixed assets, the ratio of total profits to 
fixed assets, debt-asset ratio, the foreign capital share of firms, as well as the FDI’s horizontal 
presence and vertical linkage. 
 
7.6 Estimation Results 
One of the most direct ways by which FDI can contribute to economic development is by 
increasing the amount of capital available in the local economy. In developing countries, in 
which capital is typically scarce relative to labour, policymakers frequently view potential 
capital injection to be the key benefit of FDI because it directly increases investment and 
gross domestic product (GDP) in the host economy (Alfaro et al. 2007, 2008, 2014;Lucas, 
1990). FDI thus allows countries to supplement capital provided via local savings with capital 
coming from abroad. However, as the following discussion will show, the extent to which 
foreign firm activity indeed generates a net increase in capital depends on local financial 
conditions (di Giovanni, 2005; Klein et al. 2002). 
Host country financial conditions may have an ambiguous effect on total FDI because they 
affect both whether a foreign investment takes place and whether it is financed through FDI. 
On the one hand, good financial conditions attract investment to a host market in part because 
they allow foreign investors to finance for an important share of their investment locally 
(Graham & Krugman 1995; Kindleberger, 1969; Lipsey, 2004). Local financing may be 
preferable to cross-border financing because it allows investors to hedge the exchange rate 
risk associated with sales or cost denominated in the local market currency. On the other 
hand, precisely because investors are likely to substitute FDI with local funds, in countries 
with good financial markets the total value of capital that foreign firms bring from aboard 




host country financing (provided primarily in the form of debt) indeed accounts for a larger 
share of financing than what is provided by U.S. parents. 
Beyond lowering the extent of capital inflows, foreign firms borrowing heavily from local 
banks may exacerbate domestic firms’ financing constraints by crowding them out of 
domestic capital markets. Harrison & McMillan (2003) analyse the behaviour of mostly 
French multinationals operating in Côte d’Ivoire, finding not only that domestic firms are 
more credit-constrained than foreign firms, but that borrowing by foreign firms exacerbates 
the credit constraints of domestic firms. In a country such as Côte d’Ivoire, with numerous 
market imperfections and with credit access rationed due to interest-rate ceilings, the total 
pool of capital available for local firms did not increase; rather banks substituted lending to 
domestic with lending to foreign firms. Harrison, et al. (2004), on the other hand, show 
results suggesting that FDI tends to crowd in finance for domestic enterprises across a panel 
of countries. That is, as foreign investment increases, the amount of credit available to 
domestically owned firms rises. These two studies highlight that the effect of FDI on local 
credit constraints is heterogeneous across countries, with important complementarities 
between FDI and pre-existing local financial conditions. 
Foreign firms are less likely to tap into local capital markets in countries where financial 
conditions are poor, and therefore such countries may attract more FDI. Lehmann et al. 
(2004) indeed find that in developing countries, the financing share from U.S. parents is 45% 
(as opposed to 30% in industrial countries), much of it provided in the form of equity. Desai 
et al. (2004) find that firms substitute for missing or inefficient local debt markets also 
through their internal capital markets, in the form of inter-company loans. They show foreign 
affiliates of U.S. firms in countries with weak capital markets to offset approximately three-
quarters of reductions in external borrowing with internal funds from parent companies. 
Local affiliates are more likely to opportunistically tap into parent firms’ internal resources 
through inter-company loans when local credit conditions deteriorate or in times of crisis. 
While this suggests that internal capital markets can alleviate external financing constraints, 
limits to multinational firms’ total resources and intra-firm competition for such resources 
may still restrict the growth of local affiliates in underdeveloped financial markets and render 
the size of projects suboptimal, as argued by Feinberg & Phillips (2004). 
In this section, the work is divided into two parts. First, I estimate equation (6) with the full 




the equation with domestic firms only. Because ‘foreign-invested firms’ can be defined 
differently, I have two types of domestic firms, Domestic Firms (I) and (II). Given that the 
firms’ ownership types act as a crucial determinant in accessing financing resources, I also 
analyse state-owned firms and private firms separately. 
The ownership structure is based on the questionnaire manual; and the works of H’ericourt 
and Poncet (2009), defined domestic firms has those firms with foreign capital less that 49%. 
The ownership structure is also based on the capital accumulation per firm. 
 
7.6.1 All firms included 
Manova (2006) has provided empirical support for this approach by showing that countries 
with better developed financial systems tend to export relatively more in highly external 
capital dependent industries and sectors with fewer collateralizable assets. A theoretical 
model and a calibration exercise undertaken by Alfaro et al. (2006) has suggested that well 
developed local financial markets are neededfor host countries to benefit from spillovers from 
foreign direct investment (FDI). It is because access to financing allows local entrepreneurs 
to start supplying MNCs and in this way benefit from knowledge spillovers from FDI. 
Moreover, indeed, in a cross-country growth regression, Alfaro et al. (2004, 2017) have 
found that FDI inflows contributed to a faster economic growth only in the presence of well-
developed financial markets. 
 
Ever since the influential paper by Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988),a large number of 
studies have examined the effects of liquidity constraints on investment. These papers 
challenged the neoclassical theory of investment, which suggested that the decision to invest 
was driven solely by the relative prices, and a firm’s financial structure was irrelevant to 
investment since external funds provided a perfect substitute for internal capital. 
Alternatively, as stated by Modigliani and Miller (1958), with perfect capital markets, a 
firm’s investment decision is independent of its financial condition. The alternative research 
agenda proposed by Fazzari et al. (1988) was based on the burgeoning informational 
asymmetries literature: in an environment with informational asymmetries, external funds 
may be costlier and thus provide an imperfect substitute for internal capital. The difference 




with borrowers. If this is the case, then the investment should respond positively to increases 
in internal funds available for investment. 
The principal way of testing this hypothesis is to estimate the investment equation including a 
measure of the expected profitability of the firm along with a measure of its net worth. To the 
extent that the measure of net worth (usually cash flow) predicts investment behaviour, 
researchers have concluded that financing constraints are present. 
The nature and the interpretation of the link between investment and cash flow are subject to 
an on-going debate. One stream of the literature, starting with Fazzari et al. (1988) and 
followed by Hoshi et al. (1991), Lizal and Svejnar (2002) and others, argues that investment 
cash flow sensitivities can be interpreted as evidence of financial constraints. However, 
Kaplan and Zingales (1997, 2000) questions the approach of Fazzari et al. (1988) and provide 
evidence suggesting that investment-cash flow sensitivity need not be a measure of liquidity 
constraints due to non-monotonicities. Fazzari et al. (2000) challenge their conclusions and 
derive the conditions under which the relationship between investment and cash flow is 
monotonic. Fazzari et al. (2000) basically argue that if the a priori classification of firms is 
based on criteria that result in large differences in the marginal cost of external funds across 
groups, constrained firms with large cost of external financing will have larger investments 
cash flow sensitivity than the relatively unconstrained firms that have very small cost of 
external funds. Although the debate on the interpretation of the investment cash flow 
sensitivity is still unresolved, I follow the Fazzari et al. (1988) argument in this chapter. 
The estimation results of all firms are shown in Table 7.1 in the appendix below. In column 
(1), after the three dummy variables, city–industry, firm ownership and year, are controlled, 
current investment (I/K)t and its square are significantly positive and negative. The sales-
asset ratio Y is significantly positive. These results are consistent with the findings in 
previous studies. Furthermore, I can see that the ratio of cash flow to assets CF is negative 
but not significant, while the debt-asset ratio Fin is significantly positive. According to 
Harrison and McMillan (2003), more current cash flow means lower adjustment cost of 
current investment. In the equilibrium of equated marginal adjustment cost between periods, 
it suggests a lower adjustment cost and investment in the next period (Bond & Meghir, 1994; 
and Harrison & McMillan, 2003;Whited, 1992). A firm with a heavy debt burden is likely to 
have huge constraints in financing externally; as a result, it usually has to postpone 




situation, rather than ‘only been determined by the expected profitability’ as Tobin’s Q theory 
claims. 
Columns (2) and (3) further introduce the firm’s foreign capital share FDI, the horizontal 
presence of foreign investment HFDI, backward linkage BFDI and forward linkage FFDI. 
These variables are not significant, but the debt-asset ratio remains significantly positive, 
once again showing that firms’ investment is sensitive to their financial situation. As pointed 
out earlier, by delivering the information of firms’ “qualification” to financial institutions, 
FDI directs funds to firms which have a relationship with it, and thus reduces the sensitivity 
of these firms’ investment to debt. To verify this, columns (4)– (7) add the interactive terms 
of Fin with FDI, HDFI, BFDI, and FFDI respectively. As expected, these interactive terms 
are all negative, among which the first three are significant. The results for other variables 
remain the same. This shows that, for a firm, the more foreign capital share it has, the greater 
participation of foreign investment in the industry where it stays, or the stronger vertical 
linkage with foreign investment (forward linkage with FDI in this case) of the industry, its 
investment will be less susceptible to the debt level. In other words, its financing constraints 
are more likely to be alleviated. 
As mentioned above, H´ericourt and Poncet (2009) add an interactive term between debt-
asset ratio and FDI’s horizontal presence, and explain its significantly negative sign as 
evidence thatthrough direct injection of funds, FDI alleviates financing constraints faced by 
local businesses.The interaction terms added as indicated in the works of H’ericourt and 
Poncet (2009) indicate the relationship between financial constraint and FDI in the 
measurement of domestic performance. The interaction term added which is debt asset ratio 
is the ratio that measures the extent of a company’s leverage and the FDI horizontal presence 
refers to a foreign business operating in the same industry domestically. The result indicates a 
negative sign which mean there is evidence that direct injection of funds leads to the 
alleviation of financial constraints of domestic firms by FDI within the same operating 
industry.It is understandable that FDI provides financing for its joint ventures with local firms 
or its upstream or downstream partners, but it is unbelievable that it would wish to provide 
funds to competitors in the same industry. In addition, the explanation is more persuasive. 
FDI’s presence signals an industry’s competitiveness to banks, thereby affecting the credit 
the whole industry can get. Also, I have introduced Fin∗Fdi and Fin∗HFDI in the empirical 
model, which helps to identify whether FDI only directs the funds to the firm in which it has 




coefficients of the interactive terms in columns (4) and (5), I find that, through horizontal 
presence, half of the financing-improving effect goes to its firm and another half ‘spill-overs’ 
to other firms in the same industry. 
Based on columns (4)– (6), threshold values can be obtained. For a firm, when its foreign 
capital share is larger than 39%, the foreign investment share of its industry is more than 26% 
or its industry’s forward linkage with foreign investment is beyond 1.2%, its debt level no 
longer plagues the investment. The first threshold value tells that whether FDI can attract 
credit to its firm depends on whether or not it dominates the firm. From a bank’s point of 
view, a firm controlled by foreign investors may be more secure, and therefore the bank tends 
to provide large amounts of credit. For horizontal effect, an industry with over one-quarter of 
capital from FDI must be an industry with stronginternational comparative advantage. 
Providing credit to the firms in this industry should also be safe. In Nigeria, private firms are 
facing serious financial constraints. It can be credibly imagined that the effect of FDI may 
change with the ownership type of the firms. Based upon the questionnaire, I divide the 
sample into two subsamples, private firms and state-owned firms. The estimation results are 
shown in Table 7.2 in the appendix below. Columns (1)– (4) correspond to the private firms. 
The results are almost the same as those in Table 7.1. The significantly positive result of Fin 
confirms again that private firms are credit constrained. Except for Fin∗ FFDI the other three 
interactive terms are significantly negative. For a firm, when its foreign capital share is more 
than 39%, or the foreign investment share of its industry is more than 14% or its industry’s 
forward linkage with foreign investment is more than 0.7%, the investment is no longer 
subject to its debt. These findings are very close to the results of the full sample, suggesting 
that only private firms have financing constraints and FDI alleviates only their financing 
difficulties. The subsequent examination of state-owned firms justifies this point, as shown in 
columns (1)– (4). Different from private firms, the coefficient of Fin now is no longer 
significant, indicating that the financial situation will not affect the investment of state-owned 
firms, confirming the existence of ‘soft budget constraints’ (Qian and Roland 1998); the 
interactive terms are also not significant, implying that FDI does not have any impact on the 





7.6.2. Foreign-invested firms excluded 
The above analysis is aimed at all firms, including foreign-invested firms. Now I turn to 
domestic firms. First, I define ‘those firms with foreign capital share less than 49%’ 
(H´ericourt and Poncet 2009) as Domestic Firms (I). The corresponding estimation results are 
seen in Table 7.3. For the variable of Fin, its sign and significance are consistent with Table 
7.1. All interactive terms are negative; only Fin∗ FFDI is still insignificant. After calculation, 
for a domestic firm, when its foreign capital share is more than 11%, the foreign capital share 
of its industry more than 19%, or its industry’s forward linkage with foreign investment more 
than 1.2%, its investment is not constrained by the debt anylonger. In comparison with Table 
7.1, the threshold value of a firm’s foreign capital share decreases from 39% to 11%, which 
reminds the author that to guide credits to a domestic firm does not require the foreign 
investor to be the majority stakeholder in the firm. Sorted by ownership type for Domestic 
Firm (I), the estimation results are presented in Table 7.4. Among them, columns (1)– (4) 
refer to the private firms, the results of which are similar to those in Table 7.3, while columns 
(1)–(4) report the estimation results for SOEs. The coefficients of Fin and the interaction 
terms are not significant, showing that the financial situation of state-owned firms does not 
affect their investment, and they do not need FDI’s ‘signalling’ effect in financing.  
According to Nigerian law, ‘a firm with equal to or more than 25% of foreign capital share’ is 
a foreign-invested firm. Putting these companies aside, I get Domestic Firms (II). The 
estimation results are shown in Table 7.5. Fin is still significantly positive. The interactive 
terms are negative, but only Fin∗HFDI is significant. Other interactive terms are not 
significant, probably because the effects of FDI on firms of different ownership have offset 
each other. Accordingly, I further divide the sample into state-owned firms and private firms 
as before. Estimates of the private firms are seen in columns (1)– (4), Table 7.6. Fin is still 
significantly positive. The interactive terms are negative, but now Fin∗Fdi is not significant, 
and Fin∗ FFDI is significantly negative. For a domestic private firm, when the horizontal 
presence of foreign investment is more than 20%, or forward linkage with FDI beyond 0.7%, 
or the backward nexus with foreign capital bigger than 0.9%, its financing constraints will be 
reduced. Now Fin∗Fdi is negative but insignificant. The reason is that, on the one hand, now 
only a few private firms have a foreign capital share; on the other hand, the variation of the 
firms’ foreign capital share is very small, leading to the unimportance of the ‘own-plant 




Table 7.7 in the appendix is a summary of the threshold values. As is stated above, these 
values indicate ‘the conditions for FDI participation to be met if their debt level no longer 
postpones private firms' investment’. Since state-owned firms do not have financing 
constraints, the table summarises threshold values for private firms only. According to the 
questionnaire, I find that firms meeting the condition of horizontal presence are mostly 
coming from machinery & equipment, garments and paper, but those meeting the condition 
of backward linkage are mainly from machinery& equipment, publishing, printing & media. 
For forward linkage, firms from the basic& fabricated metal, meet the condition first. 
Beneito, Rochina-Barrachina and Sanchis’s (2016) findings suggest that foreign capital 
participation alleviates the negative impact of credit constraints on firms.In their work, they 
investigated the role of foreign capital participation as a means for firms to overcome the 
obstacle posed by credit constraints to sustain R&D investments. Using data for Spanish 
manufacturing firms in the period 1990–2006, they showed that firms with foreign capital 
were significantly less likely to stop already initiated R&D projects and more likely to sustain 
R&D investment when facing credit constraints. Their results are robust to positive selection 
into foreign capital participation, which they control through a set of variables chosen from a 
propensity score estimation, and to firms fixed-effects. 
This chapter investigates the link between inward FDI and credit activity in Nigeria, using a 
large and recent firm-level database. I pay particular attention to the impact of domestic 
access to finance in this regard, as the financial system in Nigeria has been widely described 
as inefficient and skewed towards SOEs. Hence, it is of immense policy interest to see how 
this may affect domestic firms’ ability to benefit (or otherwise) from inward FDI.  
The econometric analysis shows that access to finance is an important issue for firms’ credit 
activity, and their ability to benefit from inward FDI. This, however, is mainly the case for 
private and collectively owned firms and less so for state-owned firms which are the 
beneficiaries from the current financial system.  
In particular,I find that firms with foreign capital participation or those with good access to 
domestic bank loans innovate more than others – these are the firms with low financial 
constraints. I also find that inward FDI at the sectoral level is positively associated with 
domestic-innovative activity only if firms engage in own R&D activities (i.e., have some 
“absorptive capacity”) or if they have good access to domestic finance. The latter points to a 




inward FDI. However, exploiting a feature of the dataset and categorising firms into state-
owned, private, and collectively owned enterprises shows that access to finance only plays a 
role for the latter two. As is well-documented, SOEs are largelyinefficient but enjoy 
preferential access to domestic financial resources, hence, access to finance provides no 
bottleneck to them. Furthermore, in previous chapters, I differentiate the effect of sector-level 
inward FDI into technology transfer and FDI affecting domestic credit opportunities. Here I 
find that the latter is of very little significance for SOEs and is also independent of their 
access to finance. By contrast, it is an important channel through which FDI affects the 
innovation of domestic private and collectively owned enterprises. 
This chapter analysed the role of foreign direct investment in financing gross fixed capital 
formation and its relation to other sources of financing as well as to the variables describing 
the economic environment. The empirical results showed that FDI, domestic credit and local 
capital markets are all important financing sources for capital formation, with FDI having a 
substantially greater impact than domestic credit and capital market financing, while such a 
relation could not be found for state subsidies and foreign credit. It was also shown that 
foreign direct investment was a substitute for domestic credit while foreign credit was 
positively related to FDI, taking into account the economic environment. The empirical 
analysis also confirmed results from the literature related to the considerable importance of 
natural resources and privatisation revenues as determinants of FDI. 
7.7. Robustness check and some extensions 
7.7.1. Do foreign-invested companies have credit constraints? 
So far, I have only found credit constraints among domestic private firms. Does this mean 
that the investments of foreign firms are not subject to their financial situation such as in the 
case of state-owned firms? To tackle this issue, I conduct estimation with two types of 
foreign-invested firms. For firms with foreign capital share greater than or equal to 49%, I 
find that the current investment and its squared term are respectively, significantly positive; 
Fin is mostly positive, but not significant; FDI itself is significantly positive, but horizontal 
presence and vertical linkage are not significant; all interactive terms are insignificant. For 
firms with foreign capital shares larger than or equal to 25%, FDI is positive but not 
significant, and the results for the other variables are similar. This indicates that foreign firms 
do not have any credit constraints, (see table 7.8). The reasons may be twofold. On the one 
hand, foreign investment has enjoyed a super-national treatment in Nigeria for a long time, 




acquire financing not only in Nigeria but also in the international market. In a perfect 
financial market, a company’s investment tends to ‘only [depend] on the expected return’ as 
Tobin’s Q theory proposes (Coric, 2010). 
 
7.8 Conclusion 
The role of FDI in economic growth is a highly-contested topic in the economics and finance 
literature. One of the channels through which financial development can help a country’s 
economic growth is by alleviating firm financing constraints. In this connection, the current 
study addressed the effect of financial development in reducing firm level financing 
constraints, and this will provide some evidence towards the larger debate on the finance-
growth nexus. The result of this study indicates that FDI helps to reduce firm-level financial 
constraints. One way in which FDI reduces financing constraints is by mitigating information 
asymmetry and contracting imperfections.  
To identify credit constraints, I follow the investment literature pioneered by Fazzari et al. 
(1988) by examining the extent to which Nigerian firms’ investment is affected by the 
availability of internal finance. 
Based upon the World Bank’s firm data concerning Nigeria’s investment environment, this 
chapter explores the impact of FDI inflow on the financing situation of domestic firms. Using 
an augmented Euler equation, I carry out empirical studies and get some important 
conclusions. First, Nigeria’s private firms have credit constraints, while foreign-invested 
firms and state-owned firms do not. The estimation results show that private firms with 
higher debt-asset ratio are more likely to defer investment. This finding conflicts with 
Tobin’s Q theory, which claims that in a perfect financial market, firms’ investment only 
depends on the expected return. Because of the so-called ‘soft budget constraints’, state-
owned firms do not have to worry about their debt burden when investing. With Nigeria’s 
preferential policies and the help of parent companies, foreign-invested firms do not take 
their financial situation into account either. Second, FDI alleviates the financing constraints 
of private firms by ‘signalling’ but does not affect state-owned firms and foreign-invested 
firms. In a financial market far from perfect, FDI is like ‘a visible hand’, reducing the 
information asymmetry between supply and demand of financial resources. FDI-related firms 
are often considered as low-risk customers with high credibility. Also, the FDI’s participation 




investment is no longer constrained by the debt when foreign participation reaches a certain 
level. In the full sample, when the firm’s foreign capital share is more than 50% or foreign 
investment share of its industry reaches 40%, or its industry has more than 1% forward 
linkage with FDI, the debt burden will not delay its investment. A similar conclusion can be 
drawn for domestic private firms with a foreign capital share of less than 49%. Firms with 
40% foreign capital share or more can effectively alleviate their credit constraints. When 
domestic private firms are confined to those firms with less than 25% of foreign capital share, 
backward linkage with FDI also proves to be helpful in improving the financing environment. 
The results suggest that private Nigerian firms face severe financial constraints while I find 
no such constraints for state-owned and foreign enterprises. The findings thus confirm the 
hypothesis of Huang (2003) that capital markets in developing countries are characterised by 
political pecking order based on firms’ ownership type. This finding of discrimination against 
private firms by financial institutions is at odds with the observation that these firms are the 
engine role of growth in the Nigerian economy. Therefore, I aimed to shed further light on 
the circumstances under which financial distortions may not represent an impediment to 
economic activity. I test two conditioning factors of the effectiveness of the discrimination of 
private firms by financial institutions: (1) the role of FDI in funding the Nigerian corporate 
sector and (2) the size of the state-owned corporate sector. I identify that FDI is one 
mechanism that helps firms to overcome financial constraints. FDI brings in the scarce 
capital, eases financing constraints and spurs growth and investment of private firms. The 
size of the state-owned corporate sector also appears to affect the extent to which private 
firms’ investment depends on internal finance. Financing constraints are found to be 
increasing the relative size of the state sector. Indeed, firms competing directly with 
numerous state-owned enterprises in the same province/industry depend more strongly on 
their internally generated funds for their investment. 
Overall, the results support the conjecture of Boyreau-Debray and Wei (2005) that the state-
owned banking sector favours inefficient State-Owned firms at the expense of privately 
owned firms, which face financial constraints that hinder them from growing. Moreover, the 
results indicate that private firms located in a location/sector where foreign capital is 
abundant and where the state sector is low are more able to overcome the financial market 
inefficiencies caused by Nigerian economic institutions and policies. The findings allow the 
author to predict the likely beneficial impact of the ongoing reforms inducing further 




economy. The author interprets the findings as evidence that credit constraints for private 
firms are likely to be mitigated by the growing importance of foreign firms in the Nigerian 
economy as well as the ongoing decline of the state economic predominance. Indeed, recent 
developments demonstrate a continuing shift away from state ownership.  
When technological progress and collapsing trade barriers precipitated the fragmentation of 
production processes and the emergence of global value chains, MNCs assumed a key role in 
the global production, investment, and trade in final and intermediate goods. Developing 
economies are accounting for a growing share of corresponding increases in global levels of 
foreign direct investment (FDI), posing both opportunities and challenges to host countries 
and the global economy as a whole. 
Assessing the impact of the multinational activity on host country development has been a 
major topic of economic research and policy debates. Ambiguous evidence from decades of 
inquiry into when and how the host countries derive benefits from foreign-firm activities 
notwithstanding, one finding that has emerged is that local conditions moderate the effects. 
Financial markets play a crucial role. 
In the works of Alfaro and Chauvin (2016) they decomposed anticipated development 
benefits into three broad sources – capital inflows, macroeconomic benefits (GDP growth, 
aggregate productivity, exports) and microeconomic benefits (positive externalities from 
spillovers, linkages, self-upgrading, and reallocation). FDI’s relative contribution to these 
sources of development benefits appears to vary with levels of financial development. 
Foreign firms will be more likely to bring external capital in financially underdeveloped 
economies than in developed economies, where they can raise funds locally. Both types of 
economies are likely to benefit from increases in wages and exports due to the foreign 
presence, albeit through potentially different channels. While in underdeveloped economies, 
exports may rise because foreign firms are less financially constrained and can better afford 
the fixed cost of exporting, in developed economies exports may result from foreign firms 
shunning greater competition in local markets. Greater microeconomic benefits from FDI 
spillovers, positive linkages, and competitive pressures are more likely to accrue in 
economies with well-developed financial markets where local firms can respond to these 
opportunities and competitive threats via investments that increase their productivity. 
The complementarity between FDI and financial market conditions implies that policies 




especially for firms in sectors most likely to be affected by the presence of foreign companies 
(i.e., in competing and vertically related industries). The large size of gains from competition 
and reallocation of resources also points to the importance of policies that eliminate barriers 
to the movement of labour and capital between firms. 
Despite recent advances, the understanding of how financial constraints affect multinational 
firm activity and economic development benefits derived from FDI is still limited. Existing 
research suggests that MNCs employ internalisation to overcome imperfections in arm’s 
length markets, for example in markets for inputs. To what extent MNCs internalise markets 
for capital and evidence of the effectiveness of this strategy is mixed. Well-designed cross-
country studies could determine the level of market imperfection at which internalisation 
becomes optimal. While research has focused on positive development outcomes from FDI, I 
have less understanding of potentially negative effects, for example how financial constraints 
affect competition between local firms and foreign entrants or whether foreign firms use their 
financial advantage to squeeze out competition and derive monopoly power in host markets. 
More detailed studies of the heterogeneous effects on local firms from the foreign presence 
would increase the understanding of the mixed effects of FDI found at the aggregate level. 
Finally, while the studies suggest that institutional features of capital, labour, and other factor 
markets affect productivity gains from FDI, the author believes there is still little evidence on 
the causal effect of policies that affect the institutional environment of FDI. These represent 
fruitful areas for future inquiry. 
Regarding policy implication, the importance of the work lies in two respects. First, the role 
of FDI in Nigeria should be re-examined. For emerging economies, besides providing capital 
and transferring technology, FDI is also ‘a market signal’. The results of this chapter reminds 
the author that it is not enough to evaluate FDI’s role only from traditional perspectives. For 
emerging countries, FDI also plays a role in correcting market failure and imperfection. Just 
as mentioned before, it is a breakthrough in the research areas to relate Nigeria’s FDI inflow 
with the inefficiency of its financial system. This chapter has furthered this point. Especially, 
the author believes that FDI improves the financing conditions of private firms by inducing 
funds to them. Secondly, the author mentioned that in interpreting the result, there should be 
some caution in assessing the efficiency of Nigeria’s financial resource allocation. FDI is a 
good example, which directs funds to those qualified private firms. One might ask how 
important the effects of FDI are in this regard. The author admits that FDI’s role is 




when the financial system has not been ready for an immediate radical reform, FDI tends to 
play an important role. ‘Following FDI’ is just a ‘fast-track’ for the financial sector to catch 
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D1 (Industry Distribution by City/Region) 
D2 (% of Domestic / State Ownership) 
D3 (Year 2007, 2010 and 2014)  
 
 1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8  
Food & Beverage Wood & Furniture Machinery and Equipment  Garments   Paper  Publishing, Printing & media Non-metallic Minerals Basic and Fabricated metal 
OLS RE FE OLS RE FE OLS RE FE OLS RE FE OLS RE FE OLS RE FE OLS RE FE OLS RE FE 
0.004*** 0.141*** 0.181** 0.121* 0.131*** 0.101*** 0.131*** 0.221*** 0.161*** 0.111*** 0.261*** 0.101*** -0.006 0.101*** 0.001*** 0.111*** 0.101*** 0.081*** 0.161*** -0.006 -0.004 0.101*** 0.261*** 0.101*** 
0.001 0.011 0.051 0.021 0.041 0.021 0.331 0.201 0.121 0.151 0.101 0.171 0.101 0.121 0.091 0.051 0.151 0.161 0.101 0.041 0.111 0.021 0.101 0.171 
0.140 0.141 0.122 1.344 1.055 1.523 0.534 0.579 1.253 -0.414 -0.069 2.695 -4.564 -5.036 -0.165 1.870 1.148 0.192 0.065 0.065 0.088 1.523 -0.069 2.695 
0.041*** 0.111* 0.041* 0.041* 0.061** 0.111*** 0.161* 0.101* 0.171* 0.101* 0.111* 0.161* 0.131** 0.151** 0.111** 0.101* 0.111*** 0.041** 0.131** 0.021* 0.101* 0.111* 0.111* 0.161* 
0.021 0.041 0.021 0.041 0.011 0.051 0.061 0.101 0.041 0.031 0.191 0.021 0.111 0.141 0.001 0.091 0.011 0.001 0.111 0.151 0.151 0.051 0.191 0.021 
0.138 0.143 0.099 1.879 1.109 0.048 0.072 0.061 0.081 0.073 0.069 0.083 1.960 1.667 -0.332 0.072 0.058 0.070 0.162 0.200 0.397 0.048 0.069 0.083 
0.211*** 0.181** 0.101** 0.161*** 0.061*** 0.121*** 0.111** 0.091* 0.151* 0.111** 0.131** 0.141** 0.111* 0.041* 0.011* 0.091** 0.021** 0.181** 0.171** 0.151* 0.161* 0.121** 0.131** 0.141* 
0.031 0.101 0.011 0.031 0.031 0.091 0.041 0.191 0.131 0.091 0.161 0.021 0.011 0.091 0.131 0.081 0.111 0.091 0.181 0.101 0.031 0.091 0.161 0.021 
1.420 1.316 1.246 1.138 1.031 1.251 0.302 0.323 0.681 0.636 0.650 0.582 0.016 0.076 0.211 0.058 0.051 0.104 0.072 0.060 1.138 1.251 0.650 0.582 
-0.121 -0.131 -0.231 -0.101 -0.131 -0.141 -1.751 -1.091 -1.551 -2.891 -0.131 -0.221 - 0.161** - 0.111** - 0.161** -0.13 -0.151 -0.111 -0.111 -0.091 -0.101 -0.141 -0.131 -0.221 
0.001 0.011 0.001 0.011 0.001 0.011 0.391 1.491 0.691 1.291 0.331 0.201 0.121 0.151 0.021 0.111 0.141 0.001 0.041 0.191 0.011 0.011 0.331 0.201 
0.202 0.242 0.501 0.142 0.164 0.091 0.072 0.061 0.081 0.073 0.069 0.083 1.960 1.667 -0.332 0.072 0.058 0.070 0.162 0.200 0.142 0.091 0.069 0.083 
0.341* 0.331* 0.301** 0.311* 0.141** 0.231*** 0.231* 0.101* 0.131* 0.141* 0.341** 0.331*** 0.301** 0.311*** 0.101** 0.091*** 0.161** 0.131** 0.101* -0.006 0.311* 0.231** 0.341* 0.331* 
0.011 0.001 0.011 0.011 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.011 0.001 0.011 0.011 0.001 0.011 0.011 0.031 0.191 0.021 0.111 0.171 0.101 0.011 0.001 0.011 0.001 
1.112 1.309 3.167 0.081 0.075 0.117 0.072 0.061 0.081 0.073 0.069 0.083 1.960 1.667 -0.332 0.072 0.058 0.070 0.162 0.200 0.081 0.117 0.069 0.083 
   -0.001 -0.421 -1.001 -0.101 -0.161 -0.161 -0.131 -0.151 -0.011 -1.071 -0.241 -1.141 -1.761 -0.151 -0.111 -0.101 -0.121 -0.001 -1.001 -0.151 -0.011 
   -0.359 -0.179 -0.589 -0.439 -1.119 2.701 -1.059 -1.419 -0.119 -0.169 1.981 -1.919 -1.769 0.131 0.091 0.161 0.021 -0.359 -0.589 -1.419 -0.119 
   0.011 0.001 0.001 0.072 0.061 0.081 0.073 0.069 0.083 1.960 1.667 -0.332 0.072 0.058 0.070 0.162 0.200 0.011 0.001 0.069 0.083 
      1.6907 0.2107 0.3307 0.3007 0.3107 0.9207 0.261 0.3407 0.021 0.101 0.261 0.101 -0.006 0.101 2.0407 2.0807 0.3107 0.9207 
      -1.179 0.721 0.001 0.011 0.011 -1.969 0.101 0.011 0.101 0.121 0.101 0.171 0.101 0.121 -1.559 -1.779 0.011 -1.969 
      -3.759 0.221 0.191 0.021 0.111 -0.659 0.111 0.031 0.151 0.111 0.101 0.041 0.031 0.191 0.021 -0.299 1.641 -0.389 
      0.161 0.101 0.171 0.101 0.111 0.161 0.131 0.151 0.111 0.101 0.111 0.041 0.131 0.021 0.101 0.1107 0.111 0.161 
      0.061 0.101 0.041 0.031 0.191 0.021 0.111 0.141 0.001 0.091 0.011 0.001 0.111 0.151 0.151 0.051 0.191 0.021 
      0.072 0.061 0.081 0.073 0.069 0.083 1.960 1.667 -0.332 0.072 0.058 0.070 0.162 0.200 0.397 0.048 0.069 0.083 
      0.111 0.091 0.151 0.111 0.131 0.141 0.111 0.041 0.011 0.111 0.021 0.181 0.161 0.151 0.1607 0.1207 0.131 0.141 
      0.041 0.191 0.131 0.091 0.161 0.021 0.011 0.091 0.131 0.081 0.111 0.091 0.181 0.101 0.031 0.091 0.161 0.021 
      0.302 0.323 0.681 0.636 0.650 0.582 0.016 0.076 0.211 0.058 0.051 0.104 0.072 0.060 1.138 1.251 0.650 0.582 
         -0.111*** -0.091** -0.151**             
         0.041 0.191 0.131             
         0.302 0.323 0.681             
            -0.211* -0.191** -0.251*          
            0.141 0.291 0.231          
            0.402 0.423 0.781          
               -0.311* -0.291* -0.351**       
               0.241 0.391 0.331       
               0.502 0.523 0.881       
                  -0.331* -0.311** -0.371*    
                  0.261 0.411 0.351    
                  0.522 0.543 0.901    
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
!
!






Table 7.2 Full sample sorted by ownership  
       Private firms           State-owned firms      
Variable  Food & Beverage Wood & Furniture Machinery and Equipment  Garments Food & Beverage Wood & Furniture Machinery and Equipment  Garments 
  OLS RE FE OLS RE FE OLS RE FE OLS RE FE OLS RE FE OLS RE FE OLS RE FE OLS RE FE 
Current Investment (2007-2010-2014)  0.011** 0.148*** 0.188* 0.128** 0.138*** 0.108* 0.138** 0.228* 0.168** 0.118*** 0.268* 0.108** 0.001* 0.108** 0.008** 0.118** 0.108* 0.088* 0.168** 0.001** 0.003* 0.108* 0.268** 0.108** 
  0.008 0.018 0.058 0.028 0.048 0.028 0.338 0.208 0.128 0.158 0.108 0.178 0.108 0.128 0.098 0.058 0.158 0.168 0.108 0.048 0.118 0.028 0.108 0.178 
  0.147 0.148 0.129 1.351 1.062 1.530 0.541 0.586 1.260 -0.407 -0.062 2.702 -4.557 -5.029 -0.158 1.877 1.155 0.199 0.072 0.072 0.095 1.530 -0.062 2.702 
SQ. Current Investment (2007-2010-2014)  0.048*** 0.118* 0.048** 0.048* 0.068** 0.118* 0.168*** 0.108* 0.178* 0.108** 0.118* 0.168* 0.138** 0.158* 0.118*** 0.108** 0.118* 0.048* 0.138* 0.028* 0.108* 0.118** 0.118** 0.168** 
  0.028 0.048 0.028 0.048 0.018 0.058 0.068 0.108 0.048 0.038 0.198 0.028 0.118 0.148 0.008 0.098 0.018 0.008 0.118 0.158 0.158 0.058 0.198 0.028 
  0.145 0.150 0.106 1.886 1.116 0.055 0.079 0.068 0.088 0.080 0.076 0.090 1.967 1.674 -0.325 0.079 0.065 0.077 0.169 0.207 0.404 0.055 0.076 0.090 
Sales asset ratio Y 0.218* 0.188** 0.108* 0.168* 0.068** 0.128* 0.118*** 0.098* 0.158* 0.118* 0.138* 0.148** 0.118** 0.048** 0.018*** 0.098** 0.028*** 0.188** 0.178* 0.158* 0.168* 0.128** 0.138*** 0.148* 
  0.038 0.108 0.018 0.038 0.038 0.098 0.048 0.198 0.138 0.098 0.168 0.028 0.018 0.098 0.138 0.088 0.118 0.098 0.188 0.108 0.038 0.098 0.168 0.028 
  1.427 1.323 1.253 1.145 1.038 1.258 0.309 0.330 0.688 0.643 0.657 0.589 0.023 0.083 0.218 0.065 0.058 0.111 0.079 0.067 1.145 1.258 0.657 0.589 
Cashflow asset ratio CF -0.128 -0.138 -0.238 -0.108** -0.138** -0.148** -1.758 -1.098 -1.558 -2.898 -0.138 -0.228 -0.168 -0.118 -0.168 -0.138 -0.158 -0.118 -0.118 -0.098 -0.108 -0.148 -0.138 -0.228 
  0.008 0.018 0.008 0.018 0.008 0.018 0.398 1.498 0.698 1.298 0.338 0.208 0.128 0.158 0.028 0.118 0.148 0.008 0.048 0.198 0.018 0.018 0.338 0.208 
  0.209 0.249 0.508 0.149 0.171 0.098 0.079 0.068 0.088 0.080 0.076 0.090 1.967 1.674 -0.325 0.079 0.065 0.077 0.169 0.207 0.149 0.098 0.076 0.090 
Debt asset ratio Fin 0.348* 0.338* 0.308*** 0.318* 0.148* 0.238* 0.238** 0.108* 0.138* 0.148** 0.348** 0.338** 0.308 0.318 0.108 0.098 0.168 0.138 0.108 0.001 0.318 0.238 0.348 0.338 
  0.018 0.008 0.018 0.018 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.018 0.008 0.018 0.018 0.008 0.018 0.018 0.038 0.198 0.028 0.118 0.178 0.108 0.018 0.008 0.018 0.008 
  1.119 1.316 3.174 0.088 0.082 0.124 0.079 0.068 0.088 0.080 0.076 0.090 1.967 1.674 -0.325 0.079 0.065 0.077 0.169 0.207 0.088 0.124 0.076 0.090 
FDI FDI -0.158 -0.018 -0.128 -0.008 -0.428 -1.008 -0.108 -0.168 -0.168 -0.138 -0.158 -0.018 1.078 0.248 1.148 -1.768 -0.158 -0.118 -0.108 -0.128 -0.008 -1.008 -0.158 -0.018 
  -1.412 -0.112 0.028 -0.352 -0.172 -0.582 -0.432 -1.112 2.708 -1.052 -1.412 -0.112 -0.162 1.988 -1.912 -1.762 0.138 0.098 0.168 0.028 -0.352 -0.582 -1.412 -0.112 
  0.076 0.090 0.207 0.018 0.008 0.008 0.079 0.068 0.088 0.080 0.076 0.090 1.967 1.674 -0.325 0.079 0.065 0.077 0.169 0.207 0.018 0.008 0.076 0.090 
HFDI HFDI 0.318 0.928 0.108 0.108 0.001 0.168 1.698 0.218 0.338 0.308 0.318 0.928 0.268 0.348 0.028 0.108 0.268 0.108 0.001 0.108 2.048 2.088 0.318 0.928 
  0.018 -1.962 0.128 0.038 0.108 0.108 -1.172 0.728 0.008 0.018 0.018 -1.962 0.108 0.018 0.108 0.128 0.108 0.178 0.108 0.128 -1.552 -1.772 0.018 -1.962 
  0.118 -0.652 0.198 0.080 -4.557 0.072 -3.752 0.228 0.198 0.028 0.118 -0.652 0.118 0.038 0.158 0.118 0.108 0.048 0.038 0.198 0.028 -0.292 1.648 -0.382 
BFDI BFDI 0.118 0.168 0.028 0.118 0.138 0.138 0.168 0.108 0.178 0.108 0.118 0.168 0.138 0.158 0.118 0.108 0.118 0.048 0.138 0.028 0.108 0.118 0.118 0.168 
  0.198 0.028 0.158 0.098 0.118 0.118 0.068 0.108 0.048 0.038 0.198 0.028 0.118 0.148 0.008 0.098 0.018 0.008 0.118 0.158 0.158 0.058 0.198 0.028 
  0.076 0.090 0.207 0.643 1.967 0.169 0.079 0.068 0.088 0.080 0.076 0.090 1.967 1.674 -0.325 0.079 0.065 0.077 0.169 0.207 0.404 0.055 0.076 0.090 
FFDI FFDI 0.138 0.148 0.158 2.898 0.118 0.178 0.118 0.098 0.158 0.118 0.138 0.148 0.118 0.048 0.018 0.118 0.028 0.188 0.168 0.158 0.168 0.128 0.138 0.148 
  0.168 0.028 0.108 1.298 0.018 0.188 0.048 0.198 0.138 0.098 0.168 0.028 0.018 0.098 0.138 0.088 0.118 0.098 0.188 0.108 0.038 0.098 0.168 0.028 
  0.657 0.589 0.067 0.080 0.023 0.079 0.309 0.330 0.688 0.643 0.657 0.589 0.023 0.083 0.218 0.065 0.058 0.111 0.079 0.067 1.145 1.258 0.657 0.589 
Debt asset ratio * FDI Fin*FDI -1.667** -0.332** -0.072**          0.008 0.008 0.079          
  0.311 0.101 0.091          0.001 0.168 1.698          
  0.011 0.031 0.191          0.108 0.108 -1.172          
Debt asset ratio * HFDI Fin*HFDI    -0.131** -0.141* -0.341*          0.211 0.191 0.251       
     0.001 0.011 0.011          0.141 0.291 0.231       
     0.081 0.073 0.069          0.402 0.423 0.781       
Debt asset ratio *BFDI Fin*BFDI       -0.083* -0.200* -0.011*          0.028 0.108 0.268    
        0.921 0.101 0.101          0.108 0.128 0.108    
        -1.969 0.121 0.031          0.158 0.118 0.108    
Debt asset ratio * FFDI Fin*FFDI          0.101* 0.121* -1.559          0.108 2.048 2.088 
           0.031 0.191 0.021          0.128 -1.552 -1.772 
           0.131 0.021 0.101          0.198 0.028 -0.292 
D1 (Industry Distribution by City/Region)  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
D3 (Year 2007, 2010 and 2014)  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Bootstrab RS  0.248 0.238 0.208 0.218 0.048 0.138 0.138 0.008 0.038 0.048 0.248 0.238 0.208 0.218 0.008 -0.002 0.068 0.038 0.008 -0.099 0.218 0.138 0.248 0.238 
F test  1.242 1.439 3.297 4.215 4.245 4.247 4.242 4.195 4.215 4.243 4.199 4.213 2.490 1.797 -4.242 4.242 4.188 4.200 4.292 4.330 4.215 4.247 4.199 4.213 
P Value  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
no. of Observation  1576 1576 1576 1576 1576 1576 1576 1576 1576 1576 1576 1576 531 531 531 531 531 531 531 531 531 531 531 531 
!






Table 7.3. Domestic Firms (I): FDI < 49% 
   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8  
Variable  Food & Beverage Wood & Furniture Machinery and Equipment  Garments  Paper  Publishing, Printing & media Non-metallic Minerals Basic and Fabricated metal 
  OLS RE FE OLS RE FE OLS RE FE OLS RE FE OLS RE FE OLS RE FE OLS RE FE OLS RE FE 
Current Investment (2007-2010-2014)  0.134*** 0.271* 0.311*** 0.251** 0.261** 0.231* 0.261** 0.351** 0.291* 0.241*** 0.391** 0.231** 0.124* 0.231* 0.131** 0.241** 0.231* 0.211** 0.291** 0.124** 0.126** 0.231* 0.391** 0.231** 
  0.131 0.141 0.181 0.151 0.171 0.151 0.461 0.331 0.251 0.281 0.231 0.301 0.231 0.251 0.221 0.181 0.281 0.291 0.231 0.171 0.241 0.151 0.231 0.301 
  0.270 0.271 0.252 1.474 1.185 1.653 0.664 0.709 1.383 -0.284 0.061 2.825 -4.434 -4.906 -0.035 2.000 1.278 0.322 0.195 0.195 0.218 1.653 0.061 2.825 
SQ. Current Investment (2007-2010-2014)  0.171* 0.241* 0.171** 0.171** 0.191** 0.241** 0.291* 0.231*** 0.301* 0.231** 0.241*** 0.291** 0.261* 0.281** 0.241* 0.231** 0.241** 0.171* 0.261** 0.151** 0.231** 0.241** 0.241* 0.291* 
  0.151 0.171 0.151 0.171 0.141 0.181 0.191 0.231 0.171 0.161 0.321 0.151 0.241 0.271 0.131 0.221 0.141 0.131 0.241 0.281 0.281 0.181 0.321 0.151 
  0.268 0.273 0.229 2.009 1.239 0.178 0.202 0.191 0.211 0.203 0.199 0.213 2.090 1.797 -0.202 0.202 0.188 0.200 0.292 0.330 0.527 0.178 0.199 0.213 
Sales asset ratio Y 0.341** 0.311** 0.231*** 0.291* 0.191* 0.251** 0.241** 0.221** 0.281* 0.241*** 0.261** 0.271** 0.241* 0.171*** 0.141** 0.221*** 0.151*** 0.311* 0.301*** 0.281** 0.291* 0.251* 0.261* 0.271** 
  0.161 0.231 0.141 0.161 0.161 0.221 0.171 0.321 0.261 0.221 0.291 0.151 0.141 0.221 0.261 0.211 0.241 0.221 0.311 0.231 0.161 0.221 0.291 0.151 
  1.550 1.446 1.376 1.268 1.161 1.381 0.432 0.453 0.811 0.766 0.780 0.712 0.146 0.206 0.341 0.188 0.181 0.234 0.202 0.190 1.268 1.381 0.780 0.712 
Cashflow asset ratio CF -0.251** -0.261** -0.361** -0.231 -0.261 -0.271 -1.881 -1.221 -1.681 -3.021 -0.261 -0.351 -0.291 -0.241 -0.291 -0.261** -0.281* -0.241** -0.241 -0.221 -0.231 -0.271*** -0.261*** -0.351*** 
  0.131 0.141 0.131 0.141 0.131 0.141 0.521 1.621 0.821 1.421 0.461 0.331 0.251 0.281 0.151 0.241 0.271 0.131 0.171 0.321 0.141 0.141 0.461 0.331 
  0.332 0.372 0.631 0.272 0.294 0.221 0.202 0.191 0.211 0.203 0.199 0.213 2.090 1.797 -0.202 0.202 0.188 0.200 0.292 0.330 0.272 0.221 0.199 0.213 
Debt asset ratio Fin 0.471** 0.461* 0.431* 0.441* 0.271* 0.361*** 0.361** 0.231** 0.261** 0.271** 0.471** 0.461** 0.431* 0.441** 0.231** 0.221* 0.291** 0.261* 0.231* 0.124*** 0.441*** 0.361* 0.471** 0.461* 
  0.141 0.131 0.141 0.141 0.131 0.131 0.131 0.141 0.131 0.141 0.141 0.131 0.141 0.141 0.161 0.321 0.151 0.241 0.301 0.231 0.141 0.131 0.141 0.131 
  1.242 1.439 3.297 0.211 0.205 0.247 0.202 0.191 0.211 0.203 0.199 0.213 2.090 1.797 -0.202 0.202 0.188 0.200 0.292 0.330 0.211 0.247 0.199 0.213 
FDI FDI    -0.131 -0.551 -1.131 -0.231 -0.291 -0.291 -0.261 -0.281 -0.141 1.201 -0.371 -1.271 -1.891 -0.281 -0.241 -0.231 -0.251 -0.131 -1.131 -0.281 -0.141 
     -0.229 -0.049 -0.459 -0.309 -0.989 2.831 -0.929 -1.289 0.011 -0.039 2.111 -1.789 -1.639 0.261 0.221 0.291 0.151 -0.229 -0.459 -1.289 0.011 
     0.141 0.131 0.131 0.202 0.191 0.211 0.203 0.199 0.213 2.090 1.797 -0.202 0.202 0.188 0.200 0.292 0.330 0.141 0.131 0.199 0.213 
HFDI HFDI       1.821 0.341 0.461 0.431 0.441 1.051 0.391 0.471 0.151 0.231 0.391 0.231 0.124 0.231 2.171 2.211 0.441 1.051 
        -1.049 0.851 0.131 0.141 0.141 -1.839 0.231 0.141 0.231 0.251 0.231 0.301 0.231 0.251 -1.429 -1.649 0.141 -1.839 
        -3.629 0.351 0.321 0.151 0.241 -0.529 0.241 0.161 0.281 0.241 0.231 0.171 0.161 0.321 0.151 -0.169 1.771 -0.259 
BFDI BFDI       0.291 0.231 0.301 0.231 0.241 0.291 0.261 0.281 0.241 0.231 0.241 0.171 0.261 0.151 0.231 0.241 0.241 0.291 
        0.191 0.231 0.171 0.161 0.321 0.151 0.241 0.271 0.131 0.221 0.141 0.131 0.241 0.281 0.281 0.181 0.321 0.151 
        0.202 0.191 0.211 0.203 0.199 0.213 2.090 1.797 -0.202 0.202 0.188 0.200 0.292 0.330 0.527 0.178 0.199 0.213 
FFDI FFDI       0.241 0.221 0.281 0.241 0.261 0.271 0.241 0.171 0.141 0.241 0.151 0.311 0.291 0.281 0.291 0.251 0.261 0.271 
        0.171 0.321 0.261 0.221 0.291 0.151 0.141 0.221 0.261 0.211 0.241 0.221 0.311 0.231 0.161 0.221 0.291 0.151 
        0.432 0.453 0.811 0.766 0.780 0.712 0.146 0.206 0.341 0.188 0.181 0.234 0.202 0.190 1.268 1.381 0.780 0.712 
Debt asset ratio * FDI Fin*FDI          -0.211*** -0.203* -0.199**             
           0.291 0.261 0.281             
           2.831 -0.929 -1.289             
Debt asset ratio * HFDI Fin*HFDI            -1.797* -0.202** -0.202**          
              0.471 0.151 0.231          
              0.141 0.231 0.251          
Debt asset ratio *BFDI Fin*BFDI                -0.190*   -0.292**   -0.320**      
                 0.231 0.124 0.231       
                 0.301 0.231 0.251       
Debt asset ratio * FFDI Fin*FFDI                   -0.141 -0.131 -0.141    
                    0.272 0.294 0.221    
                    0.441 0.271 0.361    
D1 (Industry Distribution by City/Region)  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
D2 (% of Domestic / State Ownership)  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
D3 (Year 2007, 2010 and 2014)  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Bootstrab RS  0.101 0.041 0.031 0.191 0.021 0.111 0.141 0.001 0.091 0.011 0.001 0.111 0.151 0.151 0.051 0.191 0.131 0.221 0.161 0.111 0.161 0.131 0.151 0.111 
F test  1.138 1.118 1.118 1.138 1.138 1.198 1.148 1.198 1.138 1.198 1.168 1.128 1.118 1.198 1.138 1.188 1.118 1.198 1.188 1.118 1.138 1.198 1.168 1.128 
P Value  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.007 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
no. of Observation  1905 1905 1905 1905 1905 1905 1905 1905 1905 1905 1905 1905 1905 1905 1905 1905 1905 1905 1905 1905 1905 1905 1905 1905 
!






Table 7.4. Domestic Firms (I) sorted by ownership 
      Private firms - Fdi < 49%         State-owned firms - Fdi < 49%     
Variable  Food & Beverage Wood & Furniture M achinery and Equipment  Garments  Food & Beverage Wood & Furniture M achinery and Equipment  Garments  
  OLS RE FE OLS RE FE OLS RE FE OLS RE FE OLS RE FE OLS RE FE OLS RE FE OLS RE FE 
Current Investment (2007-2010-2014)  -0.149** -0.012** -0.028** -0.03177 -0.02177 -0.05177 -0.022** -0.069** -0.008* -0.042 -0.108 -0.052 -0.159** -0.052** -0.152** -0.042 -0.052 -0.072 -0.009** -0.158** -0.157* -0.052** -0.108** -0.052** 
  -0.152 -0.142 -0.102 -0.132 -0.112 -0.132 0.178 0.048 -0.032 -0.002 -0.052 0.018 -0.052 -0.032 -0.062 -0.102 -0.002 0.008 -0.052 -0.112 -0.042 -0.132 -0.052 0.018 
  -0.013 -0.012 -0.031 1.191 0.902 1.370 0.381 0.426 1.100 -0.567 -0.222 2.542 -4.717 -5.189 -0.318 1.717 0.995 0.039 -0.088 -0.088 -0.065 1.370 -0.222 2.542 
SQ. Current Investment (2007-2010-2014)  -0.112** -0.042** -0.112** -0.112 -0.092 -0.042 -0.002* -0.052* -0.018** -0.052 -0.042 -0.020 -0.022** -0.002** -0.042** -0.052 -0.042 -0.112 -0.022** -0.132** -0.052** -0.042** -0.042** 0.032** 
  -0.132 -0.112 -0.132 -0.112 -0.142 -0.102 -0.092 -0.052 -0.112 -0.122 0.038 -0.132 -0.042 -0.012 -0.152 -0.062 -0.142 -0.152 -0.042 -0.002 -0.002 -0.102 0.038 -0.132 
  -0.015 -0.010 -0.054 1.726 0.956 -0.105 -0.081 -0.092 -0.072 -0.080 -0.084 -0.070 1.807 1.514 -0.485 -0.081 -0.095 -0.083 0.009 0.047 0.244 -0.105 -0.084 -0.070 
Sales asset ratio Y 0.058* 0.028** 0.052** 0.008** 0.092** 0.032** 0.042 0.062 0.002 0.042 0.022 0.012 0.042 0.112 0.142 0.062 0.132 0.028 0.018 0.002 0.008 0.032 0.022 0.012 
  -0.122 -0.052 -0.142 -0.122 -0.122 -0.062 -0.112 0.038 -0.022 -0.062 0.008 -0.132 -0.142 -0.062 -0.022 -0.072 -0.042 -0.062 0.028 -0.052 -0.122 -0.062 0.008 -0.132 
  1.267 1.163 1.093 0.985 0.878 1.098 0.149 0.170 0.528 0.483 0.497 0.429 -0.137 -0.077 0.058 -0.095 -0.102 -0.049 -0.081 -0.093 0.985 1.098 0.497 0.429 
Cashflow asset ratio CF -0.032** -0.022** -0.078** -0.052 -0.022 -0.012 1.598** 0.938* 1.398** 2.738 0.022 0.068 -0.030 -0.042 -0.040 -0.022 -0.002 -0.042 -0.042 -0.062 -0.052 -0.012 -0.022 -0.068 
  -0.152 -0.142 -0.152 -0.142 -0.152 -0.142 0.238 1.338 0.538 1.138 0.178 0.048 -0.032 -0.002 -0.132 -0.042 -0.012 -0.152 -0.112 0.038 -0.142 -0.142 0.178 0.048 
  0.049 0.089 0.348 -0.011 0.011 -0.062 -0.081 -0.092 -0.072 -0.080 -0.084 -0.070 1.807 1.514 -0.485 -0.081 -0.095 -0.083 0.009 0.047 -0.011 -0.062 -0.084 -0.070 
Debt asset ratio Fin 0.188* 0.178** 0.148* 0.158** 0.012** 0.078* 0.078** 0.052** 0.022** 0.012* 0.1889* 0.178** 0.130 0.158 0.052 0.062 0.060 0.022 0.052 0.159 0.158 0.078 0.188 0.178 
  -0.142 -0.152 -0.142 -0.142 -0.152 -0.152 -0.152 -0.142 -0.152 -0.142 -0.142 -0.152 -0.142 -0.142 -0.122 0.038 -0.132 -0.042 0.018 -0.052 -0.142 -0.152 -0.142 -0.152 
  0.959 1.156 3.014 -0.072 -0.078 -0.036 -0.081 -0.092 -0.072 -0.080 -0.084 -0.070 1.807 1.514 -0.485 -0.081 -0.095 -0.083 0.009 0.047 -0.072 -0.036 -0.084 -0.070 
FDI FDI -0.002 -0.142 -0.032 -0.152 0.268 0.848 -0.052 0.023 0.008 -0.022 -0.002 -0.142 0.918 0.088 0.988 1.608 -0.002 -0.042 -0.052 -0.032 -0.152 0.848 -0.002 -0.142 
  -1.572 -0.272 -0.132 -0.512 -0.332 -0.742 -0.592 -1.272 2.548 -1.212 -1.572 -0.272 -0.322 1.828 -2.072 -1.922 -0.022 -0.062 0.008 -0.132 -0.512 -0.742 -1.572 -0.272 
  -0.084 -0.070 0.047 -0.142 -0.152 -0.152 -0.081 -0.092 -0.072 -0.080 -0.084 -0.070 1.807 1.514 -0.485 -0.081 -0.095 -0.083 0.009 0.047 -0.142 -0.152 -0.084 -0.070 
HFDI HFDI 0.158 0.768 -0.052 -0.052 -0.159 0.008 1.538 0.058 0.178 0.148 0.158 0.768 0.108 0.188 -0.132 -0.052 0.108 -0.052 -0.159 -0.052 1.888 1.928 0.158 0.768 
  -0.142 -2.122 -0.032 -0.122 -0.052 -0.052 -1.332 0.568 -0.152 -0.142 -0.142 -2.122 -0.052 -0.142 -0.052 -0.032 -0.052 0.018 -0.052 -0.032 -1.712 -1.932 -0.142 -2.122 
  -0.042 -0.812 0.038 -0.080 -4.717 -0.088 -3.912 0.068 0.038 -0.132 -0.042 -0.812 -0.042 -0.122 -0.002 -0.042 -0.052 -0.112 -0.122 0.038 -0.132 -0.452 1.488 -0.542 
BFDI BFDI -0.042 0.008 -0.132 -0.042 -0.022 -0.022 0.008 -0.052 0.018 -0.052 -0.042 0.008 -0.022 -0.002 -0.042 -0.052 -0.042 -0.112 -0.022 -0.132 -0.052 -0.042 -0.042 0.008 
  0.038 -0.132 -0.002 -0.062 -0.042 -0.042 -0.092 -0.052 -0.112 -0.122 0.038 -0.132 -0.042 -0.012 -0.152 -0.062 -0.142 -0.152 -0.042 -0.002 -0.002 -0.102 0.038 -0.132 
  -0.084 -0.070 0.047 0.483 1.807 0.009 -0.081 -0.092 -0.072 -0.080 -0.084 -0.070 1.807 1.514 -0.485 -0.081 -0.095 -0.083 0.009 0.047 0.244 -0.105 -0.084 -0.070 
FFDI FFDI -0.022 -0.012 -0.002 2.738 -0.042 0.018 -0.042 -0.062 -0.002 -0.042 -0.022 -0.012 -0.042 -0.112 -0.142 -0.042 -0.132 0.028 0.008 -0.002 0.008 -0.032 -0.022 -0.012 
  0.008 -0.132 -0.052 1.138 -0.142 0.028 -0.112 0.038 -0.022 -0.062 0.008 -0.132 -0.142 -0.062 -0.022 -0.072 -0.042 -0.062 0.028 -0.052 -0.122 -0.062 0.008 -0.132 
  0.497 0.429 -0.093 -0.080 -0.137 -0.081 0.149 0.170 0.528 0.483 0.497 0.429 -0.137 -0.077 0.058 -0.095 -0.102 -0.049 -0.081 -0.093 0.985 1.098 0.497 0.429 
Debt asset ratio * FDI Fin*FDI -0.008** -1.538* -0.058**          -0.142 -0.152 -0.152          
  -0.052 -1.332 0.568          -0.052 -0.159 0.008          
  -0.088 -3.912 0.068          -0.122 -0.052 -0.052          
Debt asset ratio * HFDI Fin*HFDI    -0.042 -0.812 -0.042          -0.158 -0.012 -0.078       
     -0.042 0.008 -0.022          -0.142 -0.152 -0.152       
     0.038 -0.132 -0.042          -0.072 -0.078 -0.036       
Debt asset ratio *BFDI Fin*BFDI       -0.083**  -0.190*  -0.011**          0.052 1.888 1.928    
        0.921 0.101 0.101          -0.032 -1.712 -1.932    
        -1.969 0.121 0.031          0.038 -0.132 -0.452    
Debt asset ratio * FFDI Fin*FFDI          -0.047 -0.011 -0.062          -1.272 -2.548 -1.212 
           -0.159 0.158 0.078          -0.092 -0.072 -0.080 
           -0.052 -0.142 -0.152          0.058 0.178 0.148 
D1 (Industry Distribution by City/Region)  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
D3 (Year 2007, 2010 and 2014)  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Bootstrab RS  0.358 0.968 0.148 0.148 0.041 0.208 1.738 0.258 0.378 0.348 0.358 0.968 0.308 0.388 0.068 0.148 0.308 0.148 0.041 0.148 2.088 2.128 0.358 0.968 
F test  1.172 1.242 1.172 1.172 1.192 1.242 1.292 1.232 1.312 1.232 1.242 1.292 1.262 1.282 1.242 1.232 1.242 1.172 1.262 1.152 1.232 1.242 1.242 1.292 
P Value  0.05 0.043 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0.03 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.007 0 0 0 0 0.0043 0 0 0 
no. of Observation  1150 1150 1150 1150 1150 1150 1150 1150 1150 1150 1150 1150 755 755 755 755 755 755 755 755 755 755 755 755 
!







Table 7.5. Domestic Firms (II): FDI < 25%. 
Variable  Food & Beverage Wood & Furniture Machinery and Equipment  Garments  paper  Publishing, Printing & media Non-metallic Minerals Basic and Fabricated metal 
  OLS RE FE OLS RE FE OLS RE FE OLS RE FE OLS RE FE OLS RE FE OLS RE FE OLS RE FE 
Current Investment (2007-2010-2014)  0.404* 0.541* 0.581** 0.521*** 0.531** 0.501* 0.531** 0.621** 0.561* 0.511* 0.661** 0.501** 0.394* 0.501* 0.401* 0.511** 0.501** 0.481* 0.561** 0.394** 0.396** 0.501** 0.661** 0.501* 
  0.401 0.411 0.451 0.421 0.441 0.421 0.731 0.601 0.521 0.551 0.501 0.571 0.501 0.521 0.491 0.451 0.551 0.561 0.501 0.441 0.511 0.421 0.501 0.571 
  0.540 0.541 0.522 1.744 1.455 1.923 0.934 0.979 1.6527* -0.014 0.331 3.095 -4.164 -4.636 0.235 2.270 1.548 0.592 0.465 0.465 0.488 1.923 0.331 3.095 
SQ. Current Investment (2007-2010-2014)  0.441* 0.511** 0.441* 0.441*** 0.461** 0.511** 0.561** 0.501** 0.571** 0.501** 0.511* 0.561** 0.531* 0.551** 0.511* 0.501*** 0.511** 0.441** 0.531** 0.421** 0.501** 0.511* 0.511** 0.561** 
  0.421 0.441 0.421 0.441 0.411 0.451 0.461 0.501 0.4407* 0.431 0.591 0.421 0.511 0.541 0.401 0.491 0.411 0.401 0.511 0.551 0.551 0.451 0.591 0.421 
  0.538 0.543 0.499 2.279 1.509 0.448 0.472 0.461 0.481 0.473 0.469 0.483 2.360 2.067 0.068 0.472 0.458 0.470 0.562 0.600 0.797 0.448 0.469 0.483 
Sales asset ratio Y 0.611* 0.581* 0.501** 0.561*** 0.461** 0.521** 0.511*** 0.491** 0.551** 0.511** 0.531** 0.541** 0.511** 0.441** 0.411** 0.491* 0.421*** 0.581** 0.571*** 0.551*** 0.561** 0.521* 0.531*** 0.541* 
  0.431 0.501 0.411 0.431 0.431 0.491 0.441 0.591 0.531 0.491 0.561 0.421 0.411 0.491 0.531 0.481 0.511 0.491 0.581 0.501 0.431 0.491 0.561 0.421 
  1.820 1.716 1.646 1.538 1.431 1.651 0.702 0.723 1.081 1.036 1.050 0.982 0.416 0.476 0.611 0.458 0.451 0.504 0.472 0.460 1.538 1.651 1.050 0.982 
Cashflow asset ratio CF 0.521 0.531 0.631 0.501 0.531 0.541 2.151 1.491 1.951 3.291 0.531 0.621 0.561 0.511 0.561 0.531 0.551 0.511 0.511 0.491 0.501 0.541 0.531 0.621 
  0.401 0.411 0.401 0.411 0.401 0.411 0.791 1.891 1.091 1.691 0.731 0.601 0.521 0.551 0.421 0.511 0.541 0.401 0.441 0.591 0.411 0.411 0.731 0.601 
  0.602 0.642 0.901 0.542 0.564 0.491 0.472 0.461 0.481 0.473 0.469 0.483 2.360 2.067 0.068 0.472 0.458 0.470 0.562 0.600 0.542 0.491 0.469 0.483 
Debt asset ratio Fin 0.741*** 0.731** 0.701** 0.711** 0.541*** 0.631* 0.631* 0.501*** 0.531** 0.541** 0.741** 0.731*** 0.701*** 0.711** 0.501** 0.491*** 0.561** 0.531* 0.501* 0.391** 0.711** 0.631** 0.741* 0.731* 
  0.411 0.401 0.411 0.411 0.401 0.401 0.401 0.411 0.401 0.411 0.411 0.401 0.411 0.411 0.431 0.591 0.421 0.511 0.571 0.501 0.411 0.401 0.411 0.401 
  1.512 1.709 3.567 0.481 0.475 0.517 0.472 0.461 0.481 0.473 0.469 0.483 2.360 2.067 0.068 0.472 0.458 0.470 0.562 0.600 0.481 0.517 0.469 0.483 
FDI FDI    0.401 0.821 1.401 0.501 0.561 0.561 0.531 0.551 0.411 1.471 0.641 1.541 2.161 0.551 0.511 0.501 0.521 0.401 1.401 0.551 0.411 
     0.041 0.221 -0.189 -0.039 -0.719 3.101 -0.659 -1.019 0.281 0.231 2.381 -1.519 -1.369 0.531 0.491 0.561 0.421 0.041 -0.189 -1.019 0.281 
     0.411 0.401 0.401 0.472 0.461 0.481 0.473 0.469 0.483 2.360 2.067 0.068 0.472 0.458 0.470 0.562 0.600 0.411 0.401 0.469 0.483 
HFDI HFDI       2.091 0.611 0.731 0.701 0.711 1.321 0.661 0.741 0.421 0.501 0.661 0.501 0.394 0.501 2.441 2.481 0.711 1.321 
        -0.779 1.121 0.401 0.411 0.411 -1.569 0.501 0.411 0.501 0.521 0.501 0.571 0.501 0.521 -1.159 -1.379 0.411 -1.569 
        -3.359 0.621 0.591 0.421 0.511 -0.259 0.511 0.431 0.551 0.511 0.501 0.441 0.431 0.591 0.421 0.101 2.041 0.011 
BFDI BFDI       0.561 0.501 0.571 0.501 0.511 0.561 0.531 0.551 0.511 0.501 0.511 0.441 0.531 0.421 0.501 0.511 0.511 0.561 
        0.461 0.501 0.441 0.431 0.591 0.421 0.511 0.541 0.401 0.491 0.411 0.401 0.511 0.551 0.551 0.451 0.591 0.421 
        0.472 0.461 0.481 0.473 0.469 0.483 2.360 2.067 0.068 0.472 0.458 0.470 0.562 0.600 0.797 0.448 0.469 0.483 
FFDI FFDI       0.511 0.491 0.551 0.511 0.531 0.541 0.511 0.441 0.411 0.511 0.421 0.581 0.561 0.551 0.561 0.521 0.531 0.541 
        0.441 0.591 0.531 0.491 0.561 0.421 0.411 0.491 0.531 0.481 0.511 0.491 0.581 0.501 0.431 0.491 0.561 0.421 
        0.702 0.723 1.081 1.036 1.050 0.982 0.416 0.476 0.611 0.458 0.451 0.504 0.472 0.460 1.538 1.651 1.050 0.982 
Debt asset ratio * FDI Fin*FDI          -0.531 -0.541 -0.741             
           0.401 0.411 0.411             
           0.481 0.473 0.469             
Debt asset ratio * HFDI Fin*HFDI            -0.431** -0.591* -0.421**          
              0.068 0.472 0.458          
              1.541 2.161 0.551          
Debt asset ratio *BFDI Fin*BFDI               0.562 0.600 0.411        
                0.394 0.501 2.441        
                0.501 0.521 -1.159        
Debt asset ratio * FFDI Fin*FFDI                  0.501 0.411 0.501     
                   0.511 0.431 0.551     
                   0.5307 0.5507 0.5107     
D1 (Industry Distribution by City/Region)  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
D2 (% of Domestic / State Ownership)  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
D3 (Year 2007, 2010 and 2014)  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Bootstrab RS  0.161 0.171 0.161 0.171 0.161 0.171 0.551 1.651 0.851 1.451 0.491 0.361 0.281 0.311 0.181 0.271 0.301 0.161 0.201 0.351 0.171 0.171 0.491 0.361 
F test  3.134 3.144 3.134 3.144 3.134 3.144 3.524 1.624 3.824 1.424 3.464 3.334 3.254 3.284 3.154 3.244 3.274 3.134 3.174 3.324 3.144 3.144 3.464 3.334 
P Value  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.004 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
no. of Observation  614 614 614 614 614 614 614 614 614 614 614 614 614 614 614 614 614 614 614 614 614 614 614 614 
!







Table 7.6. Domestic Firms (II) sorted by ownership. 
       Private firms - Fdi <25%         State-owned firms - Fdi < 25%     
Variable  Food & Beverage W ood & Furniture Machinery and Equipment  Garments  Food & Beverage& Garments Wood & Furniture Machinery and Equipment  Garments  
  OLS RE FE OLS RE FE OLS RE FE OLS RE FE OLS RE FE OLS RE FE OLS RE FE OLS RE FE 
Current Investment (2007-2010-2014)  0.162*** 0.299*** 0.339** 0.279** 0.289** 0.259** 0.289** 0.379** 0.319*** 0.269** 0.419** 0.259*** 0.159*** 0.259*** 0.159** 0.269** 0.259** 0.239** 0.319* 0.159* 0.154*** 0.259*** 0.419** 0.259* 
  0.159 0.169 0.209 0.179 0.199 0.179 0.489 0.359 0.279 0.309 0.259 0.329 0.259 0.279 0.249 0.209 0.309 0.319 0.259 0.199 0.269 0.179 0.259 0.329 
  0.298 0.299 0.280 1.502 1.213 1.681 0.692 0.737 1.411 -0.256 0.089 2.853 -4.406 -4.878 -0.007 2.028 1.306 0.350 0.223 0.223 0.246 1.681 0.089 2.853 
SQ. Current Investment (2007-2010-2014)  0.199** 0.269* 0.199* 0.199* 0.219* 0.269** 0.319** 0.259* 0.329** 0.259** 0.269** 0.319*** -0.289 -0.309 -0.269 -0.259 -0.269 -0.199 -0.289 -0.179 -0.259 -0.269* -0.269* -0.319** 
  0.179 0.199 0.179 0.199 0.169 0.209 0.219 0.259 0.199 0.189 0.349 0.179 0.269 0.299 0.159 0.249 0.169 0.159 0.269 0.309 0.309 0.209 0.349 0.179 
  0.296 0.301 0.257 2.037 1.267 0.206 0.230 0.219 0.239 0.231 0.227 0.241 2.118 1.825 -0.174 0.230 0.216 0.228 0.320 0.358 0.555 0.206 0.227 0.241 
Sales asset ratio Y 0.369* 0.339* 0.259** 0.319* 0.219** 0.279** 0.269 0.249 0.309 0.269 0.289 0.299 0.269 0.199 0.169 0.249 0.179 0.339 0.329 0.309 0.319 0.279 0.289 0.299 
  0.189 0.259 0.169 0.189 0.189 0.249 0.199 0.349 0.289 0.249 0.319 0.179 0.169 0.249 0.289 0.239 0.269 0.249 0.339 0.259 0.189 0.249 0.319 0.179 
  1.578 1.474 1.404 1.296 1.189 1.409 0.460 0.481 0.839 0.794 0.808 0.740 0.174 0.234 0.369 0.216 0.209 0.262 0.230 0.218 1.296 1.409 0.808 0.740 
Cashflow asset ratio CF 0.279 0.289 0.389 0.259 0.289 0.299 1.909 1.249 1.709 3.049 0.289 0.379 -0.319 -0.269 -0.319 -0.289 -0.309 -0.269 -0.269 -0.249 -0.259 -0.299 -0.289 -0.379 
  0.159 0.169 0.159 0.169 0.159 0.169 0.549 1.649 0.849 1.449 0.489 0.359 0.279 0.309 0.179 0.269 0.299 0.159 0.199 0.349 0.169 0.169 0.489 0.359 
  0.360 0.400 0.659 0.300 0.322 0.249 0.230 0.219 0.239 0.231 0.227 0.241 2.118 1.825 -0.174 0.230 0.216 0.228 0.320 0.358 0.300 0.249 0.227 0.241 
Debt asset ratio Fin 0.499* 0.489* 0.459* 0.469** 0.299** 0.389** 0.389** 0.259* 0.289** 0.299** 0.499** 0.489** 0.459 0.469 0.259 0.249 0.319 0.289 0.259 0.152 0.469 0.389 0.499 0.489 
  0.169 0.159 0.169 0.169 0.159 0.159 0.159 0.169 0.159 0.169 0.169 0.159 0.169 0.169 0.189 0.349 0.179 0.269 0.329 0.259 0.169 0.159 0.169 0.159 
  1.270 1.467 3.325 0.239 0.233 0.275 0.230 0.219 0.239 0.231 0.227 0.241 2.118 1.825 -0.174 0.230 0.216 0.228 0.320 0.358 0.239 0.275 0.227 0.241 
FDI FDI 0.309 0.169 0.279 0.159 0.579 1.159 0.259 0.319 0.319 0.289 0.309 0.169 1.229 0.399 1.299 1.919 0.309 0.269 0.259 0.279 0.159 1.159 0.309 0.169 
  -1.261 0.039 0.179 -0.201 -0.021 -0.431 -0.281 -0.961 2.859 -0.901 -1.261 0.039 -0.011 2.139 -1.761 -1.611 0.289 0.249 0.319 0.179 -0.201 -0.431 -1.261 0.039 
  0.227 0.241 0.358 0.169 0.159 0.159 0.230 0.219 0.239 0.231 0.227 0.241 2.118 1.825 -0.174 0.230 0.216 0.228 0.320 0.358 0.169 0.159 0.227 0.241 
HFDI HFDI 0.469 1.079 0.259 0.259 0.152 0.319 1.849 0.369 0.489 0.459 0.469 1.079 0.419 0.499 0.179 0.259 0.419 0.259 0.152 0.259 2.199 2.239 0.469 1.079 
  0.169 -1.811 0.279 0.189 0.259 0.259 -1.021 0.879 0.159 0.169 0.169 -1.811 0.259 0.169 0.259 0.279 0.259 0.329 0.259 0.279 -1.401 -1.621 0.169 -1.811 
  0.269 -0.501 0.349 0.231 -4.406 0.223 -3.601 0.379 0.349 0.179 0.269 -0.501 0.269 0.189 0.309 0.269 0.259 0.199 0.189 0.349 0.179 -0.141 1.799 -0.231 
BFDI BFDI 0.269 0.319 0.179 0.269 0.289 0.289 0.319 0.259 0.329 0.259 0.269 0.319 0.289 0.309 0.269 0.259 0.269 0.199 0.289 0.179 0.259 0.269 0.269 0.319 
  0.349 0.179 0.309 0.249 0.269 0.269 0.219 0.259 0.199 0.189 0.349 0.179 0.269 0.299 0.159 0.249 0.169 0.159 0.269 0.309 0.309 0.209 0.349 0.179 
  0.227 0.241 0.358 0.794 2.118 0.320 0.230 0.219 0.239 0.231 0.227 0.241 2.118 1.825 -0.174 0.230 0.216 0.228 0.320 0.358 0.555 0.206 0.227 0.241 
FFDI FFDI 0.289 0.299 0.309 3.049 0.269 0.329 0.269 0.249 0.309 0.269 0.289 0.299 0.269 0.199 0.169 0.269 0.179 0.339 0.319 0.309 0.319 0.279 0.289 0.299 
  0.319 0.179 0.259 1.449 0.169 0.339 0.199 0.349 0.289 0.249 0.319 0.179 0.169 0.249 0.289 0.239 0.269 0.249 0.339 0.259 0.189 0.249 0.319 0.179 
  0.808 0.740 0.218 0.231 0.174 0.230 0.460 0.481 0.839 0.794 0.808 0.740 0.174 0.234 0.369 0.216 0.209 0.262 0.230 0.218 1.296 1.409 0.808 0.740 
Debt asset ratio * FDI Fin*FDI -0.299 -1.909 -1.249          -0.400 -0.659 -0.300          
  0.169 0.549 1.649          0.489 0.459 0.469          
  0.249 0.230 0.219          0.159 0.169 0.169          
Debt asset ratio * HFDI Fin*HFDI    -1.299* -1.919** -0.309**          -0.319 -0.259 -0.199       
     -1.761 -1.611 0.289          0.350 0.223 0.223       
     -0.174 0.230 0.216          0.199 0.289 0.179       
Debt asset ratio *BFDI Fin*BFDI       -0.269*   -0.249**   -0.309*          0.249 0.319 0.179    
        0.199 0.349 0.289          0.794 0.808 0.740    
        0.460 0.481 0.839          3.049 0.289 0.379    
Debt asset ratio * FFDI Fin*FFDI          -0.239* -0.231* -0.227*          0.209 0.219 0.259 
           0.489 0.459 0.469          0.206 0.230 0.219 
           0.159 0.169 0.169          0.279 0.269 0.249 
D1 (Industry Distribution by City/Region)  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
D3 (Year 2007, 2010 and 2014)  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Bootstrab RS  0.396 0.401 0.357 2.137 1.367 0.306 0.330 0.319 0.339 0.331 0.327 0.341 2.218 1.925 -0.074 0.330 0.316 0.328 0.420 0.458 0.655 0.306 0.327 0.341 
F test  1.172 1.172 1.172 1.172 1.172 1.172 1.172 1.172 1.172 1.232 1.242 1.292 1.262 1.282 1.242 1.232 1.242 1.172 1.262 1.152 1.232 1.242 1.242 1.292 
P Value  0.001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0009 0 0 0 0 0 
no. of Observation  384 384 384 384 384 384 384 384 384 384 384 384 230 230 230 230 230 230 230 230 230 230 230 230 
!


































Domestic Firm (I) Domestic Firm (II) 
Own-plant effect (Fdi) (%) 39 20  
Horizon. effect (HFDI) (%) 14 11 40 
Back. linkage (BFDI) (%) vertical effects 
only 
0.7 0.7 0.6 




Table 7.8. Foreign Firms (I) sorted by ownership 
       Private firms - Fdi > 49%          Private Firms - Fdi > 25%     
Variable  Food & Beverage Wood & Furniture Machinery and Equipment  Garments Food & Beverage Wood & Furniture Machinery and Equipment  Garments 
  OLS RE FE OLS RE FE OLS RE FE OLS RE FE OLS RE FE OLS RE FE OLS RE FE OLS RE FE 
Current Investment (2007-2010-2014)  0.021* 0.158*** 0.198* 0.138** 0.148** 0.118* 0.148*** 0.238*** 0.178* 0.128** 0.278** 0.118** 0.011** 0.118** 0.018* 0.128* 0.118** 0.098* 0.179** 0.011* 0.013*** 0.118* 0.278*** 0.118* 
  0.018 0.028 0.068 0.038 0.058 0.038 0.348 0.218 0.138 0.168 0.118 0.188 0.118 0.138 0.108 0.068 0.168 0.178 0.118 0.058 0.128 0.038 0.118 0.188 
  0.157 0.158 0.139 1.361 1.072 1.540 0.551 0.596 1.270 -0.397 -0.052 2.712 -4.547 -5.019 -0.148 1.887 1.165 0.209 0.082 0.082 0.105 1.540 -0.052 2.712 
SQ. Current Investment (2007-2010-2014)  0.058** 0.128* 0.058* 0.058** 0.078* 0.128* 0.172*** 0.118* 0.188* 0.118** 0.128** 0.19* 0.148* 0.168* 0.128* 0.118** 0.128** 0.058* 0.148** 0.038* 0.118** 0.128** 0.128* 0.202*** 
  0.038 0.058 0.038 0.058 0.028 0.068 0.078 0.118 0.058 0.048 0.208 0.038 0.128 0.158 0.018 0.108 0.028 0.018 0.128 0.168 0.168 0.068 0.208 0.038 
  0.155 0.160 0.116 1.896 1.126 0.065 0.089 0.078 0.098 0.090 0.086 0.100 1.977 1.684 -0.315 0.089 0.075 0.087 0.179 0.217 0.414 0.065 0.086 0.100 
Sales asset ratio Y 0.228* 0.198*** 0.118* 0.178** 0.078* 0.138* 0.128*** 0.108* 0.168* 0.128* 0.148* 0.158 0.128** 0.058* 0.028* 0.108*** 0.038* 0.198* 0.188*** 0.168* 0.178** 0.138* 0.148** 0.158*** 
  0.048 0.118 0.028 0.048 0.048 0.108 0.058 0.208 0.148 0.108 0.178 0.038 0.028 0.108 0.148 0.098 0.128 0.108 0.198 0.118 0.048 0.108 0.178 0.038 
  1.437 1.333 1.263 1.155 1.048 1.268 0.319 0.340 0.698 0.653 0.667 0.599 0.033 0.093 0.228 0.075 0.068 0.121 0.089 0.077 1.155 1.268 0.667 0.599 
Cashflow asset ratio CF 0.138*** 0.148* 0.248*** 0.1182* 0.148** 0.158** 1.768*** 1.108* 1.568* 2.908** 0.148* 0.238** 0.2* 0.128** 0.21* 0.148*** 0.168* 0.128*** 0.128* 0.108* 0.118*** 0.158* 0.148** 0.238*** 
  0.018 0.028 0.018 0.028 0.018 0.028 0.408 1.508 0.708 1.308 0.348 0.218 0.138 0.168 0.038 0.128 0.158 0.018 0.058 0.208 0.028 0.028 0.348 0.218 
  0.219 0.259 0.518 0.159 0.181 0.108 0.089 0.078 0.098 0.090 0.086 0.100 1.977 1.684 -0.315 0.089 0.075 0.087 0.179 0.217 0.159 0.108 0.086 0.100 
FDI FDI 0.358*** 0.348* 0.318* 0.328* 0.158** 0.248* 0.248*** 0.118* 0.148* 0.158** 0.358*** 0.348* 0.300 0.328 0.118 0.108 0.230 0.148 0.118 0.011 0.328 0.248 0.358 0.348 
  0.028 0.018 0.028 0.028 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.028 0.018 0.028 0.028 0.018 0.028 0.028 0.048 0.208 0.038 0.128 0.188 0.118 0.028 0.018 0.028 0.018 
  1.129 1.326 3.184 0.098 0.092 0.134 0.089 0.078 0.098 0.090 0.086 0.100 1.977 1.684 -0.315 0.089 0.075 0.087 0.179 0.217 0.098 0.134 0.086 0.100 
Debt asset ratio FIN 0.168 0.028 0.138 0.018 0.438 1.018 0.118 0.193 0.178 0.148 0.168 0.028 1.088 0.258 1.158 1.778 0.168 0.128 0.118 0.138 0.018 1.018 0.168 0.028 
  -1.402 -0.102 0.038 -0.342 -0.162 -0.572 -0.422 -1.102 2.718 -1.042 -1.402 -0.102 -0.152 1.998 -1.902 -1.752 0.148 0.108 0.178 0.038 -0.342 -0.572 -1.402 -0.102 
  0.086 0.100 0.217 0.028 0.018 0.018 0.089 0.078 0.098 0.090 0.086 0.100 1.977 1.684 -0.315 0.089 0.075 0.087 0.179 0.217 0.028 0.018 0.086 0.100 
HFDI HFDI 0.328 0.938 0.118 0.118 0.011 0.178 1.708 0.228 0.348 0.318 0.328 0.938 0.278 0.358 0.038 0.118 0.278 0.118 0.011 0.118 2.058 2.098 0.328 0.938 
  0.028 -1.952 0.138 0.048 0.118 0.118 -1.162 0.738 0.018 0.028 0.028 -1.952 0.118 0.028 0.118 0.138 0.118 0.188 0.118 0.138 -1.542 -1.762 0.028 -1.952 
  0.128 -0.642 0.208 0.090 -4.547 0.082 -3.742 0.238 0.208 0.038 0.128 -0.642 0.128 0.048 0.168 0.128 0.118 0.058 0.048 0.208 0.038 -0.282 1.658 -0.372 
BFDI BFDI 0.128 0.178 0.038 0.128 0.148 0.148 0.178 0.118 0.188 0.118 0.128 0.178 0.148 0.168 0.128 0.118 0.128 0.058 0.148 0.038 0.118 0.128 0.128 0.178 
  0.208 0.038 0.168 0.108 0.128 0.128 0.078 0.118 0.058 0.048 0.208 0.038 0.128 0.158 0.018 0.108 0.028 0.018 0.128 0.168 0.168 0.068 0.208 0.038 
  0.086 0.100 0.217 0.653 1.977 0.179 0.089 0.078 0.098 0.090 0.086 0.100 1.977 1.684 -0.315 0.089 0.075 0.087 0.179 0.217 0.414 0.065 0.086 0.100 
FFDI FFDI 0.148 0.158 0.168 2.908 0.128 0.188 0.128 0.108 0.168 0.128 0.148 0.158 0.128 0.058 0.028 0.128 0.038 0.198 0.178 0.168 0.178 0.138 0.148 0.158 
  0.178 0.038 0.118 1.308 0.028 0.198 0.058 0.208 0.148 0.108 0.178 0.038 0.028 0.108 0.148 0.098 0.128 0.108 0.198 0.118 0.048 0.108 0.178 0.038 
  0.667 0.599 0.077 0.090 0.033 0.089 0.319 0.340 0.698 0.653 0.667 0.599 0.033 0.093 0.228 0.075 0.068 0.121 0.089 0.077 1.155 1.268 0.667 0.599 
D1 (Industry Distribution by City/Region)  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
D3 (Year 2007, 2010 and 2014)  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Bootstrab RS  0.186 0.200 0.317 0.753 2.077 0.279 0.189 0.178 0.198 0.190 0.186 0.200 2.077 1.784 -0.215 0.189 0.175 0.187 0.279 0.317 0.514 0.165 0.186 0.200 
F test  4.128 4.178 4.438 4.128 4.148 4.148 4.178 4.118 4.188 4.118 4.128 4.178 4.148 4.168 4.128 4.118 4.128 4.458 4.148 4.438 4.118 4.128 4.128 4.178 
P Value  0.1 0 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
no. of Observation  698 698 698 698 698 698 698 698 698 698 698 698 274 274 274 274 274 274 274 274 274 274 274 274 
!





CHAPTER 8: Conclusion 
8.1 Introduction 
This study has conducted a detailed enquiry into the relationship between industry linkages 
and FDI on the manufacturing and service sectors in Nigeria through the construction of the 
I-O table, and estimations of augmented Cobb-Douglas and CDM models respectively. It has 
also explored the role of Export-platform FDI on backward linkages in Nigeria. Also, the 
study has examined the role of inward FDI on domestic financial constraints and included 
industry linkage effects. Overall, the analysis found intriguing evidence to boost academic 
literature on FDI spill-overs; in the areas of horizontal and vertical spill-overs; and the role on 
innovation outcome on firm performance is well discussed. Also, we threw light onto the 
importance of employment; and appropriate measure of foreign presence and technology gap 
in estimating FDI effects in using firm-level data. 
This chapter summarises the main findings from each of the chapters and suggests some 
direction for future research. Also, this chapter concludes the thesis by revisiting the research 
questions posed in chapter 1 and provides policy implications. 
 
8.2 Revisiting the Research Questions 
Question 1: Are there spill-over effects from FDI to domestic firms in Nigerian industrial 
sectors? 
Two approaches towards the estimation of FDI effect on manufacturing and service data were 
followed in this study. Chapter 3 shows that both OLS and Fixed effects estimations were 
applied to augmented Cobb-Douglas models using output and value added as dependent 
variables. Also, TFP model was also used. However, we lay more emphasis on the fixed 
effects models due to the ability of the estimation technique to control for firm-specific 
heterogeneity which can potentially bias OLS estimates in a model with both cross-sectional 
and time dimensions. The results on both Output and Value-added models show robust 
evidence of positive and significant spill-overs of FDI on foreign presence. 
Question 2: Does innovation outcomes in Nigerian industrial sectors affect domestic firm’s 
performance? 
In the case of estimating innovation outcomes in the domestic performance of Nigerian firms, 




description of firm-level innovation and liked innovation to productivity. I placed emphasis 
also on the impact of innovation of employment. The result showed that firm-level innovation 
activity in Nigeria appears to be high and even larger than in similar countries around the 
region, but the extent of innovativeness is low and incremental. 
Question 3: Does Export-platform FDI have an impact on backward linkages? 
This thesis has expanded the works of Lin and Saggi (2007), by looking at the role of Export-
platform FDI on backward linkages both from a theoretical standpoint and an empirical one. 
The different hypothesis has been tested, and a three-country model has been developed; all 
with the aim of looking at relationships between FDI and industry linkages. The results from 
the various hypothesis tested indicate that there’s a significant relationship between FDI and 
backward linkages in Nigeria; and the role of the trade agreement, local content requirement 
and market size is very crucial to spill-overs and productivity. 
Question 4: Does FDI loosen domestic firms’ financing difficulties? 
This study has estimated the roles of FDI on alleviating domestic firm’s financing constraints, 
and based on the findings it shows that private domestic firms do have financing constraints 
and the flow of inward FDI alleviate the financing constraints by signalling. Also, the 
threshold of financing constraints is well identified within this study from both horizontal and 
vertical linkages. 
 
8.3 Final Conclusion 
Investment is needed to promote economic growth in a country. Foreign direct investment is 
needed for a country that lacks domestic investment. However, FDI is more important 
because it has been long recognized as knowledge capital. The arrival of FDI could bring 
knowledge and technology. This thesis aims at verifying if the arrival of FDI in Nigeria could 
help increase the productivity of domestic firms, or if it brings technology spill-over to 
domestic firms. The thesis approaches this issue by addressing not only horizontal but also 
vertical spill-over, the role of innovation outcome and the role of Export-platform FDI on 
backward linkages.  
Also, the thesis tries to find factors enhancing productivity spill-over from FDI to domestic 




absorptive capacity of domestic firms are considered. Regarding the technology gap, this 
study uses indexes based on labour productivity and total factor productivity (TFP). 
Regarding the absorptive capacity, this study introduces two proxies of workers‟ education 
level and training offered by the firm.  
By using the unique firm level-data from Nigeria, I have found empirical evidence that there 
is productivity spill-over in both horizontal and vertical linkages. Firms with technology level 
below its foreign competitors tend to benefit from the technology brought by FDI. The 
finding confirms the important role of FDI that brings productivity spill-over to domestic 
suppliers of intermediate goods and domestic buyers of high-quality intermediate goods from 
foreign suppliers. 
In many developing countries such as Nigeria, the domestic firms tend to have the technology 
below that of the foreign competitors. Opening the economy or globalisation does bring the 
cross-border flow of technology to domestic firms in those countries. The domestic firms will 
be able to gain new knowledge using imitation, a very cost-saving strategy for a country 
which lacks financial resources to invest in R&D and innovation. The results of the 
regression analysis in Chapter 3 of this thesis show that promotion of FDI in both upstream 
and downstream sectors helps domestic firms improve their productivity. 
Innovation outcomes of Nigerian firms are well discussed in this thesis; and their linkage to 
productivity and performance. Central to the attainment of this goal is increasing knowledge 
capital investments and innovation activity. This thesis has provided a snapshot of the degree 
of firm-level innovation in Nigeria as well as its links to economic performance for the period 
2007-2014 to measure better how Nigerian firms in the manufacturing and services sectors 
can contribute to achieving this objective. Although the absence of panel structure in the 
dataset and the small sample do not facilitate the estimation of very robust statistical effects, 
this thesis provides some important findings. The main conclusion of this thesis with regards 
to innovation is that firm-level innovation activity in Nigeria appears to be high and even 
larger than in similar countries, but the extent of innovativeness is low or very incremental. 
While it is expected that innovations in countries far from the technology frontier are not 
radical innovations, the question is to what extent these incremental innovations contribute to 
productivity growth as compared to innovations in OECD countries. The answer that I find in 
the empirical analysis is that the innovations do not have a statistically significant impact on 




into innovation outcomes and then into productivity, breaks down in the case of Nigerian 
firms. This suggests that in contrast with OECD countries, some of the innovations 
implemented are so minor, or are based on imitation, to the extent that they do not have a 
significant impact on productivity (survival innovation). Although similar results have been 
found in other developing countries, more research is needed to understand the nature of this 
incremental innovation better.  
To provide robustness and expand on literature gaps, the role of Export-platform FDI on 
backward linkages is well dissected within this thesis.  I have developed a three-country 
framework allowing an examination of impacts of such investment through the competition 
and the demand effects. The former is generated when foreign production generates negative 
FDI spill-overs and then replaces domestic production whereas the latter can be directly or 
indirectly created. I have shown that Export-platform FDI has ambiguous effects on 
backward linkages, and there exists a case through which this investment improves both the 
output level of the domestic firm and the level of backward linkages. I have also studied the 
role of different variables of the economy as the third country size, the power of trade 
agreements and the LCR. In the case of Nigerian supporting industries over the period 2007-
2014, a negative impact of this investment has been found. However, trade agreements 
between Nigeria and other countries, and LCR have a positive impact while that of third 
market size is ambiguous. 
Also, using an augmented Euler equation, I carry out empirical studies and get some 
important conclusions. First, Nigeria’s private firms have credit constraints, while foreign-
invested firms and state-owned firms do not. The estimation results show that private firms 
with higher debt-asset ratio are more likely to defer investment. This finding conflict with 
Tobin’s Q theory, which claims that in a perfect financial market, firms’ investment only 
depends on the expected return. Because of the so-called ‘soft budget constraints’, state-
owned firms do not have to worry about their debt burden when investing. 
Based on some of the findings from this research, there are some policy indication/lessons. 
The findings of the thesis indicate that there are spill-overs effects, and that there a large 
technology gap. There need to be policies to improve the environmental conditions of doing 
business in Nigeria. More innovative policies must be put in place to reduce the technology 
gaps. There should be policies on the role of foreign firms on reducing the technology gaps of 




this thesis indicate that the innovative outcome are incremental and does not have an impact 
on productivity. There should be policies on how to mitigate this; either via setting thresholds 
for innovation outcomes or via the use productive platforms which provide periodic 
innovative checks. In addition, this thesis provides some element of focus; which indicate 
that more policies should be enacted to improve local content requirement; as this will help 
improve the productivity of domestic firms and improve the backward linkages. 
 
 
8.4 Limitation and direction for further research 
Despite the important contributions made in this study, particularly regarding producing an 
adequate measurement of FDI spill-over, productivity and industry linkages, there are still 
some limitations, and they culminate from chapters 3-6. To better produce a better estimation 
result, future research should focus on two things. Firstly, this study analyses the productivity 
spill-over by pooling firms across sectors due to the problems of small sample size. The 
finding can be enriched by using a large sample, which enables the estimation of the 
production function for each sector separately. At the micro-level, the hypothesis of the 
advantage of the technology gap can be tested under a consistent framework. Studies carried 
out so far use the share of FDI firm sales in total sales, or FDI employment share as the level 
of foreign penetration in the industry, neither of which considers how long the FDI firm has 
been operating in the industry. Future firm-level studies should incorporate the length of FDI 
existence into FDI penetration measures. 
Secondly, this research uses a simple method of fixed effect model to deal with endogeneity 
issues. One limiting factor of this method is that it works well only with unobservable 
variables that are invariant across time. Therefore, future studies, therefore, should take care 
of the unobservable variables that are time-variant. An alternative method proposed by 
Blundell and Bond (2000) and Bond (2002) should be used if it is possible. Finally, since 
deflators for each sector are not available, the study uses the overall consumer price index 
(CPI) to deflate relevant variables. Although deflating with overall CPI may at least give 
better-estimated coefficients than those without deflating, future studies should use deflators 




It is difficult to identify the main obstacle that hinders a positive linkage to productivity, but 
the empirical analysis in this chapter has some important suggestions. First, innovation 
outcomes in Nigeria are more common than in other countries with similar GDP per capita, 
but investments in knowledge inputs are like that of other countries. This suggests a 
mismatch in relative terms between inputs and outcomes, and the need for greater investment 
in knowledge inputs to make innovation outcomes more innovative and transformational. 
Second, and related to the first point, the empirical analysis suggests that a lack of access to 
finance significantly holds back investment in R&D. Third, there is an over-reliance by 
Nigerian firms, at least when comparing them to other countries, on internal sources for 
knowledge capital investments and innovation sources, which may indicate the absence of 
solid research and knowledge infrastructure, as well as a lack of cooperation with other firms 
and institutions. Forth, the inadequate educational levels of the labour force affect the 
capacity of firms to transform knowledge inputs into innovation outcomes, which reinforces 
the complementary role of skilled labour for innovation, and the need to support appropriate 
technical skillsets in the labour force. 
Also, this thesis opens some discussions for further investigation. First, I have worked 
entirely in a partial equilibrium framework.  Therefore, the final good’s price is endogenous. 
Wage, inputs’ price is taken as given.  Developing the three- country general equilibrium 
framework may be helpful to study the impacts of Export- platform FDI on wage, inputs’ 
price as well as the welfare of the host country. Second, the thesis only considers one MNF 
and one domestic firm. By endogenizing the entry of firms, I can study how this investment 
impacts the market structure. This is also interesting to examine whether the domestic firms 
can become more competitive than their foreign counterparts. Also, availability of more 
robust data could help simplify some of the issues in this thesis. 
In this thesis, I establish that firms can improve productivity by engaging in different types of 
industry linkages. In general, firms engaging in industry linkages enjoy more productivity 
benefits than domestic-focused firms. Firms improve productivity by utilising imported 
inputs if they have the required level of absorptive capacity. Export-focused firms gain more 
productivity benefits than domestic-focused firms by selling more products, with more 
product lines and to multiple destinations. Firms engaging in a larger number of industry 
linkages at once gain more productivity benefits than firms involved in a smaller number. 
Firms undertake innovative activities to further their competitive edge over others. 




activities. Internationally active firms gain more productivity benefits from innovations such 
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